

A NEGLECTED FACTOR IN RACE SUICIDE

THE mobile character of American society is one of its chief characteristics. The migratory disposition is strong. The force of tradition is slight. A period of five years suffices to work large changes in the membership of churches and of other organizations. West of the Appalachians, there are few ancestral estates in the possession of the third generation. Our historic background is much too brief, and we are too much possessed of the money-making spirit to be firmly rooted in the soil. Of the population born abroad this is, of course, obviously true. Few of the foreign born have been here long enough to form strong local attachments. Many of the native born, however, are as prone to migrate as are the foreign born. More than one-fifth of the total native population residing in the United States live outside of their native state.¹

The main currents of migration are westward, cityward and from abroad. Since 1790 the center of population has moved westward 519 miles, from a point 23 miles east of Baltimore, Maryland, to a point six miles southeast of Columbus, Indiana.² The urban population has much more than kept pace with the growth of the total population. Whereas in 1790 less than one person out of every twenty-five lived in a city of 8000 or more inhabitants, in 1900 more than one person out of every three lived in such a center.³ And 19,115,221 immigrants have come to our shores since 1820, not counting the arrivals since 1900, which for several years prior to the panic of 1907 amounted to considerably more than 1,000,000 per year.⁴

The purpose of this study is to inquire how these three population movements have affected the distribution of the sexes between the West and the East, between city and country and

¹ Twelfth Census, Population, part i, p. cxxxi.

² *Ibid.* p. xxxvi.

³ *Ibid.* p. lxxxiii.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. cii; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1908, p. 706.

between the United States and other nations; and, secondly, to inquire what limitations they have imposed upon the frequency of marriages and births. The extent to which the differentiation of society into classes segregates the sexes and the consequent effect upon marriages and births will be considered in a third and concluding section.

I

The tendency of modern industrialism to segregate the sexes seldom receives more than casual mention. Most industries prefer one sex or the other. The western movement is a good illustration. The work of the pioneer calls for a spirit of adventure, freedom from inertia, muscular strength and the power of physical endurance. Hence, the first steps toward pushing forward the frontier have usually been taken by men. The gentler sex has followed later. "Go west, young man"—not young woman—has been the injunction. An excess of males on the frontier and an excess of females on the Atlantic slope has been the result. In 1880 the number of females in Texas, Michigan, Minnesota, Kansas and Nebraska ranged from 80 to 90 per cent of the number of males; in Oregon, California, Dakota, Washington and Colorado, from 50 to 80 per cent; and in Wyoming, Nevada, Montana, Arizona and Idaho, the males outnumbered the females more than two to one.¹ This condition was notorious in California during the years following the discovery of gold.

It was estimated that women made up only two per cent of the population of the mining camps and but eight per cent of that of San Francisco. It was said that the chief qualification of an early governor was the presence of his wife and two daughters. Tickets to a wedding sold readily at five dollars each. Miners separated from home would frequently travel miles to see a child and would weep at the sound of its voice. A child born in the diggings received presents of gold dust that would have constituted a modest fortune in the states.²

Social conditions contributed to this result. Men encounter

¹ Tenth Census, Population, pp. xxxiv, xxxv.

² Sparks, *The Expansion of the American People*, p. 342.

less resistance than women in migrating. The care of the aged and of the sick less frequently devolves upon them, and they are less hedged about by the conventionalities of society. It is far more a matter of course for a boy to leave home and strike out for himself than for a girl. "Birds of passage" in modern immigration include few women. Single men, also, can migrate more readily than married men. They are less securely anchored by the ties of affection and need not choose between leaving their families and the added expense of taking them along. Some men, moreover, hesitate to expose those dependent upon them to risks which they would willingly incur on their own account.

