

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE FILIPINOS

A REPLY

AN article in the June (1906) number of the *POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY* from the pen of Mr. James A. LeRoy is entitled "The Philippines and the Filipinos."¹ It notices some nine or ten publications dealing in various ways with the Philippines, but it discusses only one of them in any serious way, for of a total of about thirty pages it devotes twenty-seven to that one and three to the other eight or nine. The book thus selected for special notice was prepared by the present writer.² It is not usually desirable that an author should answer in print attacks upon his work, but some misleading impressions conveyed in the article referred to have led me to attempt to correct them in the present brief paper.

I

I am unfortunately obliged to begin by demurring to personal criticism. Mr. LeRoy's article is built up in part upon a foundation of charges of "personal bias" and "bald misrepresentation."³ He bases these very serious charges upon two supports. One is the suggestion that I have written as a "critic with a very strong bias preparing a political brief." The other is a discussion of what I have written and an effort to show that the statements therein made are false or erroneous. To the charge that I have prepared any "brief," political or other, with all that such a charge implies, I can only plead not guilty in the strongest possible terms. The general allegation of bias, coloring in an unconscious way what may be written on any subject, is also personal, although less grossly so, and deserves attention in this and in every case where evidence must be weighed. Mr. LeRoy says in effect that I and those who think as I do are unworthy of confidence because biased, while he and those who assert the opposite of certain statements are not biased, and hence are credible. This is the old question: Whom shall we believe about the Philippines? It has been customary for a long time to meet every criticism on mismanagement in the Philippines with a charge of bias on the part of the critic. This must mean that such

¹ *POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY*, vol. xxi, pp. 288-318.

² *Our Philippine Problem*. Henry Holt & Co., 1905.

³ *Cf.* in particular, *loc. cit.*, pp. 297 n., 314 and 315.

critics are incapable of telling the truth without distortion, either because of previous training and associations which unfit them for clear thinking, or because of some self-interested motive which keeps them from admitting what they know to be facts. Such charges, if they are to have weight, must come from persons who are themselves entirely free from any suspicions of the kind. I submit that this is not the case with Mr. LeRoy. Ever since the beginning of his active life he has been in government employ of some kind. Beginning with a secretaryship under the Philippine Commission which he retained for some years, he was transferred from the Philippine Islands to the consulate at Durango, Mexico, and has been kept at that place ever since.

One other point deserves notice in this connection. Mr. LeRoy attempts to discredit not only the personal testimony given by critics of Philippine administration, but the evidence on which they base their belief that matters have not been well managed in the islands. It is therefore worth while to consider the character of the data upon which he himself depends, and to note the criteria by which he is guided in selecting his authorities. It will be found that his method is eclectic. He distrusts Spanish statistics for revenue on the ground of the dishonesty of Spanish officials.¹ He however relies, at least in part, upon Spanish writers and historians for his ideas as to the conduct of affairs under the native government.² He wholly discredits foreign, and especially British, business men as animated by the lowest motives.³ American business men fare little better with him, being held almost equally untrustworthy. Of the natives he entirely rejects those who are classed as "Manila radicals." He refuses the testimony of the Spanish mixed bloods who prefer "Latin" to "Anglo-Saxon" ideals.⁴ Statements coming from foreigners and writers well-known for their work on the Philippines are entirely laid aside, those in this class including Messrs. Ireland, Foreman, Colquhoun and others, one of whom he denounces as discredited⁵ while another is said to have made statements that were wholly untrue.⁶

It may fairly be asked: From whom does Mr. LeRoy get his information? Some evidence is given on this point in his article. He relies on Spanish historians and writers for his knowledge of the state of things under the government of Aguinaldo, preferring their account to the testimony of the naval officers sent out by Admiral Dewey and evidently considering it unbiased. Government reports of course he

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 310.

