

NOTES & VIEWS

Peking and the Indian CP

By Hemen Ray

When the Communists seized power in China, they believed that their victory established the pattern for further anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist revolutions throughout Asia and the rest of the underdeveloped world. Only two weeks after the birth of the new regime on October 1, 1949, they already were showing interest in India. In a message to B. T. Ranadive, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (CPI), Mao Tse-tung promised Chinese Communist aid to the CPI in order "to free" India from the "yoke of imperialism and its collaborators."¹ In early 1950 the Cominform called upon the Indian Communists to follow the Chinese path

with the aim of establishing a "people's democracy" in India.²

Some elements within the CPI were in fact already interested in the Chinese Communist revolution before its final triumph. In mid-1949 the left-wing Andhra Communists were advocating adoption of the Chinese revolutionary model in order to capture power in India. In December 1953, however, the CPI officially rejected the applicability of the Maoist strategy of revolution to India. This change in the party's attitude was the direct result of Soviet opposition to Mao's claim that the Chinese revolution should be recognized as the "prototype" for future revolutions in underdeveloped areas. Soviet pressure, however, failed to eradicate Chinese influence.

Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalin caused new ferment in CPI ranks and led the party to look again to the Chinese Communists for guid-

ance. Ajoy Ghosh, who had become CPI General Secretary in 1951, urged members of the party to study the CCP's statement "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" as the "most elaborate" and "satisfactory statement" regarding Stalin's role and as a "guide" for resolving the troubles and doubts caused by Khrushchev's action.³ Throughout the period 1956-58, the CPI was under pressure from both Moscow and Peking. On the one hand, it deferred to Soviet advice in giving support to Nehru's foreign policy, while on the other hand it continued to take a friendly attitude toward Communist China.

In the spring of 1959, the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations caused by Communist China's armed suppression of the Tibetan re-

¹ *Communist* (Bombay), Vol. III, No. 1, January 1950, p. 110.

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² *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* (Bucharest), Jan. 27, 1950, p. 1.

³ V. B. Karnik, ed., *Indian Communist Party Documents, 1930-1956*, The Democratic Research Service, Bombay, 1957.

volt created new difficulties for the CPI. In spite of Indian sympathies for the Tibetans, the party at first adopted a line supporting the Chinese action and echoing Peking's charges that "the commanding center of the rebellion" was in the northern Indian town of Kalimpong, where the Dalai Lama had taken refuge after fleeing Tibet. Secretary Ghosh criticized statements made by Prime Minister Nehru on the Tibetan situation as "heavily biased in favor of the rebels" and denied that "all the blame lies with the Chinese."⁴

In August of 1959, when Nehru revealed that Chinese forces had occupied some 15,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh and the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), the CPI again tried to minimize the affair. However, an official note from Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai to Nehru on September 8 repudiated the entire Sino-Indian border and laid claim to about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory.⁵ This rendered the CPI's position even more awkward, and immediately thereafter Ghosh left for Moscow to seek Soviet advice. While he was there, an official statement released by TASS announced a neutral Soviet position in the Sino-Indian conflict. The statement deplored the armed clashes which had taken place along the Sino-Indian border and urged both sides to seek a settlement.⁶

In these circumstances, serious dissension arose when the CPI's Central Executive Committee met at Calcutta in late September to discuss the party's stand on the border dispute

with China. Encouraged by the Soviet statement of neutrality, right-wing Politburo member S. A. Dange criticized Chinese actions towards India and demanded that the CPI declare its support of Nehru's stand on the border issue, including recognition of the McMahon Line as the frontier between India and China. Leaders of the left-wing factions, on the other hand, charged that such action would be a violation of the party's proletarian-internationalist obligations. Ghosh, who was still in Moscow, hurriedly returned to India in order to mediate between the opposing factions. At his urging, the Central Executive Committee finally adopted a compromise resolution criticizing the conduct of both India and China in the border conflict.⁷

