

4 If Peking's new diplomatic moves result in improved relations with the United States and at least tacit moral and political support to and from Yugoslavia and Romania, the Chinese leaders' fear of possible Soviet intervention in China should be reduced. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the chances for a settlement of the Sino-Soviet conflict will improve; on the contrary, the Soviet Union, apprehensive of an increased Chinese threat, will most probably enhance its vigilance along the Sino-Soviet borders and try to strengthen its position in Southeast Asia. As a logical consequence of the Soviet-Indian treaty, Moscow can be expected to expand economic relations with the Southeast Asian countries and may even be prepared to enter into loose security commitments in Asia after the anticipated reduction of the US military presence in the area. It seems unlikely, however, that such moves by Moscow would include Nationalist China on Taiwan—at least not as long as the Soviet leaders, contrary to the warnings of their China specialists, see some hope of reaching a fair settlement with a future Chinese Communist leadership group after the death of Mao. But if this hope should be abandoned, a Soviet-Indian-Japanese security arrangement with Southeast Asian countries, including Taiwan, would appear to be a realistic long-range possibility.

5 In her contacts with Western Europe, China seems primarily to look for economic ties which would give her an option between Japan and the Common Market as a source of vital investment goods. Furthermore, Peking might try to exert whatever influence it can on an eventual all-European security conference with a view to impeding arrangements that would reduce Moscow's concern for the safety of its western borders and thus strengthen the Soviet position vis-a-vis China. While it appears highly doubtful that such an effort could succeed, the leaders of Communist China might still consider it worthwhile to try.

As far as her prospective relations with the United States are concerned, China might even go so far as to entertain hope of eventually obtaining some form of tacit American nuclear guarantee against the Soviet Union. For the immediate future, however, Peking's major objectives probably comprise abandonment by the US of its security commitments to Taiwan and the promotion of conflicts between Washington and Tokyo. In addition, the Chinese leadership probably calculates that its new concilia-

tory posture will help to reverse public opinion in the United States in Peking's favor and encourage the current tendency among many American scholars to take a highly sympathetic and noncritical view of Communist China's policies and goals. Indeed, the Chinese success in this area has already been remarkable.

To sum up, the leaders in Peking probably see China's emerging ties with the United States and other Western powers as serving a dual purpose: in the short run, to give China more options and provide her with more leverage on the international scene; and, in the long run, to open the way for renewed efforts to promote revolutionary changes in the political systems of the West. There is little if any evidence that the Chinese Communists have abandoned this long-range goal, and any sober analysis must continue to take it into account in spite of the remarkable change in Peking's foreign policy posture. While responding to any indication that Peking is now willing to enter into meaningful diplomatic contacts, American and other Western leaders would thus be well advised not to harbor any illusions and to combine readiness to talk with China with prudence and firmness. The development of Soviet-American relations since the death of Stalin has led to patterns of negotiation which could well be applied in relation to the People's Republic of China.

Morton H. Halperin

1 The striking shift that has brought about China's reemergence on the world scene, following the period of inward concentration that accompanied the Cultural Revolution, may well indicate a struggle within the Chinese leadership regarding appropriate foreign policy objectives. There are no doubt differences of view among the leading representatives of the party, the military, and the ministry of foreign affairs concerning both the strategy and the tactics of Chinese foreign policy. Unfortunately, we do not have the necessary data to delineate the conflict among these groups and are forced to try to deduce Chinese interests from Chinese actions, on the assumption that,

despite differences, the leaders manage to compromise on a relatively unified approach to foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that Peking's public stance probably veils considerable behind-the-scenes debate. Statements which look like attempts to communicate with the outside world may in fact be reflections of internal tactical maneuvering to affect power relationships and to influence domestic as well as foreign policy.

With this caveat in mind, we can turn to consideration of the specific domestic and international factors which have led to a new Chinese foreign policy—or rather to the re-emergence of certain strands of policy which have appeared episodically since 1949.

