

# Social Stratification

By Victor C. Funnell

**M**uch has been said and written, in China and outside it, about the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” It is not the purpose of this article to describe it in detail, but simply to examine one of the underlying reasons that may have prompted it: Mao Tse-tung’s extreme hostility to China’s patently un-Marxist social stratification. It is indeed true that, since 1949, China’s economic and educational systems have produced wide disparities in personal income and social standing that are hardly in accord with the egalitarian tenets of Marxism. Therefore, like the Great Leap Forward and the communes in 1958, the present Cultural Revolution may be seeking to break down existing economic and social distinctions in order to forestall the kind of *embourgeoisement* that, in the view of Mao and his associates, is taking hold in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

In the broadest sense, then, the Cultural Revolution is not cultural at all, but social and economic. Viewed in this light, the developments of the past two years are a continuation, intensified and accelerated in form, of policies begun at the 10th CC Plenum in September 1962, when the party admitted to contradictions within its ranks and called

for a continuing class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Many of those now accused of numberless crimes are party veterans who have supposedly failed to respond to the Maoist vision. And these vipers, as the Maoists keep emphasizing, still inhabit the nest. “Some of them we have already seen through, others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons—like Khrushchev, for example—who are still nestling beside us.”<sup>1</sup> For this reason, the present Cultural Revolution is intended to be only the first of its kind:

**There will inevitably be many more in the future; . . . it should not be thought by any party member or any one of the people in our country that everything will be all right after one or two Cultural Revolutions, or even three or four; . . . we must be very much on the alert and never lose vigilance.**<sup>2</sup>

Semi-permanent policies of this nature imply not a localized conflict, but a fundamental intraparty divergence as to what direction Chinese society should take. This, indeed, was suggested by Mao himself in May 1963, when he said that unless something was done “it would not take long, perhaps *only several years* or a decade, or several

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<sup>1</sup> Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (May 16, 1966) in *Peking Review*, May 19, 1967, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* editorial, May 20, 1967, in *Peking Review*, May 26, 1967, p. 47.

decades at most, before a counterrevolutionary restoration on a national scale inevitably occurred; the Marxist-Leninist party would undoubtedly become a revisionist party or a fascist party, and the whole of China would change its color.”<sup>3</sup>

### *The Specter of Neo-capitalism*

Thus, the present revolution in China addresses itself to averting counterrevolution, that is, a return to the bourgeois path. There can be no doubt that, over the years, the official ideology has not prevented the emergence a whole range of capitalist economic devices that have been institutionalized, paradoxically, by official approval and proclamation. It is thus apparent that socialism, or the socialist “stage” of society, does not inevitably lead to communism, but may in fact lead to “neo-capitalism,” as it has in the Soviet Union and in the Eastern European Communist countries. China may be (in Mao’s view, she certainly is) preparing to tread the same path.

Mao’s real conflict, of course, is not with Russia nor with revisionism, but with human nature. None of the totalitarian Communist regimes has found it possible to implement total orthodoxy in practice. All have had to be content with as much orthodoxy as conditions in their particular country permit—or, more exactly, as the interests of production allow. Attempts to circumvent this snag, as in China in 1958, have led to failure and the necessity of a fresh start in a more realistic direction. Thus, we witness a mass of innovations in “fraternal” socialist countries which have discarded the dogmatic model. These may be exemplified by the private agriculture and private enterprise in Poland and Yugoslavia, the concessions to private agriculture in the Soviet Union, and the grudging exploitation of the profit motive as the guiding force in Soviet and East European industry. In China as well—not so very long ago—the atmosphere was conducive to a consideration of similar departures from the Stalinist tradition. For example, Sun Yeh-fang,<sup>4</sup> China’s Liberman, was among others who proposed imaginative innovations, only to see them wither in the frosts of the Cultural Revolution.

<sup>3</sup> Mao Tse-tung, as quoted in *Peking Review*, July 17, 1964.

<sup>4</sup> Sun’s Soviet-inspired economic theories were the cause of his dismissal, in mid-1966, as Director of the Economic Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences.