² *Ibid.*, p. 313, n. 2.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 307-308.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

accepts as absolutely true. But it is clear that for the most part it is his own notions, acquired as a clerk in the employ of the Philippine Commission, together with what may have been furnished him by the present administration, on which he chiefly depends. On the one side, therefore, we have Mr. LeRoy, the officials who are responsible for present conditions, and (as regards native doings) the Spanish testimony given at a time when the contest between Spain and the *insurrectos* was still fresh. On the other, we have the practically united opinion of those who have visited the Philippines in an unofficial capacity, the statements of business men in Manila, both American and foreign, and the testimony of those natives who are not office-holders and who are independent of the government.

Students of Philippine conditions may take their choice between these classes of evidence.

II

Despite this loud outcry of bias on the part of others, and in the face of his denial of practically every specific charge of mismanagement, it is a fact that Mr. LeRoy admits substantially the whole case. His admissions are scattered through what he has written, but when compiled make an extensive showing. In criticising *Our Philippine Problem* he finds (1) that it is "difficult not to concur in the broader statements and conclusions of . . . the chapter on the Philippine civil service."¹ "This," he says, "is perhaps the sorest spot in the Philippine situation." (2) In introducing American law into the Philippines, mistakes were made, though he thinks that none were irremediable and none vital.² (3) Many of the statements made by me, impugning the honesty of American judges in the Philippines, are correct and "point to . . . too close concert of action between the judiciary and the prosecuting and police authorities which are under executive control."³ (4) The "impatience of criticism" shown by the Commission has been a "harmful feature of the insular situation."⁴ (5) The Philippine law as to ladronism is "naturally" (*sic*) very severe, and there are instances of revenge and what Mr. LeRoy calls "spite work" on the part of the constabulary spies.⁵ (6) The constabulary is frequently "inefficient," "contains a large proportion of unfit officials and men, and has too often committed abuses."⁶ (7) The opportuneness of the Philippine land tax and internal revenue

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

² *Ibid.*, p. 293.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 297.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

tax is open to question.¹ (8) The criticism made on business conditions and upon the tariff and shipping policy pursued toward the islands is, in the main, "sound and accurate."²

The things which Mr. LeRoy unqualifiedly defends are the record of Mr. Taft in the archipelago, the educational system, the political system and political ideals set up by the insular administration for the guidance of the natives, the introduction of American legal ideas into the islands, and the general attitude adopted towards the natives by American administrators.

Mr. LeRoy's admissions, I submit, when grouped together, concede the main points at issue. So far as my own book is concerned, its various shortcomings, when demonstrated, can be of little interest to the general public. The main thing is to get a statement of the conditions now existing in the Philippines from those who were concerned in establishing them. Mr. LeRoy's article is the first sweeping, though seemingly unconscious, admission that has come from an official source. Secretary Taft's statement on arriving at San Francisco in the autumn of 1905 was a long step away from the position of rejection and denial that has been characteristic of Philippine administrators. Mr. LeRoy goes much further. In admitting that the civil service is largely made up of injurious elements, that the constabulary is corrupt and oppressive, that the judiciary in many instances is working under the direction of the police and the constabulary, that the tariff, shipping and business policies are wholly wrong, that mistakes have been made in the introduction of American law, that motives of revenge often control the detective force, that the opportuneness and wisdom of internal fiscal policies are gravely open to question, he most completely impugns the results of an American tenure of the islands lasting over eight years and a civil administration lasting five years. If Mr. LeRoy is correct, there is not a department of the whole administration in which the most serious sort of blunders have not been made, excepting only the bureau of education and the general scheme of government set up by the Commission. Taking Mr. LeRoy, as the spokesman of the government, at his word, the consequences of American control are such as to discredit us before the world as a colonizing nation.

It should also be noted in this connection that, although Mr. LeRoy is loud in protest against anything that seems like a specific reflection upon the intentions or even, in some cases, the acts of American authorities, he does not hesitate to decry the Spaniards and to offer the

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 313.