As the frontier of the miner yields to that of the farmer, and as the logging camp and the construction gang disappear, women become more and more an industrial as well as a social necessity, and the proportion of males declines. Of first importance is the fact that industrial opportunities for women abound in cities, and, as will presently appear, nothing has contributed so much toward increasing the proportion of women as urban development. Incidentally, the wives and children left behind by some of the early pioneers swell the proportion of females by joining the head of the family. As industrial conditions in the West, therefore, become more like those in the East, the proportions of the sexes in the two sections show less difference. The proportion of males, during 1890-1900, decreased in six of the eleven minor geographical divisions, remained constant in one, and slightly increased in the other four. Only two minor divisions had an excess of females in 1900 as compared with three in 1890.¹

Two counter movements have probably more than offset this more even distribution of the sexes. The first is the swarming of women to cities. In 1890 there were slightly more males than females in the urban population. Ten years later the females greatly outnumbered the males. In the same decade the proportion of females in the country districts slightly declined. The proportion of females exceeds the proportion of males

¹ Walter F. Willcox, *Proportion of the Sexes*, Bulletin 14, Bureau of the Census, p. 10.

in cities of all classes, save only in those with 2500 to 4000 inhabitants, and even in this class the proportion is considerably larger than in the surrounding country districts. The proportion is largest in cities with 8000 to 25,000 inhabitants. In Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the females exceed the males even among the foreign-born white. The distribution of the sexes between city and country in Europe is similar to that in the United States, though in the principal cities of Russia and India the conditions are exactly reversed.¹

Chief among the causes of the drift of women to cities is the difference between urban and rural pursuits. The former attract females in greater numbers than males, while the latter appeal more exclusively to males. Not merely the pecuniary return but the opportunity to gratify the desire for freedom and the sense of economic independence attract women to cities. Perhaps nothing has done so much in recent years to free woman from some of the fetters of society as the enlargement of her industrial opportunities in the urban development. At any rate, the effect has been to dissociate the sexes and to offset, largely if not altogether, their more even distribution between the East and the West. In one respect the segregation of the sexes is decreasing. In another respect it is growing, especially where the urban population is rapidly increasing. The dissociation of the sexes between city and country corresponds to that between the Atlantic slope and the Central West. The contrast is the same as between New Jersey and Kansas.²

To the rule that females predominate in the cities and males in the country there are, however, important exceptions. The needs of the industrial situation at any time and place exercise a controlling influence. The demand for females in southern agriculture, for example, is such that the cotton belt, the black belt, and the counties in which the females outnumber the males roughly coincide. On the other hand, in the urban population required for lumbering, coal mining and iron working, the males outnumber the females.³ The dissociation of the sexes is, consequently, intensified by the fact that some cities contain an

¹ Willcox, *op. cit.*, pp. 15, 19, 38.

² *Ibid.* p. 15.

³ *Ibid.* p. 16.

excess of males. Of the 160 cities with a population of at least 25,000, 59 have more males than females. In 36 cities the proportion of males exceeds that of the states in which these cities are respectively located. Seattle, South Omaha, Portland, Oregon, Superior, Duluth, East St. Louis, Gloucester, Youngstown and McKeesport are among the most noteworthy instances. There are more females than males in the cotton-mill towns of New England, but just the reverse is true in the mining and steel manufacturing centers of Pennsylvania and other states. Of the population of Troy, New York, a collar and cuff manufacturing center, only 46.19 per cent are males, while in the neighboring city of Schenectady, an electrical manufacturing center, the per cent is 53.83.¹ While, therefore, females are in the majority in the larger cities taken as a whole, there is an excess in some and a deficiency in others, and the distribution of the sexes is more uneven than at first sight appears.

A second movement which tends to offset the tendency toward the more even distribution of the sexes between the East and the West is foreign immigration. In marked contrast with many countries in Europe, the males not only outnumber the females in the United States, but the proportion of males is increasing. Migration contributes to the excess of males here and to the excess of females there. Fully three-fifths of all our immigrants are males, and 54.4 per cent of the foreign born belong to the same sex. As a result, the proportion of the foreign born and the proportion of males in the total population vary directly. Excluding the foreign white, the percentage of males in the population is 50.73. Including the foreign white, the percentage is 51.22.² This compares with 50.3 per cent in the total enumerated population of the world.³ Since 1900 the volume of immigration has been unusually large, and the proportion of males among immigrants exceptionally high.⁴ For

¹ Willcox, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 20.

