

politically agile Marxist colleagues. His argument reflects the fact that by 1926 the party leadership was already split into "right" and "left" deviations. Preobrazhensky was the principal economic spokesman for the "left."

In two of the three long chapters that make up the main body of the book, the author devotes himself to the development of two ideas which he considers to be fundamental to a "correct analysis" (and, by implication, to a correct policy) of how the Soviet economy should be guided during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. The first of these ideas, formulated by the author as the "law of primitive socialist accumulation," aroused a violent reaction on the part of his critics in the party press. In his view, this economic "law" required that the "half-socialist" economy of Russia, established by Lenin as a result of the NEP compromise, be prevented from being in time "devoured" by capitalism by the undertaking of a forced expansion of the socialist half of the economy, namely the state industrial sector. Such rapid expansion could only be achieved at the expense of peasant agriculture—i.e., by means of a systematic accumulation of a large volume of savings in the hands of the Soviet government, and by the transfer of the saved resources from agriculture to industry in the form of new capital funds for use in the rapid buildup of plant and equipment.

To support his argument, Preobrazhensky demonstrated, with the aid of many long quotations from Marx, that the capital funds which helped to build up industry historically in the West were acquired through a long process of accumulation which extended over the entire early, primitive phase of capitalism. With total obliviousness to the fine moral irony that mocked his argument, he reasoned that this was precisely the way in which the process of accumulation had to be organized during the early phase of socialism.

The second leading idea developed at length by Preobrazhensky related to the "law of value" (i.e., the imperatives of cost, profit, and price). He argued that this law, which rules the entire production and exchange process under capitalism, must begin to atrophy during the period of transition to socialism. He saw this process of "liberation" from the dictates of the law of value as spreading outward from the state sector of the economy, where, he reported

approvingly, "money is dying out in its role as one of the instruments for achieving spontaneous equilibrium in production."

It is a fair guess that modern readers will be more interested in the practical policy issues that were being hotly disputed within the ruling elite than in Preobrazhensky's own prodigious skill in applying the Marxian catechism of political economy to Russian economic conditions during the 1920's. These readers may find it profitable to concentrate on the materials in the Appendix, where the author addressed himself to the issues of practical politics raised by his opponents. Here there are a series of vigorous statements of his basic position on the hard choices confronting the new Soviet regime in the economic realm, qualified by some second thoughts regarding the incautious terminology he had used on occasion in presenting his case for the "subordination of the pre-socialist economic forms to the socialist forms."

Leon Herman

DESMOND DONNELLY: *Struggle for the World—The Cold War: 1917-1965*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1965.

DESMOND DONNELLY, a Labor Member of the British Parliament, is a staunch friend of the United States, and a supporter of its policy in world affairs. "In this age of 'Cops versus Robbers,'" he writes, "who is the hero? History's answer will be: the American people."

For an American reviewer, therefore, it is hardly pleasant to report that Mr. Donnelly's book is highly disappointing. Whether judged in terms of style, presentation or analysis, *Struggle for the World* must be rated as a rather shocking failure. Mr. Donnelly's attitude towards historic personages is a case in point: Lenin was "decidedly homely, if not ugly. . . . His broad face and thickish lips and unkempt beard gave him the appearance of a bulldog. . . . There was also the man's wide forehead, showing that he ought to be a thinker." Woodrow Wilson was a man who "liked to patronize little people." And more. Or take the author's evaluation of the 1917 Revolution in Russia. "Perhaps the most apt com-

ment," he writes, "was made by Philip Jordan, the Negro butler of David R. Francis, the American Ambassador. Writing home, he stated: 'On last Tuesday [he meant Wednesday] the Bolsheviks got the city in their hands and I want to tell you that it was something awful!'" Can Mr. Donnelly possibly be serious?

Despite its title, the book is not a history of Soviet-Western relations since 1917. It is, at best, a personalized commentary on people and events, particularly since World War II. (The period 1917-38 is cursorily dealt with in 49 pages.) The commentary, furthermore, tends to be exotic, playing up scandalous interpretations wherever possible. For example, the Treaty of Rapallo (1922) between Weimar Germany and Lenin's Russia is ominously referred to as "the first warning shot that could signify the opening of the Second World War." We are also informed that Stalin had "decided . . . to make common cause with Hitler" as early as 1936. (The Nazi-Soviet Pact itself is crudely labeled "Idiot's Delight.")

Mr. Donnelly's best chapters are devoted to the 1947-52 period, but only because in dealing with it he largely steers clear of analysis and interpretation, contenting himself with a detailed factual accounting of events. Wherever he does go beyond the facts, Mr. Donnelly yields to the unfortunate penchant for "fundamental" explanations. Thus his explanation of "the puzzling and indeed extraordinary" Soviet absence from the Security Council in June and July 1950 (which forestalled a possible veto of United Nations' action in Korea) "is simpler than many realize—it lies in the basic incompetence that stemmed from the overcentralization of major decisions in the Soviet Union, an inevitable consequence of the authoritarian regime." Simpler perhaps—but hardly more plausible than the fact that Stalin probably discounted the importance of the United Nations as a defender of the Republic of Korea, since, as Prof. Marshall Shulman has pointed out elsewhere, the organization "as a military power was as yet untried; nor were there any effective military preparations then in sight."