The present attempt to turn back the clock is unlikely to succeed in the long run, if only because the ineluctable logic of policies designed to strengthen and modernize China has brought her to the brink of the postrevolutionary phase. Logically, China should be entering upon an era of long-range economic planning in a framework of administrative stability; *pace* Mao Tse-tung, the frenetic mass campaign has had its day. It is precisely the Maoists’ reluctance to recognize this situation that has led them to sponsor the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, Mao simply refuses to contemplate a postrevolutionary phase until the class struggle has been won, that is, until he can undo the stratification of society which has come about since 1949.

### *Incentives à la Russe*

The seeds of the present social and economic situation were sown in the first years of the Chinese Communist regime, when for a variety of reasons the Soviet Union was adopted as the pattern for the reorganization of industry, agriculture and commerce. China’s industrial priorities, income policy, incentives, and wage system all derive from the Soviet model, and all were part of the Russian recipe for development that was enshrined in the first Chinese Five-Year Plan (1953 to 1957). In the train of events since then, much of this heritage has been abandoned and repudiated along with Soviet aid. In company with a more cautious domestic policy, a new trading pattern has emerged that is guided by pragmatic self-interest and designed to avoid a too exclusive reliance on any one partner. Yet, while much has changed, much has remained the same. It is, perhaps, the Stalinist model that has been overthrown, rather than the whole of Russian experience. The Leninist precedent of postponing the demise of the state in order to exploit the trappings of its bureaucracy, the skills of its specialists, and the springs of individual action, has indeed been taken very much to heart. The principle of incentives, and the consequent need to differentiate between individuals and industries—and even between different parts of the same industry—has not only not been dropped or revised, but has positively flowered in China, particularly over the last half-dozen years. Here, indeed, may lie the basis of the fear that China may return to the bourgeois path, and that “revisionism” may prove fatal to the maintenance of revolutionary élan.

The tenet of socialism, "to each according to his work," is in essence a simple statement of the incentive mechanism which has been applied universally throughout the Communist world, including China. This is the inducement to greater effort through greater reward, usually monetary, although political dividends and considerations of personal prestige also play their roles. To function efficiently, however, an incentive system based on monetary reward requires a clearly defined degree of differentiation between individuals. It is a mistake to assume—if any still make the assumption—that a Communist society is a classless society.

### *The Industrial Wage System*

The criteria of differential remuneration have been important and decisive, involving distinctions of skill, seniority, and the nature of the work performed (*i.e.*, how hard as well as how important it is). In Communist China, varying degrees of effort, skill, and experience have been remunerated under an eight-grade wage system which dates from the early years of the regime. Under this system, wage differentials between one grade and another can be quite high. In 1964, for example, the highest-paid (grade 8) worker in the Peking steam-turbine plant was reported to be earning 127 yuan a month. At the same time, the highest-paid (grade 7) worker in the Wusih rubber factory was getting only 68 yuan a month.<sup>5</sup> Yet this disparity of nearly 100 percent cannot be accounted for solely by a difference of one grade; it also clearly reflects other factors, such as working conditions, priorities, and possibly locality.

The original system was confirmed and made even more elaborate by the definitive wage reform of 1956. This reform reclassified industrial wage levels by listing industries in a descending order of pay scales, beginning with oil and timber in the first and second places, followed by coal, electricity, chemicals, machine tools, and so on down the line to matches and tobacco. Reclassification also took place with respect to different units of the same industry on the basis of their strategic importance in the national economy, their types and methods of production, and existing general wage levels. In 1956, the official ratio between the earnings of the highest and lowest-paid workers throughout industry was increased from 2.87 to 3.2

to one. (These ratios were already in evidence in the paper and oil industries during 1955. In the paper industry, a wage-span of 2.7 to one meant the difference between 27 yuan and 73 yuan a month; in the oil industry, a wage-span of 3.2 to one meant the difference between 32 yuan and 102 yuan a month.<sup>6</sup>) Altogether, according to the (then) Minister of Labor, Ma Wen-jui, the average level of wages for workers in grade 1 rose by 8 percent. The average level of wages for workers in grade 8, on the other hand, rose by 18 percent. Intellectuals, particularly in the professorial or equivalent strata, came in for a still greater wind-fall of about 30 percent. Since a higher proportion of the higher wage grades naturally tends to be found in those industries requiring extra skill and harder labor, it is not surprising that the rise in average wages in 1956 was greater in heavy industry (15.6 percent) than in light industry (12 percent).<sup>7</sup>

Differentials apply not only to categories of industry or units of the same industry; they also extend to an individual's "status." The "workers" themselves are not the sole constituent of the industrial work force, which also includes apprentices, technicians, and engineers. In each category the same considerations of differentiation apply, as illustrated in Chart 1, which gives the standard salaries of industrial and agricultural technicians as fixed in August 1955 by order of the State Council.

