Outline of International Law. By ARNOLD BENNETT HALL. Chicago, La Salle Extension University, 1915.—v, 255 pp.

The author states in his preface that this volume is intended as a brief, non-technical statement of the underlying principles of international law; that it is written, not for the specialist, but solely for the general student and reader who is interested in the world problems of today. The text, consisting of 131 sections, occupies only two-fifths of the volume. The rest is devoted to a classified bibliography and to reprints of some of the Hague conventions, and of the Declaration of London. The author undoubtedly states his propositions with clearness and force; but the demands of condensation sometimes result in the omission of essential elements, while occasionally he relies on authorities that seem to have misled him. No judgment was rendered against the United States in the case of the Texas Bonds (page 12). The decision of the umpire is readily accessible, but not in the work cited. The definition of piracy taken from another writer (page 38) is manifestly too broad; nor is the distinction noted between piracy by law of nations and piracy by municipal statute. The right to appropriate fisheries on the high seas disappeared long before the Bering Sea dispute (page 38), in which the pretensions of the United States in that regard were found to be based upon erroneous assumptions and to have no foundation whatever. The statement of the case of Martin Koszta, taken in connection with the title of the section (page 42), might create the impression that more effect was sought to be ascribed to the declaration of intention than was actually claimed for it. A third state would undoubtedly be justified in disregarding a claim based on domicile as against a claim based on citizenship, either naturalized or native. In Koszta's case there are two capital points to be noticed: (1) that he had, as the United States contended, actually lost his Austrian allegiance by a decree of that government; and (2) that the sole original ground of the claim of the United States to protect him was the fact that he was an American *protégé*, a ground which was never abandoned. The author apparently has relied upon the fragmentary and misleading statement of the case in Wharton's *International Law Digest.*

In saying that a diplomatic agent "can never . . . be tried or punished by the local authorities" (page 45), the author probably did not intend to imply that this cannot be done if his government consents to it. The obligation of a foreign man-of-war to respect the local police regulations (page 48) extends equally to the rules of neutrality, the

observance of which the local government may compel. Consular jurisdiction usually depends, not upon the fact that a foreigner is "a party" to the suit (page 49), but upon the fact that the defendant is a foreigner.

Not four classes of public ministers were created by the Congress of Vienna (page 52), but only three; a fourth class (the third in the present schedule) was added by the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Nor is it likely that inquiries at Washington, for instance, would fully substantiate the assertion that the classification is "of little importance except for ceremonial purposes." In regard to the dismissal or recall of ministers, the case of Catacazy (page 55) was complicated by certain circumstances, and especially by the visit of the Grand Duke Alexis, which render it valueless as a precedent.

The sections on treaties (65–73) might be slightly amplified to advantage; for instance, it is of the utmost importance that the elementary reader should know that the interpretation given by the United States to the most-favored-nation clause (page 63) is not generally accepted by other nations. Even our own most-favored-nation clauses are by no means confined to privileges "gratuitously" granted. It is true that the United States, Spain and Mexico did not at the time adhere to the Declaration of Paris of 1856 (page 90), but Spain at length gave her adhesion on June 18, 1908.

The section on blockade and contraband might be rendered more precise if amplified in certain particulars. This is very important at the present moment when highly metaphorical uses of the word "blockade" are current. Nor can the importance of the subject of contraband, and the confinement of claims under that title to proper limits, be overestimated. There can be no doubt that if it be left to belligerents alone to determine these questions, there is scarcely any rule established for the protection of neutral trade that is worth the paper on which it is written.

As to the Hague conventions relating to war, it is to be observed that they contain a clause which renders them inapplicable to conflicts in which not all the parties are adherents. The Declaration of London never acquired international force by the exchange of ratifications, Great Britain having declined to adopt the legislation necessary to give effect to it on the part of that government. Some of the provisions of the Declaration are indeed open to serious difference of opinion, the questions covered being substantially controversial.

J. B. Moore.

The Crowd in Peace and War. By Sir Martin Conway. New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1915.—332 pp.

The war has stunned everyone somewhat from his power to think, and has set him to feeling after the reason, the meaning of it all. Many there are who, congenitally unfit for dispassionate judgment, lacking the discipline of science in cautious generalization, and untrained in social psychology, rush into print with discussions designed to catch the popular ear, with philosophies which ofttimes cause the social scientist to "gasp and stare." An admirable case in point is the present volume by Sir Martin Conway, a student of art. As a contribution to knowledge the book is worthless; but as such it was probably not intended, and as such it would therefore be unfair to judge it. It is rather an attempt to deal in popular language with the relations of "crowds" to individuals and of "crowds" to one another.

Judged even in the light of the purpose for which it was planned, the work must face indictment on at least three counts. In the first place the author has failed to acknowledge his heavy debt to the French crowd psychologist, Le Bon. In the opening chapter where, "illustrating by concrete examples rather than by defining," Sir Martin endeavors "to show the kinds of human aggregations to which the word 'crowd' may be applied," he finds these two kinds of crowds: (a) "assemblages of human beings, all physically present together at one time and within one area, each individual conscious of the presence of the next," and (b) "groups of human beings not physically assembled together within sight and hearing of one another at any time and place, yet forming collective bodies which have a separate and conscious existence." In the second chapter, inquiring into "the nature of such crowds," he concludes that a crowd, the emotions being the basis of its formation, has no brain, never displays a trace of intelligence, and that "the opinion of a crowd has no relation to the reasoned opinion of the majority of its members, but is a mere infectious passion that sweeps through the whole body like an electric current." To any one familiar with the work of the Frenchman the striking resemblance between his teachings and those just quoted is apparent. Several passages of Conway are indeed little but loose translations of sentences published by Le Bon in 1896. Take a single illustration from page 8 of his book. "A multitude of people walking in the street, each about his own business, may form a dense mass ot humanity, but they are not a crowd until something occurs to arrest their attention and inspire in them a common emotion." Le Bon in his *Psychologie des Foules* (page 12) says: