

# *Ferment in the Communist Orbit*

*Editors' Note:* As this issue was being prepared for press, it was already apparent that the destalinization campaign initiated by Moscow last February had set off a chain reaction of increasing ferment throughout the Communist world. Nowhere, however, was there anticipation of the lightning eruption of that ferment into the terrible yet inspiring drama which has unfolded in Eastern Europe in recent weeks, shaking the Communist world to its foundations. In the immediacy of this crisis, it is impossible to predict what the repercussions of events in Hungary and Poland will be. One thing alone is certain: the profound heroism of the Hungarian people in their struggle for freedom, and the brutal suppression of that revolt by Russian tanks and guns, has revealed, as nothing before, the naked force on which Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe depends.

In the article below, the eminent political analyst Richard Lowenthal reviews the developments which led up to the East European crisis and offers a tentative analysis of its possible

impact on Kremlin policy. As he shows, the question is no longer one of defining the limits of post-Stalin "democratization" and "liberalization" but of wondering whether these "Khrushchev" policies can survive at all. On the other hand, events in Poland leave room for hope that the powerful impetus toward greater freedom from Soviet domination, put in motion by the "destalinization" program, will be carried forward. A second article by Alexander Korab discusses the developing Polish situation up to the time of Mr. Gomulka's assumption of power.

The less dramatic but nevertheless significant impact of "destalinization" on Communist China is discussed in a third article by G. F. Hudson, who also addresses himself to the problem of future Sino-Soviet relations. The latter two articles were written prior to the crisis in Hungary, though an attempt has been made to add crucial information where necessary.

## *Revolution Over Eastern Europe*

By RICHARD LOWENTHAL

**T**WELVE years after the Russian armies first established Soviet rule over Eastern Europe, the empire founded by Stalin has been shaken by a revolutionary earthquake of altogether unimagined force and scope. The tragic outcome of the Hungarian revolution must not blind us to the fact that both in Hungary and Poland, essentially revolutionary movements for the first time not only have broken the surface of totalitarian uniformity, but have in their different ways achieved an unprecedented measure of success. Moreover, they have done so entirely on the basis of the crises and contradictions which had developed within the Soviet orbit, without the aid of international conflict and indeed despite international diversions favor-

able to the Soviet rulers. The "national Communist" canalization of the Polish movement and the bloody suppression of the Hungarian uprising may restore outward calm for the moment, but the Soviet East European empire will never be the same again. Nor can this shattering blow fail to have profound repercussions both on Soviet relations with the non-Communist world and on political developments within the Soviet Union itself.

What was new in the October revolutions of 1956 was not that the national and social grievances of two enslaved peoples fused in a powerful outburst of mass revolt; that had happened before—in Pilsen and in the whole of Eastern Germany in June 1953 and in Poznan in June 1956. What was new—and, indeed, as unexpected as it was unprecedented—was that the popular movement for freedom managed in Poland to impose on the Communist Party, and through it on

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the Polish administration and army, a new leadership committed to national independence and to through-going changes in internal and economic policy. In Hungary the movement succeeded in virtually taking over the national army and, with its help, overthrowing the Communist Party dictatorship, splitting the hitherto ruling party, and creating a democratic national government committed to internal freedom and international neutrality. An attempt to understand how these events were possible is clearly vital to our judgment of the future prospects of Soviet rule in Europe.

### The Breakdown of Kremlin Control

THE major common factor in the background of both the Polish and Hungarian events was clearly the weakening of Soviet authority both within the international Communist movement in general and within the satellite states in particular. That weakening, which has proceeded slowly and gradually ever since the death of Stalin and the loosening of economic and police controls in the satellites, was greatly accelerated by two major events—the Belgrade Declaration of 1955, by which the Soviet rulers recognized Yugoslavia's right to her "own road to socialism", and the "secret" Khrushchev attack on Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU last February.

The Soviet leaders had not, of course, intended that the national independence which they recognized as inevitable for the regimes of Mao Tse-tung and Tito should apply to the satellite states, on which "socialism" had been imposed by Soviet bayonets. All they meant to grant to these countries was a replacement of detailed control through mixed companies, Soviet secret police agents, and "advisers" on all levels, by a less irksome and less costly but by no means less efficient control through party, military and economic ties at the top. As for Khrushchev's speech on "the cult of the individual", it was clearly made for strictly domestic reasons, and the hope was to confine its international repercussions to a minimum.

