

the author is broader and better than a classicist. It would be well to do away with the term, unless we are also to have Slavists, Teutonists, Chinists etc. Mr. Trever's work is too sound, and will be too widely useful, to be tabooed as classicist. He has promised a work on Greek economy. There are plenty of studies of particular subjects in the field but no comprehensive treatment known to the reviewer, and nothing whatever in English. Such a work is needed, and Dr. Trever is competent to prepare it.

GEORGE WILLIS BOTSFORD.

*La Crise de la République.* J.-L. DE LANESSAN. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1914.—vii, 342 pp.

*France Herself Again.* By ERNEST DIMNET. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914.—xxx, 399 pp.

It is sometimes said of Bodley and Lowell that simply because French government functioned differently from English or American government they considered its functioning defective. They are accused of rendering superficial judgments (as in the matter of cabinet instability) on the basis of standards familiar to them at home. In reality their criticisms were derived from French sources and have been largely justified by the experience of the last twenty years. M. de Lanessan, writing before the outbreak of the war, is still more critical. His views cannot be brushed aside as merely those of a pessimistic individual; indeed their importance depends upon the fact that they reflect a prevalent attitude among the most distinguished French publicists. Nor is he one of those reactionaries whose business it is to deride and discredit republican institutions. He is a disciple of Waldeck-Rousseau, under whom he served as minister of marine. His attitude toward the church is very much that of Aristide Briand—a full acceptance of the existing anti-clerical legislation and at the same time a belief that in the hour of victory the vanquished should be treated in a generous and conciliatory spirit. Aside from his political career, he is a scientist and an author of reputation, having written some twenty volumes on such diverse subjects as religion, colonization, Chinese philosophy, botany, and the problems of national defense.

The crisis which he describes is involved in the perversion of the parliamentary system, the substitution of legislative for executive power. The chambers, instead of responding to leadership, have reduced the ministers to vassalage and undertaken to govern France according to the Jacobin tradition. The absence of responsible authority

has led to administrative anarchy, financial disorder, and many other evils. "The Third Republic has come to a phase of its evolution where it must adopt a new orientation or succumb, as all the preceding régimes of the last century have succumbed, because of the lack of suppleness." Unless brought into harmony with the spirit of the nation, it will be "poisoned by the vices which are devouring all its organs." Sound government, M. de Lanessan says over and over again, requires the existence of two major parties of fairly equal strength. Such a situation obtained in France while the monarchists were strong enough to form an effective opposition; but as resistance to the republic gradually collapsed, the Republican party disintegrated into groups and sub-groups which soon lost anything in the shape of real programs and retained only their ambitions and their appetites. The prime minister, relying upon a temporary alliance of groups rather than upon definite policies, constitutes the alliance by the skilful distribution of portfolios; and the ministers, as mere delegates of the groups, are jealously watched and are always open to the charge of treason. In view of this situation, the number of groups tends to increase; every deputy of mark hastens to form a new group and thus render himself, as the phrase goes, *ministvable*.

M. de Lanessan cites chapter and verse in support of his contentions. He discusses, for example, the disclosures made in the senate when the budget of 1914 was being debated. It was then shown that the cabinets of the previous ten years, unable to control the individual deputies and prevent the pillaging of the treasury, had resorted to all sorts of expedients and rendered deceptive financial statements in order to conceal what was taking place. "To sum up, we have no budget because we have no government and we have no government because our parliamentary system does not possess the great parties which are indispensable to its proper functioning." M. de Lanessan examines the attitude which the various groups have taken toward the issues of the election of 1914 (military service, electoral reform and the income tax), and he concludes that, even with the sacrifice of the famous minimum program of the Radical-Socialists, a government of the extreme left has become impossible. The cleavage within the ranks of the Radical-Socialist party has not been affected by the "unification" of the party in 1913. After the elections of the following year, leaders of the left wing spoke of an alliance with the Unified Socialists as an "imperious necessity," while Léon Bourgeois, representing the right wing, demanded a policy of conciliation and a majority which would exclude the Republican Federation (Progressists) on the right and the