² Twelfth Census, Population, part i, p. xciv; Abstract of the Twelfth Census, p. 10. Immigration also contributes to the excess of males in Canada and Australia; cf. The Canada Year Book, 1906, p. 2, and Walter F. Willcox, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

³ Walter F. Willcox, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁴ Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1905, p. 53.

these reasons, the proportion of males in the total population has undoubtedly increased in the last ten years. Moreover, the age distribution of the foreign born is another important fact. They belong largely to the age classes in the prime of life, and partly on this account the proportion of males in the total population is greatest among adults. In other words, immigration tends to segregate the sexes chiefly in that portion of the population which is of marriageable age.

The first part of our study leads to the following result: In recent years, the segregating power of the western movement has been waning, while that of the movement cityward and that of immigration have been growing greater. The net effect has probably been to increase the separation of the sexes.

II

Wherever monogamous marriage prevails, the relative scarcity of either sex enforces a certain amount of celibacy upon the other. Here the scarcity of males, there the scarcity of females limits marriages and births. In states where males are in the majority, the proportion of males married is smaller than the proportion of females married, whereas the reverse is true in states where females are in the majority. Ohio, Illinois, Texas and Oregon are fairly representative of the states in which males preponderate; and the proportions of men and women at least fifteen years of age married in Ohio are respectively 56.4 and 57.7 per cent; in Illinois, 54.2 and 57.7 per cent; in Texas, 54.7 and 60.4 per cent, and in Oregon, 46.1 and 61.4 per cent. On the other hand, the proportions for states in which females preponderate are reversed. The proportions of men and women married in Georgia are respectively 57.6 and 56.7 per cent. The figures for Virginia are 53.1 and 52.6 per cent; for New York, 55.1 and 53.6 per cent; and for Massachusetts, 53.8 and 49.8 per cent.¹ Since there are 1,638,321 more males than females in the United States, the proportion of males in states where they preponderate usually exceeds the proportion of females in states where they preponderate. This is true of the

¹ Abstract of Twelfth Census, p. 83.

two sets of states named. Hence, the opportunities of males in the first set to marry are more restricted than the opportunities of females in the second. This accounts for the fact that the difference in the proportions of the sexes married is greater in the one case than in the other.

A corollary of the foregoing is that foreign-born males intermarry with native-born females more frequently than the reverse, because the deficiency of females among the foreign born is exceptionally large. Of white persons having fathers born in Austria, 4.3 per cent have native-born mothers, whereas of white persons having mothers born in Austria only 1.5 per cent have native-born fathers. The corresponding percentages for those having at least one parent born in Ireland are respectively 12.7 and 7.9; in Germany, 15.4 and 5.9; in England, 23.8 and 14.9; in Sweden, 5.1 and 2.8, and in Italy, 3.1 and 0.4. These figures are without exception typical of other countries. Of 5,089,202 native whites having one parent native-born and the other foreign-born, two-thirds have foreign-born fathers.¹

A second corollary is that the scarcity of females increases the number of early marriages among women. Of males, 15 to 19 years old, only one per cent is married, as compared with 10.9 per cent of females.² While this condition at any time and place is largely controlled by custom, as in the South, where early marriages are especially common, the scarcity of females together with the preference of men for wives younger than themselves is a factor in the problem. In the states of the Western division, the proportion of females under 20 married is generally larger than in the North Atlantic states.³

As a result of men taking wives younger than themselves, the effect of an excess of males among adults upon the relative proportion of the sexes married is minimized and sometimes obscured. In the population above 19 years old, for example, the number of married men is considerably in excess of the number of married women, since all married women under 20 are left out of the account. The result is that while the pro-

¹ Twelfth Census, Population, part i, p. cxcii.

