

Ceausescu's Romania

By Trond Gilberg

The contemporary political scene in Romania is characterized by rapid change, the emergence of an increasingly complex socio-economic system which sets important parameters for political activity, and above all by the growing personal power of Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) and President of the Republic. Indeed, some Western analysts maintain that the increasing sway of the General Secretary is the catalyst for the myriad of other political interactions and developments in Romania,¹ and there is widespread agreement that the current political scene cannot be understood without a close examination of Ceausescu and his personal political style.² This article will explore the character of Romanian politics in recent years and the factors that have shaped these politics, with special attention to the role of Ceausescu. It will also attempt to gauge the crucial determinants of political life in the Balkan country for the foreseeable future.

Ceausescu's Accumulation of Power

Among the important factors that have established the framework of Romanian politics over the last several years, perhaps the most obvious has been Ceausescu's drive to consolidate his personal power. Certainly, the authority concentrated in his

hands has steadily expanded since he assumed leadership of the RCP in 1965.³ Having spent most of his political career in the Communist Youth Organization (*Uniunea Tineretului Comunist*—UTC *) and in the RCP *apparatus* and having been a close associate of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the previous head of the party, he was an acceptable successor to Gheorghiu-Dej in the eyes of most of the RCP leadership upon the latter's death in March 1965; however, his position was by no means solid and unchallenged. In fact, he even confronted strong opponents at the highest levels who had greater seniority in the party than he had. (Born into a peasant family in 1918, Ceausescu had moved up the party ladder quite rapidly after joining the UTC in 1933. For example, he had entered the RCP Central Committee as early as 1945 and had become a member of the Secretariat in 1954.)

Today, the situation has altered dramatically. His entrenchment in the party apparatus and the number of formal posts that he occupies afford a vivid illustration. Not only is he a member of the RCP Permanent Presidium (formerly called the Politburo), but he also heads the Party Secretariat and has full membership on the RCP Executive Committee. In 1967, he acquired the position of President

¹ See, for example, Stephen Fischer-Galati, *Twentieth Century Rumania*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970.

² For a typical statement, see Gabriel Fischer, "Rumania," in Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Eds. *The Communist States in Disarray, 1965-1971*, Minneapolis, Minn., The University of Minnesota Press, 1972, pp. 158-80.

³ The biographical information in the following discussion is taken from an excellent summary, Radio Free Europe Research, "The Rumanian Party Leadership," *Rumania*/4, March 30, 1973 (introduction by Robert R. King; chart and individual chronologies by Unity Evans).

⁴ While the name has varied somewhat since the organization's founding, *Uniunea Tineretului Comunist* has been the official designation since 1949.

Mr. Gilberg is Associate Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University (University Park, Pa.). He has contributed articles on various aspects of Romanian politics to East European Quarterly, Osteuropa, and a forthcoming study on Political Socialization in Eastern Europe, edited by Ivan Volgyes.

of the Socialist Republic of Romania (head of the State Council). His other posts include Deputy to the Romanian parliament, *Marea Adunarea Nationala* (Grand National Assembly, commonly known as the GNA in the West); head of the *Frontul Unitar Socialist* (Socialist Unity Front—FUS), the “umbrella” mass organization that incorporates all major socioeconomic and political organizations in the country; and, since 1973, Chairman of the newly established Supreme Council for Socioeconomic Development.

It is fair to say that Ceausescu personally holds the most important political positions in *both* the party and state hierarchies, while his control over joint bodies such as the Supreme Council for Socioeconomic Development ensures his influence on matters pertaining to socioeconomic planning, forecasting, and actual production in the economy. No other individual in Eastern Europe possesses as much formal power as he does.

Ceausescu has achieved this status through a variety of steps over the years. The Ninth RCP Congress in July 1965—four months after Gheorgiu-Dej's death—elected a Central Committee with a

strong majority of pro-Ceausescu members.⁵ Throughout 1966 and 1967, Ceausescu further strengthened his power by various actions, especially the economic decentralization measures of the latter year. These sought to transfer some aspects of economic planning and decision-making from the central ministries to so-called “economic centrals,” which were essentially large trusts in various fields of industry. The economic centrals were designed to improve output within related fields of activity by ensuring coordination between regional and economic units, party branches, and trade union structures, but the immediate *political* effect was to reduce the influence of the central economic hierarchy while expanding that of the new RCP leader.⁶

By early 1968, Ceausescu was ready for his next move. A major administrative reorganization of the country did away with existing territorial units and reestablished the prewar “judets” (counties). To staff the new party branches in the judets, a major reshuffling of party cadres was necessary, and in the process of carrying out this reshuffling, Ceausescu staffed the regional RCP *apparats* with trusted followers—primarily from the ranks of the general *apparatchiks*, a group which had always been largely loyal to the new leader.⁷

This consolidation of Ceausescu's influence in the central and regional RCP *apparats* during 1965-68 was followed by a major ideological campaign in the party and other elite structures in 1971 and subsequently by a series of personnel changes at all levels, both of which are still under way. The ideological campaign, dubbed “the little cultural revolution” by some Western analysts,⁸ was aimed at all levels of the party organization and was primarily intended to infuse cadres everywhere with more ideological orthodoxy and greater *esprit de corps*, which by all accounts had begun to wane in



Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu during his visit to the United States in October 1970.

—Dennis Brack for Black Star.

⁵ For a list of the members of the Central Committee chosen at this congress, see *Congresul al IX-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman* (Ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party), Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1966, pp. 735-40.

⁶ The major elements of the economic reform were published in late October and early November 1967 in *Scinteia* (Bucharest) and other major newspapers.

⁷ See the author's “Regional Political Leadership in Romania: The Case of the Judet Party,” in *East European Quarterly* (Boulder, Col.), September 1974 (forthcoming). In the present context, “general *apparatchiks*” includes all individuals whose primary functional experience has been party work “in the field”—i.e., supervisory personnel without special technical or educational skills but with years of trusted service in the party.

⁸ See, for example, the present author's “Ceausescu's Little Cultural Revolution in Romania,” *Osteuropa* (Berlin), October 1972, pp. 717-28.

the second half of the 1960's. In conducting this campaign, Ceausescu has removed a number of individuals at all levels whose performances have been deemed unsatisfactory; at the same time, he has also directed the purge against anyone whose loyalty to him could be considered questionable. Thus, in early 1972, Vasile Patilinet, Party Secretary in charge of security and military affairs, was released from his duties and transferred to a relatively insignificant ministry.⁹ Previously, another Secretary, Virgil Trofin, had been removed and dispatched to an unimportant ministry, but in Trofin's case the transfer was not a clear-cut demotion since he had remained on the RCP Permanent Presidium.¹⁰ A short time after Patilinet lost his Secretariat post, a third Secretary, Paul Niculescu-Mizil—who, as Secretary with jurisdiction essentially over interparty relations, had enjoyed a substantial amount of influence—found himself reassigned to governmental service.¹¹ Other personnel changes of lesser consequence in early 1972 included the replacement of the head of the Bucharest party organization, Dimitru Popa, ostensibly for serious mistakes and misconduct; and the ouster of two judet first secretaries, Karol Kiraly of Covasna Judet and Ilie Fasui of Caras-Severin Judet—the former “at his own request,” the latter because of “serious shortcomings in party work.”¹²

The Party Secretariat underwent additional changes during the second half of 1972 and throughout 1973. For instance, there were frequent shifts in personnel dealing with security and military matters and with propaganda. In two years, four persons were designated to oversee these areas—Miu Dobrescu and Aurel Duca to handle propaganda and Vasile Patilinet and Ion Dinca to handle security and the military—only to experience early removal and demotion. (At present, it appears that Cornel Burtica, recently named to the Secretariat although his prior jobs had been largely in the state administration, is in charge of both these functional realms.)¹³ In June 1973, Josif Banc, the

Secretary presumably responsible for agriculture, suffered demotion to the post of First Secretary of Mures Judet.¹⁴ By late 1973, then, a considerable revamping of the Secretariat had taken place, and it seems quite certain that this reshuffling of personnel has measurably enhanced Ceausescu's personal power in this important body since he clearly controlled both removals and replacements.

