

caused a ripple. Now, however, when a revival of Stalinism is the order of the day in the Soviet Union, his book is an embarrassment to the leaders and a challenge to their efforts to reinstate the dead dictator in the Communist pantheon.

WHAT DO THESE three books tell us? First, that history in the Soviet Union is the jealously guarded property of the party and state, which are the protectors of its ideological and political “purity”; that it is viewed by the Soviet leaders as an instrument for rationalizing party mistakes, shaping the minds of men, projecting the future and carrying the message of the Communist millenium. It is a political and ideological expedient.

Secondly, that history in the USSR is a false mirror which is expected, as in the fable of Snow

White, to give back the same unvarying answer to perennial and troublesome questions about the quality of Soviet life. The expected answer: The Communist way of life is the best and most beautiful in the world.

Thirdly, like Hitler’s “*Gott ist mit uns*” imprinted on every Nazi belt-buckle, history in the Soviet Union is invoked as a higher imperative and an “objective” justifier of what *is*—“History is with us.”

But history, or rather historiography, can also be a vehicle for expressing a personal or institutional viewpoint, for offering veiled dissent, for talking about “then” but meaning “now” and “what about the future.” This is why the party so carefully guards its prerogative to decide what is proper to ask and discuss, and what sort of history is acceptable for the Soviet people.

China: An Overview

FRANZ SCHURMANN and ORVILLE SCHELL, Eds.: *The China Reader*. (3 vols.)
I: *Imperial China*. II: *Republican China*. III: *Communist China*.
New York, Random House and Vintage Books, 1967.

Reviewed by **Harold C. Hinton**

THE WAR IN VIETNAM, Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and Chinese nuclear testing have heightened public interest in China everywhere in the world—but especially in the United States—to a level unknown since the Korean War. Among the American public, this interest has been motivated to a large extent by a natural anxiety over the possibility that Communist China and the United States may be on a “collision course” in, or over, Vietnam. Yet, despite the growing public concern about China, few books are both readable and sufficiently general, authoritative, and up-to-date to provide the concerned reader with an adequate basis for forming intelligent judgments.

The three-volume work under review comes about as close to meeting these requirements as can reasonably be expected—even though its senior editor, Professor Franz Schurmann, an able and respected student of Chinese history and politics, has strong personal views on Chinese communism which, though by no means uncritical, are often of a sympathetic nature.

Volumes I and II demonstrate that there has been, at least since World War II, a great deal of perceptive and literate writing produced in the United States on the subject of traditional and modern (pre-Communist) China—perhaps more than anywhere else. The first volume on Imperial

China, apart from providing the minimum necessary background on traditional Chinese culture, focuses principal attention on the decline and fall of the imperial order in its Manchu incarnation in the 19th and early 20th centuries. A judicious mixture of original and secondary sources of the highest order of "relevance and readability" (the editors' criteria for inclusion) conveys very well the agony of a culture unable either to fend off, or—because of self-satisfaction and inertia—to cope with, the new technology and international order created and forced on China by the West.

Like more current writing on prerevolutionary China, the selections and commentary offered here show a tendency to idealize the Confucian tradition and to attribute China's major problems either to departures from this tradition by emperors, officials, and gentry or to intrusions by the West, rather than to defects in the Chinese tradition itself. The reviewer, on the contrary, would hold that the Chinese have displayed an almost unique capacity for evolving and clinging to unviable philosophies. Among these, Confucianism succeeded in gaining the greatest favor because of its moderate and pragmatic quality. But China's high rate of population growth, based on an exceptionally productive agriculture, made the rather rigid Confucian order workable only so long as empty arable land was available, and this condition largely ceased to exist during the 19th century. Since the decline of Confucianism in the late 19th century, only ideologies of foreign inspiration—though subsequently Sinicized almost beyond recognition—have been able to transcend the deeply divisive forces at work in China and produce a transitory semblance of national unity.