Soon afterward Ghosh left for Peking to participate in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic, hoping at the same time to persuade the Chinese leaders to change their policy towards India. The visit, however, proved to be a personal disaster for Ghosh. A day after his return from Peking, Chinese troops massacred nine members of an Indian border patrol in Ladakh. Right-wing CPI leader Dange immediately condemned the Chinese action and declared his support of the Nehru government's policy towards China. A few days later, the Central Secretariat of the CPI issued a somewhat milder statement which nevertheless criticized the Chinese action as "unjustified" and joined in "the feelings of deep resentment and indignation of the Indian people" over the "heavy loss of life."⁸ Meanwhile, in a report to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, Khrushchev expressed deep regret over the Ladakh incident and appealed for friendly negotiations to settle the conflict "to the mutual satisfaction of both

sides."⁹ Later he described the dispute as a "sad and stupid story."¹⁰

Encouraged by Khrushchev's statements, the right-wing CPI leaders intensified their pressure on the centrists to amend the Calcutta resolution and denounce the Chinese action in Ladakh. When the party's National Council met at Meerut in November, Dange renewed his demand that the CPI should support the McMahon Line as the rightful border between India and China, while the pro-Chinese group again opposed the proposal. After week-long discussions, the Council finally produced another resolution seeking to reconcile the opposing groups.¹¹

For a while thereafter, the CPI gave the impression of being in a state of suspended animation. Then, at the Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party in June 1960, Khrushchev himself raised anew the subject of the Sino-Indian border dispute. On the one hand, he chided the Chinese for "stabbing the Communist movement in the Afro-Asian world in the back for a few hundred square miles of Indian territory," and on the other hand he urged the Indian Communist delegates to "go home and convince your countrymen of the just nature of the Chinese action."¹²

⁴ *The Statesman* (New Delhi), May 11, 1959.

⁵ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between the Governments of India and China, September-November 1959*, Government of India White Paper No. 2.

⁶ *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 10, 1959. The Soviet statement was issued in spite of last-minute Chinese diplomatic efforts to dissuade Moscow from releasing it and was regarded by the Chinese as a Soviet betrayal of the CCP. (See *New China News Agency Supplement No. 45*, Nov. 2, 1963.

⁷ *New Age* (Weekly: Delhi), Oct. 4, 1959, p. 2.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1959, p. 1.

⁹ *Pravda*, Nov. 1, 1959. Prior to the Supreme Soviet session, Khrushchev had visited Peking to attend the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic. During his stay, the Chinese leaders gave him an explanation of "the true situation" in Ladakh, maintaining that the armed clash there had been provoked by India and that it would be a mistake to yield to the "Indian reactionaries." According to the Chinese, however, Khrushchev still insisted that the Chinese armed action was wrong. (See *NCNA Supplement No. 45*, cited above.)

¹⁰ *New Age* (Weekly), Nov. 15, 1959.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Nov. 22, 1959, p. 7.

¹² *Link* (New Delhi), Oct. 16, 1960. According to the Chinese, Khrushchev also told the Chinese delegates at Bucharest: "I know what war is. Since Indians were killed, this means that China attacked India. We are Communists; for us it is not important where the frontier runs." (See *NCNA Supplement No. 45*, cited above.)

In the face of Khrushchev's exhortation, the CPI could not remain silent. The party's National Council, meeting in September, passed a resolution asserting that "China has lost the sympathy of millions of Indians in return for a few miles of worthless territory," but at the same time blaming India for the trouble.¹³ This, however, did not satisfy the pro-Chinese elements in the party. The regional Communist organization of West Bengal accused the CPI's pro-Soviet leaders of "immaturity in Marxist understanding" and charged the National Council with "appeasing Indian chauvinism."¹⁴ The pro-Chinese Punjab party organization took a similar stand, demanding withdrawal of the National Council resolution.

The action of the West Bengal and Punjab party organizations was followed by the visit of a two-man CPI delegation to Hanoi to attend the Congress of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party. While in Hanoi, the Indian delegates were approached by representatives of the Chinese Communist Party, and one of the former, Harekrishna Konar, a leader of the West Bengal party organization, accepted an invitation to visit Peking, where he met with Mao and other CCP leaders.¹⁵ Upon his return to India, Konar parroted Chinese views with regard to both the Sino-Indian border dispute and the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict. This marked the first direct attempt by the CCP to extend its influence within the Indian party.