Yet the rehabilitation of Tito, and consequently of the victims of "Titoist" purges in the satellites, could not fail to discredit the most loyal exponents of Soviet supremacy in these countries at the very time when many direct Soviet agents were being withdrawn; and the tendency to extend this discredit of pro-Moscow elements to their Russian masters was of necessity powerfully strengthened by Khrushchev's disclosure and condemnation of Stalin's methods of rule. Furthermore, the view (formulated most boldly by

Togliatti) that the Soviet system, having produced clear symptoms of degeneration, could no longer be regarded as the sole model for Communists everywhere, must have gained large numbers of adherents among Communists in the satellite states—and must have furnished arguments to far larger numbers of non-Communists in their hitherto silent opposition to both Soviet rule and Soviet-type dictatorship.

During the spring of 1956 this weakening of Soviet authority found visible expression in the astonishing outburst of free criticism in the Polish Communist and non-party press, in the openly critical discussions conducted before ever larger audiences of writers, students and young officers in the "Petoefi" circle in Budapest, and—on a smaller scale—in critical statements by writers and student groups in other satellite states.

When this wave of criticism reached its culmination in the Poznan riots of June 28, the Soviet Communist leaders, by now alarmed and in part alerted by the more "orthodox" Communist leaders abroad, tried to reassert their claim to worldwide leadership and to warn against the spread of "nationalist deviations" in the name of "proletarian internationalism." The Declaration of June 30 issued by the Soviet Communist Central Committee, as well as several articles in *Pravda* and Premier Bulganin's speech in July, were all part of an effort to stem the tide. So was Moscow's insistence that Rakosi—who had to be sacrificed as Hungarian party boss because of his former role in the fight against Tito and in the Rajk trial—be replaced by the equally unconditional supporter of Moscow's authority, Erno Geroe, and that the leader of the "national-minded" Communists, Imre Nagy, be kept out.

### The Struggle to Reassert Authority

IN the circumstances, however, Moscow's effort at tightening the reins was subject to a threefold limitation. In the first place, authority once shaken cannot be restored at will, and the attempt is liable to meet resistance unless backed by overwhelming force. In the second place, the use or open threat of force was not possible without jeopardizing Soviet efforts to woo the "uncommitted nations" and endangering Moscow's dearly-bought understanding with Tito, if not the overall strategy of "peaceful coexistence". Finally, even a non-violent attempt to reassert Soviet supremacy over the satellites was bound to cause renewed friction with the Yugoslavs. Up to the time of his Moscow visit, Tito had carefully refrained from encouraging "Titoist" currents in the satellites and had insisted on working through the Soviet

government. But during the visit he made it clear that he expected the Soviets themselves to promote some further loosening of control as part of his price for closer party relations—that is, for his return to the “socialist camp”.

During August and September all of these limitations on Moscow’s attempt to return to a semi-Stalinist attitude in relation to the satellites became visible. The Polish Communist Central Committee, caught after the Poznan riots between its desire to regain the confidence of the people and the Soviet demand for drastic action against the “imperialist agents” who had caused the trouble, preferred by a majority to yield to popular pressure and to defy Soviet advice. For the first time, the Soviet leaders found they had lost control of a formerly faithful satellite party, and they were reduced to organizing a minority faction—the so-called “Natolin group” which embraced Soviet supporters in the army and in a number of important posts in the party and trade union bureaucracy.

At the same time, the Yugoslav press resumed open criticism of the insufficient pace of “destalinization” in Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania, while a Yugoslav court condemned as a traitor a former “Cominformist” who had returned from exile in Moscow. The Soviet Communist Party’s response was to warn the satellite parties by “secret” circular that the Yugoslavs, though generally “progressive” and “friendly”, were not true Marxist-Leninists, were tainted by “social-democratic confusion,” and thus were not to be taken as a model. The Yugoslavs, promptly learning of the document, reacted with further criticism.

By the end of September, this friction resulted in Mr. Khrushchev’s surprise visit to Yugoslavia, followed by Tito’s visit to Yalta. The basic issues still dividing the Soviet and Yugoslav Communists remained unresolved, but Tito agreed to speed up his resumption of contacts with other Communist parties, including the Hungarian Party, in return for a more outspoken condemnation of the latter’s past direction and the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy.

