

*The Philosophy of Nietzsche.* By A. WOLF. London, Constable and Company Limited, 1915.—116 pp.

Dr. Wolf's slender volume contains the substance of a series of lectures given at the University of London in February 1915. Its very title suggests a method of treatment that differs greatly from the usual way of writing about the author of *Thus spake Zarathustra*. And whoever thinks of Nietzsche mainly as a writer of diabolical aphorisms about War, Women and the Blond Beast will be sorely disappointed by Dr. Wolf's unsensational and thorough-going analysis of the chief elements of his philosophy. Contrary to custom, Dr. Wolf bases his argument not on the marvelous though oftentimes bewildering poetry of *Zarathustra*, but mostly on the solid prose works, with pronounced predilection for *The Will to Power*.

Dr. Wolf abstains from giving any account of Nietzsche's life and personality. The only concession he makes to popular pre-occupations is the insertion of an introductory chapter on "Nietzsche and the War." He deserves credit for having proved once for all by documentary evidence, that the all-too-familiar picture of the militaristic villain Nietzsche is "a work of creative imagination, unrestrained by knowledge" (page 9). He demonstrates the absurdity of coupling Nietzsche's name with those of Bernhardi and Treitschke, by quoting from Nietzsche's scathing arraignment of the Treitschkean type of "national and political lunacy" (page 11). He emphasizes Nietzsche's own political and cultural ideal of the broad-minded "good European" (page 12); his opposition to the doctrine of "armed peace" (page 18); his proposal of a "gradual reduction of armaments" as far back as 1879 (page 15); his fervent anticipation of a "European league of nations" (page 16). Over against this, Dr. Wolf maintains the purely poetical nature of certain dicta from *Zarathustra*, which smack of swashbuckling militarism, and have of late gained so much notoriety through Nietzsche's would-be disciple Bernhardi. Many of Nietzsche's most bellicose utterances do not at all refer to the war of battlefields. "When Nietzsche speaks of 'War,' he means the interplay of cosmic forces, or the struggle of ideas, or opposition to oppressive conventions, or the struggle with one's own passions and impulses to secure self-mastery" (page 20). However, Nietzsche was not a pacifist pure and simple; and Dr. Wolf slightly exaggerates when he declares that "his political views remind one of the peace societies and of the Society of Friends rather than of Bernhardi and Treitschke" (page 17).

The central part of the book undertakes to reveal the basic impulses and ideas of Nietzsche's philosophy. Dr. Wolf recognizes that the fundamental ethical motive of Nietzsche's doctrine has something in common with the cry of "return to nature" that has been so often heard, from the Stoa to Rousseau and Tolstoy. But Nietzsche is not satisfied with merely propagating a new morality as a preacher; he is resolved to "discover and *establish* new values for life" as a philosopher. Dr. Wolf aptly points out that Nietzsche, as early as 1873, took David Friedrich Strauss severely to task for constructing his ethics quite independently of the question, "What is our conception of the universe?" (page 37).

This intimate connection between metaphysics and ethics, indispensable though it be for a just appreciation of Nietzsche's "revaluation of all values," has received but scant attention among the earlier critics of Nietzsche. It is for this reason that the two chapters on Nietzsche's theory of knowledge and of the universe constitute the most valuable part of Dr. Wolf's book. They add to our information about the essential coherence of Nietzsche's teachings. Dr. Wolf does not fail to observe that Nietzsche, in important points of his theory of knowledge, anticipates the pragmatist view. Nietzsche emphasized the "man-made" character of our "truths" in much the same spirit as William James. "The human mind, in short, may only be an instrument of power, that is, of life, and not an instrument for the discovery of 'truth'" (page 49). Dr. Wolf is not the only writer who has noticed the curious similarity of representative thinkers of modern Germany and America in certain tendencies of epistemology. The most circumstantial account of these similarities (which are not due to any direct influence of one philosopher on the other) was given in 1913 by R. Müller-Freienfels in his essay on "Nietzsche und der Pragmatismus" (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, volume xxxvi).