Unified Socialists on the left. Because of this cleavage the Ribot-Bourgeois cabinet was driven from office as soon as it faced the chambers. M. de Lanessan believes that in future the groups cannot form the basis of any government worthy of the name. "No ministry which does not have a program at once very definite and very homogeneous will be durable. . . . I believe that France is in such a state of moral discomfiture that there would be grave danger in neglecting to show in the clearest fashion the direction in which the government wishes to lead her." In fact, notwithstanding the multiplicity of groups, the way lies open to the development of two large parties—the party of force and the party of liberty. To unite the liberal elements nothing is needed now but resolute leadership and a definite program. Aristide Briand and Louis Barthou, two politicians who stand very close to the president, made a beginning in the spring of 1914 when they organized the Federation of the Left. In the last hundred pages of his book M. de Lanessan seeks to formulate a comprehensive and detailed platform which he thinks the great mass of liberals would accept.

First of all he wishes to impose limitations upon parliament, which, under the control of the radicals, has become a collective despotism and destroyed civil liberty. There must be a court, like the American Supreme Court, to enforce certain great principles of private rights such as those proclaimed by the Revolution. "Right must be placed above the law. No law, for example, should invade the natural right by virtue of which every citizen may practise and teach freely his religion or his philosophical ideas." The powers of parliament and the ministers would be farther reduced by a sweeping measure of decentralization, thirty great "regions" taking the place of the departments and determining all matters of local concern. Since the deputies are mainly occupied with overthrowing cabinets in order to secure places for themselves, the ministers should henceforth be chosen from outside parliament, the only exceptions being the ministers of the interior, justice, and foreign affairs, one of whom should be prime minister. The scope of the president's authority should be extended, not by any change in the constitution, but by an abandonment of the political custom which has made him hitherto, in the phrase of Marcel Sembat, a mere "hole at the top." Eventually the constitution should be amended so as to provide a new method of choosing the president. M. de Lanessan also advocates reforms in taxation and in budget procedure, the systematic development of internal resources and means of transportation, a more conservative attitude toward social reform, the abolition of government monopolies, a civil-service law

which would free the permanent officials from political influences, and an improvement in the personnel of the chamber of deputies by means of proportional representation. If some of these proposals are open to no serious objection, others seem quite beyond the range of practical politics. It is not quite clear how a court, erected by statute, would dare to override an act of parliament because it conflicted with some vague principle of the Declaration of Rights, or how the president could assume effective command of the army and navy, as M. de Lanessan suggests, without compromising the whole system of ministerial responsibility. Moreover, according to his own thesis, the abuses which he describes would disappear with the formation of strong parties; the checks and balances would no longer be necessary when once the Liberal party had become strong enough to impose them.

The election of President Poincaré has been regarded as significant of a new tendency in French political life. It seemed to mark the disintegration of the Radical-Socialist party which had dominated the government for ten years or more. The Radical-Socialists offered bitter opposition to his candidacy. They feared him as a man of strong character and positive ideas who had resolutely opposed their most cherished policies, especially in the matter of national defense. In the national assembly they greeted his election with cries of "Down with the dictator! Down with the nominee of the Right!" They understood that the issue raised between the Radical-Socialist Pams and the moderate Poincaré at Versailles was part of a larger conflict which threatened to drive them permanently from the seats of power.

France was at that time passing through something like a transformation; and M. Dimnet seeks to explain the nature of the change. He believes that decadent influences, which had begun to assert themselves under the Second Empire, culminated in the years 1898-1905. In the latter period "a sort of destructive folly possesses the politicians; they wildly go to work, and what they do is nothing short of the sackage of France in the name of reason and justice." But in 1905, just when this destructive spirit was at its height, the nation had to face a sudden crisis.

The Tangier affair was a flash of lightning, after which the clouds lifted. It was one of those events which rapidly destroy a whole system of thought or, at any rate, throw into the shade the protagonists who only a short time before seemed to hold the field, meanwhile liberating another system until then unnoticed or disregarded. What has been called the regeneration of France dated from that shock.