² *Ibid.*, p. 305.

most serious charges against their character and the methods of government employed by them. This too is done without the presentation of a shred of evidence in support of the claims made. The great increase in customs duties collected under the American control was due in part to the higher rates of duty imposed and in part to the fact that our large army of occupation made demands for commodities never before imported in such quantities; yet this increase is attributed by Mr. LeRoy not solely to the obvious growth in government business, but largely to the fact that the Spaniards did not report all of the customs duties they collected, but permitted the officials of the ports to retain a portion. There is no evidence that the dishonesty of the Spanish officials, whatever it may have been, was great enough to make any such profound alteration in the figures as is here indicated. Mr. LeRoy refers to no such evidence but makes his charges positively and on his own sole and unsupported authority. He here falls into the error too widely and too readily accepted in this country of supposing that the Spanish administration of the islands was wholly corrupt and inefficient and was unsuited to the needs of the people. The Spanish did in the Philippines and in many of their other colonies a work for which they have received scant credit at the hands of their "Anglo-Saxon" critics. In the Philippines their system of rule was much more acceptable to the natives during the greater part of their stay than is that of the Americans. This is shown by the relatively small size of the army they employed and by the fact that it was largely composed of native soldiers. There has been more profound dissatisfaction, more unrest and more military activity in different parts of the islands since the Americans took charge, than there was in many times the same number of years under Spanish rule. This is the universal opinion among military men and among civilians who have studied the Philippine question on the spot.

III

Although Mr. LeRoy thus admits the general case against the quality of American rule in the Philippines, he seeks to prove that the situation is not so bad as it is painted, and that those who attack its weak points are unpatriotic. He concedes that the complaints of misgovernment have a substantial basis, but he then tries to weaken faith in them by attacking the specific charges upon which they rest. Although he admits the general defectiveness of the government, he seeks to show that in no definite point is it at fault. It is thus necessary to consider his points successively. It will not be possible to cover every issue raised by him, owing to the limitations of space imposed upon me. Much of

his criticism consists in simply asserting the contrary of what I have stated. In answer to these parts of his article, I merely enter a counter denial, and I shall confine the discussion to a very few of the points on which documentary or official evidence is available.

In the effort to discredit my criticism of Philippine administration much attention is devoted by Mr. LeRoy to matters mentioned incidentally as features in the history of our occupation of the Philippines. One of these questions relates to the destruction of life attendant upon our military operations. He takes much pains to demonstrate from the Philippine census that the estimate quoted by me from General Bell as to the death of probably one-sixth the population of Luzon during our campaigns on that island is inaccurate, and that the alleged disproportion of women and children as compared with adult males at the present time does not exist. On these points I may say, first of all, that Mr. LeRoy damages his argument by giving them much more significance than was accorded to them by me. The loss of life, whatever it was, has been inflicted, and it was tremendous—of that no doubt has ever been expressed. Further, it is evident that neither the Philippine census nor any other collection of data enables us to test conclusively the correctness of General Bell's broad assertion. That can rest only upon estimate. The opinion of those who were in the field would seem to be worthy of greater credence than that of those who came to the islands some time after the fighting was over. That estimate is, however, put forward solely on its own merits. Personally it seems to me reasonable, on the strength of other facts that are now available; but, in any event, this is not an essential question. The other assertion, the disproportionate number of women and children as compared with the men, is of more importance. It was made by a Congressman of ability, a Republican and friend of the administration, before the census was issued and on the basis of his own observations. Mr. LeRoy attempts to rebut it by figures drawn from the census, but in so doing he only strengthens the argument in behalf of its truth. He assembles figures representing the population of various provinces, and maintains that these prove the inaccuracy of the statement alleging a preponderance of women over men. This is a mode of proceeding that hardly seems worthy. A historian who should seek to estimate the damage caused by Sherman's march to the sea would hardly think that the number of inhabitants of Oregon or California should be brought into the account when trying to ascertain the effect of a military movement confined to limited territory. The comparison must be based upon the provinces where military operations actually occurred or it is

necessarily worthless. The census figures cited for those provinces where military operations were extensive, when comparison is made with the figures for other provinces, fully support the charge that there is a great difference between the peaceful and hostile provinces in respect to the proportion of men and women in the population at the time the census was taken. This is the whole point. The comparison becomes more striking when the figures for men of military age are compared with the whole of the population. Space forbids full analysis here. There is ample evidence in the census figures, defective as they are, of the general accuracy of the claims made by the competent observers who expressed themselves prior to the publication of the census. The suffering of the most seriously affected provinces and the lack of labor in them are abundant proof of the disastrous economic conditions there prevailing, from whatever causes their condition may proceed.¹

In this connection, too, it is worth while to answer Mr. LeRoy's assertions concerning the work of the board of health. What I said on this subject was derived from those in charge of the bureau of public health at Manila and from religious workers whose main effort is in the direction of ameliorating the conditions among the natives. The statements made are true, as I can fully establish, and Mr. LeRoy adduces no evidence to show the contrary. The assertions made by him in this connection² are erroneous, except in so far as changes have been made within the past two years.