² *Ibid.* part ii, pp. lxxxvii, lxxxix.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 259-307.

portion of married men among the males of marriageable age is given with substantial accuracy, the proportion of married women among females of marriageable age is not correctly indicated. In the North Atlantic and South Atlantic states there are somewhat more men than women (above 19), and yet the proportion of adult males married in each of these divisions exceeds the proportion of females. Where, however, the excess of males is marked, as in the North Central and especially in the Western division, the effect upon the proportions of the sexes married stands out boldly, in spite of the large number of married women under 20 omitted.¹

Moreover, in determining the limitations upon marriage of a scarcity of females, the married portion of the population should properly be excluded and the inquiry confined to the single, widowed and divorced, or to those eligible to marry. For the same reason, all persons under marriageable age should be excluded. Excluding those married and all minors under 15 years of age, 53.1 per cent of the remainder of the population are males, as compared with 51.2 per cent of the total population. In other words, the dearth of females is greater among those eligible to marry than in the population as a whole. In the North Central States, the percentage of males among those eligible to marry is 54.6, and in the Western division the eligible males outnumber the eligible females nearly two to one.² Strictly speaking, the dearth of eligible females is greater than the figures stated indicate, because of the large number of widows, whose chance to marry is less than that of the spinsters on account of age.³

Unequal distribution of the sexes is of a threefold character. There is a large excess of males in the West, due to the westward migration; there is a notable excess of females in cities and of males in the country districts, because of the different demands of urban and rural development; and there is a considerable excess of males in the total population to which foreign immigration contributes. The restriction of marriage

¹ Twelfth Census, pp. lxxxv, lxxxvi.

² *Ibid.* part ii, pp. lxxxii, lxxxiii.

³ Mayo-Smith, *Statistics and Sociology*, p. 109.

caused by the last of these inequalities is not only the greatest of the three, but, as already noted,¹ it has measurably increased in recent years. In each of these cases the restraint of marriage is due to one or both of two causes; the friction of distance, and social, racial and international differences. The latter will be considered in the third part of this paper.

First, then, as to the friction of distance. An excess in the matrimonial supply of either sex at any given place does not find its way to places where the supply is deficient with anything like the readiness with which commodities flow to the points at which they are most needed. This is largely because commodities are standardized, and can therefore be sent from the point of excess to the point of deficiency with a fair prospect that they will find takers. A man in Liverpool can readily order a cargo of cotton or wheat from any quarter of the world by sample, with reasonable assurance that he will get what he wants. In the realm of the sentiments, however, the personal equation is decisive. Human affections do not conform to any hard and fast lines, nor are individuals made after any fixed pattern. Hence, one condition essential to a world market in the case of commodities is lacking in the matter of giving and taking in marriage.

Distance interferes more with the circulation of persons than with that of commodities for a second reason. The latter are objective to self, as one's person is not, and can therefore be sent from place to place without interfering seriously with one's comfort or convenience. The trader risks only his fortune in a business venture, while he who marries risks his very self. Moreover, freight rates are relatively much lower than passenger fares. Hence, distance interposes far more resistance to social relations than to trade.

In the third place, marriage is normally the outcome of acquaintanceship, and distance interferes with the sort of acquaintanceship which is likely to ripen into affection. In the arrangement of marriages proximity is far more necessary than in most business transactions. Instances of love at first sight

¹ *Supra*, pp. 642, 643.

are not uncommon; but most persons in their right minds wish to see and know something more of each other, prior to marriage, than a chance acquaintance reveals; and this usually requires proximity at recurrent intervals. The ruling families of Europe contract international marriages for reasons of state or to avoid marriage with their social inferiors. Foreigners with titles, also, occasionally exchange a certain social status for generous marriage settlements with American heiresses. In general, however, the rule holds that local shortages in the matrimonial supply of either sex are not made good by drawing upon the world at large. In point of fact, the intervention of a third party, so characteristic of the modern bargain counter and so necessary to bring consumer and producer together, seldom figures in the mating of the sexes. Courtship by proxy is next to impossible, as the case of Miles Standish illustrates; and few things are more sure to arouse resentment than proffered aid in a matter that is so purely personal as marriage. Society is much more mobile in gratifying its economic wants than in ministering to its sentiments.