The end of the Cultural Revolution was certainly a precondition for a new and more active Chinese role in the world. This is true if for no other reason than the factor of demands on the time and attention of the senior leaders. With China in convulsions, with the power of Peking over the provinces in doubt, and with large-scale clashes taking place, the leaders would not have had the time and energy to devote to foreign policy questions. Moreover, the emphasis of the Cultural Revolution on ideological purification would have tended to work against efforts to deal on a pragmatic basis with foreign governments. At a time when cadres were vying with each other to prove their revolutionary zeal, few would have been willing to advocate exploring the possibility of improved relations with the Soviet Union or with bourgeois governments in the non-Communist world.

With the decline of the Cultural Revolution these tendencies toward isolation abated. Today the foreign ministry appears to have been returned to the control of professional Chinese diplomats whose interests and inclinations would lead them to seek to deal with other nations on a state-to-state basis and to seek improved relations where possible.

The complex and somewhat enigmatic relationship between Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung is undoubtedly an important part of the explanation for the new turn in Chinese foreign policy. Chou and his associates in the foreign ministry had a relatively free hand in the pursuit of a moderate foreign policy in the early 1960's. During this period, China devoted considerable energy and some economic resources to efforts to establish good relations not only with the developing nations but with the so-called "second intermediate zone" of developed nations which were willing to oppose both US and Soviet attempts to establish hegemony in different

areas of the globe. Peking's efforts appear to have accomplished very little and to have climaxed in its failure to have the Soviet Union excluded from the proposed second Afro-Asian conference at Bandung (which never took place). Mao's disillusionment with these policies became part of his general concern about the tendency toward bureaucratization in Chinese policymaking.

Confronted with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, Chou most likely devoted his energies to preserving his own position, protecting the domestic policies which he believed were important, and protecting individuals who were identified with him. This would have left him with little time and probably little inclination to fight about foreign policy matters. However, with the ebbing of the Cultural Revolution and Chou's re-establishment as the principal figure in the management of the government and the economy, he may have felt freer to propose a new effort to improve China's relations with the outside world. Mao appears once again to have moved to the background and to have given Chou a relatively free hand in directing foreign as well as domestic policy.

These changes in the Chinese domestic situation might have been insufficient to cause a shift in Peking's foreign policy had it not been for several major developments in the international sphere. The key factors which seem to have influenced Chinese policy were: (1) the Soviet military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border; (2) economic and political developments in Japan, as viewed by Peking; and (3) the beginning of the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam and the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine. Each of these will be considered in turn.

The Soviet Union has engaged in a very extensive buildup of military forces on the Sino-Soviet border over the last several years. This action has cost the Soviet Union a good deal of money in a period marked by increasing pressure on the Soviet economy in general and on the defense budget in particular. Since the Soviet military apparatus is essentially oriented toward Europe, except for certain segments (which have never seemed strong) directly concerned with the Far East, it seems likely that the pressure for the buildup on the border initiated with the political leadership, which must have calculated that such forces at a minimum would provide political leverage in the ongoing Sino-Soviet struggle, and might in fact be needed for military combat.

It was to be expected that the Chinese leaders,

who have seen their country subjected to foreign invasion and military threat throughout most of their lives, would take Moscow's actions very seriously. They knew that the buildup on the border was costly and was not undertaken lightly. What is more, the Soviet moves were accompanied by clear hints that military action might follow.

Peking responded to these moves by launching a massive effort to move key defense facilities underground and by indicating a new "willingness" to engage in diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union on state-to-state matters. Without doubt, fears of a Soviet attack also played a major role in precipitating China's new foreign policy vis-a-vis the non-Communist world. Peking's leaders may well have calculated that perpetuation of the image which China had presented during the Cultural Revolution would increase the probability of a Soviet attack, since the Soviets might claim that Mao's regime was losing control of China and there was need to remove the threat of an irresponsible use of nuclear weapons. They must have realized, too, that China's isolation from the outside world would make it more difficult to bring the pressure of international opinion to bear to deter Soviet aggression.

American statements, particularly the comments by Secretary of State William Rogers that the United States would view with concern any outbreak of hostilities on the Sino-Soviet border, may have led the Chinese to believe that they could inhibit Moscow by establishing contact with the US. More broadly, if China could get into the UN, she could expect to reduce the Soviets' room for maneuver.

The concerns of the Chinese political leadership were undoubtedly shared by the military and may have defused objections on their part to seeking rapprochement with the nation that had previously been viewed as China's primary military opponent. With a very real Soviet enemy facing them across

the border, neither the generals nor the ideologues needed to conjure up the specter of the United States as a military threat.

A second factor that surely played a role in both the timing and the nature of Peking's new foreign policy was its apprehension over developments in Japan. Chinese leaders have been making it clear in recent conversations, including the James Reston interview with Chou En-lai, that they are particularly concerned over the possible revival of Japanese militarism. While the writer will not attempt to assess the real chances or dangers of such a revival, there is no doubt that the Chinese take them very seriously. Of course, all of the Chinese leaders grew up in a period when Japan was attacking China, and the possibility of a second invasion would seem more real to them than to anyone else. The growth of Japanese economic power and the re-emergence of Japan on the world political scene also affects Chinese claims to leadership in Asia and threatens a revival of Japanese economic and political influence, which the Chinese must fear would be directed toward their containment.

Optimally, Peking would like to stimulate the conditions for an upheaval in Japan which would replace the current government with groups more sympathetic to the PRC. At a minimum, the Chinese hope to generate pressures which would force the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party to recognize Peking and break relations with the Taiwan regime. Otherwise, the Chinese fear that ties between Taiwan and Japan will grow and that the Japanese might seek to encourage a Taiwan independence movement. The Chinese view such a possibility with great alarm, and one of their highest priorities now is to create the conditions in Japan—and in Asia in general—that would prevent such a move. This means seeking to solve the problem of Taiwan with the United States before Japan resumes a dominant role in Asia, and also seeking to create an international climate which could alter Japanese policy.

Finally, changes in American policy have undoubtedly been an important factor leading to the new Chinese posture. As long as the United States was escalating the war in Vietnam and seemed prepared to stay indefinitely, Peking could not seek improved relations with Washington without endangering its influence in Hanoi. Now, however, Peking appears to have become persuaded that the United States is engaged in a military withdrawal from Indochina. A series of other signals from the United

What Japan should take is another road—the road of independence, democracy, peace and neutrality. That is to say, Japan must free herself from US imperialist control, have US military bases dismantled, and achieve genuine national independence; . . . she must stop tailing after US imperialism's policies of aggression and war, cease to be a US tool for aggression, and live on an equal footing and in peace with all countries. . . .

—Editorial in *Jen-mih Jih-pao*
(Peking), Sept. 18, 1971.

States have suggested its growing willingness to consider improved relations with Peking, ranging from the abandonment in 1969 of trade and travel embargos in effect since the establishment of the PRC, to the recent diplomatic maneuvers that climaxed in President Nixon's announcement of an impending visit to Peking.

2 China's general posture in international affairs has already changed substantially. For example, Peking is now actively seeking membership in the United Nations and is no longer demanding, as in the past, that that body purge itself of anti-Chinese resolutions prior to the PRC's entry. Peking is also seeking diplomatic relations with many countries, and in pursuit of this objective it has substantially softened its stance on Taiwan. While it continues to insist that the United States and Japan recognize the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan, it has dropped the demand for such explicit recognition in establishing formal ties with several other nations, holding only that the PRC must be recognized as the sole legitimate government of China. In another new shift, the Chinese are now seeking to use the lure of trade to move other countries toward better relations with Peking. Toward this end, pressure has been brought to bear on the Australian authorities in connection with wheat purchases and on Japanese firms whose main markets heretofore have been in the United States or South Korea.

With respect to Chinese support for wars of national liberation, the situation is more complicated. Peking will undoubtedly continue to affirm its support for revolutionary movements throughout the world and to provide training and minimum levels of support for such operations. However, the Chinese leadership has learned that revolutionary groups, even those which proclaim themselves to be Marxist-Leninist, are not necessarily in ideological sympathy with Peking or willing to subordinate themselves to a worldwide Communist movement under China's control. Thus, Peking recently found itself in strange alignment with the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and India when it backed efforts to suppress a self-styled Marxist movement in Ceylon.

Despite Peking's continued ideological commitment to revolutionary movements, support for such activities is likely to play a minimum role in Chinese policy and will not be permitted to interfere with the improvement of state-to-state relations, particularly

in the Arab world and in Africa and Latin America. On the Chinese border, Peking's choices will be more difficult. Whether the Chinese will be prepared to abandon support for dissident movements in India, Burma and Thailand in return for improved relations with the governments of those countries probably has yet to be determined in Peking and may in part depend on the attitude and conditions voiced by those governments. In Indochina, Peking will no doubt continue to support the various revolutionary movements engaged in the struggle there, although its posture in a period after an American withdrawal would depend on Hanoi's attitude in combination with the scope and nature of the arrangements to emerge following the American disengagement.

3 As has already been suggested, Peking's concern about developments in Japan is likely to be at the heart of its Asian policy and indeed much of its worldwide diplomacy in the coming years. The Chinese appear to be trying to isolate Tokyo. Thus, they have resisted efforts on the part of the Sato regime to move toward increased contacts and discussions with Peking.

If the Chinese do succeed in entering the United Nations, there will be enormous domestic pressure on the Japanese government to seek to establish diplomatic relations. Peking will then have to define the terms under which it is prepared to move toward rapprochement. The Chinese are likely to make such terms rather severe, demanding, for example, a renunciation of the existing treaty between the Chinese Nationalists and Japan and the renegotiation of a peace treaty between Peking and Tokyo, including perhaps token reparations. They are also likely to demand the cessation of Japan's diplomatic and perhaps even trade relations with Taiwan. Peking's posture will no doubt be influenced by its desire to promote the ouster of the current Japanese government and its replacement, at the least, by a Liberal Democratic regime more friendly toward China, or preferably, by a coalition including pro-Peking elements of the opposition. Until and unless it succeeds in dislodging the Sato regime, which it views as anti-Chinese, Peking is likely to persist in its tough stand towards Japan. Meantime, in its dealings with other Asian countries, Peking is likely to play on fears of growing Japanese economic and political influence in an effort to create an anti-Japanese bloc.

China is a country which was blockaded by the United States for more than 20 years. Now, since there is a desire to come and look at China, it's all right. And since there is a desire to talk, we are also ready to talk. Of course, it goes without saying that the positions of our two sides are different. . . . To achieve relaxation, there must be a common desire for it, so various questions may be placed on the table for discussion. We do not expect a settlement of all questions at one stroke. . . .

—Chou En-lai in an interview with James Reston, *The New York Times*, Aug. 10, 1971.

Peking will be particularly concerned about Tokyo's relations with Seoul and Taipei. While the Chinese have recently shown somewhat greater flexibility on the issue of Taiwan (as noted above), they are totally opposed to growing ties between Taiwan and Japan and thus to any scheme for an independent Taiwan with strong economic links to Tokyo. In the future they will probably seek support from other Asian countries for the return of Taiwan to China, and they may even seek to open negotiations with the Chinese rulers on Taiwan, appealing to their nationalism to get their commitment to such an arrangement.

Peking's concern about Korea has similar bases. It fears that Tokyo will establish close relations with Seoul and gradually replace the United States as the protector of the anti-Communist regime in South Korea. To counter such a possibility, the Chinese may go so far as to encourage Pyongyang to move toward rapprochement with Seoul.

Peking's concern about Japan will create dilemmas in terms of its effort to reduce the United States' influence and presence in Asia. Chinese leaders must recognize that a complete US withdrawal would substantially increase the probability of a Japanese move toward assertive nationalism and rearmament, including the possession of nuclear weapons. Thus, Peking may learn to accommodate to a certain amount of American presence in Asia as an alternative to a growing role for Tokyo.