Provision is made here for distinctions between five broad categories of industry and between several levels of individual attainment within those industries. The size of the technical elite has been increasing in proportion to the total work force. According to the communique of the National People's Congress in 1963, there was then a 70-percent increase in the number of technicians over 1957. This would indicate a total of approximately 850,000 technical personnel, or a proportion of one technician to every twelve industrial workers.

### *The State Bureaucracy*

Technicians have the status of civil servants and are usually referred to as "employees" in the service of the central ministries or their subordinate

<sup>5</sup> *The Times* (London), March 3, 1964, p. 19.

<sup>6</sup> L. Lavallée, *Economie de la Chine socialiste*, Genève, 1957, p. 416.

<sup>7</sup> Ma Wen-jui's report, as translated in *Current Background* (Survey of China Mainland Press), No. 405 (July 26, 1956).

branches. But the incentive policy for members of the bureaucracy is broadly the same as that for workers. The introduction, in August 1955, of a graded wage system based on a unified scale of differentials was, in fact, attuned to the requirements of a state bureaucracy wedded to an ambitious program of industrialization. Even Mao has his

appropriate wage grade, as do other government leaders. Thirty grades range from the head of state down to the humblest local employee. This graduated scale applies to People's Congresses, offices of the State Council, provincial, municipal, urban, *hsien* and ward offices of the administration, and all levels of the People's Courts. (It is

## CHART 1

### Standard Salaries of Industrial and Agricultural Technicians \*

August 1955 (*yuan* per month)

Grade	Category					Industrial Technicians	Agricultural Technicians
	1	2	3	4	5		
Special							
1	210	208	206	204	202	Engineers Grade I Grade II Grade III Grade IV	Agricultural Technicians Grade I Grade II Grade III Grade IV
2	192	190	188	186	184		
3	168	166	164	162	160		
4	152	150	148	146	144		
5	134	132	130	129	128		
6	120	118	116	115	114		
7	104	103	102	101	100		
8	92	91	90	89	88		
1	83	82	81	80	79	Technicians	Technicians
2	74	73	72	71	70		
3	65	65	64	64	64		
4	58	58	58	58	58		
5	52	52	52	52	52		
1	46	46	46	46	46	Assistant Technicians	Assistant Technicians
2	40	40	40	40	40		
3	35	35	35	35	35		
4	30	30	30	30	30		
1	25	25	25	25	25	Apprentices	Apprentices
2	22	22	22	22	22		

#### Notes

- (a) This table shows standard salaries. Wherever applicable, cost-of-living allowances should be added.
- (b) The table shows five different categories of technicians in different industries:
  1. Steel, coal, color metals, geology, smelting, aviation.
  2. Electricity, oil refining, machinery, heavy chemicals, timber.
  3. Building, railways, telecommunication, roads, water conservancy, meteorology.
  4. Textiles, leather, paper, printing, fats, rubber, agriculture (fishery, animal husbandry, veterinary, forestry).
  5. Flour, matches, tobacco, food, and other light industries.
- (c) The salary grading of all technicians is determined by the nature of the industry. If this is difficult to determine the department itself should decide.
- (d) The table shows the salaries of technicians in industry and agriculture. The grading of similar technicians can be similarly applied.
- (e) If there is a grade of "Master Technician" in industry, the grading can be either that of Engineer or Technician.
- (f) The name of the job is here preceded by the grade. The grade is not part of the name or title.

\* A copy of the original Chinese table, including the accompanying notes, was made available to the author by the Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, through the courtesy of Miss Donnithorne, University College, London.

interesting to note that the salaries of the security police are comparatively low, ranging from 26 to 62 yuan a month, depending on "qualifications.")