The concentration of the excess of males in the United States in three of the five leading geographical divisions adds force to the preceding reasoning. All but three-tenths of one per cent of the excess is in the South Central, North Central and Western divisions; 82.3 per cent of the excess is in the last two divisions.¹ In many parts of the Western division, the scarcity of women is so great that "men are little more than wall flowers at dances and other social functions." The relative scarcity of women in any country limits the opportunity of men to marry, and the concentration of the excess of men within a portion of the country limits their opportunity still further. In fact, an excess of either sex within a portion of a field limits its opportunity to marry quite aside from the inequality of the sexes within the field as a whole. The sentiments are seldom equal to the task of bringing together the units which economic forces have dispersed.

¹ Twelfth Census, Population, part i, p. xcvi. The distribution of the sexes in Canada is similar to that in the United States. There are 132,101 more males than females in the Dominion, and 81.1 per cent of this excess is found in the western provinces and territories; cf. The Canada Year Book, 1906, pp. 2-13.

An inspection of the age distribution of the population in several western states confirms the preceding analysis. If the excess of males concentrated in certain geographical divisions were chiefly among minors, the effect upon marriage would be almost nil. The reverse, however, is the case. For the development of the West has not only attracted males rather than females, but it has appealed especially to males in the full vigor of life. Accordingly, in Illinois, the males constitute 51.3 per cent of the total population and 52.2 per cent of the portion from 20 to 54 years of age. The corresponding figures for Texas are 51.8 and 53; for Oklahoma, 53.8 and 55.9; for California, 55.3 and 56.8; and for Oregon 56.3 and 58.9. For the United States the corresponding figures are 51.2 and 51.9. In each of the states named the concentration of the excess of males in the age period between 20 to 54 is, therefore, more marked than in the country at large. In three of the states named, moreover, the proportion of males among those under 20 is less than for the entire country, and in Oklahoma and Texas the females in this portion of the population actually outnumber the males.¹ These facts lead unmistakably to two conclusions. First, the excess of males in the United States is more marked in the age class from 20 to 54 than in the total population. Secondly, the concentration of this portion of the male population is especially noteworthy. In other words, the deficiency of females is precisely at the point where, in connection with the friction of distance, it necessarily limits the number of marriages.

Due account should of course be taken of the various acquaintance-promoting forces and agencies which counteract distance. A certain spirit of adventure and the attraction of the unknown prompt many to seek acquaintances outside of their immediate locality and circle of friends. In many instances, the very meagerness of the home supply may put men

¹ Twelfth Census, Population, part ii, pp. 110, 111. In Canada these conditions are even more striking than in the United States. In Manitoba, the males constitute 54.2 per cent of the total population, and 57.4 per cent of the portion in the age class between 20 and 54. The corresponding percentages for British Columbia are 63.8 and 70.9; *cf.* The Canada Year Book, 1906, pp. 4, 5, 18, 19.

on their mettle and stimulate them to look elsewhere. The agencies which promote acquaintance away from home are many and varied. Annual conclaves, religious or secular, world's fairs and expositions, summer and winter resorts, Chautauquas, attendance at college and at athletic games, the postal service, cheap excursions and travel for business, all perform an acquaintance-promoting function which results in a certain number of marriages as a by-product. By contrast ours is, indeed, a cosmopolitan age. However, the forces and agencies noted entice few far from home. Curiosity and a spirit of adventure are often satisfied a short distance away. With all the improvement in material conditions and in the agencies of transportation, lack of means still limits the long-distance travel of the masses. Most colleges are largely dependent upon local constituencies, and the attendance at world's fairs comes mainly from the region immediately tributary. Many excursions are such rush affairs as to afford little time for acquaintance. Notwithstanding the aid of the mails, relatively few friendships long outlast the separation that usually follows their establishment. New friendships, near enough to be kept up, side-track the old. Of the marriages which result from acquaintances formed away from home, some are contracted between persons from the same locality or from localities in which the proportions of the sexes are the same. Of the remainder, a certain number merely offset each other; for example, a marriage that carries an eastern girl to the West is counterbalanced by a marriage which brings a western girl to the East. The net effect of the agencies which counteract distance in promoting acquaintance is, therefore, less than appears upon the surface.

III

Propinquity is but one of the conditions favorable to marriage. A certain degree of social equality is at least equally important. Modern industrialism has still further segregated the sexes by creating class differences which interfere with social intercourse. Of these differences, three deserve special consideration.

Lines of social cleavage due to differences in industrial and

economic status have become much sharper during the last two generations. In most country communities, fifty years ago, the hired man was socially so nearly the peer of his employer that he frequently married the daughter of the man for whom he worked. Such marriages have become much less frequent. When land was so abundant that practically every man was the potential if not the actual owner of a farm, one man was as good as another; but as the public domain approached exhaustion and it became increasingly difficult for the landless man to become a landowner, social distinctions arose. In the towns and cities the differences between the employer and the employee class have become even more marked. In town and country alike, however, economic, industrial and cultural differences have widened and deepened until intermarriage is normally quite out of the question. The exceptions in which sentiment bridges the gulf are so rare as to prove the rule. Where class distinctions reach the point that one portion of the community does not feel welcome to attend the church of another portion, the chance for social intercourse on terms of equality is small. Under such conditions, the matrimonial supply for either sex is restricted to the number of the other sex available in the same social class. The limitations are, therefore, greater than the inequality of the sexes within the community as a whole indicates. The economic motive is the great driving power in the evolution of modern society, and in any given class it frequently assembles more of one sex than of the other.

The cleavage line between city and country marks a second class difference. The conventionalities of life are so much more exacting in the city than in the country that the countryman is apt to feel ill at ease with those brought up in the city. The contrast extends to the working hours. In the country a man at work does not hesitate to take off his coat to add to his comfort, while in the city the office force of certain large corporations works with coats on no matter how sweltering the weather. It is not so much distance as social contrasts that keep city and country apart. The term "hayseed" suggests social inferiority. As relatively more of the population has

drifted cityward, the cleavage line between city and country has hardened and become more important as a social barrier. It is more rigid between the large center and the country than between the small town and the country. The city-bred girl seldom looks for her ideal in the country-bred man, nor does the lot of a farmer's wife usually appeal to her. Thus there is little chance of eligible suitors from the country population for the excess of women in cities. Again, the number of farmers' daughters predisposed to marry city-bred men increases the supply at a point where it is already excessive.

In the third place, immigration deposits the discordant races and nationalities of Europe and of other lands side by side in the United States, and time is necessary to overcome their antipathies to each other and their lack of like-mindedness with the native born. There is a certain correspondence between the demands of the industrial situation at any time and the quality as well as the quantity of immigrants.¹ The sources of immigration have, consequently, shifted as the country has become less exclusively agricultural and more and more industrial, until drafts have been made upon practically every country in Europe and upon many in Asia. Prior to 1890 immigration came chiefly from northern and western Europe, but during the next ten years 50.1 per cent of all immigrants came from southern and eastern Europe.² In 1880, 3.9 per cent of the foreign-born population were natives of the second group of countries; in 1890, 8.8 per cent; in 1900, 18 per cent.³ Since 1900 the proportion has doubtless still further increased. Racial, national and religious feeling as well as industrial and economic differences impede intermarriage between these diverse elements as well as between them and the native born. Immigrants from southern and eastern Europe are more strongly affected by these hindrances than those from northern and western Europe, since the deficiency of females among them is much greater. In the ten years, 1881 to 1890, the proportion of males among immigrants ranged from 51 per

¹ J. R. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America*, chapter v.

² Twelfth Census, *Population*, part i, p. cii.

