

All these developments have contributed to the crisis of fragmentation in which the Latin American Left finds itself at present, bringing forth a welter of new theories and action programs. Some of the more prominent notions current among the new radical groups have been adumbrated above, such as their impatience with the status quo, their disbelief in the possibility of effecting orderly change and their penchant for direct action, their

economic nationalism, their championing of the peasants, and the like. These notions defy any neat categorization. What does seem probable—at least from the perspective of 1970—is that while these vital issues may draw more elements into the leftist groups, they will continue to generate arguments and disputes which will keep the Left in Latin America in a state of disarray, confusion, and fragmentation for some time to come.

Castro: The Limits of Charisma

By Edward Gonzalez

For more than a decade since his rise to power, Fidel Castro's charisma and radical style of leadership have functioned as the linchpin of the Cuban Revolution. As the supreme *caudillo* in Cuban politics, he has had the final word in both ideological and policy determinations of the regime, and he has asserted unifying authority over factional tendencies. More important, his personal appeal has been essential in mobilizing Cuban society and stimulating popular support. In a system that has not yet developed institutions truly responsive to popular demands, Castro has provided the personal link between the regime and the masses, thereby

imbuing the Cuban revolutionary process with a dynamic, populist character.

At the same time, the regime's very dependence on the personality and personal authority of its *Lider maximo* has tended to impede the institutionalization of the revolutionary process, creating tension between the need for his dominant charismatic authority and the need for a more ordered system of governance.¹ To grasp the import of this fact, it may be helpful to analyze the Cuban experience of the past decade in terms of two broad phases. In the first phase—embracing several

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¹ Castro's own personality and dominating style resist organization inasmuch as the *Lider maximo* tends to involve himself in decision-making at lower levels. Characteristically, Fidel reportedly reacted to an early meeting on planning by exploding, "Nobody is going to put me in a straightjacket!" Quoted in Herbert L. Matthews, *Fidel Castro*, New York, Simon and Shuster, 1969, p. 324.

critical stages of development in the years 1959–66—Castro strove to consolidate and expand his power, to transform his political revolution into a radical social revolution, and to build a socialist-communist system. In the international sphere, he developed ties with the Soviet bloc, defeated the US-sponsored invasion of Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs, survived the 1962 missile crisis, and militantly encouraged armed revolution elsewhere in the hemisphere. In this whole period—when it was necessary to break prerevolutionary patterns of internal and external dominance, and when there existed favorable conditions for doing so—Castro’s charisma and radical political style were both successful and relevant to his aims.

After 1966, however, the course of the Cuban regime began to shift emphatically toward concentration on domestic economic development. In the opinion of the writer, the consequences of this shift—together with fundamental changes in Cuba’s internal and external environment—raise doubts about the continued functionality of Castro’s style of revolutionary leadership. Simply put, the issue is whether Cuba can develop further economically and institutionally—as well as maintain its independence—if the regime persists in clinging to the familiar elements of the Fidelista formula of leadership.

The Castro Style: 1959-66

From the first, the Cuban revolutionary process was marked and molded by Castro’s disposition to take bold risks, assume defiant postures and stake out maximum objectives. For example, his radical redistributive measures and egalitarian appeals after mid-1959 alienated his erstwhile urban middle-class supporters, whose collaboration might have aided Cuba’s economic development and dissipated opposition to his regime. But these policies solidified support among the rural and urban lower classes and the youth, effectively neutralizing the old political class. Similarly, he took a great risk in openly repudiating the United States and turning to the Soviet Union in early 1960; yet in the process he managed to galvanize nationalistic support at home and to secure a needed lifeline from the Soviet bloc.² Later, seeking to strengthen the Soviet com-

mitment to besieged Cuba on the eve of the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, he boldly announced that the Cuban Revolution was “socialist,” despite the absence of a ruling Communist party. Castro also pursued maximum objectives in his economic strategy. In 1959–1963 he embarked upon rapid industrialization despite the island’s lack of natural, technological and capital resources. The failure of the industrialization program did nothing to cramp his style; reversing his developmental strategy in the mid-1960’s, he set up an equally ambitious economic goal by scheduling an unprecedented 10-million-ton sugar harvest for 1970.

Of special interest were Castro’s foreign policy tactics to secure and exploit Cuba’s ties with the Soviet Union. As the outcome of the 1962 missile crisis demonstrated, the USSR and Cuba had basically different revolutionary objectives and strategic interests. Thus Castro had to guard against the weakening of Soviet solidarity with Cuba; at times his approach was cooperative, but almost as often he adopted defiant postures in order to maneuver Moscow into a recommitment to Havana. After the missile crisis, for example, he acidly criticized the Soviet capitulation and Khrushchev’s line of “peaceful coexistence”; he exploited the Sino-Soviet schism by courting Peking; he roundly castigated the non-revolutionary character of the Moscow-oriented Latin American Communist parties; and he reaffirmed Cuba’s support for the Fidelista insurgent movements in the hemisphere.³ In the end, Moscow granted key concessions to Cuba. Two visits by Castro to the Soviet Union in 1963 and 1964 resulted, respectively, in Moscow’s formal recognition of Cuba’s “Communist” status (1963), and a long-term trade pact (1964) which committed the Soviet Union to purchase increasing amounts of Cuban sugar at the fixed price of 6.11 cents a pound through 1970.

These ties with the Soviet Union were crucial to the survival and development of the Cuban Revolution. Havana’s links with Moscow offered the regime a greater sense of security against the possibility of US aggression. Moreover, the flow of Soviet-bloc military assistance (approximately \$1.5 billion through 1969) enabled the regime to buttress its own defenses. Finally, the economic lifeline from the Soviet bloc supplied essential support for the Cuban economy, with the USSR alone

² See this author’s article, “Castro’s Revolution, Cuban Communist Appeals, and the Soviet Response,” *World Politics* (Princeton), October 1968, pp. 39–68.