In 1955, civil service salaries were clearly demarcated, and the gap between those at the top and their lowest underlings was very wide, amounting to a thirtyfold difference in salary. The ladder stretching above an ambitious office boy was tall indeed. According to Ma Wen-Jui, the 1956 reform raised state salaries by an average of 10 percent, but the ratio between top and bottom evidently decreased to 28 to 1, and by 1958 to 20 to 1.<sup>8</sup> This appears to have been confirmed by a report in the Japanese press in September 1963, which said that the salary of Mao, Chou, and others had been reduced to 400 yuan.<sup>9</sup> Even this would still be three or four times greater than the earnings of a top-grade worker, twice an engineer's salary, and perhaps 20 percent higher than the income of a professor at Peking University.

The principle of differential wages also applies on a regional basis. Certain areas or cities, notably Shanghai and the industrial northeast, have traditionally led the rest of the field. Among the poorer regions, the south-central region has traditionally paid higher wages than the more underdeveloped northwest and southwest. Where applicable, local cost-of-living allowances and inducement or "hardship" payments have generally been in effect, and so-called "frontier allowances" have been paid in the more remote provinces (in 1955, for example, in Urumchi, the allowance was 15 percent of the regular wage).<sup>10</sup> Although information about regional differentiation is scanty, the general principle was outlined in the journal *Lao-tung* in 1960:

**Regarding the current regional wage relationships, apart from the fact that the state has provided a special temporary allowance for workers in those backward, sparsely-populated, remote regions such as Tibet, Sinkiang, and the Tsaidam Basin in Tsinghai province, adequate differences in wages have also been prescribed for workers in ordinary regions.<sup>11</sup>**

These differences may well follow the pattern laid down for state employees by the State Coun-

cil in 1955. Under this system, the country is divided into eleven wage regions. Thus, there are eleven different variations of the thirty wage-grades of civil servants. The differential between each regional scale is about 3 percent, making a disparity of 30 percent between the highest and the lowest scales.<sup>12</sup> There has been scant information in the Chinese press as to how the scales are determined or where the eleven regions are. The first or highest scale is reported to be in force at Hai-k'ou on Hainan Island, the second in Canton and Shanghai, and the third in Peking and Tientsin. Some industrial areas, such as Changsha and other places in Hunan Province, are also on the third scale. Five different scales (the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 11th) are said to be in use in various places in Inner Mongolia.<sup>13</sup> It would, therefore, appear that the higher scales are generally applied to areas of defense and industrial priority, or where living costs are held to justify it.

### *Agricultural Incentives*

Nowhere is the principle of "to each according to his work" better illustrated than in the agricultural sphere. Here the basic incentive mechanism lies in the direct relationship between income and production. The twin pillars on which it rests are the so-called work-point and the private plot. Once again, the system was patterned on the Soviet model. In setting up the cooperatives, the labor-day was introduced as the average work norm, or the equivalent of 10 work-points. The value of a work-point is determined annually and may fluctuate from year to year, since it is based on the collective income after the normal deductions for agricultural tax, welfare and investment funds, and running costs have been made. Special levies, such as contributions to support the "people's war" in Vietnam, may also serve to reduce the total income remaining in the hands of the production team. But fortunately for the peasant, the private plot enables him to preserve a measure of independence.

From the beginning, the cooperatives have recognized the importance of the private plot and subsidiary activities as stimuli to production. Only during the comparatively short-lived experiment

<sup>8</sup> Liu Tzu-chiu, "Wage Relations and Wage Differences," *Lao-tung* (Labor), No. 2 (January 18, 1960), pp. 1-4 in *Translations on International Communist Developments*, Joint Publications Research Service, No. 5155 (August 5, 1960), p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> This information was given to a visiting party of Japanese journalists in Peking.

<sup>10</sup> C. Y. Cheng, *Income and Standard of Living in Mainland China*, Union Research Service, Hongkong, 1957, Vol. I, p. 122.

<sup>11</sup> Liu Tzu-chiu, *op cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> See Union Research Service (Hongkong), Vol. 33, No. 10, p. 167.



of the communes in their purest form in the latter half of 1958 and early 1959 were the work-point and the private plot in eclipse. The communal substitute of wage-grades on the industrial pattern and a preponderance of payments in kind over monetary rewards were soon found to be unworkable. Post-commune developments have once again restored a wide range of material incentives, including a degree of private ownership, private cultivation, and the private sale of farm and handicraft products at local markets. In spite of the accusations hurled at the Soviet Union, China's agricultural system is not so very different from the Soviet after all.

