

EGYPT AND ENGLAND.¹

THERE is no known method of governing which is not applied to some portion of the British Empire, and no two portions of it bear an identical relation to the home government. I suppose we may now call Egypt the latest important acquisition of the British crown. The method of acquisition and the method of control, however, are alike marked by the most extraordinary indirection, for neither ownership nor rule is complete. As yet Egypt is under the nominal suzerainty of the Porte and pays to the Sultan a large annual tribute in recognition of that fact. But Mehemet Ali, after England had wrested the country from the French in 1803 and restored it to Turkey, got up a petty civil war, had himself elected Pasha, and wrung recognition as a semi-independent ruler from his suzerain. Until 1831 he crushed one form after another of resistance to his power, and by his son Ibrahim reduced Syria to his sway. This was a wonderful man: but that England forbade him he would have thrown off entirely the nominal rule of Turkey. He was ruthless in his dealings, but he reformed administration, laws and education to what, for the time and place, was a wonderful point.

His successors down to 1863 were unimportant and mediocre persons. It was from one of them, Said Pasha, that the concession for the Suez Canal was secured by the French. The great enterprise was undertaken in 1859 and the work was done by what amounted to forced labor, the tale of workmen being secured by laws of a despotic nature. In 1863 Ismail, the grandson of

¹ This article is based on Lord Cromer's report for 1902, a masterly review of twenty years' work, on Lord Milner's *England in Egypt*, on a few volumes and articles now useful only in parts, and on notes made by the writer while sojourning in Egypt for nearly four months during the season of 1903-1904. The recent diplomatic arrangement between France and England does not appear to have gone further in regulating their Egyptian relations than the removal of friction in the management of the finances. This, however, as the context will show, is a matter of vital importance, destined to free the action of Great Britain in almost every important reform.

Mehemet Ali, came to the throne. Educated in Paris, he made a great display of European culture; railways and canals, especially the Suez Canal, were pushed to completion at a dizzy rate, and there seemed no limit to his care for agriculture, which is the one resource of the country. New irrigation ditches of great dimensions were opened, dug by forced labor of course. The Suez Canal was completed in 1869: four million two hundred thousand pounds were spent in the festivities at the opening. In fact money was spent so lavishly on all occasions that the public debt, secured by successive bond issues, became tremendous. At the same time it was found that he and his favorites were accumulating enormous private fortunes.

The public finances were soon in distress, and in order to raise the wind Ismail sold to England in Disraeli's administration (1875) all his Suez shares, 176,602 in number. There being all told 400,000 shares, this purchase, along with what was already held by individuals, gave to British shareholders a controlling interest in the French company. The block was then worth four millions sterling; it is now worth twenty-five millions. What was more important, it was a crushing blow, of course, to the predominance of French influence. Things went from bad to worse with the finances until Ismail's government became shamelessly venal and the peasants were cruelly oppressed. European bondholders were justly uneasy and interest was not forthcoming. In 1878 France urged the coöperation of Great Britain in securing control of Egyptian finances and a joint commission of inquiry was appointed. The debt was ninety millions sterling, the interest about two and a half millions. This Ismail extorted with such cruelty from the peasants that their cries ascended to heaven: under pressure the Khedive (a new title given him by the Sultan in 1867, as an acknowledgment of virtual independence) agreed to rule thereafter by a cabinet. One was formed and, at Ismail's own instigation, mobbed, the two principal ministers, those of finance and public works, being English and French respectively, and the nominal head an astute Armenian, Nubar.

This governmental device was well understood to depend on the European representatives in Cairo, the consuls-general. Nubar

demanded from them a larger army, which he got, and other powers to which they could not assent. After reducing the interest on the debt, he resigned and was succeeded by Taufik, the heir-apparent, as prime minister. In a very short time Ismail dismissed the whole cabinet and appointed a new one consisting entirely of natives: this was done to conciliate the upper classes, wealthy Turks who had grown rich at the expense of the poor, and it was speciously represented as a national movement. It was an effort of course to throw off international control before it became too strong. England and France immediately demanded Ismail's deposition at the Porte, and although the Khedive had sent enormous bribes to Constantinople, the Sultan was nevertheless at the disposal of the powers.

Ismail was succeeded by his son Taufik on May 25, 1879, and five days later left for Smyrna, taking with him an enormous fortune and a numerous harem. He died in Constantinople in 1895. At once, after his departure, the international control was restored in Egypt, and a commission of liquidation set to work reducing taxes and instituting various reforms. The abuses of oriental conditions by European consulates are notorious: at times the right of extraterritoriality has been so extended as to give consuls perfect control over hundreds of natives who are ostensibly in their employ but are really fugitives from justice or recalcitrant to the customs of their people. Long endurance of that outrage and the fact that Egypt has been for ages a refuge for the scum and outlaws of southern Europe, combined of course with religious fanaticism and national pride, resulted in an exasperation among high-spirited natives that finally ended in Arabi's rebellion against what seemed an effort to render intolerable conditions permanent. He and his agents aimed to increase the native army and get control of Taufik.

In this last they succeeded and were rapidly making headway with their other plans, when on May 25, 1881, the consuls-general of France and England demanded the banishment of Arabi and the resignation of the cabinet in which as minister of war he was the ruling spirit. The Khedive yielded, formally; but under the plea of repressing the disorder which was now becoming general in the great towns he continued Arabi in place and actually dec-

orated him for his services. On June 11 the natives of Alexandria began to riot and killed a hundred and fifty Europeans, the life of the British consul being saved with great difficulty from those who pursued and stoned him. Both France and England had been gathering a fleet in anticipation of trouble. France remained inactive, but on July 11, when the news of Arabi's successes and of his decoration for the sorry work was confirmed, seven British warships bombarded the town. The rabble with oriental versatility employed their opportunity in burning and plundering beneath the hissing shells. Three days later, July 14, the British finally landed marines and restored order. They likewise occupied a number of forts commanding the town. In the sequel a commission of indemnities awarded nearly four and a half millions sterling to those who suffered from the bombardment.