³ See Andres Suarez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959–1966*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1967, pp. 171–78.

absorbing more than \$1.1 billion in Cuban trade deficits between 1961–67.⁴

Castro's consolidation and expansion of revolutionary power at home and abroad was helped along by a number of objectively favorable circumstances. Internally, the promotion of a radical social revolution was greatly facilitated by the prerevolutionary accumulation of wealth, which was partially redistributed by the regime during its first years in power. Even after these assets began to be exhausted, the regime was able to maintain and expand other popular and egalitarian aspects of the social revolution without sacrificing Castro's developmental goals. Opportunities for upward mobility were made available to the lower class and especially to the youth. Full and stable employment was achieved for a labor force which had averaged over 16 percent annual unemployment prior to 1959. Wage and salary differentials were greatly reduced. Free or low-cost medical, public health and public utility services were extended to the rural as well as the urban population. Public education was rapidly expanded, resulting in a 66-percent increase in student enrollment between 1961–67; by the latter year over 25 percent of the total population was going to school. These social benefits, along with the psychic support generated by revolutionary symbols, contributed to the regime's continued popular legitimacy during the lean years that followed the redistributive phase of the Revolution.⁵

Externally, Castro's leverage with the Soviet Union was greatly dependent upon his hemispheric influence and the vitality of the continental revolution. After the missile crisis, the resurgence of Fidelista armed activity in Venezuela and the emergence of similar guerrilla activities in Peru, Colombia and Guatemala reduced Cuba's isolation and strengthened Fidel's bargaining position with Moscow. The increase in insurgency, the support given to the revolutionary movements by Havana, and the resulting tension between the Fidelistas and Latin American Communists in effect com-

pelled Moscow to come to terms with Cuba in order to avoid losing influence over guerrilla activities in Latin America. Thus, between 1963 and 1966, the Soviets not only granted political and economic concessions to Castro, but they also gave qualified endorsement to his strategy of armed struggle and temporarily evinced greater interest in Latin America's revolutionary potential.⁶ The continued viability of the Fidelista movement, therefore, provided Castro with a key instrument for overcoming Cuba's isolation both in the Western hemisphere and in the socialist camp.

Beginning in 1966, however, the regime was faced with new problems and conditions that taxed Fidel's style of leadership. At home, the regime embarked upon a new stage of accelerated economic development, while confronting growing discontent among the populace. And abroad it faced the prospects of new isolation as a result of developments within the socialist camp and the hemisphere.

Domestic Problems after 1965

During 1963–64, Castro had redefined his economic policy to put new stress on an agro-industrial strategy of development aimed at the rapid expansion, modernization and diversification of agriculture and livestock production. Planned increases in sugar production were expected to provide Cuba's main source of foreign exchange earnings, and the expanded agrarian sector was to serve as the basis for the island's later industrialization. Starting in 1966, the regime moved to accelerate this process by allocating additional capital, technology and manpower to development programs that necessarily entailed a delayed pay-off, and by restricting personal consumption for the time being. In the next few years an increasingly higher share of Cuba's gross disposable material product was thus devoted to total investments—24.4 percent in 1966, 27.1 percent in 1967, and 31.0 percent in 1968.⁷ At the same time, the regime placed renewed em-

⁴ Based on trade figures in Dirección Central de Estadística, Junta Central de Planificación, *Boletín Estadístico de 1966*, Havana, p. 125; and information obtained by the author in Havana in 1968.

⁵ On this subject see Maurice Zeitlin, *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class*, Princeton University Press, 1967, esp. Ch. 11. On the regime's efforts to inculcate revolutionary values in society, see Richard R. Fagen, *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba*, Stanford University Press, 1969; and Jaime Suchlicki, *University Students and Revolution in Cuba, 1920–1968*, Coral Gables, University of Miami Press, 1969, Chs. 5 and 6.

⁶ For example, see A. Sivolobov, "Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Latinskoi Amerike," *Kommunist*, August 1964, pp. 100–07. At the Havana conference of November 1964, called to reconcile differences between the Cubans, Soviets and Latin American Communists, the latter two conceded that active support should be given to the insurgencies in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Haiti.

⁷ For investment data, see Table II and Castro's speech of March 13, 1968, in *Granma*, March 24, p. 6. All references to *Granma* are to the weekly English edition unless otherwise noted.

phasis on “moral incentives” instead of material rewards as the stimuli for the labor force in the new developmental struggle. This policy was justified on the ground that it would help to create “Communist” consciousness, but it was also necessitated by the regime’s developmental priorities and the resulting shortages in consumer goods.

The new tempo of development was reflected in the clearing of scrub lands, producing a total of 4,000,000 hectares of land under cultivation by 1968, devoted principally to sugar cane, rice, citrus fruits and coffee.⁸ A comprehensive road-building program was launched, calling for a threefold increase in the island’s paved road system, and rapid progress was also made on an ambitious water conservation program.⁹ The use of fertilizers increased nearly tenfold during 1963–68, and domestic production was to be further augmented by the completion of two new nitrogen fertilizer plants.¹⁰ The mechanization of agriculture proceeded rapidly: some 42,000 tractors were imported during 1960–68, representing a fivefold increase over the 8,200 in operation in 1958.¹¹ The addition of new tandems to sugar mills, the widespread introduction of artificial inseminators in the cattle industry, and the establishment of agrarian research centers were further steps taken toward the modernization of the agrarian sector.

⁸ See Castro’s speech, *ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1969, p. 3.

⁹ By the end of 1968 there were 15 large and nine smaller dams, plus numerous irrigation and drainage systems under construction: *ibid.*, Dec. 22, 1968, p. 8.

¹⁰ See a report by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez to the 10th Regional Conference of the FAO, *ibid.*, Dec. 22, 1968, p. 4.

¹¹ See Castro’s speech, Jan. 2, 1969, *ibid.*, Jan. 5, p. 4.

As Table I indicates, the Cuban economy showed a few striking improvements in production by 1966–67. However, these advances were atypical. Table II suggests that despite the high level of investments, the large import surpluses from the USSR, and the consumption squeeze after 1965, the overall record of production between 1962 and 1967 was at best erratic. Worse still, the success of the agro-industrial strategy was undermined by Cuba’s chronic inability to meet annual sugar production targets (see Table III). Finally, total agricultural output—reflecting the performance of the sugar industry—oscillated from year to year, but declined overall by 19 percent between 1961 and 1968, while per capita production suffered an even sharper decrease of 29 percent over the same period (Table IV).

In part these results could be attributed to the time lag that was inevitable before Cuba’s developmental investments could register increases in production. But other factors also contributed to the regime’s economic problems. Adverse weather conditions in the middle-1960’s damaged crops and lowered agricultural output. Also, there was an extraordinarily high rate of capital depreciation during the early years of the US economic embargo, helping to depress production. For all these reasons—not to mention deficiencies in planning and management—the economy remained sluggish, and there was little expectation of improvement until the early 1970’s.