Mao is currently charging his opponents with wishing to extend the system of private plots and rural markets. These institutions, quite apart from being ideologically improper, have tended to encourage and perpetuate the stratification of the rural population. The rich and upper-middle peasants gain at the expense of the lower-middle and poor peasants. This can be illustrated by two sample surveys conducted by the Communists at the beginning and end of the cooperative campaign, in 1954 and 1957.<sup>14</sup> Both provide data on the basis

of class strata. While the surveys preserve the original land-reform classification into former landlords, rich peasants, upper-middle peasants, and lower-middle and poor peasants, successive organizational changes in the countryside have caused these categories to dance a kind of minuet, with first one and then the other taking the lead in terms of income.

The 1954 survey showed that, after the completion of land reform, the gross earnings of the former landlord had dropped to a level below that of the poor peasant, with rich peasants earning almost twice as much as former landlords. The former landlord received a gross income of 226 yuan, the poor peasant 244 yuan, and the rich peasant 432 yuan. In terms of gross earnings per capita, however, the former landlord maintained a slight lead over the poor peasant, with the latter receiving 116 yuan, the former landlord 118 yuan, and the rich peasant 209 yuan (see Chart No. 2). The explanation for this discrepancy should be sought in the varying structure of rural households. The same survey revealed that while there was an average total of 4.2 persons in both the poor peasant and former landlord households, and 6.2 in rich peasant households, the average number of working members per household in the three categories was 2, 2.2, and 3, respectively.

The collectivization that followed the land reform reduced the earnings of the rich peasant in

<sup>14</sup> Published in *T'ung-chi Kung-tso* (Statistical Work), May 29, 1957, and August 23, 1958, respectively.

## CHART 2

### Earnings of Peasant Households by Social Stratum \*

Stratum	1954 <sup>1</sup>		1956 <sup>2</sup>		1957 <sup>2</sup>	
	Gross earnings (yuan)	Index	Net earnings (yuan)	Index	Net earnings (yuan)	Index
Poor peasant	116.4	1.000	61.3	1.000	60.2	1.000
Lower-middle peasant	154.8	1.330	67.6	1.103	69.9	1.161
Upper-middle peasant			77.2	1.259	79.0	1.312
Rich peasant	209.2	1.797	55.3	.902	58.7	.975
Former landlord	118.4	1.017	59.0	.962	66.2	1.100

\* Figures for 1954 show average per capita earnings of 16,000 peasant households classified by stratum; figures for 1956 and 1957 provide the same data for 4,321 cooperative households. Derived from the excellent unpublished thesis by P. Schran, "The Structure of Income in Communist China," University of California, Berkeley, 1961, p. 204.

<sup>1</sup> See *T'ung-chi Kung-tso* (Statistical Work), May 29, 1957, pp. 31-32.

<sup>2</sup> See *T'ung-chi Kung-tso*, August 23, 1958, pp. 11-12.

the same way that the land reform had reduced those of the former landlord, to below the level of the "poor peasant." By 1956 (according to a sub-sample taken during the 1957 survey), the average net income per capita of former rich peasants was 55 yuan, 4 yuan less than that of former landlords. Poor peasants received 61 yuan per capita, while the upper-middle peasants were highest with 77 yuan. In 1957, however, this trend was halted. That year the survey showed that the other strata improved their positions relative to the poor peasant, while at the same time the differentials between the former narrowed. The average per capita earnings of poor peasants in 1957 declined marginally to 60 yuan, while those of former rich peasants rose to 59 yuan, of former landlords to 66 yuan, and of upper-middle peasants to 79 yuan. The differential between the poor peasant and the highest-earning upper-middle peasant had thus increased. This interesting development may well have been due to the encouragement given in 1957 to the development of private cultivation in the interests of increased production. Since, at that fairly late stage, the organizational changes in the countryside had effectively ended traditional class differentials, it may fairly be assumed that continuing peasant stratification depended mainly on skill or experience, and to some extent on household structure as well. While such differences could be controlled somewhat within the cooperative framework, the survey shows that revival of the private sphere served to heighten them.