Mr. LeRoy's statements as to reconcentration are misleading. He complains of my figures for the number of persons affected on several grounds. The 100,000 *reconcentrados* of Batangas, he says, should not be classed in the table of those reconcentrated under civil government, since Batangas was then subject to full military government with Malvar in the field. This seems to be a disingenuous kind of argument. Mil-

¹Just at this point should be uttered a word of warning against the Philippine census. That document is one of the poorest pieces of census work ever put together between covers, and is conceded so to be by all who have carefully examined it. This is not solely the fault of the compilers. The difficulties to be contended with in the islands themselves in taking the census were very nearly insuperable so far as an exact count of population is concerned. This can be easily understood by any one who reflects upon the condition of transportation, the entire inaccessibility of parts of the country, and other obstacles. But in addition there was a deep-rooted opposition to the census on the part of the natives, who did their best to retard its progress. The census itself is remarkably careless in its make-up. Harmonizing the schedules led to profound modifications in the census office after the figures had reached this country.

²*Loc. cit.*, pp. 304, 305.

itary rule had been reestablished because the civil authorities were unable to control matters. The reconcentration was an incident to civil rule in the Philippines, just as much as the placing of an American city under martial law by order of the proper authorities would be an incident to civil rule in this country. Again, Mr. LeRoy attempts to discredit the figures for Albay because they show a greater population than Albay possesses. This is another example of oblique reasoning. The reconcentration in Albay has of course to be called by some name. It included, as a matter of fact, a good many people from neighboring provinces. Mr. LeRoy complains because the authority for the figures given is in part that of a "random observer."¹ The term is misapplied in this case, since the observer referred to went to the Philippines with the personal endorsement and introduction of the authorities in Washington as the representative of some leading Republican senators. He was the guest of the Philippine commissioners while in the islands and was provided with every official facility for making his inquiries. He was later offered an appointment as provincial governor by Mr. Taft, and he is thoroughly friendly to the administration. His testimony is entitled to the same weight as that of any well qualified person. His evidence is printed as a Senate document.

Dealing with the question of civil service in the islands, Mr. LeRoy complains of the criticisms directed against the character of the present employees, although he has already admitted that the civil service is the sorest spot in the whole administration. He protests against demands for a set of well-trained men "who do not exist" for employment in the colonies, and urges that inasmuch as critics of the present regime demand the withdrawal of the American officials so far as possible, they should not quarrel with the character of the persons temporarily employed. This would be sound reasoning provided the notion of substituting Filipinos for Americans had been accepted by the administration. Such is not, and is not likely to be, the case. Therefore the present administrators must be judged by their own standards and not by those of a policy which some one else hopes to see adopted, but which has not been and, so far as can now be discerned, never will be while those now in control remain in the saddle. The complaints as to the present system of local and provincial government which I have reproduced in my volume are waved aside by Mr. LeRoy because of insufficient experience on my part "to give the conclusions value." I will pass the latter point without argument and call attention to the fact that the

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 297.

complaints of the present inefficient and hopeless mode of managing these local communities do not come from any one individual but are verified by the common testimony of men of far greater experience and length of residence in the islands than my critic—men, too, who have seen the work of other governments in their colonies and who are free from political connections, American or foreign.