Under such pressure Arabi was dismissed at last and immediately began to organize his many followers for war. On August 15 Wolseley arrived and on the 18th his army. The British fleet seized the Suez Canal and gave the company a hundred thousand pounds as indemnity. On September 13 the English met Arabi at Tel-el-Kebir and overwhelmed his force; two days later they occupied Cairo; and at Christmas Arabi was sent as a prisoner to Ceylon. England had nominally and ostensibly conquered Egypt for its Khedive, who of course had yielded to Arabi under the stress of necessity! That was made as clear as words and deeds could make it. It would have been a simple thing then and there to have declared a protectorate; but politics was just then very tangled in Europe, and out of deference to French feeling no outward sign was given. In fact Gladstone declared that English intervention had no other aim than to restore order. This was certainly said in good faith, and the Liberal government certainly intended to evacuate Egypt in due time.

But restore order! Neither the ignorant, venal Pasha class of Turks who had misgoverned the country, nor the ignorant, rash, inexperienced natives of the Arabi class, nor the existing ministers with their bureaucracy — no one in Egypt could either restore or keep order. Fire kindled almost immediately in the farthest Egyptian province, the Sudan. In 1883 two Egyptian

expeditions under English generals were wiped out by the fanatic leader who called himself by the style of Mahdi (Messiah) and his followers by that of dervishes (devout). Next year Gordon took command, tried his fortune on a reasonable plan, but was not properly supported, and Wolseley, sent to reinforce him, came too late. In 1885 the Sudan was lost and the Mahdi reigned at Khartum. What was to be done to keep Egypt at all for its Khedive and regenerate the land so that resources even for self-preservation might be created? Should the English destroy existing institutions root and branch, or put life and decency into the old? In a forcible way England announced that Egypt would be ruled as always, only now by the "advice" of Great Britain as conveyed through her consul-general and minister plenipotentiary in Cairo.

After a few trials the right man for that important position was found in Evelyn Baring, now Lord Cromer. Lord Dufferin came, saw, diagnosed, and laid down the lines of action. These lines have in the main been followed, and in times of uneasiness the word of power has been spoken from the respectable but insignificant mansion which is the British diplomatic agency and consulate. Reform progressed so rapidly and financial prosperity came so quickly that in 1889, the Mahdi being dead and his successor worthless, preparations began for the reconquest of the Sudan. After two years of preliminary movements, Kitchener wiped out the Dervish force at Omdurman with an army which was partly Egyptian but also partly English. Victory therefore was not followed by a complete restoration of the vast and indefinite territory of the Sudan to Egypt as an Egyptian province: a separate government known as the *condominium* of England and Egypt, purely military, under the Sirdar Kitchener, commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, was established at Khartum. The British and Egyptian flags fly side by side throughout the Sudan, whose limits, now that France has been shouldered out of Fashoda, are fairly definite and comprise a territory as large as all central Europe.

So much for the historical outline; what was the organic force? A certain number of Englishmen were appointed to the higher offices in every branch of the administration, and they were ex-

pected by the exercise of common sense and with the moral backing of British prestige, gradually to revolutionize the spirit of every department. This they began at once to do; their first concern being the irrigation system, which is initial and central to Egyptian well-being. Hitherto the great proprietors had taken water from the canals, when, where and how they pleased, by the simple process of bribing the officials and bullying the peasant owners at will. This was instantly stopped, and what the rich lost the peasants gained. The former class turned sullen and bitter, but their obstruction was futile. Immediately there began a vast development of paid public labor, the curse of the *corvée* or forced labor being abolished at a cost of nearly half a million sterling. Every energy was concentrated for the wider and cheaper distribution of Nile water to the cultivators by repairing the old works and building new ones.

But even ample water at a fair price could not pay the peasants' debts. For ages Greeks, Syrians and Copts, all avowed Christians, had been the usurers of Egypt, and like the Jews in Europe, they held the people in galling bonds. They bribed and combined with the tax gatherers to strike abject terror into every heart by irregular, uncertain and unjust methods of collecting taxes and interest, both of which were for the most part paid in kind. The rate of interest ran as high as sixty per cent, and the security was the growing crops! France and England already had control of the finance, but as they could not agree about methods of reform, France withdrew. The land tax was the foundation tax, and only by thorough discipline of the collectors could it be justly laid and raised. This England undertook alone and accomplished, but in the process her extra-legal financial adviser, really controller, revolutionized both the personnel and the methods of what is the largest portion of the entire administrative system.

The first step was to inaugurate a system of penurious economy in every department except that of public works, which directs the irrigation system. There was terribly bitter feeling far and near, from the Khedive's ministers down; for England not merely gave "advice" to the ministers, it peered into every department of administration to the limits of the land by means of its in-

spectors. The Egyptian bureaucracy felt its prestige annihilated; and but for unprecedented caution and manners of un-British inoffensiveness this would have been the case. With the ultra-caution of the officials the situation, however, was saved. A few, a very few, Englishmen ran to and fro examining, regulating, correcting; they were almost ubiquitous, yet the face of the native government "was not blackened" as the people say in the metaphor of their native Arabic. In fact, as it was definitely settled that Great Britain would not assume the government, many important concessions were made to native prejudice and feeling. This was a very hard and very risky course, for the failures of the ministry in any direction would naturally be attributed by the jealous public opinion of Europe to English mismanagement. Nubar the prime minister had already succeeded in diminishing the abuses of the consular courts by organizing mixed tribunals, composed of native and European judges, and competent in all disputes between natives and strangers. He was now permitted to try his hand at the reform of the pure native courts, and he signally failed. In the menace of immediate bankruptcy the English took funds from the treasury for purposes not permitted under the international control of the finances and there was a terrible outcry. And the Egyptian army with British officers in the Egyptian service had lost the Sudan! France and the French newspaper organs rent the heavens with remonstrance and abuse. A French paper of Cairo was so scurrilous and so traitorous that it was suppressed, and by means which the French consul showed to be illegal. Altogether the middle eighties in Egypt went far to destroy British prestige in colonial administration. As under the conditions prevailing the interest on the debt could no longer be paid, radical measures seemed necessary to all Europe.

