

thing called a "circular flow of power" model, to denote the shift after Khrushchev from one-man rule to collective leadership. It leads him onto some rather thin theoretical ice when he goes so far as to see bureaucrats and technocrats locked in "a new Soviet class struggle . . . the stuff revolutions are made of."

This brings us full circle to the centralist, self-validating concepts of Reshetar. They are based on a persistent treatment of the party as a "secular priesthood" and "a small minority of the population," despite the surge of membership beyond the 14 million mark and what this figure portends in terms

of expanded civic participation. They go on to repeat the totalitarian refrain concerning a system that "makes an unlimited claim on man," without considering the growing numbers who have been resisting that claim, or the extent to which its very stridency reveals the insecurity of the current leadership. They conclude with a token nod at the regime's broadening of "inputs in the form of interests, demands, values, and expectations" to achieve "more effective outputs." But they imply that genuine change or reform cannot take place within the existing system; all that can happen, in Reshetar's words, is that "a

system that adopts enough policies and reforms . . . may undergo a qualitative change, so that in 'maintaining' itself it actually becomes a different system."

For this kind of categorical analysis the student might wish to substitute the skeptical attitude of John Strong, editor of the Carleton papers. His is a call for the recognition of the Soviets' "pragmatic realism" — haltingly and unevenly though it has emerged—as the hallmark of the recent period. Stereotypes seem particularly ill-suited to the essential flux of these "transition years" in the perplexing evolution of the Soviet system.

## Models of Conflict in Chinese Politics

By Andrew J. Nathan

JOHN WILSON LEWIS, Ed., *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*. Contemporary China Institute Publications. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1970.

JOHN M. H. LINDBECK, Ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society*. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1971.

FRANK N. TRAGER and WILLIAM HENDERSON, Eds., *Communist China, 1949-69: A Twenty-Year Appraisal*. New York, The New York University Press, 1970.

THESE THREE BOOKS comprise 35 articles on Chinese politics and policies, inspiring the observation that in the last five or six years the study of Chinese politics

has enjoyed a remarkable leap forward. Not only has this advance altered the composition of our reading lists; it has also raised the level of our understanding of China a distinct notch. Although the Cultural Revolution was helpful in shaking up old interpretations and providing new sources, the advance in understanding has resulted mainly from the inherent maturation of the field. These books, for example, show us not only senior scholars but also a new wave of junior scholars making important contributions to the field, and earlier studies now provide a basis from which both older and younger specialists are moving forward.

The Lewis volume is the product of the 1968 Ditchley Confer-

ence organized under the auspices of *The China Quarterly*. This conference focused on the Chinese Communist Party—its history, its internal dynamics, and its relations with other political and social forces such as the army, the intellectuals, the peasants, the state, and Chairman Mao. The resulting articles are highly useful, particularly for their cumulative insights into the Mao-party relationship and into the forms of political conflict in the system—themes to be discussed in a moment. One must carp, however, at the editor's failure to notify the reader that all but two of the articles, by this reviewer's count, have been published in *The China Quarterly* (the new pieces are Philip Bridgham's

"Factionalism in the Central Committee," and John Gittings' "Army-Party Relations in the Light of the Cultural Revolution").

The Lindbeck volume is the second in a series on Chinese politics stemming from conferences sponsored by the Joint Committee on Contemporary China. In this case, the conference, held in Cuernavaca in 1969, dealt with what might broadly be called "administration" in China. Most of the articles analyze the policy-making process and fluctuations in specific policy areas. Others discuss the nature of the relationship between the government and the masses. A short concluding essay by Gabriel A. Almond evaluates how far China studies have come, and how far they still have to go, from the viewpoint of the discipline of political science. Most of the chapters in this book are weighty, original and interesting contributions.

The third collection, edited by Trager and Henderson, was sponsored by the American-Asian Educational Exchange, an organization dedicated to "creating a broader understanding between the peoples of the United States and the independent nations of Asia" (p. iv). The book suffers slightly from a split personality. An excellent article by William W. Whitson on the military role in policy-making and a piece by Richard C. Thornton on Sino-Soviet relations are, despite the absence of elaborate footnoting, essentially reports of scholarly research; however, most of the other articles in the book constitute, in keeping with its title, "appraisals" of the performance of the Chinese government during its first 20 years in such areas as the provision of order, economic growth, education, literature and art, and

foreign relations. The predominant theme of the assessments is that the government has failed to solve the problems that have confronted it. Some authors go so far as to suggest that the present "regime" cannot last. (Tottering or not, the People's Republic of China "poses an unlimited threat to American interests in Asia," say Trager and Henderson in their concluding essay [p. 317].) Despite the intrinsic interest of the book's subject, it is not clear to the reviewer who will want to read the volume. Most of the articles in it seem too specialized for the general reader, yet the majority of them are obviously not aimed at specialists either (a typical footnote on p. 219 identifies Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Hu Shih as "prominent modern Chinese intellectuals and scholars").