The personnel changes in the Secretariat, it should be noted, were not confined to the top echelons but extended down through the general Central Committee *apparatus* as well—especially in the Section on Military and Security Affairs. A recent appointment to this section, Ion Coman, may be one of the new “Ceausescu men” who can be expected to come to the fore.¹⁵

While the Secretariat has been substantially altered, it is true that the RCP Executive Committee and the Permanent Presidium have remained essentially the same during the last two or three years. The removal of several individuals from the Secretariat, in short, has not resulted in their dismissal from the Executive Committee or the Presidium. For example, Niculescu-Mizil and Trofin retain membership on the latter, while Patilinet, Banc and Dinca are still on the former body.¹⁶ This anomaly may indicate that Ceausescu is unwilling or unable to change these two bodies substantially—or it may be proof that the personnel changes effected constitute a genuine “rotation of cadres”, as is officially maintained.¹⁷ Even in the latter case, however, Ceausescu's position is obviously stronger than before as a result of the rotation.

The reshuffling at the top of the party hierarchy has had its counterpart at the lower levels of the pyramid. Since the “little cultural revolution” was ostensibly launched to combat “careerism, sloganeering, formalism, and lack of ideological-educational activity” among party cadres as well as other elites, it was inevitable that a purge would follow throughout the RCP. There is no available information on the number of individuals involved, but there have clearly been many reassignments of personnel and an injection of loyal *apparatchiks* at all levels. This fundamental reshuffling is still going on and has now overlapped with a major transfer of state ad-

⁹ Patilinet's removal from the Secretariat was announced in *Scinteia*, Feb. 17, 1972.

¹⁰ See “The Rumanian Party Leadership,” p. 19.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹² *Scinteia*, April 19, 1972.

¹³ As indicated in fn. 9, Patilinet's replacement was reported in *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1972. For information about Dinca, see *ibid.*, June 20, 1973; about Dobrescu and Duca, Radio Free Europe, “Unresolved Questions Concerning Personnel Changes in the Rumanian Party Leadership,” *Rumania*/8, June 29, 1973; about Butica, “The Rumanian Party Leadership.”

¹⁴ *Scinteia*, June 20, 1973.

¹⁵ Coman's appointment was confirmed by the RCP Central Committee Plenum in June 1973. See Radio Bucharest, May 29, 1973.

¹⁶ “The Rumanian Party Leadership,” pp. 13-21.

¹⁷ See, for example, Ceausescu's speech to the RCP National Conference, July 1972, *Scinteia*, July 20, 1972.

ministrative personnel to production jobs (to be discussed in detail in another context).

The growing degree of Ceausescu's sway in the party is also reflected in some of the major mass organizations affiliated with the RCP, notably the UTC and the trade unions. His ideological campaign was directed partly against the UTC, which had experienced considerable difficulties in getting through to Romanian youth, and whose programs were plainly unequal to the task of instilling ideological fervor in the younger generation. Continuing problems in this field have resulted in a rapid turnover of the UTC's top leaders over the last few years, with three individuals—Ion Iliescu, Martian Dan, and Traian Stefanescu—having served as General Secretary. The current occupant of the post, Traian Stefanescu, is reputed to be a close follower of Ceausescu.¹⁸

Relatively rapid turnover of the top leadership of the trade unions has likewise been a hallmark of the Ceausescu era. Florian Danalache, head of the *Uniunea Generala a Sindicatelor din Romania* (General Confederation of Trade Unions in Romania—UGSR) in the 1960's, was replaced in 1971 by Virgil Trofin, who in turn lost this position to Mihai Dalea in 1973. Both Trofin and Dalea must be considered close associates of Ceausescu, so the latter change appears to have mirrored primarily the RCP General Secretary's unhappiness with ideological work in the unions. At the same time, Trofin's ouster from this powerful structure served to prevent any "empire building" on his part, a fact obviously beneficial to Ceausescu.

