

Germanism, the dream of universal empire, the fantasy of Charlemagne, the delirium of Charles V, the arrogance of Napoleon, the sanguinary folly of William." Far from being enamored of the Roman maxim, "If you wish for peace prepare for war," Dr. Sa Vianna believes that the pitch to which military preparation had been carried in Europe insured the breaking-out of a conflict sooner or later; but he declares that the great crime is not so much the fact that war was not avoided, as the spirit in which it was premeditated and the manner in which it has been carried on by the powers to which he imputes its precipitation.

Already most persons have only a hazy recollection of the events that quickly followed one another in the world of finance at the end of July and early in August 1914. It is the object of *War and Lombard Street* (New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1915; viii, 171 pp.) to give an outline of what took place in financial London during those momentous days. The author is M. Hartley Withers. The subjects with which he deals are more or less technical, but he shows great facility in explaining them so that they can be readily comprehended by the average reader. Owing to London's position as the money-center of the world, the problem was external as well as internal. What happened bore striking testimony to the City's financial strength. In the course of his review the author discusses the mechanism of exchange, the relief given to the acceptors of bills, the issue of finance bills, and the moratorium and the measures by which it was put into effect. He evidently feels much solicitude regarding the future workings of the provisions of the Currency and Bank-Notes Act of 1914, under which the government has been issuing its own paper money. This "new departure," so susceptible of abuse, will, he thinks "have to be watched over and regulated very carefully," in order that the government may not "go on merrily paying its way in pieces of paper, and inflating the currency to any extent that it pleases."

Mr. Daniel Chauncey Brewer's *Rights and Duties of Neutrals* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916; ix, 260 pp.) is a readable discussion of principles and practices relative to the rights and duties of neutrals. The common-sense of the author and his general grasp of the practical bearing and relative importance of the question he is discussing make up, to a certain degree, for his evident lack of scientific training and familiarity with juridical principles. For instance, in chapter xxi on "unneutral service" he says not one word about unneutral service; instead he discusses violations of neutrality. Mr. Brewer well points out the necessity of preparing to defend our rights "to compel peace as soldier kings have compelled war." International law, he believes,

will never assume "the position which belongs to it, nor non-belligerent nations secure their rights, until neutrals are themselves prepared single-handed or in company to join battle in vindication of principles to which they are committed."

*The Diplomacy of the War of 1812* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1915; x, 494 pp.), by Frank A. Updyke, Professor of Political Science at Dartmouth College, embodies the Albert Shaw lectures on diplomatic history at Johns Hopkins University in 1914. It is material to observe that the title of the volume is, as the author points out, somewhat broader than the contents, since the work is in effect confined to Anglo-American relations, with special reference to the negotiations leading to the signing of the Treaty of Ghent. The author has not only diligently explored the printed sources, but has had access to the manuscript archives of the Department of State at Washington and also of the British Foreign Office. His use of the sources has been full and painstaking, and his labors are in that particular to be highly commended. But, as is the case with so much of our current historical writing, fidelity is secured more by the process of transcription than by the thorough assimilation and mastery of the subject-matter and the presentation of the essential points with clear and perspicuous brevity. As a result the average reader is likely to become lost in the long succession of statements that Mr. Adams said thus and so, that Lord Somebody then answered him to this or that effect, and so on, in endless compilatory succession, with scarcely any effort on the part of the writer to bring the essential issues into vivid and impressive relief. These remarks are by no means exceptionally or peculiarly applicable to the present work, whose merits deserve distinct acknowledgment. They apply to a great part of our present historical "output," which, like the multiplication of unnecessarily prolix judicial opinions, may now and then betray the reader into the expression, indiscreet though it be, of a desire for condensation and clarity. It would be a great gain if we could enlarge our collection of true source-material by the more extensive publication of original text, and thus pave the way for briefer commentaries.

A brief account of the relations between the United States and Great Britain since the signing of the Treaty of Ghent in 1814 is given in *One Hundred Years of Peace* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1913; vii, 136 pp.), by Henry Cabot Lodge. In reality the hundred years of peace have, as appears by the narrative, been anything but tranquil. The War of 1812 had barely closed when diplomatic controversies began again to spring up. Besides, almost or quite