Probably in part as a result of these negotiations, there followed a number of dynamic developments in Hungary. Early in October—on the eve of the departure for Belgrade of a Hungarian party delegation headed by Geroe—Rajk and the other “martyrs” of the Titoist purge were solemnly reburied in Budapest, and former Defense Minister Farkas was arrested for his role in the frame-up of Rajk. It was also publicly admitted that Rakosi had not resigned for health reasons in July but had been deposed for his “violations of legality.” Finally, Nagy was readmitted to the party on the understanding that he would observe

discipline but would be entitled to a re-examination of the political charges which had led to his fall and subsequent expulsion. With these developments, the authority of the Soviet leaders and of Geroe took yet another knock in Hungary.

### The Polish Revolt

MEANTIME events were moving in Poland. Totalitarian regimes can stand up to the most bitter discontent of the masses for a long time; but once authority gets weakened or divided at the top, long-standing grievances suddenly become motors of action. It is at the moment of loosening, of “liberalization,” that the masses start moving and refuse to tolerate the oppressive gesture which no longer seems to be part of an unalterable order of things.

The factional struggle within the Polish Communist leadership had quickly become a competition for mass influence of an almost “democratic” character. As the “liberalizers” stood for freedom of expression and economic reform as well as for national independence in internal affairs, the “Natolin” faction, headed by General Witaszewski, Marshal Rokossovsky’s chief political commissar, offered anti-semitism as a substitute for nationalism, and demagogic wage increases as a substitute for greater freedom and economic reform. It was this competition for mass influence which led to the resurgence of “Wieslaw” Gomulka, the former “national Communist” leader who, though released from prison, had been politically condemned for his views by the whole party leadership as late as last April. Gomulka became the arbiter of the emergent factional struggle simply because by his former resistance to forced collectivization and to Soviet control, he had become the one Communist leader whose patriotism was trusted by the non-Communist masses. Herein lies the vital difference between Gomulka’s victory and “Titoism”: Tito defied Moscow while in control of a party and state machine created by himself; Gomulka was enabled by a popular movement to dictate his terms to a party whose machine had been packed by his enemies for many years, and this in defiance of an occupying power!

The terms which Gomulka laid down before agreeing to resume leadership of the party which had expelled and imprisoned him ranged him squarely with the “liberalizers”: no economic or anti-semitic demagoguery, complete frankness on the economic plight of the country, a sharp turn away from enforced collectivization, moves toward ending enforced agricultural deliveries, dissolution of the machine tractor stations, gradual steps to decentralize economic planning, cautious experiments in “workers’ control”,

new relations with the USSR on a basis of political and economic equality, and removal of Moscow's stooges from the party leadership. It was this last point—to wit, the intended exclusion of Marshal Rokossovsky from the party Politburo—which led to the decisive showdown with the Soviet leaders on October 19.

When Messrs. Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov and Kaganovich descended on Warsaw, to the accompaniment of troop movements, at the moment of the decisive meeting of the Polish Central Committee, they were convinced that a show of determination and strength would be sufficient to restore the subordination of at least a majority of the Polish Politburo. Instead, they were confronted by a majority of men determined to risk the wrath of Moscow rather than that of the Polish people. Thus the Soviet leaders had to choose between using naked force or admitting Poland's internal independence. It was still the independence of a Communist Poland willing to stand loyally by the Soviet alliance. And though the liberalizing pressures which had brought about the change were far broader than those associated with Yugoslav Titoism, the Polish leaders were willing, for obvious geographical and international

reasons, to keep the new regime within the limits of Titoism. After a few days of hesitation, the Soviet leaders decided to refrain from using force and to accept the accomplished fact.

For months, Poland's intellectuals had talked excitedly of their "second revolution", though in fact there had been no shift in the control of the decisive levers of power. But on the weekend of October 20–21 there was indeed a revolution in Poland: on these days Gomulka resumed the party leadership and removed the Soviet stooges from it, following up his action by corresponding changes in the army. The weakening of Soviet authority and the restraints imposed by "competitive coexistence" on the use of force had caused the Soviet leaders to accept, for the first time in their history, the peaceful overthrow of a satellite regime.