With reference to the judicial system now in force in the islands, Mr. LeRoy is hardly fair. He admits that "several of the circuit judges in the Philippines have not shown themselves to be sufficiently independent of mind, and that there has been in some cases too strong a tendency to convict and too close a concert of action between the judiciary and the police and prosecuting authorities which are under executive control." This is the main point in the case, and it is, as Mr. LeRoy observes, a "matter of general and serious concern." That being true, why should my critic complain because the statement of this fact impugns the honesty of American judges and of the "highest American officials in the Philippines?" It does, of course, and Mr. LeRoy's admission just quoted does so to an equal degree—the term "honesty" being used in its broader sense and not with any pecuniary reference. He complains because no evidence is adduced in support of the charge that native witnesses are discredited in testifying against white men—a fact requiring no proof, as it is stated and recognized by everyone in the Philippines, white or brown, official or unofficial. The statements made by me concerning the Freedom sedition case are rebutted on the evidence of a man who is now a practicing attorney in Manila, and who has every motive, in the interest of his present prospects, to smooth over events which occurred a few years ago. There is, however, one fact which by itself fully substantiates my description of the judicial conditions in the islands. This is that Secretary Taft, when in the Philippines in 1905, took up the question of executive interference with the judiciary and discussed it with the Commission itself or, in Mr. LeRoy's words, with "the highest American officials in the Philippines." Mr. Taft then said that legislation should be prepared, taking out of the hands of the Commission the power to appoint judges, giving the judges fixed terms, and allowing the supreme court and not the attorney-general's office to fix the distribution of cases. This legislation, which will undoubtedly be passed very soon, shows Mr. Taft's idea of the necessities of the case. While Mr. LeRoy neglects this fact, which he must have known, he also neglects the actual testimony given in *Our Philippine Problem* as to the incompetence of the American judges and the methods of the inefficient and venal interpreters

attached to the courts. This testimony is given in the form of a careful letter sent by one of the most eminent lawyers in Manila to Mr. Taft. That letter stands for the opinion of the best legal authorities in the islands. It may be fair to add that every statement contained in my chapter on the Philippine judiciary can be confirmed by the testimony of two judges, two ex-judges, or two Philippine public officials.

Although Mr. LeRoy is willing to admit the whole case against the constabulary, saying "that it has proved inefficient, that it contains a large proportion of unfit officials and men, and that it too often has committed abuses," he yet contends in the common official way that the arraignment is "one-sided." This is followed by the significant claim that "whatever be the means and methods adopted to preserve public order in the Philippines, some degree of evil and abuse will inevitably be associated with them." Such a statement seems like a confession of the inability of the American administration to assure good government in the islands. It can hardly be interpreted in any other way. Mr. LeRoy maintains that the abuse and misrule of the constabulary is due to the fact that the people do not "know their rights." But that is precisely the reason why it is supposed that we must remain in the islands. Mr. LeRoy proves too much or he proves too little. If the constabulary is as inefficient as he admits, it must be due to the fault of those who organized it and who are in control, and not to that of those who are controlled by it. Absolute power produces the same consequences whether it is exerted in Russia or in the Philippines. If Mr. LeRoy is right, some degree of abuse (and probably a large degree) will always and inevitably be "associated with" our control of the natives. One pointed charge is made by Mr. LeRoy concerning the trick by which the Albay *ladrones* were induced to surrender on promise of amnesty. He calls attention to the fact that Col. H. H. Bandholtz, who had the Albay matter in charge, now denies all knowledge of the document by which amnesty was offered to the natives. He endorses the statements of Bandholtz, and on the strength of these statements he charges me with "peculiar methods."¹ This is the usual Philippine way of accepting the statement of a constabulary officer at full value, but in this case it will hardly pass muster. The document referred to by me is contained in the court records, was considered at the trial of Simeon Ola, and was never questioned by the government attorney. Since my book appeared, Ola has been reported pardoned, thus carrying out the agreement made with him personally.

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 297 n.