THE SECOND VOLUME deals with the period (1911-1949), during which disunity, chaos, and war plunged China into an abyss of misery and despair, finally leading the Chinese to turn to the latest of these foreign-inspired ideologies—i.e., Marxism Sinicized into the "thought of Mao Tse-tung"—for their salvation, much as the Germans clutched at Hitlerism as seemingly their best hope of escape from a comparable agony. The approach here is perhaps somewhat too historical, with the result that detail tends to obscure analysis. The intellectual and literary quality of the selections is also not quite as high as in the less controversial first volume. There is a tendency to treat the Communist victory as in some sense inevitable, whereas in all probability it would not have occurred with-

out the Japanese aggression of 1937-45, and even then might have been fended off had the Kuomintang had better leadership. The Japanese invasion and Kuomintang ineptitude combined to present the Communists with a historic opportunity—to which they took full advantage—to prove that a party of the Marxist-Leninist type could unify and reinvigorate China as no other post-Confucian movement had yet succeeded in doing. It is all the more ironical that Mao Tse-tung, in his dotage, should have turned against the very party organization that he is usually credited with having built up. One key to this riddle lies in the fact that the party (or at least the party apparat) is in reality not so much the creature of Mao himself as of those very colleagues whom he has been denouncing.

THE THIRD VOLUME, which is almost as long as the other two combined, deals of course with China since 1949. It contains a somewhat excessive number of selections from Chinese sources, many of which are presented without adequate commentary and are therefore likely to strike the general reader as incomprehensible or absurd, or both. The entire subject is treated with great solemnity, which is to say, without a proper sense of proportion. Where humor does creep in, it is one-sided: why not balance the Chinese poem satirizing US refusal to allow some shrimp of Chinese Communist origin to be transported through American territory en route to Canada with, say, *The Economist's* superb poetic commentary on Mao's celebrated July 1966 swim in the Yangtze, entitled "But Has He Tried Walking on It?"

There is virtually nothing in the third volume to prepare the reader for that new manifestation of Mao's penchant for "uninterrupted revolution" which has become known as the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." Even the epilogue, which was written in the autumn of 1966 when the GPCR was just going into full swing, is not very enlightening on this subject. In all fairness, however, it must be said that no outside observer of China, including this reviewer, could have done significantly better at that time. The fact nevertheless remains that the book has already been outdated by the events of the GPCR. These events have done more than simply add another chapter to contemporary Chinese history; they have brought into relief certain elements that call for a reappraisal of past interpretations of developments in China. Even if we ignore the more lurid absurdities of the wall pos-

ters, the disclosures flowing from the GPCR show policy-making in Communist China since the early or mid-1950s to have been a process of interaction between Mao Tse-tung's jacobin idealism and the more professionally and bureaucratically-oriented views of many of his colleagues, with Chou En-lai probably serving as the main bridge between the two until 1965 or 1966, when he chose—outwardly at least—to take his stand with Mao.

The treatment of foreign policy in the third volume is less than satisfactory, and the commentaries in particular abound in extraordinary propositions. It is impossible, for example, to justify the assertions that in 1950 the Soviet Union threw its nuclear shield over Communist China in exchange for complete Chinese subordination to Moscow (p. 233); that China's recent foreign policy setbacks have occurred only in the ideological realm and not in the area of "pragmatic policy" (p. 336); or that the Afro-Asian conference of 1965 failed to meet because of Algerian President Ben Bella's overthrow (p. 539) rather than because a number of the participants disliked the arrogant line which the Chinese were taking with regard to the conference and used Ben Bella's ouster as an excuse for shelving the meeting. The editors also take note of China's "sudden but limited attack on India" in 1962 without further explanation and without any qualification of their contention that Communist China is essentially non-expansionist (p. 557).

Indeed, the basic theme of the commentaries on Chinese foreign policy, if not of all the selections, is that Peking, contrary to views held widely in the United States, is not expansionist, and that a

US policy of containment is not only unnecessary but likely to lead to a Sino-American war. There is a logical problem here which critics of containment never fully face. If one comes upon a town in which the crime rate is low and the police force large and efficient, it does not necessarily follow that the latter is unnecessary and should be disbanded. Even if one concedes that the Chinese have little or no interest in invading other countries, it still seems reasonable to believe that, in the absence of a countervailing US presence (including a military presence), not only would there be heavy pressure on China's non-Communist Asian neighbors to accommodate themselves to the demands of Chinese policy, but even such accommodation might not suffice to protect them against active Chinese support of efforts by local Communist parties to seize power. The current Chinese fixation on Vietnam seems due in large measure to a felt need on Peking's part for a victory of the Maoist strategy of "people's war" in order to counterbalance failures and setbacks in other areas once thought to be promising, notably Indonesia and the Congo (Leopoldville). None of this suggests to the reviewer that containment is either unnecessary or bound to lead to war with Communist China, although the latter must be admitted as a possibility.