In presenting his views M. Dimnet examines a wide range of phenomena, political, literary, educational, moral. His exposition is brilliant, but prejudiced. His scathing indictment of Emile Combes completely ignores the clerical and military intrigues which provoked reprisals; in discussing the Dreyfus case he does not disguise his sympathy with the army and with the church. He condemns the passive attitude shown by President Poincaré at certain critical junctures, notably after the fall of the Barthou cabinet, and observes that "he will never be again, unless he should make a *coup d'état*, the representative of that generous spirit which uplifted France and gathered every energy around him when he was prime minister." M. Dimnet demands strong government. But it would be a mistake to classify as a reactionary a man who considers Alexandre Millerand "by far the clearest head and the strongest hand this country has known since 1870, outside the army."

M. Dimnet emphasizes as one of the aspects of "Combism" its pacifistic spirit. During those three years of Combes (1902-1905) the socialists controlled the cabinet, although not one of them held office in it; Jaurès was the real master, because socialist votes kept the cabinet in office. This will explain why on official occasions Combes allowed the red flag to be displayed and the Internationale to displace the Marseillaise. It was indeed a time when the cult of internationalism had many devotees outside the Socialist party. Never had belief in the fraternity of nations been more general. Patriotism was derided, even in class-rooms, extremists maintaining that the absorption of France by another state would be no calamity at all. "War appeared as a barbarous impossibility, and the chief preoccupation of the ministers of war and marine was to civilize the army and navy, turn ships and barracks into institutions for the civic perfection of young Frenchmen, and, in short, prepare the world for universal peace." While the officers instructed their men how to raise pigeons or bees, the frontier defenses were neglected. Military service was reduced to two years. It was very much the same with the navy under the administration of the journalist, Camille Pelletan. He "had ideas of his own concerning the composition of the fleet; their chief result was the passage of the naval power of France from the second rank to the fourth. He did not believe more than André in the possibility of war, and the navy magazines were as empty as those of the army."

This was the situation when in 1905 the Kaiser landed at Tangier, causing the citizens of France suddenly to realize that their dream of internationalism had been an illusion.

From high to low the French felt that they were threatened with a foreign domination, and the most unbearable foreign domination they could imagine; it was enough to revive in them the passionate interest in their state which used to possess their ancestors, the ennobling consciousness of participating in its defense, if not in its government. In truth it is on the memory of those moments that France has lived ever since, and her fountain of new energy rose when she realized the significance of the Kaiser's demonstration in Morocco. . . . The universal feeling was the consciousness of an immense absurdity. Pacifism had been a ridiculous farce. Because modern people, too nervous to think of blood, had chosen to think of commerce and money instead; because a few dozen socialists in France and Germany had bragged that no fratricidal duel would henceforward be suffered where they had a word to say; because M. Léon Bourgeois had been admired at a Congress of Peace, and M. d'Estournelles de Constant meditated writing a crushing letter to the first monarch who should call his people to the flag, war had been regarded as an impossibility. But war at present was near at hand all the same. It mattered little that France had not wished for it, never given a thought to it—there it was.

The immediate consequence was a revival of the military spirit. "The yearly maneuvers, which reservists had formerly been glad to shirk, were accepted as treats. The officers who commanded those of 1905 are unanimous in their statements that the men were as different from themselves as if twenty years had intervened." Political indifference diminished. The country, manifesting a desire for more effective leadership, regarded with satisfaction the gradual shifting of the basis of authority from the chambers to the prime minister.

The indisputable fact is that since the Tangier affair France has constantly been in search of a man—to such an extent that successive disappointments have only made her longing more acute. . . . On the whole M. Clemenceau, who had never acknowledged any authority, showed himself the most authoritative of prime ministers, and, in spite of all that in his already long life had been known against him, the country loved him for it.

Then came Briand, Poincaré, and Barthou. "These three men were looked upon as rescuers. . . . At various periods of their governments they had to speak up, show the strong hand, and on the whole make the enemies of order realize that they felt the country on their side against anarchy, and would act in consequence." M. Dimnet, after developing these considerations at some length, notices other aspects of the renaissance, above all the rapid diffusion of a new mentality which set its mark upon literature and upon theories of education.