More examples could be cited, but as an American it might perhaps be best for this reviewer to rest his case right here.

Morton Schwartz

The Muslim East

MAXIME RODINSON: *Islam et Capitalisme*. Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1966.

AS MIGHT BE expected from Professor Rodinson, this is a work of great erudition. It deals with problems related to economic practice in the Muslim world, in particular examining to what extent, if at all, the capitalist system as practiced in Muslim countries has been induced or impeded by the ideology of Islam.

The author is described by his publisher as a "militant progressivist and anticolonialist" and as a "specialist with the views of a Marxist sociologist." His declared purpose is to help "the intellectuals of those countries coming within the orbit of the Muslim religion and civilization . . . to understand their destiny." Whether or not his Muslim readers will accept this help in the spirit in which it is offered, there can be no doubt that the book contains a great deal of original and stimulating thought on a subject about which there has been much misunderstanding.

Outlining the economic doctrine set forth in the Qur'an and the Sunna, the author concludes that it neither condemns in principle nor interferes with the practice of what is now known as the capitalist sector of a country's economy. He next compares Islamic economic prescriptions with those of Christianity and expresses the opinion that Islam has no more inhibited the development of capitalism on modern lines than Christianity has promoted it.

The longest and perhaps the most important chapter deals with present-day capitalism in Muslim countries. Here the author's conclusion is that the Muslim East has modeled its capitalism on the West. If it has failed to reach Western standards, this is not attributable in any way to Islam. Reluctance to invest money in industry, for example, is not due to Islamic injunctions on the subject but to the unsettled conditions prevailing in Muslim countries—a product, in Rodinson's view, of the pressure of European colonialism.

Having rejected the notion that Islamic doctrine precludes capitalism, he naturally proceeds to consider whether it is conducive to socialism. He maintains that in spite of Islamic precepts

enjoining compassion towards suffering, "these precepts have so far served more often to justify societies based on privilege." He therefore sees no reason to suppose that they will play any part in leading the way either to socialism or to étatism.

Somewhat surprisingly Professor Rodinson makes no mention of the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union where, it is claimed, Marxist socialism has been preferred to capitalism. If it is true that the Western capitalist system was imposed on the Muslim countries of the Middle East and South Asia by colonialist Europe, it is surely also true that socialism was imposed on the Muslim colonies of the Tsarist empire by the Soviet regime. Professor Rodinson's cautious references to "the Soviet experiment" and his conclusion that Lutskiy, the well-known Soviet writer on Middle East economics, is no true Marxist suggest that he might agree with this proposition.

Whether or not one accepts the arguments advanced and the conclusions reached, this is a remarkable book and a notable contribution to the study of economic practice and possibilities in the Muslim East.

Geoffrey Wheeler

Soviet Nationalities

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, US LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: *The Soviet Empire. A Study in Discrimination and Abuse of Power*. Washington, D. C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.

THIS STUDY LEAVES the reader with highly mixed feelings. On the one hand, its 200 tightly packed pages are obviously the product of an assiduous effort of compilation and documentation, providing a large variety of source materials bearing on the nationalities problem in the USSR, supplemented by statistical tables and maps. On the other hand, except in the short chapter on "Economic Retardation," the material is presented in a most indiscriminating fashion. No attempt is made to distinguish between reliable and unreliable sources, and a variety of genuine and less genuine experts are quoted in and out of context. The end result

is a smorgasbord of extremely uneven quality.

The study also suffers at times from a regrettable lack of objectivity. There are certainly more than enough valid criticisms to be made of Soviet nationality policy, but there are some crimes which were *not* committed by Moscow, and not every single Soviet move has a hidden nefarious meaning. Is there anything unusual, for example, about the fact that "Russians hold a commanding position within the RSFSR" (p. 13)? Or, whatever the bad features of kolkhoz life, can one say without exaggeration that "the Soviet peasant remains a collectivized serf" (p. 66)? Again, granted that there are elements of colonialism in Moscow's relationship with the nationalities of Central Asia, can it simply be assumed that "politically the Soviets have created a strictly colonial relationship with clearly racial overtones" (p. 144)? Or can one properly define the economic relations between Russia and the non-Russian republics as "imperial-colonial . . . reminiscent of the European experience during the age of exploitation and empire building" (p. 163)?

We are told that students from the provinces are admitted to Moscow institutions of higher learning on the basis of some regional or Union Republican quotas (p. 137). Doesn't much the same thing apply to the Ivy League schools in the United States? What is wrong in the fact that most Soviet universities are located in Russia (p. 139)? Where else would one expect them to be located? What is so unusual if Russians, who account for 54.9% of the total population of the USSR, constitute 58% of the professionals? Is it really surprising that almost four times as many books per capita are published in Russian as in Kazakh (p. 125)? Since when are the Kazakhs such voracious readers? It sounds impressive to say that "in Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, the Russian influx has reduced native Lithuanians to a minority" (p. 158), but how many centuries ago was it that Lithuanians last constituted a majority in Vilnius? Are Uzbeks really suffering "total discrimination in art" (p. 135)?

Prerevolutionary conditions are treated with scarcely any greater sophistication. The Ukraine is said to have been "an ordinary colony of the Russian Empire" (p. 130), which is at least controversial; and Russian expansion from the Volga to the Pacific Ocean