

will never assume "the position which belongs to it, nor non-belligerent nations secure their rights, until neutrals are themselves prepared single-handed or in company to join battle in vindication of principles to which they are committed."

*The Diplomacy of the War of 1812* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1915; x, 494 pp.), by Frank A. Updyke, Professor of Political Science at Dartmouth College, embodies the Albert Shaw lectures on diplomatic history at Johns Hopkins University in 1914. It is material to observe that the title of the volume is, as the author points out, somewhat broader than the contents, since the work is in effect confined to Anglo-American relations, with special reference to the negotiations leading to the signing of the Treaty of Ghent. The author has not only diligently explored the printed sources, but has had access to the manuscript archives of the Department of State at Washington and also of the British Foreign Office. His use of the sources has been full and painstaking, and his labors are in that particular to be highly commended. But, as is the case with so much of our current historical writing, fidelity is secured more by the process of transcription than by the thorough assimilation and mastery of the subject-matter and the presentation of the essential points with clear and perspicuous brevity. As a result the average reader is likely to become lost in the long succession of statements that Mr. Adams said thus and so, that Lord Somebody then answered him to this or that effect, and so on, in endless compilatory succession, with scarcely any effort on the part of the writer to bring the essential issues into vivid and impressive relief. These remarks are by no means exceptionally or peculiarly applicable to the present work, whose merits deserve distinct acknowledgment. They apply to a great part of our present historical "output," which, like the multiplication of unnecessarily prolix judicial opinions, may now and then betray the reader into the expression, indiscreet though it be, of a desire for condensation and clarity. It would be a great gain if we could enlarge our collection of true source-material by the more extensive publication of original text, and thus pave the way for briefer commentaries.

A brief account of the relations between the United States and Great Britain since the signing of the Treaty of Ghent in 1814 is given in *One Hundred Years of Peace* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1913; vii, 136 pp.), by Henry Cabot Lodge. In reality the hundred years of peace have, as appears by the narrative, been anything but tranquil. The War of 1812 had barely closed when diplomatic controversies began again to spring up. Besides, almost or quite

one-fourth of the volume is devoted to an exemplification of the style of detraction and abuse which Southey, Sydney Smith, Dickens and other English writers indulged toward things American. The feeling thus engendered had by no means disappeared when the Civil War broke out in the United States, only to be followed by words and by acts, such as the fitting-out of Confederate cruisers in British ports, which again carried resentment to a dangerous pitch. In saying that, after the questions growing out of the Civil War were settled, there was no "clash" between the two countries till the "English invasion of the Monroe Doctrine" in the case of the Venezuelan boundary, the author either overlooks the fisheries dispute of 1886-88, or else considers it less serious than it was then generally believed to be. "England was surprised, and operators in the stock market were greatly annoyed," by President Cleveland's message on the Venezuelan boundary, it is stated, but, "however much Wall Street might cry out," the President "had the country with him." That the effects of the panic were, however, more serious than a mere flurry among stock gamblers, may be inferred from the public appeal immediately afterwards made by President Cleveland for the replenishment of the gold reserve. Moreover, the imputation that the award eventually made by the tribunal of arbitration at Paris on the boundary question was a diplomatic compromise and not a judgment based upon the evidence will not by any means be unanimously or unreservedly accepted by those who are acquainted with the law and the facts of the case. But it is no doubt true, as the volume indicates, that the attitude of Great Britain towards the United States during the ten years following the Venezuelan incident was more conciliatory than during the preceding decade. This circumstance is duly emphasized as an augury of continued peace and friendship.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, has issued (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915; xxx, 303 pp.) an English version of the texts of *The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907*, with tables of signatures, ratifications, and adhesions of the various powers, and the texts of the reservations. These translations reproduce the official translations of the Department of State at Washington, "except that a few obvious reprints and occasional mistranslations have been corrected." The fact should not, however, be lost sight of, that the original text of the various acts is the signed French text, which is the ultimate standard of authority.