My critic brings forward again the old complaint as to a biased source of information when he comes to deal with what I have said of the schools of the Philippines. He remarks that the information in question undoubtedly came from "certain Manila radicals." That seems a promising hypothesis, and it is unfortunate that he should contradict it by suggesting that the discussion reads like a contribution from one of the "dissatisfied American teachers . . . who came home to scold about the mistakes of those in authority." The last shot is the nearer to the mark. The statements I made came from the teachers themselves, and since nearly all are "dissatisfied" it is perhaps fair to say that they came from "dissatisfied teachers." Among the "teachers" I talked with at length were the superintendent of education himself and several superintendents of provinces as well as probably forty or fifty teachers selected at random in traveling through the country. The Filipino enthusiasm over the schools to which Mr. LeRoy refers is largely a superstition of officialdom. So far as it extends, it is enthusiasm, not for the methods of the American school system, but for the chance to get educational opportunities at all. Chief among the errors referred to is that of selecting English as the medium of instruction. No well-informed person, American or Filipino, now denies that this choice was a gross blunder. The statements made by me as to the conditions under which the school system was begun rest upon the authority of the Philippine bureau of education. It is not true, as stated by Mr. LeRoy, that "more Filipinos can speak English than Spanish." The data as to enrolment in the schools were given me by Dr. Barrows, chief of the bureau of education, a few days before I left the islands.

Mr. LeRoy's criticism of what I have said of the church problem is directed against certain specific points. He maintains that the charge made by me that too high a price was paid for the friar lands is unfounded. He wholly disregards the fact that the incomes received by the religious orders from the lands sold by them in the shape of interest on their money are far greater than the sums they received as rents under the old régime. The price—\$18.00 per acre—was undoubtedly an exorbitant charge for the best land in the islands in any such quantity, which is of course the fair construction of the words used by me. It is also a fact that the friars in retaining their city property have kept the best element in their estates. Speaking of these two points and with special reference to the question of price, Governor Wright, when I was in Manila, used the following pointed expression: "The friars have without doubt given us the dirty end of the stick." A third state-

ment to which Mr. LeRoy takes exception is that the friars are now returning to the islands in considerable numbers. That this is true he could have learned by communicating with almost any of his official friends in Manila or, better still, with some of the church authorities. Archbishop Harty, during my stay in Manila, stated to me explicitly that many of the friars would be absolutely necessary in the service of the church owing to the difficulty of getting any other ecclesiastics to take their places.

The disastrous economic conditions prevailing in the Philippines to-day are now so well recognized and so fully admitted that it seems unnecessary to make any reply to Mr. LeRoy's ineffectual attempt to palliate these industrial evils. The fiscal side of the situation, however, demands attention. Mr. LeRoy, like many other official apologists of the present régime, does not care to admit the fact that the American government has been enormously more expensive than that of our predecessors. The figures given in *Our Philippine Problem* with reference to this question were all obtained by personal application to the officials of the Philippine treasury or of the bureau of insular affairs and show precisely what the government of the islands represents itself as spending. In order to mask the significance of the figures, however, Mr. LeRoy resorts to two distinct methods. (1) He endeavors to show that comparisons with the reports of Spanish expenditure are erroneous because of failure to take account of changes in the purchasing power of money and because of the incomplete character of the accounts of the Spanish authorities. (2) He endeavors to explain away the great totals of the American expenditures by claiming that they represent "gross" and not "net" outlays. These claims deserve careful study, because they involve the whole issue of our financial management in the Philippines.

In reply to Mr. LeRoy's first point, attention may be called to the fact that the Schurman commission presented the accounts I reproduced as showing the expenditures of the islands in a "normal year." We may fully trust the commission on this head. Mr. LeRoy's claim that certain additions should be made is worthy of no attention, because the same additions would have to be made in nearly all cases to expenditure under our régime, so that the comparison would remain unchanged. His claims as to changes in the purchasing power of the money unit in government finance can have no application unless account is likewise taken of the great changes in the prices of commodities and their effect upon the buying power of the community, in which case the comparison is even more unfavorable to the American

régime than it seems to be on the face of things. This phase of the discussion is one that involves numerous considerations which must be omitted here owing to lack of space.