Meantime, the Cuban consumer was faced with increasing austerity. Whereas per capita personal consumption had risen by 7 percent between 1962 and 1965, it dropped sharply by 10 percent between 1965 and 1967 (see Table II). This downward

TABLE I

Selected Production Advances

	1962	1965	1966	1967	1968
Beef	196,392	309,985	326,379	324,176	369,352
Milk	219,414	243,198	329,505	324,120	302,102
Eggs	174,604	920,267	1,019,868	1,177,607	1,193,379
Fish	35,493	40,282	43,215	62,881	62,834

NOTE: The figures for beef production represent state procurement totals expressed in metric tons. Other figures are official reports of production, expressed in thousands of liters for milk; thousands of units for eggs; and metric tons for fish.

SOURCES: Direccion Central de Estadistica, Junta Central de Planificacion, *Boletin Estadistico de 1966*, Havana; and *Compendio Estadistico de Cuba 1968*, Havana.

TABLE II

Production, Investment and Consumption

(In millions of 1965 pesos* or percentages, as noted)

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Gross Material Product (GMP)	3,698	3,737	4,075	4,137	3,986	3,900
Gross Disposable Material Product (GDMP)	3,793	4,030	4,497	4,309	4,294	4,335
State Investments (SI)	608	717	795	827	910	979
Total Investments (TI)	885	981	1,228	947	1,048	1,175
Percent of GDMP devoted to SI	16.0	17.8	17.7	19.2	21.2	22.6
Percent of GDMP devoted to TI	23.3	24.3	27.3	21.2	24.4	27.1
Per Capita Personal Consumption	352	367	374	378	355	338

NOTE: GMP is the Cuban "Producto Bruto." GDMP is GMP, plus imports, less exports. TI is GDMP less total consumption. The abnormally high figure for TI in 1964 reflects an abnormally high rate of inventory accumulation.

SOURCES: The 1962-66 figures are based on data in *Boletín Estadístico de 1966*, p. 20 (see source note, Table I). The 1967 figures are estimates computed on the basis of data contained in Fidel Castro's speech of March 13, 1968, published in *Granma* (Havana), March 24, p. 6.

* One 1965 peso = one US dollar at the official exchange rate.

trend appears to have continued through 1968 as new shortages in consumer staples required the addition of new items to the ration list. The introduction of workers' mess halls serving low-priced meals, free local telephone calls, and nominal urban bus fares did little to mitigate the new austerity. Growing deprivation, coupled with the absence of visible production advances, contributed to the increased demoralization and disaffection evident among elements of Cuban society after 1967.

In a major speech of March 13, 1968, Fidel acknowledged that there were signs of "protest," "discontent," "confusion" and "uneasiness" among sectors of the populace as a result of the new shortages.¹² The following September, he bitterly assailed acts of industrial sabotage that had been taking place throughout the island, the hippie movement among some of Havana's youth (who had been forcibly rounded up the previous month), and incidents of vandalism in the schools of the capital.¹³ Discontent was no longer confined to the

so-called *gusanos* (worms) among the remnants of the middle class, but appeared to have spread to workers and even some sectors of Cuba's relatively privileged youth.¹⁴

By no means did the degree of discontent endanger the security of the regime. But it did threaten the vitality of the economy by making it more difficult to obtain maximum effort from the labor force. Absenteeism increased and productivity fell, once the workers found that they could not spend their wages on non-existent commodities.¹⁵ Thus the regime's reliance on "moral incentives" or revolutionary exhortation proved insufficient to mobilize the labor force on a sustained

¹² *Granma*, March 24, 1968, p. 2.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1969.

¹⁴ My own 1968 stay in Cuba contrasted sharply with my previous year's visit: I found a heightened sense of demoralization and outright alienation among many individuals who had previously been identified with the Revolution. René Dumont, a close follower of Cuban developments, also observed growing popular disaffection during his visit in 1969. See his *Cuba: est-il socialiste?*, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1970.

¹⁵ In a study of absenteeism, the Cuban Communist Party's Commission on Revolutionary Orientation reported: "There is more money in circulation than things on which to spend it. Every worker knows that he can live on what he is paid for working 15 or 20 days a month." *Granma*, Nov. 9, 1969, p. 2.

basis. At the same time, developmental priorities and the shortage of consumer goods precluded the return to material incentives.

External Problems: 1965-68

On the foreign front, four developments after 1965 increased Cuba's isolation and lessened her external leverage. First, seeing the futility of armed struggle, the Soviets and Latin American Communists moved to disassociate themselves from the insurgent guerrilla movements on the continent in order to work with established Latin American governments.¹⁶ Between 1965 and 1968 the Soviets pushed for the normalization of diplomatic and trade relations with anti-Castro governments in Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela, even though the latter two were targets of guerrilla activity. Castro considered Moscow's moves a blatant betrayal of revolutionary internationalism and a sacrifice of Cuba's interests. In an address of August 10, 1967, to the first conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS), Fidel acidly declared that "... if internationalism exists, if solidarity is a word worthy of respect, the least that we can expect of any state of the socialist camp

¹⁶ This reassessment of the Latin American situation was given impetus by the US intervention in the Dominican revolt. Thereafter, Moscow and the Communists argued for the avoidance of provocative and premature actions and for the formation of broad anti-imperialist fronts. This prescription was the main theme of the *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), August 1965.

TABLE III

Sugar Production

(In thousands of metric tons)

	Target	Harvest
1962	--	4,815
1963	--	3,882
1964	--	4,474
1965	6,000	6,156
1966	6,500	4,537
1967	7,500	6,236
1968	8,000	5,164
1969	9,000	4,459

SOURCES: *Hoy* Oct. 14, 1964; and Fidel Castro's address of May 20, 1970, in *Granma* May 31, p. 7.