Soon afterwards a five-man CPI

delegation led by Secretary Ghosh left for Moscow to attend the Conference of 81 Communist Parties. While in the Soviet capital, the delegates were received by Mikhail Suslov, who criticized the CPI for its anti-Chinese policy and urged the party to follow the Moscow conference declaration in its relations with the CCP. The outcome of the talks represented a clear-cut victory for the pro-Chinese wing of the Indian party. When the CPI National Council met again in January 1961, the pro-Chinese elements demanded the repudiation of the council's Meerut resolution, citing Suslov's advice in support of their stand. Ghosh, however, mustered enough right-wing support to block the demand. Enraged at this, Promode Das Gupta, Secretary of the West Bengal party organization, circulated a document entitled "Revisionist Trend in the CPI," which attacked the policies of the Ghosh leadership as a "surrender" to the bourgeoisie and imperialism and demanded that the CPI "follow the lead of the CCP."¹⁶

Despite this pro-Chinese opposition within the party, the leadership reacted sharply when Nehru revealed new Chinese armed incursions into Indian territory in November of 1961. In a statement, Secretary Ghosh assailed the Chinese aggression and demanded that Peking "immediately put an end to such acts" and "take effective measures to insure that such incidents do not occur again."¹⁷ A short while later the CCP central organ *Jen-min jih-pao* countered with an editorial attacking Ghosh for having "trailed behind Nehru and having hurriedly issued a statement condemning China without bothering to find out the truth or look into the rights and wrongs of the case."¹⁸ This unprecedented Chinese Communist attack upon Ghosh served to heighten

tension within the CPI and prompted the Indian party leader to strike back by pledging CPI support of action by the Nehru government to repel any Chinese invasion.¹⁹ Thus, by the end of 1961, the pro-Soviet leaders of the CPI were openly criticizing the Chinese Communist leadership and in turn were being bitterly attacked by Peking.

The massive new attack launched by the Chinese in the North-east Frontier Agency and Ladakh regions on October 20, 1962, precipitated a fresh crisis in the Indian party and led to a decisive showdown between the dominant right-wing forces and the pro-Chinese opposition. S. A. Dange, now occupying the newly-created post of Party Chairman, and other right-wing CPI leaders promptly reacted with public denunciations of the new Chinese aggression. However, eleven days of internal debate intervened before the party decided its official position.

During this interval, two important developments took place within the Communist world. In a sudden shift of attitude, evidently caused by the Cuban missile crisis, a *Pravda* editorial on October 25 voiced strong support of Communist China's stand towards India, repudiated the McMahon line as the Sino-Indian boundary, urged Indian acceptance of China's proposals for settling the border dispute, and called upon Indian "progressives" to restrain themselves and their government. Two days later, on October 27, *Jen-min jih-pao* denounced Nehru as an out-and-out agent of imperialism, and Dange as a "self-styled Marxist-Leninist" who "trails closely behind Nehru and falsely accuses China of encroachment on Indian territory." In addition, the CCP organ implicitly rebuffed *Pravda's* gesture at concili-

¹³ *Link*, Sept. 11 and 18, 1960.

¹⁴ *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), Oct. 14, 1960.

¹⁵ The other CPI delegate was K. Damodaran, of the Kerala party organization. Before their departure for Hanoi, both delegates were instructed by Secretary Ghosh to stay away from the Chinese but, if approached by the latter, to tell them frankly how the CPI viewed the CCP's general political line and Chinese policy towards India. Damodaran declined to meet with the Chinese delegates at Hanoi, but Konar did and was then invited to Peking.

¹⁶ *Link*, Feb. 5, 1961.

¹⁷ *New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1961; *New Age* (Weekly), Nov. 26, 1961.

¹⁸ Dec. 7, 1961.