Nietzsche's cosmology is rooted, according to Dr. Wolf, in Schopenhauer's doctrine of "Will" as the essence of reality, in the theory of evolution, and in a misinterpretation of the principle of the conservation of energy. "Will to Power," a "creative will" resulting in continual change, is to Nietzsche the essence of the cosmic process (page 65). The universe, to Nietzsche, is a finite quantity of energy, occupying a finite space, but infinite in its duration (page 67). The doctrine of the world's eternal recurrence is the ultimate conclusion reached from such premises (page 68). Dr. Wolf attributes perhaps too much importance to Nietzsche's casual references to the possible conception of a "becoming God who is identical with the universe at each culminat-

ing stage of its development in the infinite course of its eternal recurrence" (page 73). But he demonstrates with admirable insight how Nietzsche's tragic conception of an apparently chaotic and godless universe, far from turning to a numb pessimism, actually heightened his conception of human life and destiny, and helped to formulate his ethical idea of a "full, heroic life."

Only the last chapter of the book is given to a discussion of the most familiar though often misunderstood parts of Nietzsche's philosophy, his views on human life and conduct. Here again, Dr. Wolf's painstaking and circumspect interpretation succeeds in exposing certain popular misapprehensions through which Nietzsche's name has come into disrepute. He takes the sting out of the offensive distinction between master morality and slave morality by reducing it to a simple recognition of a natural "order of rank" among men, which makes it impossible to apply the same code of conduct to all alike (page 93). And the ethical ideal of the superman is far from being "the horrible vision of a supermaniac" (page 77); "it is not a soft option, but a severe discipline" (page 113). "The conception of a full, courageous, and spontaneous individuality has a message for everybody of intelligence and spirit" (page 113).

Dr. Wolf finally pleads that the gospel of the superman has touched a sympathetic chord even among democrats.

It is the inmost and growing purpose of democracy not that all men be alike, but that all alike should have an opportunity of cultivating each his own individuality according to the measure of his endowment. And that purpose is after Nietzsche's own heart. . . . The spirit of modern democracy and the spirit of Nietzsche's philosophy are not so opposed as is often asserted. Nor do his views on the future of mankind and their international relations contain anything but what may be regarded as a consummation devoutly to be wished [page 114].

This somewhat hasty endeavor to enlist Nietzsche in the cause of "democracy" is not quite unwarranted, surprising as it seems. As early as 1910 Professor Hammacher worked out an ingenious theoretical synthesis of Nietzsche's aristocratic individualism and the altruistic motives which underlie the modern social welfare movement ("Nietzsche und die soziale Frage," in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft* volume xxxi). Hammacher comes to the conclusion that a highly socialized state of society is the *sine qua non* for the realization of Nietzsche's individualistic ideals. There can be no doubt that notwithstanding Nietzsche's personal enmity to democracy and socialism,

the actual effect of his teachings on the German nation has been to stir up a new impulse toward individual development even among the working classes. A recent publication of A. Levenstein, *Nietzsche im Urteil der Arbeiterklasse* (Leipzig, 1914), gives documentary evidence for this much overlooked practical outgrowth of Nietzsche's philosophy. Thus, Dr. Wolf's concluding remarks are not so paradoxical or fantastic as might appear at first glance.

On the whole Dr. Wolf's book commends itself not only by its scholarly method and the judicious treatment of its subject; a skilful arrangement of the material, together with a remarkable facility in presenting difficult problems in a lucid and interesting manner, contributes to render the little volume especially useful for any one who desires to get a concise summary of the problems connected with the philosophy of Nietzsche.

TRAUGOTT BÖHME.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

*The Prevention and Control of Monopolies.* By W. JETHRO BROWN. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1915.—xix, 198 pp.

This volume discusses the problems of monopoly with reference to Australian conditions: While paying considerable attention to American writings, the author keeps the reader on his guard against drawing general conclusions from special American experience, and indicates what differences in policy the Australian situation may demand. This fact makes the book a suggestive one for American readers. It shows that American experience is not final, and it also points out aspects of our situation which, not being salient and unmistakable, have been neglected. The author discusses a wide range of topics, including syndicalism as a remedy for private monopoly, the limitation of size, publicity, supervision of competition, nationalization, public competition, limitation of profits, control of prices, the New South Wales Gas Act of 1912, and the treatment of the Australian sugar industry. Covering so much in such small compass, the treatment cannot be exhaustive, and it has the merits and the limitations of a somewhat informal discussion. The interest increases in the latter part of the book as the author passes from general to specific topics and to a more first-hand discussion of detailed questions.

So far as the book has a general thesis, it is that no one remedy by itself is adequate, but that each has a useful place, and that a system should be above all things adaptable, giving ear to the interests as