TABLE IV

Agricultural Production

(1952-1956 = 100)

	Total	Per Capita
1961	122	106
1962	100	85
1963	86	71
1964	94	76
1965	113	89
1966	94	72
1967	115	87
1968	103	77

SOURCES: Based on Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, *Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics* (Rome), July-August 1969, pp. 17, 19.

is that it refrain from giving any financial or technical aid to those regimes."¹⁷ The scuttling of the Fidelista insurgent forces by local Communist parties similarly incensed Havana. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Venezuela. There, the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) took steps to disengage itself from the guerrilla forces from April 1965 onward, leading eventually to Castro's violent denunciation of, and open break with, the PCV on March 13, 1967.¹⁸

The second development disturbing to Havana was the course of the war in Vietnam, which increased Castro's doubts about the genuineness of the Soviet commitment to Communist solidarity. Moscow had not deterred "imperialist aggression" nor actively responded to the US bombing of a bona fide Communist state, as called for by the Cuban leadership.¹⁹ Together with the Soviet failure to assist the Arab states in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the Kosygin-Johnson talks at Glassboro, the Vietnam war reinforced the fears of the Cuban

¹⁷ *Granma*, Aug. 20, 1967, p. 5.

¹⁸ On the Venezuelan affair, see D. Bruce Jackson, *Castro, The Kremlin, and Communism in Latin America*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1969, pp. 40-119.

¹⁹ Armando Hart, head of the Cuban delegation to the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966, expressed Havana's view in a statement declaring that the socialist states had "the right and the duty" to hurl back the US "aggressors." He quoted Castro's speech of March 13, 1965, demanding armed intervention in Vietnam "whatever the risks that are necessary." Reported in *Cuba Socialista* (Havana), May 1966, pp. 38-39.

regime that Moscow was capable of sacrificing its allies.

The third reversal underscoring Cuba's vulnerability was the clear demise of the Fidelista insurgent forces in Venezuela, Peru and Colombia after mid-1965. The moribund continental revolution confronted Havana with the prospect of losing not only its supportive movement in the hemisphere, but also its principal source of international leverage. To arrest this development, the Cubans attempted to reconstitute and transform the revolutionary movement. First, they provided support for a new guerrilla *foco*, established in Bolivia by Ernesto Che Guevara in late 1966, with a force that included seven former members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. Next, Havana injected new content into the doctrine of guerrilla war through the publication in early 1967 of Régis Debray's book, *Revolution in the Revolution*. The Cubans' final step was to provide the continental revolution with an institutional base by convening the aforementioned conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization in August 1967. Attended by some 160 Latin American delegates in Havana, the OLAS conference broke decisively with Moscow's line on peaceful revolution and established a permanent Executive Committee to promote armed revolutionary struggle.

The final and most traumatic setback for Havana was Guevara's capture and execution in October 1967, ending the Bolivian guerrilla *foco*. The Bolivian fiasco signaled the bankruptcy of Fidel's policy of continental revolution. With Che dead, Havana was left with a bureaucratic appendage in OLAS, but without much hope of attracting new revolutionaries. Without a viable revolutionary movement in the hemisphere, the Castro regime was deprived of its principal external resource in dealing with Moscow—at a time when Cuban-Soviet relations had become increasingly strained. Indeed, Soviet retaliation against Havana's insubordination was not long in coming. On January 2, 1968, Castro announced the immediate rationing of gasoline because of the "limited" possibility of the Soviet Union meeting Cuba's growing fuel consumption needs.²⁰ Fidel thus needed to find new counters to Soviet pressures, and to restructure Cuba's relationship with Moscow and the hemisphere, just when domestic problems were becoming more pressing.

Recovering Momentum: 1968-70

Following Guevara's death, Havana's attention was redirected inward towards the revitalization of revolutionary élan and the waging of the development struggle. Castro's speeches throughout 1968 and 1969 were virtually devoid of references to the continental revolution, concentrating instead on domestic political and economic issues. While the themes of Che's guerrilla struggle and sacrifice and the war in Vietnam were sounded, they were used mainly for inspirational purposes in mobilizing the populace toward greater productive efforts. Havana's reorientation was highlighted in the 1968 centennial celebration of Cuba's quest for independence, with Castro's revolution portrayed as an integral part of "One Hundred Years of Struggle" from 1868 to 1968. Having focused inwards, the regime sought to regain revolutionary momentum through (a) a return to ideological militancy, (b) new emphasis on the commitment to a 10-million-ton sugar harvest, and (c) militarization of the Castroite Revolution.

The regime's new phase of ideological fervor began with a "revolutionary offensive" launched in March 1968. Puritanical in intent, it aimed at accelerating the construction of "real communism" by eradicating capitalism and residual bourgeois

The Persistence of "Capitalism"

Are we going to construct socialism, or are we going to construct vending stands? Gentleman, we did not make a Revolution here to establish the right to trade! Whoever says that capitalism is easily deterred is a liar; capitalism has to be dug out by the roots. . . .

. . . we had thought it would be possible to reduce the number of businesses little by little. . . . But what actually happened? Businesses did not disappear; they increased in number. Almost half of the businesses came into being after the Revolution. . . . But little by little we are sanitizing our environment, cleaning it up, creating a country that is really a country of workers.

—Fidel Castro, speeches of March 13 and March 15, 1968, in *Granma* (Havana), March 24, 1968.

²⁰ *Granma* (daily), Jan. 3, 1968, p. 3.

vices from Cuban society. In his aforementioned speech of March 13, 1968, Castro stressed that revolution would not be an “easy road” gilded by Soviet assistance, and called upon the Cuban people to display “everyday heroism” by accepting necessary deprivations. Declaring that there could be no “accommodation” with capitalism in the new society, he announced that the remaining private non-agrarian sector was to be abolished immediately because of profiteering and blackmarket activities by “anti-social” elements. In short, “capitalism,” “parasitism,” and the “exploitation of man” were to be “dug out by the roots” in creating Cuba’s Communist society.²¹

By the end of March, 55,600 small, privately-owned retail, service and manufacturing establishments were nationalized, giving Cuba the distinction of having the highest ratio of state to private ownership of any Communist country in the world.²² The immediate effect of this measure, however, was to aggravate discontent, partly as a result of new bottlenecks in the distribution of goods and services previously supplied by the private sector.