Patience was essential, or at least a substitute for patience, and the substitute was at hand. England grew uneasy under the Irish question and left her agents to themselves, creditors were timidly quiet and clamor ceased when the world realized that to hound the English in occupation was to ruin themselves. The doctors at the bedside might be ill-advised but there were no others to take their place, not only no better ones, but absolutely none. Throughout 1884 and 1885 the powers discussed;

and when the plain facts were made known a reasonable arrangement of the finances, since called the London Convention, was drawn up and signed in March, 1885. The astute Nubar saw that England had come to stay; an able man and a true patriot, he had fretted under her control; and after making one last futile effort to shake it off by an appeal in person to the continental powers and to England herself he resigned. The second greatest obstacle to British success was thus removed.

As a proof of the esteem in which the English held him one may see in All Saints Church, Cairo, a tablet to his memory as that of a just man! In fact his own people had long since ceased to love him, for they could not realize how helpless he had been and blamed him for every English advance. His last and final defeat was in the reorganization of the police system, when he made unwise nominations and was discredited by their rejection. This he gave as the ostensible reason for his resignation. Lord Cromer is a quiet and a stern man; it was seen how unwise it had been to raise an issue with him. For, all this time there was a British army of occupation, and the Sudan affairs made it easy to post its detachments at every strategic point. An awful outbreak of cholera brought British inspectors into every hamlet almost simultaneously, and the simple code of health laws was rigidly enforced in spite of numberless outbreaks of fanatical resistance. The mailed hand was at every man's door; and, though it was there only in beneficence, it was felt to be a mighty fist that could easily strike in anger.

Then began almost magically the complete turn in British luck with Egypt. Her agents have been able from that hour to play the strangest game of government that ever was played and to play it with signal success. Their policy of Egypt for the Egyptians, of the restoration of order and the establishment of prosperity by means of Egyptians and as far as Egyptians can carry it, has never faltered for one moment. The complexities of its realization are infinite, the hollow and side-splitting farce of Turkish suzerainty, the comedy of khedivial rule, the melodrama of continued international control — all these are played with a zest worthy of reality and an artistic skill that produces the effect of the highest naturalness. It seems to pay, this puz-

zling complexity, difficult and illogical and opportunist as it is. For already Egypt is a solvent, peaceful, regenerate, happy land. Even Moslemism has ceased from its fanatic agitations, for the time, and the highest authorities of Islam give their edicts in consonance with British policy.

Here is a sample or two of the way it works. The English army of occupation has been reduced to a few regiments; in Egypt proper, three thousand men all told or thereabouts. Yet the military power of Great Britain in Egypt is tremendously strengthened. Why? Because in 1884 the Egyptian peasants, beggared and abused, so hated military service that on the slightest provocation, in presence of the enemy, they threw down their arms and ran; with Moslem fatalism they even sought death as preferable to the long torture of their lives. Now after years of kindly treatment they prove faithful and courageous soldiers, good on the march, trustworthy in battle. As the Sirdar or chief commander is a British general, the Egyptian army not only holds Egypt for England, but it could be immediately employed in any sudden crisis to put down rebellion in the Sudan, where at Khar-tum there is a mere handful of English soldiers. As things are, the British troops in Egypt have no status whatever, they are merely uninvited guests. Morally their presence produces an enormous effect, of course, in upholding Cromer's authority, but really it is already the sanction of the Egyptian army which is behind British administration and British control. By way of making the situation complete, the coal-black Soudanese have been enlisted and formed into battalions. While the Egyptians have a passion for drill and fight quite well enough, the Soudanese are impatient of drill but fight as few other soldiers in the world.

The total force is under fifteen thousand. They are so distributed as to protect the only frontier line which requires defence — that on the extreme south with the eastward outpost of Suakin on the Red Sea. Three or four thousand are scattered here and there down below, partly for display, partly to insure internal order in case of extremity. Their minor officers are in the main native Egyptians of Arab, Coptic or Turkish extraction. In them lies the weak point of the military structure. They are impatient of education and discipline, they lack character and

initiative. Their own claim is that they are kept down and deprived of opportunity. The British rulers of Egypt are extremely anxious for high quality in the men of their own blood employed in the country, and since they know that an increase in the number of British officials, civil and military, would mean a lower standard of capacity, they are growing uneasy lest the company officers should fail and have to be replaced by commonplace or low-grade Englishmen. They appear therefore to be on the eve of an experiment, that of taking the native officers at their word and giving them their chance, reducing the number of higher British officers as the others rise to replace them.

The greatest value of a journey through Egypt is that the traveller is forced to perceive how closely the state stands related to its folk. All life is so simple and so primitive that cause and effect are directly, momentarily visible. In this simplicity it was and can now be seen how Ismail, wickedly prodigal, created a burden of debt the interest on which must be paid by direct taxes. These taxes fall chiefly on the land, and they increase in exact proportion as taxable property diminishes from want of water or other disaster. On the other hand, they decrease as there is plenty of water to make plenty of taxable land, or as other minor almost negligible forms of prosperity create other although less important taxable property. With the observant eye is literally seen, and not deduced by tedious economic logic from masses of statistics, exactly how public utilities create private property: in this case how irrigation works, which can only be constructed at public expense, bring immediate return to the government by what is paid for water, by what is created for taxation, by the increased well-being of the people and their consequent contentment. To the individual the efficiency of the government is everything: with a certain supply of water, he can raise one crop, with more another, with a perennial supply still a third or even a fourth. This of course reacts directly on every department of life, on wages, on imports, on barter, on exchange, on security, on the welfare of man and of men. Here is political, social, financial economy in a system easily comprehended by any clear mind. With a thrifty, almost parsimonious administration

taxes are diminished in their incidence upon each unit, exactly as there are more units on which to lay them.