4 It is doubtful that China's new posture will lead to any substantial improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Some moderation in polemics may be expected, along with some improvement in diplomatic give-and-take, including trade relations. Most important, from Peking's point of view, the prospects of a Soviet military move against China have probably been reduced.

5 Except in the case of the United States and Japan, the prospects for Peking's establishment of diplomatic relations and resumption of normal contacts with Western nations appear quite good.

Insofar as the US is concerned, China's goals revolve primarily around the issues of security and territorial integrity. The leaders in Peking no doubt hope to negotiate an American military withdrawal from Taiwan which would permit negotiations with the Chinese Nationalists for a reincorporation of the island under Chinese control. In addition, they seek diplomatic recognition from the US and assurances that it is no longer committed to the overthrow of their regime. More broadly, they hope to establish the PRC as a major world power which is consulted on international issues, particularly those touching on Asian affairs.

The state of relations between Peking and Washington will hinge on how far the latter is prepared to go in loosening its ties to Taiwan and how rigid the former is in demanding formal renunciation of the American security treaty with Taiwan. The United States is unlikely to be willing to renounce its commitment to defend Taiwan but might be prepared to end its very limited military presence there. Even if this move were made, the prospect for a resumption of diplomatic relations between the US and the PRC in the short run appears to be remote. More likely, President Nixon's trip to Peking will lead to the establishment of a multitude of contacts, both formal and informal, between the Chinese and the Americans, leading gradually to a normalization of relations.

Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Strategy

By Harry G. Gelber

The strategic calculations of the People's Republic of China (PRC) over the last 20 years have taken place under unique constraints. The industrial and force structures required to underpin China's international claims have had to be constructed in the midst of major domestic difficulties and foreign dangers, including threats from both superpowers. Yet China achieved her first nuclear explosion in the mid-1960's, only a few years after the break with Moscow. At the beginning of the 1970's, she has a small medium-range potential which is being enlarged. This article examines the evolution of Peking's attitudes toward nuclear weapons; the present status of Chinese nuclear capabilities and the ways in which they may be developed and expanded; and the effect which the creation of these forces may have on the conduct of China's foreign relations.

Early Views

Reconciliation of Maoist principles of revolutionary warfare with the new facts of nuclear weaponry has been an important problem for Chinese military thought since 1945. The initial synthesis had come to be broadly accepted by the early 1950's. It included assumptions about the continuing validity

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of at least three principles: the primacy of politics; the refusal to admit sharp distinctions between the use of force and other means of achieving political aims; and the idea that a properly designed strategy can make possible the achievement of political gains from a position of technical military inferiority. Nuclear weapons were "paper tigers"—not in the sense that they were not highly destructive, but in the sense that their development did not alter the basic laws of social change. Weapons would always be less important than the men who controlled them, and political action and revolutionary spirit would continue to prevail over merely material factors.¹ At the same time, revolutionaries had an obligation to observe other principles of action, including caution. The use of force was one essential dimension of the struggle for political victory; however, this fact did not contradict but rather emphasized the need to avoid adventurism.

In Peking's view, experience seemed to point toward similar conclusions: atomic weapons were apparently not relevant to many kinds of conflict situations, and low-level conflicts did not need to escalate. The US possessed such weapons, but they had not been used to prevent the Chinese Communist Party's victory within China, to overcome a stalemate in Korea, or to prevent or limit other nationalist revolutions in Asia. Hence, political gains might still be made in cautious—even if sometimes violent—ways which would not invoke the use of

¹ For a more recent assertion of the supremacy of people over things, see the joint editorial in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily), *Hung-ch'i* (Red Flag), and *Chieh-fang-chun Pao* (Liberation Army Daily) on Aug. 1, 1970, commemorating the 43rd anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), in *Peking Review*, Aug. 7, 1970, pp. 6-7, 23.