### The Tragedy of Hungary

THE news of Polish events hit a Hungary already in ferment after the concessions made to the "national Communist" elements a week before—the above-mentioned solemn reburial of Rajk, the arrest of Farkas, and the partial rehabilitation of Nagy. When Geroe returned from Yugoslavia on October 23,

## *Free Hungary Speaks*

### THE PEOPLE . . .

Today we are burying our dead in Miskolc. . . . Rakosi! Geroe and other oppressors of the people! Can you hear the weeping at the funeral . . . ? Can you see the gravestones . . . ? Answer! Because the people will find you wherever you are hiding! Do not believe . . . that we shall be annihilated! . . . We have swept away the dirty surge of the tide which has brought you to the surface and now, here, at the graves of Hungarian martyrs, we believe firmly that . . . liberty . . . can never again be covered up.

—Radio Miskolc, October 28, 1956.

### THE ARMY . . .

The treacherous occupation forces attacked Budapest and several other cities in the country. The battle is on in Pecs, Szekesfehervar, Dunafoldvar, and Veszperer. Hungarians as one man are fighting against the intruders and will keep on fighting for the sacred cause of the Hungarian revolution up to their last drop of blood. . . . Hungarians, do not permit the Russian troops to carry out massacres in our precious country. The fight is still on. . . . The garrison troops of Dunanpentele will hold out to the last man! Death to the Soviet occupiers!

—Radio Dunanpentele, November 4, 1956.

### THE NATIVE COMMUNIST . . .

Comrades . . . the place of every true Hungarian Communist is on the barricades . . . [in] the struggle against brutal imperialism. We true Hungarian Communists . . . must frustrate the activities of any party which . . . tries to serve only Russian imperialism and to keep Hungary in a colonial status. Soviet leaders must realize that . . . even if they subjugate the nation, those of us who remain alive . . . will wage an underground war against them. . . . We shall do our best to present a clear picture of the Russians' colonial rule not only to our Russian comrades but to our comrades in Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and in the free countries. We shall tell them that the Soviets do not want communism, for the trampling underfoot of free nations is not communism. . . . Those who cooperate with the occupying colonial power . . . are traitors not only to Hungary but to communism, and we shall fight them. Comrades, the place of every honest Hungarian Communist is on the barricades.

—Radio Rajk, November 5, 1956.



he was greeted by the news that a students' demonstration was going on which had been initiated without party permission and was persisting, despite a party ban, with the support of the leaders of the intellectual "Petöfi" circle. At first calling for comparatively moderate reforms, the demonstration, carried forward under Hungarian and Polish national flags, quickly assumed both an unprecedented scale and a marked anti-Soviet note. By evening Geroe felt forced to broadcast a warning against "counter-revolutionary nationalism", which only served to increase anger among the demonstrators. The secret police became jittery and started to fire into the crowd. By nightfall, groups of students and workers had started to fight back with weapons supplied by Hungarian Army soldiers and officers who had joined them.

Overnight, the pro-Soviet party leaders realized that a serious uprising had started, that the army was unwilling to fight the people, and that the secret police was unable to cope with the situation. By the morning of the 24th, the regime had called on the Soviet Army for help and at the same time announced the appointment of Imre Nagy as Prime Minister in an effort to calm the population. The intervention of Soviet troops was the insufferable final blow, provoking widespread and desperate resistance. The appeals of Nagy made no impact on the aroused population; neither did the announcement on the following day that Geroe had been replaced as party Secretary by Janos Kadar (a former participant in the Rakosi regime but later its victim). Army units and officers seemed to have joined the insurgents in increasing numbers during the following days, while the government, isolated by the Budapest uprising, lost control of large parts of the country. Revolutionary workers' and students' "councils" were set up in several regions, everywhere putting the withdrawal of Soviet troops at the head of their demands.

By Sunday October 28, the Hungarian people had clearly succeeded in their revolution. The Nagy government, now no longer a facade for the pro-Soviet group among the party leaders, proclaimed a cease-fire and called for a withdrawal of Soviet forces from the battered capital. Negotiations for broadening the government leadership with non-Communist elements started in earnest. The Soviet command actually started to extricate its troops from Budapest, and the government promised both to dissolve the secret police, replacing it with a newly recruited popular police force, and to negotiate with the USSR for a general withdrawal of Soviet forces from the country. Gradually, fighting subsided.