When Ismail was deposed, by a law of liquidation the debt was consolidated at its face value, almost a hundred million pounds (nearly a third of his borrowings had been retained by the lenders as commission), and the interest was scaled down on the various divisions of bonds to five and four per cent according to terms and security, until the interest account called for about three and a half millions a year. By the tribute to the Porte and by what was guaranteed to England as return on her Suez Canal shares this sum was raised to about four and a half millions per annum, almost half of the total revenue of the country at the time. From the other half, another portion was deducted as a sinking fund. This amounted only to a million, when at a bound Arabi's rebellion and the revolt of the Sudan, following each other in a brief space, added ten million to the debt. Yet the law was still in force when peace came and the revenues rose by leaps and bounds; in the single year 1883, eight hundred thousand went to the sinking fund. Unfortunately the expense of administration rose too, and double that sum had to be found to meet the deficit in the budget for administration. This absurdity was carefully studied by experts appointed by the various powers who met in convention at London in 1884, and on the basis of their reports a binding agreement was reached in 1885. Six commissioners from as many powers have absolute control of the debt; these nations guaranteed a new loan of nine millions which was raised at about three per cent, entailing an annual charge of three hundred and fifteen thousand pounds. The new loan wiped out all outstanding debts and furnished a million for irrigation. This was so wisely spent that it returned in a single year new receipts nearly equal to the capital.

Under the London Convention things work somewhat in this way. The commissioners of the debt are known as the *Caisse de la Dette* — *Caisse* for short. The *Caisse* takes, as under the law of liquidation, a certain share of the revenue, about four-ninths; the rest goes for administration to the government. The latter makes a budget which is authorized by all concerned. The *Caisse* first pays all the bond coupons and from the surplus pays

any deficit in the authorized budget. Should the *Caisse* still have a surplus, it shares it equally with the government. The bulk of the latter's expenditure was permanently fixed by the London Convention, the variation from year to year occurs in items that cannot be prearranged. Should the *Caisse* have a surplus — as it surely does — say of half a million, and the government an authorized deficit of three hundred thousand and an unauthorized deficit of fifty besides, the *Caisse* hands over first the three hundred, then halves the remaining two hundred, and then, having still a hundred, it halves this again, paying fifty to the government for its unauthorized deficit and applying the other fifty thousand to the reduction of the debt.

Complicated as is the system, it is not confused, and it works very well in composing all the constant trouble, the complaints and jealousies of the ever quarrelling six powers, five of which have really no interest in Egyptian affairs except to safeguard their citizens or corporations who are bondholders and — of course — to diminish England's power and prestige. The only exasperation is this, that to increase the amount of authorized expenditure for administration the consent of the powers has to be asked, and while from time to time they do give it, they are inclined to be grudging and nasty. This fact has made splendid internal reforms like those of education and justice very slow, and hence for these and similar purposes the enlightened rulers steadily increase the unauthorized budget. The *Caisse* has accumulated a considerable reserve fund, but so has the government; and so far the latter has not made any call on the other, meeting extra charges from its own funds. But further and very serious trouble is almost certain, for under this system the government is bound, whenever it does not secure an increase of authorized expenditure, to raise by taxation exactly double the amount it has need of for itself. This is a cardinal fact. To remove or at least diminish this serious difficulty is the most important of the questions lately negotiated between Paris and London.¹

There has already been one illustration of what may prove an

¹ As nearly as an outsider can comprehend the rather confused accounts of the recent Anglo-French agreement so far given to the public, about six million pounds are thereby released for use on public works.

almost insuperable difficulty hereafter. There have always been foreign experts, so called, and many of them in the service of the Egyptian government. At one, and that the formative, period most of these men were French, and with time some of the most important offices have come to be regarded by France as hers of right. To these she especially clings since throughout the Levant her influence, once paramount, is now steadily waning and is in fact entirely jeopardized by the hostile attitude of the government to French Roman Catholic missions. Under these circumstances secular power is not willingly relinquished, and no occasion is so lofty, no purpose so high, as to prevent France from demanding returns, however petty, for anything she yields. For ages it had been a matter of course in Egypt that irrigation canals should be built and maintained by the *corvée*, that the forced labor of the peasantry should be exacted with tyranny and corruption at their busiest season, and that it should be used quite as often for the private advantage of high officials as for state purposes. It was the preëminent abuse of oriental government. The English first stopped the abuses and then proceeded to abolish the system. Four hundred thousand pounds a year was needed. In the course of unifying and funding the debt great economies had been secured and the taxes correspondingly diminished. Under the various laws a saving of two hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year had been effected, and this could by the assent of the powers be applied to the abolition of the *corvée*. For three weary years the peasants sighed and groaned before France would assent definitively, and that she did only after securing certain substantial advantages in return.

As the financial revival has proved itself continuous everything has steadily improved. There is no tyranny, and, considering oriental ideas, very little corruption in the collection and distribution of the public moneys. In order to diminish the rate of interest by conversion, the capital of the debt has been somewhat increased, and a further increase of about one and a half millions has been caused by borrowing for public works. But the proportion between income and outgo has steadily improved, and together the *Caisse* and the government have saved some millions as a reserve fund, on which from time to time drafts for pub-

lic works are authorized. If this amount were deducted from the amount of the debt, the capital and interest would alike be diminished, but the government would lose its hard-earned liberty. As matters are, the soil yields far greater returns than ever, even allowing for an unprecedented decrease in prices; exports and imports alike increase, so that customs receipts mount ever higher and the receipts of the railways are of course larger and larger as there is greater and greater prosperity.