³ *Ibid.* p. clxxi.

cent among the Irish and 57.6 per cent among the Germans to 65.8 per cent among the Russians (including the Russian Poles), 73.8 per cent among the Hungarians and 79.4 per cent among the Italians.¹ Moreover, the immigrant population is largely concentrated in the northern states, notably in the larger cities. The purely social barriers above noted further limit the opportunity of the foreign-born males to marry.

Mixed marriages, between either the foreign born and the native born, or between the foreign born of different nationalities, occur most frequently at the point of least resistance. Irish-born males intermarry most frequently with natives of Scotland, English Canada and England, the number of marriages increasing in the order named. German-born males intermarry most frequently with natives of France, Switzerland, England and Ireland; English-born males with natives of Germany, Scotland, English Canada and Ireland; English-Canadian-born males with natives of Scotland, England and Ireland; males born in Sweden with natives of Norway and Germany; and males born in Scotland with natives of English Canada, England and Ireland.² These are the principal combinations between the foreign born. While propinquity doubtless contributes to the number of these combinations, the conclusion is unavoidable that community of thought and feeling, associated with a common language and more or less community of traditions, plays an important part. Mixed marriages between the foreign born and the native born are controlled by the same influences. Immigrants from northern and western Europe intermarry more freely with the native born than do immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, as the following comparisons show. Of native white persons with fathers born in Sweden, 5.1 per cent have native mothers. The corresponding figures for those whose fathers were born in Norway are 8.7; in Denmark, 9; in Ireland, 12.7; in Germany, 15.4; in Switzerland, 17.7; in Scotland, 19.4; in Wales, 19.6; and in England, 23.8. These figures compare with 1.68 per cent for those with Russian, 2.2 per cent for those with Polish or Hungarian

¹ Mayo-Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

² Twelfth Census, Population, part i, p. cxci.

and 3.1 per cent for those with Italian fathers.¹ The wide disparity between these two sets of figures is due mainly to two facts. In the first place, immigrants from the second group of countries are more heavily handicapped by racial, religious and linguistic hindrances than are those from the first group. Secondly, immigration from the first group set in so much earlier than from the second that intermarriage between recent comers and the native-born descendants of the earlier arrivals is possible in the one case as it is not in the other. When the immigrants from southeastern Europe shall have had more time to learn the ways of the country and to solve their economic problems, doubtless relatively more will intermarry with the native born.

Foreign immigration has tended to make good the deficiency of males in the North Atlantic states due to the western movement; but from the matrimonial point of view, the foreign-born males do not take the place left open by the westward migration of the native born. This helps to explain the large number of spinsters in some eastern communities. When it comes to types so divergent as are the Japanese and the Chinese, intermarriages with persons of native white extraction are extremely rare. The volume and intensity of the popular opposition to immigration from these countries is but another expression of the same antithesis. In the long run, the increased ease with which people are transported and brought into juxtaposition with each other may tend to render of one mind the diverse peoples of the world, but the immediate effect is to bring into relief the differences that separate them. With all the advance in religious toleration, the differences between Jews and Christians and between Catholics and Protestants still act as a bar to marriage. The nomination and election of Judge Taft to the presidency awakened a real although unimportant opposition because he was a Unitarian. Probably neither of the two leading parties for years to come will dare to invite the opposition which the nomination of a Catholic to the presidency would arouse. And while religious differences have become less acute,

¹ Twelfth Census, Population, part i, p. cxcii.

differences in refinement and education and in industrial, economic and social status have become more pronounced. The instinctive feeling against the miscegenation of negroes and whites in the United States is apparently as strong as ever. As society grows more highly differentiated, an excess of either sex in any social class becomes unavailable to make good a deficiency in another.

To sum up: Of the influences which dissociate the sexes and thereby determine the precise proportion of marriageable persons in each sex at any time and place, economic conditions are the most important. The affections play a subordinate rôle; they do not prevent matters of economic moment from separating the sexes, and they do not easily overleap the economic lines of separation even in single instances. Among economic conditions none is more fundamental to the modern industrial and social structure than transportation. By making possible an interchange of products, it has differentiated the work of the world into feminine and masculine pursuits, with the result that there is an excess of women in some localities and an excess of men in others. And since economic conditions are all the time shifting, no distribution of the sexes is equally good for all time, nor is there any distribution at any point in time that is equally good for every place. The forces in control usually stop far short of complete segregation, but they seldom bring about precise equality. There is a certain adjustment of the number of each sex to that of the other that best meets the need of each particular situation.