## The Fateful Return to Brute Force

THE Soviet leaders were now faced with the question of whether to accept this second revolutionary *fait accompli*, achieved this time in open conflict with their occupation forces and in circumstances far more damaging to their prestige than in the Polish situation. For two more days they seem to have hesitated: reports concerning the machinations of "counter-revolutionaries" in Hungary ceased, and some publicity was given to Nagy's new version that the victorious popular movement was a natural reaction to the mistakes and crimes of the former Hungarian Communist leadership. This policy, motivated apparently by Moscow's desire to save what at first it thought could be saved—*i. e.*, the principle of Communist rule and Hungarian membership in the Warsaw Pact—found its most far-reaching expression in the Soviet government declaration broadcast from Moscow on October 30, which generally proclaimed the need for greater independence and equality for the member states of the "socialist camp", and specifically expressed readiness to discuss the need for further stationing of Soviet troops in Poland, Hungary and Rumania within the framework of the Warsaw Pact.

By the time this declaration was broadcast, however, a new Soviet policy for Hungary was emerging. For by October 30, the pre-1947 democratic parties of the workers and peasants had already been reconstituted in Hungary, and Nagy had announced the abandonment of the one-party regime, the transformation of his government into a genuine coalition, and his pledge to hold free elections. He had also spoken of Hungary's desire to leave the Warsaw Pact and to become neutral under international guarantee on the Austrian model. Meantime the command of the Hungarian army and air force had been taken over by "revolutionary councils", one of which threatened the Soviet forces with bombardment in case of refusal to withdraw.

By October 30 at the latest, it was thus clear to the Soviet leaders that nothing whatever would remain of their Hungarian position if they gave in. The local alternatives were brute force or total defeat. The Hungarian revolution, led not by "counter-revolutionary" émigrés but by workers, students reared under the Communist regime, and soldiers of its own army, had within a week evolved from a program of "Titoist" independence and reform to a pledge of full democracy, combining workers' councils with trade union freedom, an end to both collectivization and forced deliveries in agriculture, and a clean breakaway from the Soviet bloc. If the USSR had

given in, Hungary would have become not a new Poland or a new Yugoslavia, but a new Austria or at best a new Finland.

To tolerate such a development, as a result of a revolutionary movement directed against Soviet control, would have started a chain reaction throughout the satellite empire. It also would have inflicted a fatal blow on the Communists' confidence in the irreversible character of all their conquests, allegedly guaranteed by the laws of history. All considerations of local strategy as well as of ideology thus favored the decision to crush the Hungarian revolution in blood.

The only factor which might have stood in the way of such a decision was the effect that Soviet repressive action was sure to have on the uncommitted countries of Asia. This consideration, implicit in the whole strategy of competitive coexistence, had clearly exercised a restraining effect on Moscow up to the moment of its fateful decision. But just as clearly, that effect was bound to reach its limits at the point at which the threat of the loss of the Soviet empire loomed larger than the threat of the loss of sympathies in Asia. The Soviet leaders would rather accept a temporary setback in the competition for uncommitted countries than put up with the total loss of their own possessions in half a continent. Moreover, at the critical moment the effect of this restraining factor was largely nullified owing to the Anglo-French action against Egypt, which Moscow could expect would divert the attention of non-committed Asia from Soviet repression in Eastern Europe. The Soviet leaders thus chose to save their empire for the time being by the wholesale butchery of the Hungarian people.

### Prospects for the Future

**W**HAT are the likely consequences of this decision? In the first place, the dilemma of the policy of "relaxation" in satellite Europe has not been solved. The puppet government of Hungary installed by the Soviets under Mr. Kadar had to start by splitting even the Hungarian Communist Party,

and it seems at the time of writing to have no army, no civil service and no following; yet it is already trying to promise the Hungarian people that most of the gains of their revolution would be respected, and that even the Soviet forces will withdraw "after the restoration of order." However untrustworthy these promises may be, they testify to the unwillingness of the Soviets to cancel their whole relaxation policy officially and to resume a kind of direct rule. Yet such is the united and desperate resistance of the people of Hungary that Moscow may yet be compelled to do just that, even resorting to the Stalinist method of mass deportation—and what part of recent reforms would then survive anywhere in Eastern Europe?