¹⁹ *The Hindu* (Madras), Dec. 17, 1961.

ation by insisting upon complete abandonment by Moscow of its past policy of friendship toward the Nehru Government.²⁰

On November 1 the CPI National Council finally passed a resolution which branded China as an aggressor, repudiated the Chinese claims to Indian territory, endorsed the Indian government's decision to buy arms abroad to resist the Chinese aggression, and gave full support to the government's conditions for entering into negotiations with China on the border issue.²¹ Thus the CPI took a position that not only defied Peking but also rejected *Pravda's* advice that India should agree to negotiate the border dispute on China's terms.

Following the National Council's action, the CPI secretariat addressed a letter to the Communist parties of other countries explaining the Indian party's stand on the border dispute and asking them to exert their influence to restrain China in her "adventurous course." The secretariat also appealed to Indian Communists abroad to explain India's case to their host countries.²² Shortly afterwards Dange himself left for the Soviet Union and other East European countries to explain the CPI's position, conferring before his departure with Nehru and Indian Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. (Peking later charged that the CPI chairman had gone to Moscow to act as an "agent" of the Nehru government.²³ While Dange was in Moscow, Khrushchev

made a report to the Supreme Soviet in which he again criticized the Chinese armed invasion of India, reaffirmed Soviet neutrality, and appealed for the peaceful solution of the border conflict.²⁴ The Chinese promptly denounced this statement as a betrayal of the Soviet Union's obligation to support a fellow socialist country in a dispute with a bourgeois-national government.²⁵

Apparently assured of Moscow's backing, Dange continued to take a strong anti-Chinese line after his return to India, reaffirming the CPI's full support of the Nehru Government. In February 1963, the CPI National Council issued another resolution denouncing China's aggression against India and accusing the CCP of violating the principles of Marxism-Leninism.²⁶ This called forth a furious counterattack from the CCP, which assailed Dange as a "Titoist revisionist" who had betrayed and split the CPI by capitulating to Nehru and the Indian bourgeoisie. The statement accused the Indian party leader of planning "to turn the CPI into an appendage of India's big bourgeoisie and big landlords and a lackey of the Nehru Government," and expressed CCP support of the left-wing elements in the party.²⁷

After a lapse of more than six weeks, Dange replied to the Chinese attack in a 30,000-word statement published in the CPI's weekly organ *New Age*. Entitled "Neither Revisionism nor Dogmatism Is Our Guide," the statement began in an almost apologetic tone, as from a small party without much revolutionary experience to a great party. After retracing the course of Sino-Indian relations and the evolution of the CPI's stand on the border conflict, however, the statement went on to castigate the CPI

leadership for creating a problem not only for India but for the Communist movement throughout the world.²⁸

In August 1963, Dange again journeyed to Moscow at the invitation of the CPSU. While he was there, *Pravda* (August 10) published an article condemning the Chinese leadership for its "aggressive policy" towards India and for "openly interfering" in the internal affairs of the CPI. Returning home, apparently with renewed assurances of Soviet support, Dange launched a violent campaign against the CCP and called Communist China an "inimical force" threatening the security of India.²⁹

With the CCP openly encouraging left-wing Indian Communist opposition to the CPI leadership, tensions within the Indian party reached a critical point early in 1964. In January the CPI Central Executive Committee, dominated by the right-wing leaders, circulated a letter calling for "vigilance" against attempts by individuals or groups to split the party in response to "open directives from Chinese or Indonesian Communist leaders."³⁰ The threatened crisis did indeed materialize at the next meeting of the National Council in April, when 32 left-wing and centrist members walked out and called for repudiation of the party leadership. The dissidents, subsequently expelled by the National Council, were charged by Dange with identifying themselves with the political and ideological positions of the CCP.³¹ On July 7 the pro-Chinese

²⁰ In view of Peking's intransigence, Moscow returned to its neutral position toward the Sino-Indian conflict after the termination of the Cuban missile crisis. On November 5, a *Pravda* editorial declared that China and India should "cease fire and, without advancing any terms, sit down at roundtable negotiations." The paper dropped its earlier contention that the McMahon Line was invalid and that India should accept Peking's terms as the basis of negotiations.

²¹ *Indian Express* (New Delhi), Nov. 2, 1962.