Mr. LeRoy's second criticism, that the figures given by me for American expenditures or receipts are "gross and not net" means, if it means anything, that, included in the figures given, there are some items that are duplicated owing to payments passing between different departments of the government and by each credited as revenue. In answer to this charge, I raise the question: Whose testimony is authoritative on Philippine modes of accounting, that of the officials of the government or that of Mr. LeRoy? The figures given by me are taken from the published accounts of the government. These accounts were shown and explained to me by officials of the treasury department, and represent what they at least supposed themselves to be expending. Throughout his argument there runs an attempt to confuse the issues by misstating figures, representing sums given in one kind of currency as if they were given in another, and variously confounding the real question raised. The limitations of space prevent me from rebutting more than one or two of his points. His most severe criticism relates to a table given on page 426 of my volume, in which the cost of American government for the future, so far as derived from taxation, is estimated as 35,300,000 *pesos*. Of this estimate of mine he says:

Yet he is willing to set such an exaggerated hypothetical estimate of revenue collections against the incomplete statements for a comparatively low year of Spain's actual collections, and in the next breath he says: "This furnishes a comparative test of the real burdens resting on the people ten years ago and at the present moment." The burden of taxation at the present moment he thus represents to be over 35,000,000 *pesos*. The revenue collections for the fiscal year 1904-05 were really 18,264,000 *pesos*, net, for the insular government (according to figures furnished the reviewer in Manila last August) and about 9,500,000 *pesos* for the provincial and municipal governments, or a total of less than 28,000,000 *pesos*. Comment is unnecessary.¹

In this brief statement there appear at least four distinct misrepresentations. (1) My original estimate of 35,000,000 *pesos* is stated in Mexican dollars, while Mr. LeRoy neglected to note that the figures he furnishes are in Philippine *pesos*, worth at the time they were given at least ten per cent more than the Mexican dollars employed by me.

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 313.

This at once raises his 28,000,000 *pesos* to 30,800,000. (2) Mr. LeRoy includes "insular," "provincial" and "municipal" revenues, but he omits the city of Manila, which is always separately classified and in which the receipts are never less than \$1,500,000 gold per annum. This would add some 3,150,000 *pesos* Mexican to the total already given, making altogether about 34,000,000 *pesos* Mexican.

(3) Mr. LeRoy's figures are too small if they are intended fairly to represent average conditions. In the report of the Bureau of Insular Affairs just published, the "net" revenues of the Philippines are explicitly given as \$11,468,067 insular, \$4,509,572 provincial and municipal, and \$1,995,289 for the city of Manila. This makes a total of \$17,972,928 gold as the total revenues of the islands, and it is specifically stated that the figure is "net, excluding all articles of a refundable character." From this total, however, must be deducted the sums contributed by the insular government to the other grades of government, which of course figure twice in the total. With these deductions the total income is still between \$15,000,000 and \$16,000,000 gold, which is more than the tentative estimate I made two years ago.

(4) Mr. LeRoy neglects to state that subsequent to the publication of my book serious changes were made in the internal revenue law, so that, had the collections turned out to be smaller than was estimated by me, there would still have been no evidence of an alleged disposition on my part to exaggerate. From what has been said it is clear also that the computations made by me with regard to the past cost of Philippine government are below, rather than above the mark.¹ Responsible officers of the government have informed me that such is the case. In

¹ It is a trifle hard to understand the contradictory assertions of Mr. LeRoy as to my remarks on the question of roads for the islands. Apparently he disagrees with the statements which I have made, for he cites some figures as to the outlays made by the administration and says: "This is a rather different story from that told by Mr. Willis's figures and assertions." Why these figures should be held to tell a "rather different story" from mine when they are (differences in dates being borne in mind) practically the same as those given by me at the bottom of pp. 371 *et seq.*, it would be difficult to see. Almost in the same connection he says: "The islands were never well provided with roads in the past and the same is true today, and the existing roads are still in more general disrepair than before warfare began." This is practically the only point in the case. We have not restored the transportation system to a condition equalling that which existed prior to the outbreak of warfare. The question whether we are spending as much as the Spaniards did is subsidiary, though it can be shown that we are not. The Spaniards created the whole transportation system and maintained it by forced labor. We have not ventured to restore the forced labor until lately, and we have not been able to appropriate enough cash annually to hire equivalent labor.

view of these facts, it would seem that Mr. LeRoy's attempt to prove misrepresentation on my part as to the insular financial status is far from warranted by the facts, which he seems to have distorted to suit his own purposes. Of the multitude of other points he raises no account can be taken here. I can only say that in nearly every case he gives a fundamentally erroneous and twisted view of the facts.