Nevertheless, the renewed emphasis upon ideological militancy continued. In the fall of 1968, the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) spearheaded a drive against “bourgeois” intellectuals and antirevolutionary literature, insisting that there must be no “ideological softening” in the revolutionary movement.²³ At the end of March 1969, a “National Forum on Internal Order” was convened to examine the problem of “antisocial behavior.” Attended by representatives of the party, MINFAR, the Ministry of Interior, and various mass organizations, the forum discussed measures to rekindle revolutionary zeal in the populace and to cope with such problems as the rising rate of juvenile delinquency and crimes against property.²⁴

In the meantime, Castro had launched an effort to mobilize popular attention and energy by making a national crusade out of the commitment to pro-

duce 10 million tons of sugar by 1970. This enormous goal had first been announced in the fall of 1964 as the final target in a five-year production plan for 1965–70.²⁵ From 1965 to 1967, it got little mention in official pronouncements and propaganda—partly, no doubt, because sugar production failed to meet the planned levels, and also because the regime’s major interest of the moment was the continental revolution. Very shortly after the Bolivian fiasco, however, Fidel suddenly began to emphasize the 1970 sugar target in terms that made its achievement both a matter of national honor and a test of Castroism itself.²⁶

It is interesting to consider what must have gone through Castro’s mind as he embarked upon this course. Certainly, if such a stupendous harvest could be achieved, it would represent a stunning comeback for Havana, counterbalancing the collapse of the continental revolution and the spasmodic past performance of the Cuban economy. Moreover, it would make Cuba dominant in the world sugar market at the time the 1964 Soviet-Cuban trade treaty was due to expire, thereby offering Havana the possibility of turning to the West as a market for sugar sales. At the same time, there were high risks involved in Castro’s gamble; while a successful harvest might yield great psychological, political and economic pay-offs, a poor harvest would undeniably demoralize the population and further damage Havana’s credibility.

In short, the harvest posed a number of decisive tests for the regime. At stake was the superiority of the new over the old order, for Fidel proposed to better the previous record of sugar production set in 1952—7.29 million tons (in 110 days)—by nearly 40 percent (in a much longer harvest period of over 280 days). At stake also was Cuba’s international credit position among socialist and capitalist trading partners, since a successful harvest would naturally strengthen their confidence in the Cuban economy. But most important, the 10-million-ton goal was a test of Castro’s charisma and radical style of leadership. Fidel sought to revive the revolutionary commitment of the populace by accomplishing what had never been done in Cuba’s history.

Standing in the way of this maximum goal were

²¹ *Ibid.*, March 24, 1968, pp. 2–8.

²² Only the agrarian sector remained partly outside the area of state ownership, with 30 percent of the land still in private hands. See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, “The Revolutionary Offensive,” *Transaction* (St. Louis), April 1969, pp. 22–29, 62.

²³ Attacks against deviant intellectuals were published in *Verde Olivo* (Havana), the MINFAR’s official weekly, in five successive issues beginning Nov. 3, 1968.

²⁴ See *Granma*, April 6, 1969, pp. 4–5.

²⁵ See *Hoy* (Havana), Oct. 14, 1964.

²⁶ See, for example, Castro’s speeches of Dec. 24, 1967, and Jan. 2, 1968 (reported by Havana Radio on those dates), and especially his speech of March 13, 1968, in *Granma*, March 24, pp. 2–8.

such “objective” conditions as the limited production capacity of the sugar mills, the unpredictability of weather conditions, the inadequacies in transportation facilities, and the low productivity of the non-professional cane-cutting force.²⁷ One way Fidel sought to overcome these obstacles was to rely on “subjectivism,” or the “Sierra Maestra complex.” In the same manner that his small guerrilla force had defeated Batista’s army, the work force, by its revolutionary will, determination and effort, would collectively triumph over all obstacles standing in the way of bringing in the harvest. Mobilizing several hundred thousand volunteers, Castro made the harvest a “historic battle,” a test of character for the Cuban people.²⁸

Castro did not depend on “subjectivism” alone, however; soon after the all-out harvesting effort was announced, the regime took steps leading to the increasing militarization of the economy. Beginning in 1968, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) became a developmental weapon funneling supervisory personnel and manpower into the economy and organizing part of the labor force along paramilitary lines. These steps helped compensate for the dearth of competent civilian managers and technicians in the field by supplying army officers with command and organizational skills, as well as relatively high levels of technical competence.²⁹ The army also helped to overcome organizational deficiencies in the party which, to use Castro’s term, had impeded the waging of “simultaneous battles” on several economic fronts.³⁰ In addition, the militarization of the labor force was aimed at inculcating the work discipline necessary for realizing production targets.³¹

Beginning in 1968, therefore, army officers could be found in crucial positions at the provincial and regional levels of the sugar industry. The two most important sugar-producing provinces of Oriente and Camaguey were under army command, while junior officers assumed management of the most important sugar *centrales*, especially those undergoing conversion into super-mills. The provincial command posts reportedly were linked in turn with headquarters in Havana. In addition, the labor force was increasingly organized along military lines in the form of columns, battalions and brigades—including a 40,000-man Centennial Youth Column in Camaguey, in which youths served to fulfill their military obligation. Finally, the army’s mechanized “Che Guevara” Brigade was directly employed in clearing away scrub lands for agricultural development.

The growing reliance on the FAR as a developmental weapon and organizational model continued throughout 1969 in preparation for the 1970 harvest. In March 1969 Castro stressed the use of the army in solving production problems in Camaguey province.³² In October Armando Hart, party Organization Secretary, extolled the example of the army in agricultural work, stressing that the production rate of the FAR labor brigades exceeded that of other agricultural workers.³³ In November Fidel fully acknowledged the increasing significance of the FAR. He announced that between 80,000 and 100,000 armed forces personnel would be mobilized for the 1970 harvest. Referring to the need for “discipline and good work habits” in the labor force, he called upon the FAR to provide the necessary direction:

The armed forces represent . . . the institution with the most experience in organization; they are the ones with the most discipline. They must contribute that spirit of organization and discipline . . . as well as their experience.³⁴

In Castro’s bid to regain revolutionary momentum, the 10-million ton target provided Cuban society with an all-consuming goal, while the militarization of the revolution became the organizational means for attaining that objective. The future of the militarized model, in turn, depended upon the success of the 1970 harvest.

Well before the harvest was in, it was clear from

²⁷ For example, unforeseen delays and problems made it impossible to achieve planned increases in the production capacity of sugar mills undergoing plant expansion. Acknowledging “complications and difficulties on Feb. 9, 1970, Castro concluded that “the new equipment for the 1970 harvest, rather than helping the harvest, turned out to be something of an obstacle to it.” *Ibid.*, Feb. 15, 1970, p. 2.