²² *Ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1962.

²³ *Jen-min jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 15, 1963.

²⁴ *Tass*, Dec. 12, 1962.

²⁵ *Jen-min jih-pao*, Dec. 15, 1962.

²⁶ *New Age* (Weekly), Feb. 24, 1963, pp. 5-10.

²⁷ *Jen-min jih-pao*, March 3, 1963.

²⁸ For full text of the statement, see *New Age* (Weekly) Supplement, April 21, 1963.

²⁹ *The Statesman*, Aug. 17, 1963.

³⁰ *The Times of India* (New Delhi), Jan. 16, 1964.

³¹ *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), 1964, p. 5811. Following the National Council meeting, Jyoti Basu, one of the dissidents, declared: "We are out of it. We are the Communist Party. We do not recognize them (Dange's supporters) as the Communist Party."

leaders met at Tenali, in Andhra Pradesh, and formed a second CPI (hereafter referred to as the Left-CPI). The right-wing party leadership responded with a furious attack on the CCP for instigating the split in the Indian party. Dange called Mao a “well-developed warmonger” and again denounced Chinese policies of “expansionism and aggressiveness.”³²

In October the Left-CPI convened an all-India conference at Calcutta which, claiming to act as the Seventh Congress of the CPI, voted to expel the “renegade Dange” from the party—a move immediately applauded by Peking as a “significant” act. The regular Seventh Congress of the CPI, convened by the right-wing leadership, met at Bombay in December, with the CPSU represented by Boris Ponomarev. At the Congress, Dange defended the action taken by the National Council in November 1962 to condemn China’s aggression against India, claiming that this action had “saved the democratic movement in our country.” The Congress then passed a resolution repudiating the CCP’s stand on all major issues and accusing the Chinese Communist leadership of being “dogmatic and disruptive” and indulging in “narrow nationalism” and “chauvinistic distortions.” The resolution also charged the CCP with open interference in the affairs of the CPI.³³

Peking responded to these criticisms with a massive attack on the “renegade Dange group,” which it said had “usurped” the CPI leadership in November 1962 and had since “pursued a line of national chauvinism and mass capitulationism,” opposed by “the mass of CPI members.” Referring to the Seventh Congress of the Right-CPI, the Chinese statement said that the Dange group and its “handful” of supporters, “acting in the service of imperialism and the In-

dian reactionaries,” had loudly prated revisionist ideas, poured venom on China, and boosted Lal Bahadur Shastri’s government. The statement also criticized Ponomarev for “boosting” the Dange group.³⁴

The war of recrimination between the CCP and the Right-CPI leadership continued through 1965. In February Dange accused the Chinese Communist leadership of “wrecking” the revolution in India and bluntly declared that the CPI would never “bow down to the thought of Mao,” however profound it might be for the Chinese people. He also criticized the Chinese for having expressed “indignation” at the Indian government’s arrest of Left-CPI leaders in late 1964, defending the government as one “freely elected on the basis of adult franchise.”³⁵ Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai retorted by again calling Dange a “renegade” who had become the “favorite” of the reactionary Indian government. Chou asserted that “most of the leaders” of the CPI had quit Dange’s party, and that “a great number of these Indian revolutionary Communists have now been imprisoned by the Indian Government.”³⁶

In September 1965, a three-day Chinese ultimatum to India demanding the dismantling of military installations along the China-Sikkim border reunderlined the division in Indian Communist ranks. Dr. Z. A. Ahmed, a Right-CPI leader, denounced the Chinese as “crooks, opportunists, imperialists and saboteurs,”³⁷ while Left-CPI leader E. M. S. Namboodiripad merely called the Chinese ultimatum “unfortunate” and urged that the Indian Government settle the whole border conflict by ceding the Aksai Chin to China in return for Chinese

recognition of all territories south of the McMahon Line as belonging to India.³⁸