Take the central, vital, focal, inclusive question — that of water. In Lower Egypt, north of Cairo, there is some rain, but its value for agriculture is nothing. In Upper Egypt a light shower of five minutes' duration is rare, and soaking rain a phenomenon. But far in the heart of Africa under the tropics abundant rains are as regular as the seasons. So the great river, "which is Egypt," is for some months by nature a swollen devastating flood, surcharged with a deposit of fertility in the shape of red virgin soil. The alluvion of this soil has for untold ages made and re-made the shore strips of tillable land, and the floods, in their turn, have repeatedly torn this ground away to increase the delta or to be wasted in the Mediterranean. But between the bed of the river and the hills on either side are great expanses which of itself the water never reached. Accordingly the Pharaohs built canals parallel to the river and opening from it, from which water could be drawn for irrigation at considerable distances from the banks, and one monarch made a vast reservoir out of a natural depression in the soil, the Lake Moeris which Herodotus describes. This last was suffered to fall into disuse; the canals, however, have been to some extent rebuilt or maintained, and we still see on some reaches of the river retaining constructions which are said to date from very early times.

So things remained until the French designed and built a dam below Cairo on a most elaborate scale; it was intended to hold up the Nile when high and distribute the waters when needed to Lower Egypt. But their *barrage* would not bär. The masonry, when the sluices were closed, could not bear the strain and began to bulge. It was claimed that no foundation for such a work could be secured in Nile mud, and the beautiful, costly structure stood for years unused. The British engineers put an apron of

masonry laid in cement before its base and further strengthened it by stone weirs parallel with the current. It now holds up the high Nile, distributes red water where needed the whole year round, and works so perfectly that the two arms into which the river bifurcates just below it receive just enough water to keep navigation open and no more: one of them will probably soon be reduced to a canal.

So magical was the effect of this perennial irrigation on the direct returns of cotton, sugar and other staples that the government next built and put into successful operation a similar structure at Siut, two hundred and fifty miles further up the river, and it has just completed the stupendous dam at the first cataract, six hundred miles up from Cairo. When all the canals which the Nile can feed are completed, the arable land of Egypt will be doubled in acreage; and since almost the whole of it will be irrigated throughout the entire year, it will produce at least three crops! The population has already increased thirty per cent since 1882, and double the number of persons will soon live in peace and plenty on it. Many see the day in the early future when the stupendous current of the Nile at flood will be curbed like a steed, when there will be no devastation, and the irrigation engineer will have the tropical rains under control as the locomotive engineer has his machine. It was a stroke of genius to discover that the great reservoirs behind the dams already created or yet to be created need not be settling vats, arresting the fertile turbidity of the water, provided only the water were liberated, as it is, from the bottoms of the sluices and not from the top.

These may be considered the triumphs of British administration already either won or in sight. Taxes diminished, equitably laid and honestly collected; the complicated financial system made to work smoothly and economically; railways, post-office and telegraphs all excellent and efficient, with the trunk lines steadily lengthened, officials efficient, decent and honest; the army made effective for the national protection, the frontiers defined and protected, the Sudan reconquered and the personnel improved beyond recognition. These reforms and achievements have been slow and sure, the miracles of the irrigation department have

been swift and impressive: the total is likely to dazzle the traveller.

But in the lines of education and justice the case has been different. The police system leaves much to be desired; both insanity and certain classes of crimes, especially those against the person, have steadily increased. These are very knotty problems, because unlike the others they are inextricably complicated by the unity of Mohammedan religion with Mohammedan law and by the training of the young. The matter of education can be dismissed in a few words. The mosque of El Azhar in Cairo is the greatest centre of Mohammedan learning, so called: boys and young men of all ages to the number of about nine thousand attend there, at one time or another of the year, upon the instruction of self-appointed teachers. These commend themselves by their knowledge of classical Arabic, the Koran, and the commentators on the Koran who have written Mohammedan theology and jurisprudence as traditionally derived from the book. Very, very few are interested in either of the higher studies: for in Islam there are neither priests nor lawyers. The services of the mosques are performed by laymen distinguished for their known fanaticism and devotion: the Cadi hears all causes, listens to any pleading there may be by the litigants or their friends and gives his decision. Hence the really learned are few indeed; and they pursue their studies either in the hope of getting slender fees for teaching or of obtaining the higher appointments made by the chief of state, all of which combine in their duties both secular and religious elements, with a predominance sometimes of one, sometimes of the other. The Mohammedan world is an effort to expand patriarchal authority to the utmost.

Most of those who attend El Azhar therefore learn to read and write, and to recite the Koran: their arithmetic is either non-existent or negligible. With this outfit they return to their homes as schoolmasters. Every village of any size has a mosque, larger or smaller, and connected with it a school where little children sit swaying and committing by heart chapters of the Koran, no single sound of which conveys the slightest meaning to them, for spoken Arabic is even less like classical Arabic than our speech is like that of Chaucer. They may also be seen writing with a

sharpened reed on a whitewashed board, but not often. Otherwise their master carefully instructs them in bitter hatred for Christians, who are represented as a sort of modern crusaders, ready to devour every person and thing not of their own faith. This is a fair account of the education of Islam, as enjoyed by Egyptian boys; the girls get no attention, though some of them pick up by hook or crook nearly as much as their brothers. The Copts have from immemorial times had convents and schools where the formal learning of their church was taught with such intense interest that they actually forgot their own language. Of recent years these schools have had some new life infused into them under influences of which America may well be proud, *viz.*, the mission schools of the United Presbyterian Church, directed and supported largely from the state of Ohio.