²⁸ For examples of his ongoing theme, see Castro’s speeches in *ibid.*, Nov. 2 and Nov. 16, 1969, and Feb. 15, 1970.

²⁹ On March 13, 1969, Castro pointed out that thousands of work centers were being administered by persons with limited education: *ibid.*, March 16, 1969, pp. 2–4. At the time, the Communist Party of Cuba probably did not exceed 60,000 members, whose low level of technical competence and lack of organizational abilities further undermined the regime’s developmental efforts. See Armando Hart’s revealing speech, *ibid.*, May 25, 1969, pp. 3–5.

³⁰ See Castro’s admonitions in *ibid.*, March 16, 1969, p. 5.

³¹ See Castro’s address of Nov. 4, 1969, *ibid.*, Nov. 16, p. 3.

³² *Ibid.*, (daily), March 20, 1969, p. 2.

³³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 5, 1969, pp. 4–6.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 16, 1969, pp. 2–4.

Havana's own reports that the Cubans would not manage to reach their 10-million-ton target, but that they would succeed in producing a new record harvest of 8.5 million tons.³⁵ On balance, this performance represents a setback for Castro (on which more shortly). But the position of the FAR and the attractiveness of the militarized model may have been enhanced, since they appear to have been decisive in setting the new record of production. As will be seen, such a development could hold crucial significance for the future of the Cuban Revolution.

Relations with Moscow

The recovery of domestic revolutionary momentum was paralleled by bold efforts on Castro's part to exact a firmer Soviet commitment to Havana. Deprived of his hemispheric leverage following Che's death, Fidel severely strained Cuba's relationship with Moscow throughout most of 1968 in an effort to force a new understanding with the Soviets. This phase of political maneuvering, which was characterized by mutual retaliations, came to an end with Fidel's speech on the Soviet bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Thereafter, a new compromise emerged which has since produced closer bonds between the two countries, but which also has left Cuba precariously dependent upon Moscow.

To review these developments, the pattern of strained relations was set in late 1967 when Havana substituted Minister of Public Health Major Jose R. Machado for President Osvaldo Dorticos in Cuba's delegation to Moscow's 50th-anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution. This slight was followed by the "microfaction" affair involving the old Stalinist, Anibal Escalante, former Executive Secretary of the defunct pro-Soviet Popular Socialist Party (PSP). In January 1968, Escalante and 34 other ex-PSP members were arrested, tried and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 2 to 15 years; the principal charges leveled against them were that they had operated as a so-called "microfaction" to oppose Castro's economic and foreign policies, and that through Soviet, East German and Czech contacts they had urged the withdrawal of Soviet-bloc support in order to bring about Castro's downfall and replacement by trusted old-

line Communists. Responsible authorities of the Soviet and East European countries were exempted from blame for the subversive activities of the "microfaction." Nevertheless, the arrest and sentencing of this pro-Soviet faction was apparently intended to serve as a clear warning to Moscow: Havana would oppose increased Soviet influence in Cuba's affairs and stood ready to retaliate against cutbacks in Soviet assistance by carrying out further actions embarrassing to Moscow.³⁶

The Escalante affair, along with Havana's boycott of the Soviet-sponsored meeting of Communist parties in Bucharest in February, came at a time of hard bargaining between Cuba and the USSR over the 1968 trade protocol. Negotiations had been going on since the preceding October, with the protocol finally signed on March 22. The new protocol did in fact reflect a tightening up of Soviet economic assistance: reportedly, the volume of trade in 1968 was to increase by only 10 percent as opposed to 23 percent in 1967; and the Soviets henceforth were to charge an undisclosed rate of interest on new credits extended to Cuba.³⁷ Given the poor 1968 sugar harvest of 5.2 million tons, the Soviets seemed to have a stranglehold on the Cuban regime, against which further countermoves by Havana would be futile if not hazardous for the Cuban economy.

The Soviet-bloc intervention in Czechoslovakia, however, gave Castro the opportunity to air Cuban grievances and to demand a redefinition of Soviet-Cuban ties—in exchange for his endorsement of the occupation. In a speech of August 23, 1968, Castro vented Havana's displeasure over Soviet-bloc internal developments and relations with Cuba: both the bureaucratic Novotny and the revisionist Dubcek had corrupted Communist ideals; and the poor quality and onerous terms of Czechoslovak aid to Cuba had violated the spirit of internationalism. Next, he both condemned and approved the Warsaw Pact occupation: it was a "flagrant" violation of Czechoslovakia's sovereignty and thus

³⁵ Castro's speech of May 19, 1970, in *ibid.*, May 31, p. 4.

³⁶ See the attacks against the "microfaction" by Raul Castro and others, *ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1968, pp. 2, 4–5, 7–11. The affair was also directed against "reformist" currents within the Revolution. See Castro's speech of March 13, *ibid.*, March 24, 1968, p. 2.

³⁷ Kevin Devlin, "The Soviet-Cuban Confrontation: Economic Reality and Political Judo," from the Research Department of Radio Free Europe, April 1, 1968, pp. 15–16.

illegal; but it was justifiable politically because “Czechoslovakia was moving toward a counter-revolutionary situation . . . and into the arms of imperialism . . . [and] it was absolutely necessary, at all costs, in one way or another, to prevent this from eventually taking place.” Castro thus based his argument for Soviet intervention on ideological rather than geopolitical grounds. Accordingly, he demanded that the same Soviet-bloc protection be extended to North Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba: “. . . will they send the divisions of the Warsaw Pact to Cuba if the Yankee imperialists attack—or even threaten to attack—our country, if we request it?”³⁸

Castro’s speech on the Czech crisis appears to have been a major turning point in Cuban-Soviet affairs. Earlier tension gave way to a rapprochement by 1969, marked by mutual concessions and new bonds of solidarity between the two countries. In early 1969 and 1970, the Soviets signed trade protocols with Havana that evidently were satisfactory to the Cubans. For the first time a Soviet naval flotilla visited Cuba in 1969 on the occasion of the July 26th anniversary (an important one in the Castroite calendar, marking Fidel’s first major strike against Batista). In November a group of 650 Soviet technicians and diplomats, headed by the Soviet ambassador, spent a day cutting sugar cane as a gesture of solidarity with the Cubans. Marshal Grechko, the Soviet Minister of Defense, visited Havana in the same month, stirring speculation of a new Soviet arms agreement with Cuba.³⁹ Castro thus appears to have been successful in strengthening Soviet-Cuban ties as a means of overcoming Cuba’s isolation.

For its part, Havana seems to have swung back into line behind Moscow since 1968, fully endorsing the Soviet Union’s domestic and foreign policies. The Cubans have also ceased their polemical attacks on the pro-Soviet Latin American Communist parties, and have backed off from their promotion of the strategy of armed struggle.⁴⁰ Finally, Havana has moderated its policy toward Latin America in a further effort to reduce Cuba’s hemispheric

isolation. A trade agreement with Chile was signed early in 1970, and Fidel has praised the nationalist and reformist posture of the Peruvian military regime on several occasions since its rise to power on July 14, 1969.

These shifts in the Cuban line were no more evident than in Castro’s speech of April 22, 1970, honoring Lenin’s birth. Fidel paid tribute to the Soviet state, without which “. . . it would have been impossible for Cuba to become the first socialist country in Latin America.” He attacked the leftist critics of the Soviet Union in Europe and Latin America for having condemned Soviet-bloc intervention in Czechoslovakia. He further praised the Soviet Union for its supportive role against “imperialist aggression” in Vietnam, the Middle East and Cuba, noting that his regime alone had received \$1.5 billion in Soviet arms. Concerning Latin America, he vowed that Cuba had not and would not give up her support for the revolutionary movement. But in an apparent reference to the Peruvian example, he added:

. . . [Cuban] support does not necessarily have to be expressed exclusively in favor of guerrilla movements, but [can be extended to] any government which sincerely adopts a policy of economic and social development and of liberating its country from the Yankee imperialist yoke; no matter by what path that government has reached power, Cuba will support it.⁴¹

The recent Cuban-Soviet reconciliation marks a significant departure from Castro’s earlier political approach to Moscow. To be sure, the accommodation was reached only after hard bargaining; but in contrast to the past, it was an extraneous factor—the Czech crisis—that gave Fidel the singular opportunity to press for a trade-off. Otherwise Castro would have had little to bargain with. His stance on armed struggle has lost a good deal of its significance since the collapse of the revolutionary movement on the Latin American continent. Moreover, Moscow’s position has been strengthened by the Cuban economy’s continuing need for maximum Soviet assistance, and particularly by the fact that the 1964 trade pact is due to lapse at the end of 1970. Hence, Cuba has been placed in a position of critical dependency, leaving Fidel with little room to maneuver. One way remains for Castro to regain leverage, and that is to explore new alternatives for Cuba in her policy vis-à-vis the Western hemisphere.

³⁸ *Granma*, Aug 25, 1968, pp. 1-4.

³⁹ Raul Castro paid a six-week return visit to the Soviet Union in April–May 1970. According to one report, the Soviets agreed to re-equip the FAR, supplying it, *inter alia*, with improved SA-2 air defense missiles and a 25-plane squadron of F-model MIG-21’s: *Time* (New York), July 27, 1970, p. 17.

⁴⁰ As a result, Douglas Bravo, commander of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), issued a communique on January 15, 1970, accusing the Castro leadership of abandoning the guerrilla movements.

⁴¹ *Granma*, May 3, 1970, pp. 2-5.

Revolutionary Junctures and Prospects

The recent developments in Cuba's domestic and foreign policies pose critical issues which affect the character and direction of the Cuban Revolution. Internally, the issue is whether charisma, radicalism and the resultant popular basis of the Revolution can be reconciled with the organizational imperatives of sustained economic development. Externally, the issue is whether Cuba can overcome her hemispheric isolation and reduce her dependency upon the Soviet Union by coming to terms with Latin American governments.

Fidel's charisma and revolutionary style appear to have become less relevant to the new development process. The commitment to the 10-million-ton harvest was the product of Fidel's radicalism, reflecting his personal decision-making authority and his emphasis on subjectivism as the motive force. But his revolutionary style probably did no more than supply the necessary inspirational force for the 1970 harvest. It was the new reliance on the armed forces as a developmental force, and on the militarized model of production, that evidently provided the needed institutional support and organization for the collective effort. At issue, therefore, is whether the regime can reconcile the func-

The Many Voices of Castro

On Soviet Solidarity

In my opinion, this "we are defended" . . . attitude led to a certain sit-back-and-take-it-easy mentality when the only correct, the only intelligent, the only truly revolutionary attitude was always to depend on ourselves . . . to rely first on ourselves and only on ourselves, and always be ready to place a high price on our lives without waiting for anyone to come and defend us.—(*March 13, 1968.*)

We shall never break our political ties with the Soviet Union or even what they call military ties. On the contrary! As far as we are concerned, we'll always be ready to increase our military ties with the Soviet Union. —(*April 22, 1970.*)

On the Revolutionary Movement

The guerrilla is bound to be the nucleus of the revolutionary movement. . . . We are absolutely convinced that, in the long run, there is only one solution, as expressed in the [OLAS] Resolution: guerrilla warfare in Latin America.—(*August 10, 1967.*)

When we speak of supporting a revolutionary movement, we should say that that support does not necessarily have to be expressed exclusively in favor of guerrilla movements. . . . I say this because . . . no two cases in the history of the world are exactly alike, and there will not be two revolutions that will develop in the same way. New possibilities and new forms appear . . . [and] any Latin American govern-

ment that sincerely and consistently undertakes the economic and social development of its country and its liberation from the imperialist yoke will be able to count on the support of our people and of our Revolution.—(*April 22, 1970.*)

On the Sugar Harvest

. . . it is not a matter of eight point something, or nine, but at least 10 million tons. And not a ton less, not one tone less, with or without a drought! And, if there's no drought, there's no telling how many tons we'll have!—(*April 19, 1968.*)

What this will mean from a political, moral and revolutionary point of view is undoubtedly worth much more than the ten million tons of sugar themselves. It will be a great ideological victory of the Revolution and the revolutionary camp in general. . . . It will be a great ideological and moral victory over imperialism, over the capitalists and reactionaries!—(*November 4, 1969.*)

We won't accept a pound less than ten million tons. That is our position, and we repeat and reaffirm it. It would be incredibly humiliating if we were to produce anything less than ten million tons.—(*February 9, 1970.*)

I can tell you that we won't reach the ten million ton mark. I'm not going to beat around the bush. That, in short, is the situation. . . . Now the struggle for the ten million tons must become the struggle for the nine million tons.—(*May 19, 1970.*)

tions and prerogatives of charismatic leadership with the institutional structures and orderly processes which are needed to promote rapid economic growth.

While it should help to resolve immediate production problems, the militarized revolutionary model seems incompatible with the Cuban Revolution's earlier voluntarism and populism. Such a model involves a regimented command system directed from above. It would thus close off the possibilities of building responsive institutions that could provide for effective popular participation in influencing national policies.⁴²

The choice before the regime is whether to push on with its accelerated developmental program under the militarized model or some other command system, or to opt for a more responsive system at the expense of some of its more radical goals. Ironically, however, even if the militarized path is chosen, Castro's presence and personal ties with the masses may be needed to make the new revolutionary order more palatable.

On the international front, Havana needs to overcome its isolation within the hemisphere both to gain a greater sense of security and to reduce dependency on the Soviets. Here, however, the regime may face a dilemma in choosing between Cuba's diplomatic and revolutionary interests. This is clearly illustrated by the Peruvian case. On the one hand, Castro has indicated that he is encouraged by recent Peruvian developments, and he may even be looking to the anti-Communist Peruvian military regime as a potential anchor in realigning right-wing and left-wing nationalism in Latin America.⁴³ On the other hand, any move by Cuba toward the establishment of relations with Peru (or any other country) would require that Havana associate itself with governments confronting insurgent groups and urban terrorists. In turn,

this could cut Fidel off from whatever remains of the revolutionary Left, leaving him open to the charge of having abandoned the revolutionary struggle. Nevertheless, if assertive nationalistic tendencies continue to develop among non-Fidelista groups in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America, Havana may decide to forego its revolutionary objectives in favor of Cuba's diplomatic interests. Such a step would signal a new direction for the Cuban Revolution.

POSTSCRIPT

The 1970 harvest ended with a record production of 8.526 million tons.⁴⁴ Nonetheless all indications are that it represents a major personal defeat for Castro, reflecting adversely on his credibility and radical style of leadership. Consequently, it may signify a watershed in Cuba's internal development in the same way that Guevara's death proved a turning point in Fidel's efforts to revolutionize the hemisphere.

In speeches of May 19 and 20, and most recently of July 26,⁴⁵ Castro acknowledged personal as well as collective "responsibility" for the harvest "set-back" and "defeat." In the latter speech he also revealed a number of other reversals in the economy and gave a gloomy forecast of the continued hardship and supreme effort that lie ahead in Cuba's drive for economic development. Overall, he called for the strengthening of the Communist Party apparatus and mass organizations in an apparent effort to arrest demoralization in the populace, reverse the trend toward a slackening of work, and control dissenting elements within his regime. He further indicated that administrative reforms would be adopted to improve the coordination of economic activities and to remove party personnel from management functions at the plant level.

These and other steps suggest that Castro is under pressure from technocratic and reformist elements in Cuba. Supported by the Soviet Union, and bolstered by Fidel's defeat in the sugar harvest, they may be pressing for greater influence in the formulation of economic policies under a less personalized decision-making system.

⁴² Maurice Zeitlin observes: "At present, despite the apparently ample participation of the workers in discussions and decisions concerning the *implementation* of the national economic plan set for their plant, the workers have no role . . . in determining the plan itself." He adds that little has been done ". . . to establish institutions to guarantee that competing points of view can be heard within the revolutionary socialist consensus; that meaningful alternatives are debated, that policies are initiated, as well as implemented, by the citizenry at large." "Inside Cuba: Workers and Revolution," *Ramparts* (San Francisco), March 1970, pp. 70, 74.

⁴³ The Cuban-Peruvian alignment might be facilitated by the trend toward left-wing militarization in Cuba. The two countries would share institutional, elite-generational and developmental similarities, as well as assertive nationalism, which would help overcome ideological differences between the two regimes.

⁴⁴ Havana Radio, July 25, 1970.

⁴⁵ *Granma*, May 31, 1970, pp. 2-5, 7-12; and Havana Radio, July 26, 1970.

Che in Bolivia:

The “Revolution” That Failed

By Robert F. Lamberg

Ernesto Guevara comes/from the country to the city/[with] a heart and a gun. . . .
—Bolivian guerrilla song.

[Our] isolation continues to be total . . . the peasant base is still undeveloped. . . . We still have not recruited any peasants, which is understandable considering the little contact we have had with them. . . .

—From Guevara’s field diary,
April and August 1967.

It is ironic—but not untypical of Fidel Castro’s checkered course—that only a few months after he stage-managed a major demonstration of his influence on the Latin American continent (the conference of the “Latin American Solidarity Organization” convened in Havana in August 1967), the strategy of guerrilla warfare by which he and his followers hoped to achieve their revolutionary

aims was emphatically and decisively repudiated—in the much celebrated misadventure of “Che” Guevara in Bolivia.

There are several reasons why it is important to examine the Bolivian guerrilla movement. First and foremost, it was the only insurgent force organized entirely on the basis of refinements in guerrilla theory that might be described as the third phase of the Castroite ideology.¹ Secondly, it was the only guerrilla action in Latin America that yielded a great deal of firsthand documentary

¹ In the writer’s view, it is possible to distinguish three distinct phases in the evolution of Castroite ideology. In the first, theoretical notions were formulated *ex post facto* to explain and glorify Castro’s successful revolution in Cuba; the classic expression of these theories was Guevara’s famous volume, *Guerra de Guerrillas*, published in Havana in 1960. In the second phase, Castroism was elaborated and infused with doctrinal concepts that placed it unmistakably in the ideological orbit of communism (see, for example, the “Second Declaration of Havana,” *Revolucion* (Havana) Feb. 5, 1962; Guevara’s “Guerra de Guerrillas: Un Metodo,” *Cuba Socialista*, September 1962; and other sources). The third phase witnessed the amendment of Guevara’s theories of guerrilla warfare to emphasize the need for armed struggle by guerrillas operating independently from political control (reflecting Havana’s impatience with the peaceful politics and tactics of the pro-Soviet Communist parties on the continent). The chief articulator of this last phase of ideology was the Frenchman Jules Régis Debray. See in particular his *Revolution in the Revolution*, New York, The Monthly Review Press, 1967.

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