The split in the party was again manifested when Communist China carried out its third nuclear test explosion in May this year. On the one hand, the weekly organ of the Right-CPI denounced China for pursuing “militaristic and hegemonic ambitions.”³⁹ On the other, Left-CPI spokesmen defended China’s right to develop nuclear weapons and again pressed the Indian government to take the initiative towards reaching a negotiated settlement of the border conflict. B. T. Ranadive, now a member of the Left-CPI Politburo, declared that India faced a clear option—either a peaceful settlement with China or ruin.⁴⁰

Thus, the Communist movement in India today finds itself more seriously and openly divided than at any time in its long and checkered history. Confronted by the steadily mounting tide of anti-Chinese public sentiment at home resulting from China’s acts of aggression against India, the CPI leadership was finally forced to opt for a policy of supporting India’s national-bourgeois government against an outside Communist power. By choosing this course, the Dange leadership may well have saved the CPI from losing all its gains in popularity achieved over the past decade, if not from total extinction, but it has not brought India closer to the goal of socialist revolution, and it has split the party in two.

The rupture between the two segments of the party is now open and complete. Both claim legitimacy as the sole Communist Party of India,

³⁴ *Peking Review*, Jan. 22, 1965, pp. 18-19.

³⁵ *New Age* (Weekly), Feb. 4, 1965.

³⁶ Interview published in *New Statesman* (London), March 26, 1965, p. 476.

³⁷ *Patriot* (New Delhi), Sept. 19, 1965.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1965; also, *Hindustan Times*, Nov. 11, 1965.

³⁹ *New Age* (Weekly), May 15, 1966, p. 15.

⁴⁰ *The Statesman*, May 12, 1966.

³² *The Statesman*, Sept. 17, 1964.

³³ *The Times of India*, Dec. 17-22, 1964.

the pretensions of the Right-CPI having the endorsement and sympathy of Moscow while those of the Left-CPI are recognized and supported by Peking. Yet the split is more than just a reflection of the ideological division between the Soviet and Chinese parties, or of the differing attitudes of the two CPI's with respect to the Sino-Indian border conflict. More important is the fact that they disagree profoundly on fundamental issues of Communist strategy in India—so much so that their respective leaders now see slight chance of reunifying the party through a reconciliation of differences.

There is little reliable information as to the relative numerical strength of the two CPI's. Both claim memberships slightly in excess of 100,000 (the Right-CPI, 107,763; the Left-CPI, 104,421), but chances are that these claims overlap each other, while estimates from non-Indian sources (including Moscow and Peking) are so conflicting as to shed scant light on the situation.⁴¹

Whatever the relative strengths of the two rivals in terms of membership, there is little doubt that the Right-CPI has been steadily losing ground in the inter-party struggle.

The chief reason for this is that the Right leadership is torn by personal rivalries which the Left has been quick to exploit. Even in the top echelon of the Right-CPI, there are individuals who personally dislike Dange and have become restive under his leadership. Consequently, the Left leadership has systematically concentrated its attack on Dange in an effort to undermine his image among his own followers, and this effort has met with considerable success. The Left-CPI leaders, who include such able and down-to-earth Communist political strategists as E.M.S. Namboodiripad, Jyoti Basu, and P. Ramamurti, evidently calculate that if they can dislodge Dange from his controlling position in the Right-CPI, the way will be opened for them to recapture the rival organization and reunify the Communist movement under their own militant leadership.

With the approach of new general elections in India, the really burning and basic issue between the two CPI's is the strategy that should be adopted to advance the cause of domestic Communist revolution—and, more specifically, the position to be taken towards the Indian National Congress. Meeting at Tenali in June of this year, the Left-CPI Central Committee labelled the Congress as "the main enemy of the people," and the party leaders are now laying the groundwork for a concerted anti-Congress electoral strategy which they hope will enable the Communists to win

governing power in those Indian states where the party's influence has been relatively strong. As part of this strategy, the Left-CPI has been actively seeking alliances not only with other leftist organizations like the Praja Socialist Party and the Forward Bloc in West Bengal, but even with various reactionary communal organizations such as the Moslem League in Kerala, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Madras, the Akali Party in the Punjab, and the Janata Party in Bihar.