In conclusion, it must be said that, in spite of the shortcomings of these volumes, they are nonetheless important and useful and should be read by everyone wishing to augment his knowledge of a complex country which will unquestionably exert considerable influence on the future course of world affairs.

Reviews in Brief

The Early Internationals

JULIUS BRAUNTHAL: *History of the International, 1864-1914*. F. A. Praeger, New York, 1967.

THIS COMPREHENSIVE and informative account of the origins, activities, and fate of the First and Second Internationals (presented here in easy and fluent translation from the original German) is almost more than one could expect from the labors of one man. Mr. Braunthal's book is obviously the product of prodigious industry and unrivaled knowledge, and at the same time of a profound commitment to the movement he is writing about. For while he writes impartially, he is not dispassionate—his sympathies are unmistakable.

Mr. Braunthal traces the origins of the First International, which was founded in 1864, to two sources: (1) the universalist ideas and claims of the French Revolution; and (2) the demands of early 19th-century radical and reformist political thinkers and associations for the abolition of private property—an idea which was first advanced by Babeuf.

The International Workingmen's Association, as the First International was formally christened, began with total resources of £33.0, collected from among the members of the General Council at its first meeting, and its highest annual income (for 1869-70) was £51.7.1. Mr. Braunthal makes a careful attempt to estimate its membership, but the figures are too incomplete to yield any satisfactory result. Unquestionably, however, the total was small.

Given its small size and meager resources, the fears that the International aroused appear both startling and ludicrous. To the Pope, it was "the enemy of God and man." Thiers, who was largely responsible for the sickening brutality with which the Paris Commune of 1871 was suppressed, wanted its adherents treated as the Spanish Inquisition had treated heretics. The International was accused of conspiring with both Bismarck and Louis Napoleon, and some even laid the Chicago fire of 1871 at its door.

But it is rather to the conflicts within the International that Mr. Braunthal devotes his main attention. From the beginning there were sharp differences between Marx and his followers on the one hand and sundry groups on the other: the Proudhonists, who opposed political action; the purists, who disapproved of even temporary alliances with middle-class radicals; and, fatally for the International, the followers of Bakunin. In dealing with these conflicts, Mr. Braunthal follows an orderly procedure, first giving a brief theoretical analysis of the dispute, then discussing it in the context of the different national groups affiliated to the International, and finally tracing its course within the International itself.

By the time the Second International was founded in 1889, well-organized socialist parties and trade unions with views and problems of their own had been established in a number of countries. It took eleven years for the International to establish a permanent central body (in Brussels) to act and speak on its behalf, and even then it functioned only as a loose federation of autonomous national parties. Most of these parties regarded themselves as Marxist, but when the English an-

archosyndicalist leader William Morris, who attended the inaugural congress, was asked what he thought of Marx and the theory of surplus value, he replied that much of political economy struck him as "dreary rubbish." "It is enough political economy for me," he added, "to know that the idle class is rich and the working class is poor, and that the rich are rich because they rob the poor." It did not matter whether the robbery was effected by surplus value, slavery, or brigandage. "The whole system," Morris declared, "is monstrous and intolerable."

Like its predecessor, the Second International was plagued by internal conflict. Although its stated principles, its philosophy of history, and its economics were broadly Marxist, there was no agreement on whether capitalism could be overthrown by legal means or only by revolution, on the use and dangers of the general strike, on the threat of war and how to avert it, on the attitude to be taken toward colonies. In most of the debates the real problems were evaded, and virtually nothing was resolved before the outbreak of war engulfed all the participants and the societies they were challenging.

Looking back, these men—here brought vividly to life—may seem like starry-eyed dreamers. In this "apostolic period of socialism" they were advancing a new set of values in sharp and shining contrast to prevailing standards. *The Times* (London) wrote of the First International that "one has to go back to the time of the birth of Christianity and the rejuvenation of the ancient world by the Germanic nations to find anything analogous to the workers' movement . . .," and that its aim was "surely the most comprehensive . . . to which any institution apart from