The limitations upon marriage due to the segregation of the sexes are for the most part independent of the human will and make for involuntary rather than voluntary celibacy. They abridge the opportunity rather than lessen the inclination to marry. The relative scarcity of either sex sets an inelastic limit which, in connection with the friction of distance, necessarily excludes a portion of the other from marriage; and the differentiation of society into classes tends to limit choice within class lines that are little less inelastic. The choices of the more numerous sex are subject to qualitative as well as to

quantitative restrictions. It is not contended that these limitations act to the exclusion of all others or even that they are paramount. Probably the influences of chief importance in accounting for the decline of marriage and birth rates act through the agency of the will. Such at least is the view to which many economists and sociologists incline. The thesis here advanced and maintained is that the unequal division of the sexes within any geographic limits or class lines exerts an appreciable and at times an important influence.

The selective forces which segregate the sexes have been increasing in strength. The preference of the western movement for males has become less pronounced, and the excess of males is somewhat more evenly distributed over the country. On the other hand, the proportion of males in the country districts has slightly increased, while the proportion of females in the cities has become decidedly greater. At the same time the insistent demand of certain cities for males has still further dissociated the sexes. Again, the significance of the continued movement westward of the center of population should not be overlooked. The end of each decade has found a larger proportion of the total population residing where the scarcity of females limits the opportunity to marry. Moreover, immigration has swelled the proportion of males in the total population, notably among adults, and since 1900 this has been especially marked, partly because of the number of immigrants and partly because, in response to changed industrial conditions, new sources of immigration have largely supplanted the old. Finally, the segregating influence of cultural and other differences has been steadily growing stronger. The disappearance of the public domain, the growth of manufactures and commerce, the flocking to cities, the volume of immigration and the shifting source of its supply have been forcing the differentiation of American society for fully thirty years at an unusually rapid pace. The net effect of these several tendencies has been unfavorable to the marriage rate. Assuming that births have varied directly with marriages, the net effect has also been unfavorable to the birth rate.

CHARLES FRANKLIN EMERICK.

SMITH COLLEGE, NORTHAMPTON, MASS.

RADICAL DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE. IV¹

MATURITY, DECLINE AND FALL

THUS at last had disappeared the three great shams of the age: a sham church, a sham army and a sham monarchy. What were the substitutes? Merely another set of shams. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy did not meet the wants of the religious, being abhorred alike by pious ultramontanes and by fanatical radicals. The enthusiastic but rowdy mob which composed the army had neither generals nor discipline nor supplies, and its first brilliant exploit was followed by disaster after disaster until the crowning disgrace of Neerwinden, when France was again invaded. The sham monarchy was succeeded by a sham "polyarchy," wherein Danton, Robespierre and Hébert were in turn the real but irresponsible dictators, evading the Convention and tricking the nation by devices which met each crisis but were destitute of permanent worth.

Step by step the Jacobin minority had been outwitting the Girondin majority in parliamentary tactics. The country now believed that the Girondins had brought on the war and had utterly failed in its conduct until the energy of the Jacobins had won the victory. It believed, further, that the Girondins harbored federalistic sentiments, making for division and weakness, while the Jacobins were securing a united front against a sacrilegious invasion. It believed, finally, that the Girondin majority had destroyed the monarchy only by a half-hearted apologetic indirection, while the Jacobin minority had no responsibility except for positive, vigorous deeds, essential to the preservation of the nation and the establishment of popular sovereignty. This growing conviction was the invaluable political outfit with which the Mountain set out to strip its opponents of every vestige of power and to save the gains of the Revolu-

¹ See POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. xvii, pp. 631-649; vol. xviii, pp. 238-253; vol. xxii, pp. 245-266.