### *A Return to the Communes?*

This economic stratification may largely explain the "social necessity" for the communes in 1958, and the hostility now displayed by the Maoists toward those accused of revisionism, of having opposed the communes, and of rejoicing in their partial dismantling. It was this "social necessity"

that, in Mao's view, many critics of the communes had been unwilling to admit. For instance, in 1959, the criticisms of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai and others centered on the *economic* impracticability of communization, whereas Mao saw it as a *socio-political* imperative. The problem of stratification was to be solved by the creation of a peasant proletariat. The splintering of the household, communal feeding, a graded wage system, and equal payments in kind, regardless of the number of dependents, were all steps in this direction.

While information on the effects of the communes on income differentials is limited, suffice it to say that the great reversal of policy after 1960 can only have increased them. The decline in the proportion of payments in kind, the adoption of piece-rates, and the restoration of private plots have recreated the very conditions that the communes were designed to suppress. Renewed official distinctions between social strata, the increased emphasis—since 1962—on class struggle, and the more recent setting-up of associations of poor and lower-middle peasants to function in the general capacity of watchdogs all imply that there are now marked differences in earnings among the peasantry. The "Cultural Revolution" has once again made the communes and the possibility of a new "leap forward" in the countryside a topical issue.

It can certainly not be claimed that social stratification is the mainspring of the turbulent events in China since 1965. The attacks on party leaders, the formation of the Red Guards, and the worsening of relations with the Soviet Union and other countries involve a whole range of issues, both foreign and domestic. Yet, if Mao fears that the party has lost contact with the masses, that it has lost control over the social concomitants of economic development, and that the application of formulas first formulated nearly thirty years ago to a shifting social base is becoming increasingly difficult, then the question of social stratification must stand somewhere near the center of the storm sweeping China.

# Mao and Stalin's Mantle

By David E. Powell

**T**he Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has been hailed by its adherents as a unique and glorious achievement. It has been called "the most profound class struggle history has ever witnessed,"<sup>1</sup> and likened to "a roaring, swift current that has swept across thousands of miles . . . ; judging from its extensive scale and great power, the broad masses it has mobilized, and its profundity, it is unparalleled in history."<sup>2</sup>

To be sure, the events in China have been extraordinary: aside from the phenomena of armed clashes, riots, economic disruption, and widespread dismissals of party and government officials, the current scene has witnessed the unusual situation of a sustained attack on one of China's major political figures, Liu Shao-ch'i, who has nonetheless escaped removal from office. Yet whatever its unique aspects, the Cultural Revolution also has features that are reminiscent of Stalinism. Those responsible for organizing the Cultural Revolution—whether

under Mao's direction, with his acquiescence, or simply in his name—have used techniques and rhetoric that hark back to Stalinist paranoia at its most extreme. In particular, they have resuscitated Stalin's thesis that as communism draws nearer, the class struggle intensifies—along with the corollary theses that the state must therefore become stronger, that the tactics of class enemies will grow increasingly cunning and dangerous, and that domestic enemies will conspire with international reaction to subvert the new order. While the argument today is not phrased in precisely the terms that Stalin employed, the fact remains that Chinese propaganda has increasingly echoed the rhetoric of the Great Purge. The Cultural Revolution, like Stalin's purges, is the class struggle writ large. The paranoia, the xenophobia, the bizarre accusations, and the constant emphasis on vigilance and struggle are cut from the same cloth.

Thus the Cultural Revolution can be better understood if seen in historical perspective. At the same time, an examination of Soviet and Chinese treatment of the doctrine of postrevolutionary class struggle is not simply an exercise in intellectual history; it has predictive value as well. The use of certain key phrases and formulas has always foreshadowed and then accompanied political purge. From the Soviet and Chinese conceptions of domestic class struggle, we can learn a great

<sup>1</sup> *Hung Ch'i*, No. 15, 1966, in *Peking Review*, Dec. 23, 1966, p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> *Hung Ch'i*, No. 5, 1967, in *Joint Publications Research Service* (hereafter *JPRS*) (Washington, DC), No. 40739, April 24, 1967, p. 49.

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