TO DO JUSTICE to the wide-ranging and often excellent work contained in these volumes, one would have to discuss each article separately; nevertheless, certain themes do seem to emerge with particular force. The first is that Mao, by instituting the Cultural Revolution, set himself above the party as a source of legitimacy and a standard of rectitude; in so doing, he revealed the belief—the roots of which can in retrospect be traced to earlier periods of CCP history—that the party is, in Stuart R. Schram's phrase, "merely one instrument among others." This point is most fully explored in Schram's contribution to the Lewis volume, "The Party in Chinese Communist Ideology." It is enriched by several other pieces in the same volume: Benjamin I. Schwartz's "The Reign of Virtue," which sheds new light on Mao's thought by comparing it with that of Rousseau; Leonard

Schapiro and John Wilson Lewis' "The Roles of the Monolithic Party under the Totalitarian Leader," which compares Mao's struggle against the CCP with Stalin's subjugation of the CPSU; and William F. Dorrell's "Transfer of Legitimacy in the Chinese Communist Party," which shows how some episodes in party history were revised to create an "aura of legitimacy" around the person of Mao.

Such a proposition represents an important new insight. It provides the key with which we can go back (as these authors do) before the Cultural Revolution and open the "black box" of "the party" or "the regime" to reveal the processes of political conflict going on inside. Instead of a consensual or monolithic elite, whose shared tempering in the fires of Kiangsi and Yenan produced a single political instrument with no cracks or flaws, we now perceive Mao and Liu, and by implication others, fighting and compromising from the 1940's to the 1960's. Suddenly, as in Schram's article, certain hitherto obscure phrases in the writings of Mao and Liu become meaningful. But new mysteries arise. What analysis of the Chinese political process can we bring forward to replace the formerly accepted view—most influentially delineated by Franz Schurmann—of shifting "opinion groups," with no "organized force" behind them, operating within a basically consensual Politburo? <sup>1</sup>

This problem—basically, what sorts of alignments have characterized Chinese Communist politics—forms a prominent area of inquiry in these volumes. The answers are tentative, unsystematic,

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<sup>1</sup> Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966, pp. 55-57.

and often implicit, but they show some clear convergences. First, a number of the authors believe in a "Mao-in-command" model of the Chinese political system. According to this model, Mao has both defined and settled the important issues of Chinese politics since 1949, and other elements in the system have made their influence felt only by structuring Mao's perceptions and alternatives or by evading or bending his decisions. Those who have tried to go further have been crushed. This view receives what may become its classic statement in Michel Oksenberg's "Policy Making Under Mao, 1949-1968: An Overview," in the Lindbeck volume, an article which is based upon 15 or more case studies that have accumulated over roughly the last 10 years. It seems to be shared by Schram and by Schapiro and Lewis, who, despite their focus on the conflict between Mao and the party, see Mao as bringing the party to heel at the moment of his own choosing when it had ceased to serve his purposes. Even Philip Bridgman—although the title of his article, "Factionalism in the Central Committee," suggests independent power centers rather than Maoist control—ends by depicting the three episodes of top-level conflict in the Chinese elite since 1949 as cases where Mao simply crushed those who stepped out of line. One wonders, however, whether the "Maoist myth" ("of Mao's invariably correct and victorious leadership") that Dorrell identifies within the CCP has not given rise among China scholars to another kind of Maoist myth—a myth of Mao's invariably predominant and controlling role within the Chinese elite. This is clearly an area that demands further study and concerning which one

may hope for new materials to be released in the future. We may eventually move toward a more complex view which, without derogating Mao's political genius, concedes considerably more power to his colleagues and opponents over the years.

IN ADDITION TO the Mao-in-command view, one sees in many of the articles the emergence of an interest-group model of Chinese politics (the two models are not necessarily in contradiction and can be used either separately or together). It is developed most explicitly and consistently in William W. Whitson's "The Military: Their Role in the Policy Process," in Trager and Henderson. Whitson uses a distinction among four "functional elites"—the career military commanders, the party administrators, the civilian ideologues, and the military commissars—to explain alignments in controversies over military and foreign policy. Ellis Joffe, in an excellent article on "The Chinese Army Under Lin Piao: Prelude to Political Intervention" in the Lindbeck volume, attributes certain views on military and foreign policy to "the officer corps" (e.g., pp. 354-55). Victor H. Li, writing on "The Evolution and Development of the Chinese Legal System" in Lindbeck, analyzes the conflict between "the legal specialists" and "the new cadres" in the political-legal system (p. 233). In the same book, Donald W. Klein's "The Management of Foreign Affairs in Communist China" discerns in the career patterns of top foreign-affairs officials a "process of professionalization" (p. 317) which, although Klein does not say so, might be expected to lead to a vested interest in certain policies. Also in Lind-

beck, Frederick C. Teiwes, in "Provincial Politics in China: Theme and Variations," searches for signs that provincial officials have represented provincial "interests" to the center (he finds that the available evidence does not permit this hypothesis to be upheld).