A short time since there appeared in the most influential of the Paris newspapers an article declaring that ultimately, and perhaps at no distant date, the knotty question of the hither East would be settled not by any of the great powers of Europe, but by America! As France was once paramount in the Levant by her Roman Catholic missions, America had become so by her Protestant missions — and these missions, said the writer, the American nation will protect with its guns. There is truth in this general contention although the last proposition is doubtful. Roberts College has transformed the old Turkey in Europe, and her graduates are the statesmen of the little Balkan kingdoms struggling into decent life; the great American university at Beyrut furnishes the Arab world with professional men and, dull as the lump is, they are the leaven in it, steadily and surely though very slowly leavening it. Just fifty years ago the American United Presbyterians began work in Alexandria. To-day their schools, nearly all self-supporting, cover the entire land: they number about 125 and have probably 10,000 pupils. The instruction is admirable, comprising all the ordinary branches, with English, French and Arabic. Established originally for the Copts, and for boys, they now, with a majority of Copts, have also a large minority of Mohammedans, and about a third of the pupils are girls. In fact they are about to found a girls' college for which they have already raised two-thirds of the needed endowment.

The example has been most illuminating: as I have said, the minor offices are filled by young men trained in these schools, and the many United Presbyterian churches erected everywhere in Egypt at important centres are full of Copts. So the Coptic church has been roused from its slumbers and now cherishes its own schools into higher and higher development, while even the Mohammedans apprehend that if they are to keep any hold in their own land they must learn some of the things which they begin to see are absolutely requisite. The traveller hears of many schools in Egypt. They exist, but they are scarcely to be reckoned as Egyptian. There are close to a hundred and twenty-five thousand foreigners in the country. The Greeks are by far the most numerous, and they have their children taught somehow; then come the Italians, who have many well ordered schools for their own children; an effort is making to endow two or three schools on the English model, and so far it meets with encouraging success.

The khedivial, or ostensible, government has with its crude, inchoate concepts of European culture long been struggling to inaugurate a system of government education controlled by a minister of public education. It has been but moderately successful. Under the ministry is a committee of nine members: two English, two French, one Austrian and four Egyptians. They work through a single secretary who has substantial control, and he is an Englishman. Under this control are the khedivial library with a German librarian; an observatory with an Egyptian director; a board of three members, English, French and Egyptian, who examine for teachers' primary and secondary certificates; a staff of six inspectors: one English, one French and four Egyptian; and an office for the management of certain estates which have been assigned as educational endowments. The office staff of this bureau is wholly native. Directly under the secretary-general are fifty-six lowest grade schools like those of the mosques, with sheyks from Al Azhar as teachers; thirty-eight primary schools under Egyptian masters with government certificates; three secondary schools under English, French and Egyptian head masters respectively; and finally nine professional schools, two polytechnics, with French and Egyptian directors respectively, a school of agriculture under an Englishman, a law school with a French

director and an Egyptian assistant director, a medical school with an Egyptian principal and English vice-principal in control, a model polytechnic controlled in the same way and three normal schools with Egyptian, French and English heads respectively. This sounds well, not to say formidable. But the international direction would in itself prevent real unity of work and harmony of plan. The programmes, it is true, are good and fairly carried out, yet there are only about a hundred and fifty schools of the lowest grade and about forty-five of the primary schools. In all government institutions there are perhaps twenty-five hundred pupils. Throughout the land its proverbial darkness yet prevails — only one person in ten can read and write!

But a still darker side of Egypt is in the constant and almost epidemic miscarriage of justice. I do not refer to the native or oriental justice as administered by the local judges or cadis. This is what it always was, neither worse nor better — a curious intermixture of patriarchal severity and tenderness, conformable partly to the precepts of the Koran, partly to race tradition, and very often displaying good, shrewd common sense. What I refer to is the curse wrought on an innocent people by the capitulations of the Sultan, which as I have indicated were privileges granted in the day of his power to foreigners resident within his empire: a good-natured gift which, since the foreigners have secured a power greater than his own, he dare not and cannot recall. Fifteen powers, including the United States, dispense these privileges — immunity from taxation (except the land tax), immunity of domicile and immunity from the jurisdiction of local courts — not only to their respective resident subjects but to the natives attached to their consulates under the law of extraterritoriality.

These consular courts still exist and open the way for unmeasured abuses; it may serve to mention one alone. Neither municipal laws nor police regulations can be enforced against foreigners without the unanimous consent of the fifteen powers, a thing almost impossible to get! To this monstrosity a score of others could be added: it is the foreigners, in large measure Greeks and other southern Europeans, who carry on organized smuggling, who keep brothels and gambling hells, who use the inviolability of their houses for dozens of nefarious purposes. It is they who

debauch the public morals in all the large towns. One can very well imagine what the consular courts of minor powers might be; but it is painfully notorious that France has used the capitulations to the ruthless furtherance of all her interests as no other nation has done which claims to be enlightened.

Since England has been in power there have been secured certain modifications of these old treaties making for improvement. Foreigners have at least to pay taxes on their houses, and certain courts have been organized which do some of the work once entrusted to the various consular courts. On the other hand the closer contact of Europeans with the native peasantry and the prosperity of the latter have both been accompanied by deplorable results. The fellah, waxing fat, has kicked. His religion sits much lighter upon him and, his purse being fuller, he does things which sadly demoralize him. What is to the European a sin against himself is to the Mohammedan a sin against God, and this consciousness makes him desperate where the other is only repentant. The common Egyptian of town and country gets and drinks whiskey both openly and secretly, he smuggles and smokes more and more hasheesh, he eats more meat and heating food than the climate permits; and as a consequence there is a steady increase of crime without any corresponding increase of efficiency in the police, the police courts, or the courts with criminal jurisdiction. Perjury and false witness are regarded as venial faults; an unwillingness to denounce crime and an eagerness to shield criminals characterize the great man and the little.

The remedy for this deplorable situation has not been found. The upper classes, including the foreigners, are calling loudly for reform; but that requires money and, as in the cases of the abolition of the *corvée* and the improvement of the irrigation system, the inexorable *Caisse* will not yield the money. The head of the Mohammedans, the Sheyk-ul-Islam, is at this moment suggesting that the pious and learned men of Cairo, the *ulemas*, go out and conduct revivals of religion throughout the land.