As for the future, M. Dimnet notes "the existence in the national atmosphere of a longing, a sort of Messianic expectation of a better state of affairs." There is hope that the pressure of opinion will be sufficient to bring about, "slowly or forcibly, through persuasion or through *coup d'état*, a modification of the constitutional laws limiting the powers of the Senate and Chamber and giving sufficient elbow-room to the government to make its name something better than a mockery and its responsibility a reality rather than a word." He very kindly furnishes a recipe for the *coup d'état*. He explains how the parliamentary sessions should be suspended, how a dozen members (including Clemenceau and Caillaux) should be arrested, and how the operation would be "wonderfully easy" if certain men were appointed to the portfolios of war and the interior, and to the prefecture of police.

Who are the people against whom this violent operation would be conducted? Ask anybody living in France; his embarrassment will show you at once that the tyrant one would have to get rid of is not very formidable . . . The more one thinks over these possibilities the more one sees that the rampart between a dictator and his success is neither public opinion, nor any strongly organized or sufficiently popular party, but a Senate and Chamber so divided and weak, so impregnated themselves with the belief in a change, that resistance on their part would practically be impossible. To sum up in one brief formula, both the tyrant of France and her possible liberator are anonymous, but the tyrant is a cardboard giant who has long ceased to be a scarecrow, while the liberator is a living hope.

Unhappily, while a *coup d'état* never seemed more advisable, the men who could accomplish it are not disposed to act. "What is the good or even the interest," M. Dimnet despondently concludes, "when everything indicates that it will not take place?" However, if the specific cannot be applied, recourse may be had to palliatives; and M. Dimnet endorses the proposals which Charles Benoist laid before the country in the elections of 1914: the president to be invested with independent authority, the ministers to be chosen from outside parliament, the existing electoral system to be supplanted by proportional representation, and the power of the national government to be reduced by a measure of decentralization. These would be the first steps; but ultimately the country should be relieved from the incubus of "the legal anarchy known as the constitution of 1875."

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*The Philosophy of Nietzsche.* By A. WOLF. London, Constable and Company Limited, 1915.—116 pp.

Dr. Wolf's slender volume contains the substance of a series of lectures given at the University of London in February 1915. Its very title suggests a method of treatment that differs greatly from the usual way of writing about the author of *Thus spake Zarathustra*. And whoever thinks of Nietzsche mainly as a writer of diabolical aphorisms about War, Women and the Blond Beast will be sorely disappointed by Dr. Wolf's unsensational and thorough-going analysis of the chief elements of his philosophy. Contrary to custom, Dr. Wolf bases his argument not on the marvelous though oftentimes bewildering poetry of *Zarathustra*, but mostly on the solid prose works, with pronounced predilection for *The Will to Power*.

Dr. Wolf abstains from giving any account of Nietzsche's life and personality. The only concession he makes to popular pre-occupations is the insertion of an introductory chapter on "Nietzsche and the War." He deserves credit for having proved once for all by documentary evidence, that the all-too-familiar picture of the militaristic villain Nietzsche is "a work of creative imagination, unrestrained by knowledge" (page 9). He demonstrates the absurdity of coupling Nietzsche's name with those of Bernhardi and Treitschke, by quoting from Nietzsche's scathing arraignment of the Treitschkean type of "national and political lunacy" (page 11). He emphasizes Nietzsche's own political and cultural ideal of the broad-minded "good European" (page 12); his opposition to the doctrine of "armed peace" (page 18); his proposal of a "gradual reduction of armaments" as far back as 1879 (page 15); his fervent anticipation of a "European league of nations" (page 16). Over against this, Dr. Wolf maintains the purely poetical nature of certain dicta from *Zarathustra*, which smack of swashbuckling militarism, and have of late gained so much notoriety through Nietzsche's would-be disciple Bernhardi. Many of Nietzsche's most bellicose utterances do not at all refer to the war of battlefields. "When Nietzsche speaks of 'War,' he means the interplay of cosmic forces, or the struggle of ideas, or opposition to oppressive conventions, or the struggle with one's own passions and impulses to secure self-mastery" (page 20). However, Nietzsche was not a pacifist pure and simple; and Dr. Wolf slightly exaggerates when he declares that "his political views remind one of the peace societies and of the Society of Friends rather than of Bernhardi and Treitschke" (page 17).