Ceausescu's major shakeup of the political elite in Romania has involved members of the state governmental structure and the general state administration as well as those of party and party-connected bodies. At the apex of this hierarchy, there have been frequent changes of ministers, and the Foreign Service has recently experienced a big turnover of personnel. While some of these transfers probably stem from the principle of regular rotation—a principle which the General Secretary has emphasized during the last few years¹⁹—most of them must be seen as part of an attempt by Ceausescu to

increase the party's hold on the state administration by "functional unification" of RCP cadres and government personnel. During 1972-73, for instance, several important party leaders—notably Virgil Trofin, Manea Manescu, Maxim Berghianu, Emil Draganescu, Florian Danalache, Miron Constantinescu, and Paul Niculescu-Mizil—assumed high governmental positions, essentially Vice-Premierships. (All these individuals are members of the Executive Committee, the Secretariat, or the Permanent Presidium of the RCP.) In some cases, the shift of personnel entailed transfer of party *apparatchiks* to governmental positions (Trofin and Niculescu-Mizil); in the rest, persons previously appointed to government jobs were reassigned in such a manner as to strengthen party control. As of the spring of 1973, fully 26 of the 54 major governmental posts (Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, heads of ministries, and heads of various significant joint councils) were in the hands of individuals belonging to one or more of the top three RCP bodies, and the remaining 28 were filled by persons on the RCP Central Committee, either as full or alternate members.²⁰

This tightening of party control of the governmental structure has been carried further during the last year. Beginning in the early summer of 1973, Ceausescu launched a drive to reduce the heavy administrative component of Romanian ministries and economic agencies. Literally thousands of individuals whose tasks were previously administrative have been transferred to productive jobs in enterprises, on farms, in transportation and commerce, and in numerous other activities.²¹ The economic purpose of these transfers was more efficient employment of trained personnel in the production process and reduction of so-called "overhead costs" and general waste resulting from excessive bureaucratization, but the reorganization had major political significance, too. It removed many of the governmental experts from immediate administrative work and placed them "in the field," where they would be subject to party direction as well as to supervision by such party-dominated bodies as trade unions, workers' control councils, and local "people's councils." In this respect, it inevitably enhanced the power

¹⁸ Stefanescu was one of the chief overseers of Ceausescu's ideological campaign among students and academic personnel. See his speech as head of the Union of Students' Associations of Romania in honor of the Eighth Conference of the Union, *Romania's Youth* (Bucharest), No. 1, 1971, pp. 34-44.

¹⁹ E.g., *Scinteia*, July 20, 1972. See also Robert R. King, "Reorganization in Rumania," *Osteuropa*, January 1974, pp. 37-46.

²⁰ These data were compiled from "The Rumanian Party Leadership."

²¹ See, for example, the reorganizations announced in *Viata Economica* (Bucharest), May 11, 1973; *Era Socialista* (Bucharest), No. 9, 1973; and numerous issues of *Scinteia* during the summer and fall of 1973.

not only of the party at large but also of the General Secretary personally, for one of the main obstacles to Ceausescu's assertion of his own will had been the entrenched state and economic bureaucracy, which was demanding a greater say in political decision-making as a *quid pro quo* for the important services it rendered in the modernization process.²² The stripping away of much of the experts' power base has reduced the ability of such individuals and groups to have an effect on decision-making in contemporary Romania.

Ceausescu's Personality and Style

A second critical factor that has had an impact on recent political life in Romania has been Ceausescu's personality and style as a leader. He at present constitutes the main motor force of Romanian politics. Indeed, a good deal of the interaction within the political system consists of elite personnel responding to his initiatives, criticisms, and exhortations. This monopoly on policy initiative in most of the important areas has produced a one-man show in Bucharest which is unprecedented anywhere in Eastern Europe since the death of Stalin.

To understand the precise effects of this factor, one must look closely at Ceausescu the man and at his value system.