In its forced impotence the British authority contemplates regeneration in a purely secular way. The religious courts seem to work fairly well. They deal with the personal status of Mohammedans and are called *mehkemés*; they comprise three cate-

gories, courts of first instance, of appeal and of execution. Their head is the Grand Cadi who employs two supervising inspectors. Next below him is the Grand Mufti whose functions are quite general and then come the cadis of the towns and villages.

The police operate in a sufficiently logical sequence. There is a public prosecutor, an Englishman, who controls the bureau of criminal investigation with an English director, and parallel with this bureau there is a *parquet* or sort of grand jury with the duties of a public prosecutor which controls the relations of the ministry of the interior with the courts. Under this last are the *mudirs* or heads of provinces and the police force. This is controlled by fourteen English, two hundred and thirty Egyptian and twenty continental European officers holding commissions: the non-commissioned officers and men number about fifty-seven hundred, all Egyptians except a hundred and eighty. They appear to be a smart, well set up body of brisk young fellows, all very proud of their European uniforms.

The courts are organized under a committee of judicial supervision which consists of five members, three English, one French and one Italian, and is controlled by one of the great English officials known as Judicial Adviser to his Highness the Khedive. Under this committee are two English and three Egyptian inspectors, who exercise general supervision over the national tribunals. These consist of forty-five summary courts with one judge each and jurisdiction up to a hundred pounds and three years imprisonment, seven courts of first instance with seven to ten judges in each court, and a court of appeal consisting of twenty councillors, of whom ten are Egyptians, eight are British and two are continental Europeans. There is likewise a court or committee of four continental Europeans which controls claims against the state.

Finally there are three so-called mixed tribunals, courts sitting at Cairo, Alexandria and Mansoorah, which were intended to be a link between the consular and native courts, transacting the bulk of the business so pitifully botched in the former and thus inspiring some respect for the government of Egypt. At first they were the bulwark of the bondholders, but they also have jurisdiction in suits between natives and foreigners, and between

foreigners of different nationalities. Their proceedings are in French, Italian and Arabic; as yet, strangely enough, they do not permit the use of English, although two of the judges are Americans. The British appear to have no special fondness for them, although they mitigate the abuses of the consular courts substantially. But they were the device of Nubar, and they have on several occasions applied the brakes when English officials were going too fast.

Both the native courts and the mixed tribunals use in procedure a modification of the Code Napoleon, which though not yet sufficiently adapted to Egyptian conditions is in form and principle fairly good. Their almost utter worthlessness at the beginning (1884) and for some time later was due to the fact that suitable men could not be found for judges. Unsuitable men enough there were, young fellows who went to France, got a smattering in some decent law school or bought a diploma from the then disreputable faculty at Aix, and returned to secure an appointment by favoritism. The courts reeked with corruption, their procedure was slow and costly, their method complicated. Most of the causes required something altogether different, the issues being simple and small. The worst vice of these courts was on the criminal side, for after long effort and despite many improvements, the administration of criminal justice is still complicated, slow and uncertain. But much has been accomplished by the rigid inspection provided in the outline given above, by demanding substantial diplomas from candidates for the bench (the Cairo Law School is now very efficient), and by the extension of summary justice through the establishment of the circuit system.

Thus gradually the courts are improving and the character of the bar rising: sometimes threats are heard of amalgamating the mixed tribunals with the native courts, so good are the latter likely to become. But the former rest on the assent of fourteen powers who can easily be brought to renew their mandate every five years, as is done, and cannot easily be brought to a common assent to abolish them. They are likely to continue for a long time therefore, although their final disappearance is sure. Meantime, their work is the more important because, as is only human,

the judges magnify their office, consider as mixed causes for their jurisdiction many doubtful cases which the British prefer to have go before the regular courts, and because by agreement litigating natives bring cases which clearly belong elsewhere to the mixed tribunals. It has been charged that they do this as a matter of style, to show contemptuous indifference to their own people, a curious oriental quality. But the charge is untrue: Egyptians go before the mixed tribunals because they are absolutely sure to get justice, which is as yet not the case when trial is had before the native courts.

It is thus easy to see how the polyglot international confusion so prevalent everywhere in Egypt prevails too in the courts. Add to this the ordinary official jealousies, and the imperfect administration of justice is easily accounted for. The worst effect of native jealousy toward foreign influence is seen in the case of the police. The principal city districts, six in number, are under governors, all Egyptians; as too are the twenty-six *mudirs* who preside over the provinces. In old days the Pasha or ruling class were all Turks: as yet many of these governors and *mudirs* are Turks too, but with a difference. Then they were virtual viceroys and had the police entirely in their control; their favorite punishment was the *kurbash*, or whip of alligator hide. This brutality has now been abolished and the authority of the *mudirs* over the police limited, partly by government inspectors, partly by a division of responsibility. Provinces are divided into districts, these into townships, and these last into villages. Over the district is a *mamur*, over the township an *omdeh*, over the village a sheyk.

The village watchmen, or *gaffirs*, were once very numerous and no better than bandits in disguise. They have now been much reduced in number and the sheyk is responsible for their efficiency to the *omdeh*, a man generally of real dignity and importance. If he needs the police he applies to the police official of the district through the *mamur* and is directly responsible with the police officer for what is done. There is continuous conscription for the army in Egypt, but as few men are needed only the selected conscripts are taken to serve six years under the flag. Thereafter these fine fellows, who are comfortable and well content with their pay, are divided between the army reserve

and the police. These last ought to be, and when well directed are, entirely competent men.

The British feel that in the present crisis they have a choice of two courses, either to multiply European officials or to compel closer attention to duty both by the European heads and Egyptian hands, keeping the inspectors more continuously resident within their respective districts, and generally practising greater severity on offenders. This latter process has begun; it remains to be seen how effective it may prove. It is doubtful whether, even if the money for reform could be had from the *Caisse*, which is highly improbable, they would care to multiply officials, courts and policemen. The number of natives fit for office is exhausted and the native quality improves very slowly. Then, as has been said, it is dangerous to increase the number of European and British officials; what is required especially in the case of the latter is high quality; better a few first-rate men than any degeneracy in character through increase in numbers.