Why finally should my critic complain because of a failure on my part to point out that Mr. Taft was not responsible for the errors that have lately been committed in handling the islands? On the contrary, the policy now being worked out is the direct result of Mr. Taft's plans. There has not been a moment when Mr. Taft has not been in direct control either as governor-general of the Philippines or as secretary of war. As governor he was given a perfectly free hand, and as secretary he has retained the actual power in insular matters in his own possession instead of turning it over, as he might have done, to his successors. It is perfectly idle to try, as Mr. LeRoy does here and elsewhere, to differentiate between the personal relation of Mr. Taft and of his successors to Philippine policy. No such difference exists, and the attempt to draw an imaginary line of distinction is as unwise as it is difficult.

The personal bias against Mr. Taft which Mr. LeRoy attributes to me exists only in his own imagination, and every item which he cites in the attempt to support this assertion is perverted or misrepresented. He complains of an "insinuation" on my part that secret influences are at work in Washington in behalf of financial and industrial interests. On this he challenges me for "specifications." In reply to him I will cite, as illustrating my meaning, the bill discriminating in favor of American cottons passed by Congress in 1906, and the retention of the present situation as regards the export tax on hemp. As an example of the "features of administration" to which he refers, may be mentioned the way in which the new silver for the coinage was purchased. Both of these latter points are fully dealt with in my book. There is no charge of "dishonesty" in what I wrote, despite Mr. LeRoy's effort to make it appear as if there were. The charge made is a charge of undue control by business interests, too strong to be resisted by the most upright of administrators, not of "dishonesty."

Mr. LeRoy's article is merely one example of current political evasion of the issues involved in the Philippine problem. He is the more blameworthy in that he resorts to methods of obscurity under the guise of a "book review" in a scientific publication.

H. PARKER WILLIS.

A REJOINDER.

Mr. Willis's attempt to impugn my criticism of his book on the ground that I hold a government position and am therefore bound in my own interest to defend the present administration of affairs in the Philippines raises an issue which I shall not discuss. I shall not even attempt to correct his misstatements of fact as regards the length and continuity of my governmental service. The majority of readers, who know nothing about me personally, will have to judge from my writings whether I have studied the subject and have shown independence of opinion.

My statement that Mr. Willis's book was not a political scientist's "calm, detached survey of events and conditions," but a "political brief," and that it exhibited "strong bias," particularly against Secretary Taft, was not simply the expression of a personal opinion on my part—in fact, there was nothing personal in the matter at all. In my review I cited passages from his book and compared these passages with the evidence which was before Mr. Willis himself; and I submitted, as I still submit, that the comparison proves bias. It is not I who arraign Mr. Willis, but his own printed statements, when they are confronted with the facts. From such an arraignment he can not exculpate himself by sweeping protestations or by assailing my good faith and intellectual honesty.

I shall not attempt to discuss Mr. Willis's general denials, nor shall I revert to the issues, some of them serious, which he now evades under the plea of "limitations of space." I refer the interested reader—whose interest lies, of course, not in determining the personal merits of Mr. Willis or of myself, but in ascertaining the truth about the Philippine situation—to my contribution to the *POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY* for June, 1906, where facts and figures are given and the authorities are in most cases cited to support them. A few of the new statements of Mr. Willis, however, merit attention here.

As to reconcentration. Mr. Willis, in his book (pp. 130-134), after expressly excepting those cases where it was "earlier practised by the military authorities," said that "the number of persons recently affected by this policy under civil government" was 451,000, as shown in a table he gave, wherein 100,000 of these *reconcentrados* were credited to Batangas in 1902 and 300,000 to Albay in 1903. It is not true, as to Batangas in 1902, that "military rule had been re-established because the civil authorities were unable to control matters." Against its own inclination, and at the request of General MacArthur, who recommended it as a measure calculated to "pacify" the province,