The interest-group model is certainly an attractive device for explaining alignments in Chinese politics, and it is almost always stimulating and suggestive. There are pitfalls, however, connected with it. The analyst can always identify a group in his own mind ("the intellectuals," "the managers," "students," "biologists," "cultural commissars"), and that group will, by definition, have distinctive "interests" in the abstract. But this analytic construct only explains alignments if the members of that group do in fact identify themselves as a group with special interests. Since it is impossible that all imaginable analytic "groups" actually "exist" in this sense, it is incumbent upon the analyst to persuade us that in the given case the group has political life, either through a formal organization or through some informal network of communication and action. The analyst also needs to argue that group membership has more explanatory power for political alignments than other possible bases of alignment (ideology, personal ties, opportunism, and so forth). While, as always, the data we have on China are inadequate to resolve such issues definitively, they can be marshaled more or less persuasively to deal with possible objections.

A third possible model for explaining alignments in Chinese politics is adumbrated by John Wilson Lewis in the Introduction to *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power*, though the model

is not employed in his or any other articles in the three volumes. Official propaganda and formal command structures, Lewis writes,

*distort the analysis of leadership and power by making formal organizational patterns seem more important than they are. As seen in the rivalries exposed in the Cultural Revolution and also in the make-up of the Ninth Central Committee, informal groupings are crucial to the flow of decisions, indeed to the whole conduct of Chinese political life. . . . It may well be that at present there is no sin-*

*gle well-integrated political system for all China and that, as Mao has sometimes insisted, there are a number of different centres or even 'independent kingdoms.'*

Such a model—of personal factional groupings operating somewhat disconnectedly at various levels of the political system—would indeed be a departure from our pre-Cultural Revolution image of reasoned debate in the Politburo.

The emergence of these various models of political conflict affords a welcome sign of increasing em-

pirical and theoretical sophistication in the China field. At the same time, it creates new challenges—to clarify the implications of each model, to determine the degree to which they are mutually compatible or exclusive, and to review the explanatory power of each in various political periods, arenas, and issue areas. As students of Chinese politics refine, revise and perhaps expand the number of their models of conflict, they will both sharpen our understanding of China and begin to contribute more substantially to the comparative study of politics.

# Romania and a Theory of Progress

By R. V. Burks

KENNETH JOWITT: *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development. The Case of Romania, 1944-1965*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971.

THE PROCESS OF modernization—how it occurs, and whether or not it can successfully be hastened—is one of the more intriguing theoretical puzzles of our time. Professor Jowitt has written in the hope of broadening our comprehension of this process; he wishes to clarify the relationship between Marxism-Leninism, on the one hand, and nation-building, on the other, and to illustrate, demonstrate and augment his clarification by means of a case study.

Modernization, or nation-building, as Professor Jowitt conceives it, takes place in two giant steps.

The first of these is a revolutionary breakthrough in which the traditional social order and the interest groups associated with it are either destroyed or pushed aside. The essential requirement of revolutionary breakthrough is a revolutionary party made up of expendable cadres and possessed of a transnational ideology that releases its supporters from lesser commitments. Professor Jowitt considers at some length whether a reformist, representative or coalition party might not be able to engineer a breakthrough but emerges with a negative response: reformist movements, e.g., the Indian Congress Party, operate by making commitments to various constituencies, and these commitments end by becoming an insuperable obstacle to structural change.

The weakness of the Leninist Party, as no doubt of all other revolutionary organizations, is that its reliance on violence tends to produce a counterparty in the form of the security police or the guerrilla army, and to end in the use of terror. Professor Jowitt carefully distinguishes between reprehensible terror (e.g., the brutal waste of slave labor in the Romanian Communists' unsuccessful project to streamline the Black Sea-Danube canal, which he calls a "very remarkable instance of the irrational use of violence") and indirect "violence" or coercion, such as that embodied in government allocation of newsprint, of which he seems to approve.

Once a decisive breakthrough has been made, the way is prepared for the second of the two