This value system appears to be a highly original mix of orthodox Marxism-Leninism, Romanian nationalism, and a form of populism springing in part from distrust of bureaucratic procedures and expertise. The General Secretary is, of course, the major Romanian exponent of ideological orthodoxy, of the belief in the expansion of party influence, of mobilization of the masses, and of mass indoctrination through political socialization (all to be treated in detail later). However, his stress on such orthodox Marxist-Leninist themes as the supremacy of the party and democratic centralism is tempered by a strong attachment to the concept of "the national road." According to this notion, each country must apply the *general* elements of the Marxist-Leninist classics creatively within the national context—i.e., within the parameters of existing socioeconomic and cultural conditions in each country. Ceausescu has repeatedly rejected rigid and unquestioning application of some supranational "model" of Marxism-

²² See the author's "Ceausescu's Little Cultural Revolution . . ." especially pp. 726-28.

Leninism, and he has castigated those who have demanded such rigor as "scholastics" and "formalists." He considers "formalism" a major sin in elite political behavior, exceeded only by "bourgeois-capitalist deviationism" in his catalogue of undesirable traits.²³ There is a Romanian way, a Yugoslav way, a Soviet way, and so on, and it has been clear that Ceausescu intends to make the Romanian path conform to *his* own vision of it.

Ceausescu's constant insistence on a Romanian road to socialism and communism reflects the strong nationalism in his thinking. On virtually every major occasion, he has made plain his conviction that the RCP is a national leadership vehicle which will propel Romania to its rightful place among nations and restore to the country a prominent place in the world, a place which was lost for centuries as the result of foreign occupation and subjugation.²⁴ The Romanian press and radio have often compared him, as the leader of this national revival, with national heroes such as Michael the Brave and Stephen the Great, and there is little doubt that he accepts the responsibility inherent in such a comparison with alacrity and enthusiasm. Party publications, speeches, and even resolutions of political and economic decision-making bodies have strongly emphasized the national heritage.²⁵ In literature and the arts, historical themes abound, and archaeological and anthropological works which stress the Roman heritage of the present inhabitants of the country have been produced constantly. Historical works have also attempted to show the traditional Romanian heritage of such disputed border areas as Transylvania and Moldavia.²⁶

The nationalistic aspect of Ceausescu's outlook has been highly popular among the Romanian masses in this multi-ethnic country, who have always tended to view Romania as an outpost of Latin culture in a sea of Slavic underdevelopment. The General Secretary, to be sure, has carefully avoided direct association with the more outspoken nationalists and chauvinists in the country. For instance, he

²³ See, for instance, his speech to the 1972 RCP National Conference, *loc. cit.*

²⁴ See his speech to the Tenth RCP Congress in August 1969, in *Congresul al X-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman*, Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1969, especially pp. 57-64.

²⁵ See, for example, the theses and resolutions of the 1972 RCP National Conference published in *Scinteia*, July 22, 1972.

²⁶ See, for instance, G. Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* (Petition by the People of Walachia), Bucharest, Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1971, particularly the commentary, pp. 347-467.



Nicolae Ceausescu discusses with local officials the most suitable location of new installations.

—Eastfoto.

has underscored the need for all groups, "Romanians, Hungarians, Germans and other nationalities," to live together in harmony and to build jointly a higher civilization neither Romanian nor minority-oriented in character but incorporating the best elements of all national traditions.²⁷ Despite his overt commitment to a political system above ethnic particularisms, however, it seems clear that Ceausescu's vision of Romania's future society is above all a *Romanian* vision, and that many features of his conception of the desirable societal system at this stage are heavily infused with traditional Romanian nationalism. Therefore, with socioeconomic modernization and a rise in political self-consciousness occurring among all ethnic groups, the General Secretary's nationalism could eventually clash with increasing particularism, especially among the Hungarians, and put his ideal of a new socialist culture transcending old rivalries to an acid test.