Secondly, the very need to use brutal force in Hungary represents a massive failure for some of the policies initiated by Mr. Khrushchev. The cost of reconciliation with Tito and of destalinization at home has proved far higher than he calculated; the gain, even in the case of Tito, has proved extremely limited and doubtful. The attempt at an "ideological offensive" by means of flexibility has failed, and Khrushchev as its main exponent must be weakened to a corresponding extent. By contrast, the advocates of reliance on Soviet armed might and particularly the political exponents of army influence must be correspondingly strengthened. Whatever the extent of the internal frictions the Soviet leadership is probably united in regarding the Hungarian uprising and the Anglo-French intervention against Egypt as parallel challenges requiring a demonstrative reassertion of Soviet prestige.

What form this reassertion should take will be the major question at issue. The advocates of naked force certainly will be applying the strongest pressure for a return to military rigidity and uncompromising hostility to the West that Soviet Russia has experienced since the death of Stalin. But it is hard to imagine how such a return could take place without a major shift of power within the Soviet leadership—a shift which would run contrary to the profound tendency toward relaxation resulting from the internal development of Soviet society.

# Poland: The Search for Independence

By ALEXANDER KORAB

THE tumultuous events surrounding the reelection of Wladyslaw Gomulka to the Politburo of the Polish government and to the position of Secretary-General of the party cast in bold relief the less sensational developments of the past two years, as Poland moved gradually to reach her present position of qualified independence of action. While they moved with greater speed after the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party (February 1956), Polish intellectuals and party theoreticians had in effect been searching out a unique "road to socialism"—although their quest was not so defined—for over a year prior to the Congress. In the process, they had subjected their most basic theories and practices to penetrating criticism. For example, in January 1955 the Communist Workers' Party Central Committee decided to "democratize" the Security Police and to restrict its supreme powers. During the summer a campaign preceding trade union elections was enlivened by "a soul-searching criticism of managerial and trade union practices."<sup>1</sup> Even more significant was a discussion on the connection between Communist doctrine and intellectual creativity which raged in the fall of the year among the leading party ideologists. The most prominent of the debaters, Adam Schaff, won almost unanimous support for his condemnation of the "injurious personality cult" and the consequent "degeneration of the Leninist norms of party life." Although these statements did not immediately result in significant practical changes in the Communist dictatorship, the atmosphere created was unmistakably favorable to the later resolutions of the CPSU Congress.

Another factor which had as great an effect on post-Congress political developments in Poland was

<sup>1</sup> For a complete discussion see Kazimierz Grzybowski, "Trade Unions in Communist Poland," *Problems of Communism*, No. 5 (September-October), 1956.

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the death in Moscow, on March 12, 1956, immediately following the Congress, of Boleslaw Bierut, leader of the Polish party. A skillful tactician, Bierut's career was distinguished by his exceptional ability to straddle the fence between Moscow's imperial objectives and the desires of the overwhelming majority of Polish public opinion, which is both anti-Communist and anti-Russian. Bierut's death marked the end of one-man dictatorship in Poland. There arose a dualism in the Warsaw ruling system, with control divided between the party on the one hand—under the leadership of Edward Ochab, Bierut's successor—and the government on the other—headed by Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz. In the period immediately following the Twentieth Congress and before the Poznan riots they represented respectively the conservative-Stalinist and the "liberal" factions of the Polish party. As these factions struggled for supremacy, neither clearly ascendant, each with his supporters in the periodic press, the revelation of Khrushchev's "secret" speech burst on the Polish scene, adding heat to the already free-wheeling discussion.

## The Personality Cult Under Fire

WELL advanced in criticizing violations of the "Leninist norms of party life," the Polish Communists proceeded without too many personal recriminations to the heart of the matter: the reasons for the development of the personality cult in the USSR and the search for means to control its effects in Poland. The party philosopher Adam Schaff spoke for a large segment of the Polish party when he wrote in the pages of the party theoretical journal, *Nowe Drogi*, that it was not enough to condemn Stalin for being a certain type of person and possessing certain characteristics:

It is clear that such a presentation of the problem would be a demonology which is alien to the spirit and position of Marxism. It is doubtless a great practical political achievement that the distortions connected with the person of Stalin, which we term the personality cult, were described and that the individual facts of these distortions were