As opposed to the Left-CPI strategy of militant opposition to the National Congress, the Right-CPI stands for a continuation of cooperation with the Indian nationalists because it is optimistic about the chances of gradually pushing the Congress farther to the left and strengthening the position of such left-wing Congress politicians as Krishna Menon and his friends. The Right-CPI leaders believe that the national strategy they advocate is the best, if not the only, way for the Communists to achieve eventual ruling power in India, even though it may require a long and difficult political struggle.

Thus, the line is sharply drawn between the rival standard-bearers of Indian communism. While the Sino-Indian conflict has receded into the background, at least for the time being, there is little question that the Left-CPI's strategy of militant opposition to the National Congress has the full blessing of Peking.

⁴¹ An official American estimate places the membership of the Right-CPI at 55,000, and of the Left-CPI at 70,000. US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *World Strength of Communist Party Organizations*, January 1966.

Pravda, Herr Goebbels, and Problems of Communism

EDITORS' NOTE: Soviet attacks on Problems of Communism are no longer a rarity. Sometimes we disregard them. At other times we reproduce them, with the suggestion that our replies, in turn, be reprinted for the benefit of Soviet readers—a suggestion that has yet to be taken up by our critics (see, for instance, “‘Frying Snowballs’ in the Soviet Press—A Reply to the New Times,” January-February 1961; “Literary Gazette on Problems of Communism,” March-April 1963; and “From Russia Sans Love,” September-October 1964). For sheer artlessness, however, the article reproduced below eclipses anything that has appeared in Cyrillic heretofore. It was published in the September 12, 1966, issue of Pravda under the title “Old Tunes, Mister Bramberg” (Why transliterate the name with an “a” rather than the usual “u,” one wonders—does it perhaps render it more Germanic to Russian eyes?) and is offered here without any abridgments, though with a few apposite editorial footnotes.

As is known, American journalists are not to be trifled with. As far as pushiness is concerned, it is hard to find their equal. The situation is pressing, of course. Competition and the like. But I think the boys from the staff of USIA's *Problems of Communism* magazine are the shiftiest. The chief of them, a certain Brumberg, has recently beaten all records in indelicacy. He penetrated—where, do you think?—into the nether world and interviewed Hitler's Minister of Propaganda, Josef Goebbels. That same one who said that a lie repeated millions of times becomes, in the end, believable. The text of the interview follows:

Brumberg: Hello, Herr Goebbels! Allow me to introduce myself. I am Brumberg, from the American magazine *Problems of Communism*.

Goebbels: Heil Hitler, Mr. Brumberg! What may I do for you?

Brumberg: I, as a matter of fact, would like to talk to you about something.

Though we have traveled a long way from you. These are new times, of course, and so are our anti-Communist tunes.

Goebbels: I detect, Mr. Brumberg, more self-satisfaction than evidence in your words. The new, as Johann Wolfgang Goethe used to say, is the old that has been thoroughly forgotten. Sometimes I feel as if I am guiding the hands of many of your authors.

Brumberg: What on earth are you talking about?

Goebbels: Do you remember my book *Communism Unmasked*? It was published in Munich in 1936. Among other things, I stated there: “International communism is striving to eliminate all the national and racial features which nature has provided.” You are elaborating this thesis in many materials, and in particular in the article “Soviet Colonialism: Does It Exist?”¹

I noted further that communism comes out against property and expropriates it systematically, on a broad

scale, and by refined and cruel methods. Your special issue on “Law and Legality in the USSR” sounds like an echo of my words.²

I always used to say that communism denies the value of the individual. And you repeat this theme in different ways in every issue. My very words on communism's elimination and annihilation of all high spiritual aspirations of human beings and nations with the aid of materialist principles have been kindly translated into English and flavored

¹ The reference here is to a symposium under the collective title “Soviet Colonialism: Does it Exist?,” with contributions by Richard Pipes, Michael Rywkin, Hugh Seton-Watson, and commentaries by B. D. G. Folsom, Wang Gungwu, and Frank Moraes (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1964). For an earlier Soviet reaction to the symposium, see “From Russia Sans Love,” March-April 1964.

² See *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1965.