There are, outside the war office and the police, nine hundred and sixty-four foreigners in the service of Egypt, and of these three hundred and sixteen, less than a third, are British; the rest are Italian, French, Greek, Austrian, Germans and scattering, in that order, the Italians two-fifty-six, the French one-eighty-six. As the grand total of civil servants is eleven thousand three hundred and six, the proportion of English is astonishingly small. Lord Cromer and his colleagues seem determined that it shall not increase. The departments of finance, interior, justice, and public works are monopolized virtually as far as foreign officials are concerned by the British, and are therefore purely Anglo-Egyptian. It is claimed and properly, I believe, that these are the most efficient departments of the government; international shackling and meddling has been the curse of Egypt as of other Oriental lands, and where there are the variegated and jarring prejudices of different nationalities, there of course is to be found confusion and wrong. Since the adjustment of her French relations, England probably looks to see the entire government Anglo-Egyptian at some distant day, but meantime hers is the golfer's cardinal motto: "Don't press." Lord Cromer has announced as his policy: *Ohne Hast aber auch ohne Rast*.

These appear to be the two sides of the shield from the point of view of an English protectorate, and there can be no question but that British administration has on the whole met with signal and brilliant, almost dazzling success. Yet there is a mystery. It lies of course in the system of Islam. Such travellers as spend a few weeks or even a winter in Egypt should be slow to form opinions. Nevertheless they see and feel something, and sometimes the quick perception of a passer-by is truer than the unob-servant habitual look of a resident. It seems as if the population of Egypt were capable of no other loyalty than that which they undoubtedly feel for the Khedive and the Sultan. The British are hated and know it: fortunately they also know why. First there is the cumulative interest of every other power against them, to thwart them where possible, to misrepresent them everywhere. Then there is the Khedive. His father knew that England had saved his throne and after Arabi's rebellion he behaved like a man of sense. This young man, like almost every heir to a throne, appears never to have been in sympathy with his father and to have dreamed of a return to his grandfather Ismail's unrestricted despotism tempered by some enlightenment. In any case at the outset of his reign he showed a preference for French influences and finally went so far as to tamper with several English institutions, including the army. He received a smart piece or two of "advice" and thereafter for some years kept his place, though rather sullenly. Latterly he seems to realize the inevitable and to follow his father's example. The British believe that the native press, in Arabic of course, which is uniformly hostile to them was, for a time at least, subsidized from the palace. Now, this is no longer the case. For all that, newspaper hostility has not ceased. It must pay because, as far as a superficial observer can judge, the people as a whole, while they hate the Turkish Pasha class, still regard the Sultan as the Caliph, the successor of the prophet, and the Khedive as his vice-regent. It is amusing to see a tall Nubian draw himself to his full height, strike an attitude with his right hand on his heart and say: "My King, the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, bestowed medals and the title of Pasha" on so and so. For him and his kind there is but one supreme permanent authority, that which is administered by the govern-

ment of his Khedive Abbas Hilmi and interpreted by the *mehmemés* and *ulemas* or men learned in the law. All else is transitory and mediate.

No one understands this situation better than the British, and when the Khedive succeeded no Mohammedan was more eager than they were for the proper Firman of the Porte establishing the new authority over Egyptian Moslems. Well aware of this fact, the Porte and its officials shrewdly exacted and got the last farthing of the customary fees before, after weeks of carefully protracted negotiation, the wonderfully bedizened and illuminated parchment was in due and solemn form exhibited to the populace from the steps of the Abdin Palace in Cairo and there read to them aloud in a perfect form, secured only at the last moment by telegram and, of course, for a consideration. King Edward has more Moslem subjects than the Sultan, by far, and his ministers well understand that the price of outward calm is careful conformity to Moslem traditions and nice consideration for Moslem prejudice. They dare not make a slip nor give the slightest hold to fanatical enmity. The French and native journals are ready to give the signal: hostile powers wait like hounds in a leash, and apparently even yet would make the leap, if only they could reach the British throat. But their dream is vanity: after all, this bond around Egypt is like others which bind the British Empire; though it looks gossamer, it is efficient and sufficient.

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REVIEWS.

A History of Mediæval Political Theory in the West. By R. W. CARLYLE and A. J. CARLYLE. Vol. I: *The Second Century to the Ninth.* By A. J. CARLYLE. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons; Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood and Sons, 1903. — xvii, 314 pp.

The Development of European Polity. By HENRY SIDGWICK. London, Macmillan & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1903. — xxvi, 448 pp.

The Political Theories of the Ancient World. By W. W. WILLOUGHBY. New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1903. — xiii, 294.

If any doubt has existed as to the utility of the study of political ideas in their historical development, the almost simultaneous appearance of these three volumes ought to do much toward removing it. In these works representative men of three great educational institutions, Oxford, Cambridge and the Johns Hopkins University, manifest their conviction that such study is worthy of the best effort that ripe scholarship can bring to bear upon it. However different the points of view and the methods of treatment, all the authors alike contribute to the one end of removing from English literature the reproach to which it was long exposed, that it embodied no adequate treatment of the history of political ideas.

Professor Sidgwick's work is posthumously published under the editorial supervision of his wife. It differs in general character from the other two volumes under review. While they agree in devoting much attention to the political ideas which are to be found explicitly or implicitly in the literature of the periods covered, Professor Sidgwick's interest is more in the generalizations which are possible from the actual institutions of successive epochs in history. His work follows to a great extent the method of Freeman's *Comparative Politics*. It is a study of governments rather than of anybody's theories about them, and the author's end is to formulate a history of political ideas by immediate