The third major element in Ceausescu's political approach has been a highly personal style of decision-making, which to some extent springs from

skepticism about bureaucratic procedures and a preference for personal contact with the masses. He is wont to make frequent forays out of Bucharest to visit regional cities, industrial centers, and agricultural districts. On these occasions, he gives a major speech on some subject ranging from economic problems and political mobilization to foreign policy at mass meetings, and he confers with regional leaders, planners, and trade union officials at a series of smaller meetings. But the emphasis is heavily on contact with the rank and file and a relatively open exchange of information, suggestions, and complaints.²⁸ Such contact with elements of the mass population encourages input from the lower levels in a limited form. It is a carefully orchestrated kind of mass participation which funnels information directly to the party leader, often bypassing bureaucratic channels and structures. The kinds of inputs sought have to do largely with implementation of already established decisions or complaints about

²⁷ E.g., his speech to the 1972 RCP National Conference, *loc. cit.*

²⁸ This style has been dramatically exhibited on numerous occasions, and the party press has dutifully reported it in detail. See, for instance, *Scinteia*, Sept. 15, 1972.

mistakes committed; no basic criticism of the political system *per se* is permitted.

Even this limited kind of contact has proved highly important because it has afforded Ceausescu personal access to the mass public and has provided a safety valve for the release of popular frustrations with aspects of the existing regime. For Ceausescu himself, the results have been exceedingly beneficial, for this populist, semi-plebiscitarian approach has given him a highly useful image of concern for the average citizen and has at the same time afforded him additional leverage over the bureaucratic *apparats*. Indeed, it has been a major reason for the rise in his power.

While Ceausescu has been encouraging limited involvement of the masses in Romanian politics, he has simultaneously been rotating cadres, reducing the power of the party *apparatus*, and using "proletarian organs" and the RCP to restrict the options of socioeconomic and cultural elites. This course, it should be stressed, holds potential dangers, for it may prove impossible to deny the various administrative *apparatus* influence for long. The continuing modernization process in Romania is bound to cause more social differentiation than has thus far occurred, and the sophisticated, modern economy now emerging will demand ever larger numbers of technical and managerial experts. Consequently, in supervising the modernization process, the political elite will likely become heavily dependent upon the experts for uninterrupted progress toward the socioeconomic and political goals that the political elite establishes, and it seems unrealistic to suppose that the ubiquitous and indispensable specialists would put themselves unquestioningly at the disposal of a group of nonexpert, party *apparatchik* generalists. In short, the specialists will probably demand a meaningful role in the political system in terms of both information input and participation in actual decision-making—particularly since they enjoyed at least indirect access to the political process between 1965 and 1970-71, before the "little cultural revolution" and the present reorganization of bureaucratic structures, including dismantling of much administrative "overhead," altered the situation.

With respect to this issue, Ceausescu seems to find himself caught in a major dilemma. On the one hand, the general population undoubtedly welcomes its expanded role as an input factor, but its craving for higher material consumption and better services is also considerable after years of relative deprivation. Indeed, the demand for a higher living stand-

ard is probably greater than the desire for a symbolic right of limited political participation. Ceausescu undoubtedly realizes this and seeks to "lay the material basis of socialism" through rapid economic development and improved living conditions. To deliver on such a program, on the other hand, he must have the cooperation of the socioeconomic elites who constitute the lifeblood of modern society.

The Effects of Modernization

A third major factor which has had a part in shaping contemporary Romanian politics has been the country's rapid (especially in recent years) socioeconomic and political modernization. Since 1950, total industrial production has expanded 10 times. Production in heavy industry ("Group A") has increased 13 times, while the light and consumer goods industries ("Group B") have registered a much more modest amount of growth (the index of production in Group B stood at 674 in 1969 with 1950 output as the base of 100). The number of wage earners rose almost two-and-a-half times during this period, and the volume of investments went up a phenomenal 12 times. Even agriculture experienced some development (the index of production had reached 225 in 1969 with 1950 output as the base of 100).²⁹

Along with socioeconomic development has come increasing social stratification. The relatively uniform mass of the peasantry has been considerably depleted by migration to the cities, where occupational specialization has produced social differentiation. As the Romanian economy has grown more sophisticated, new employment categories have emerged. The 1966 census lists 353 occupations in the economy and provides a detailed breakdown of the "economically active" citizens in these categories, which range from supervisory personnel at all levels to farmhands in "general" functions on the land.³⁰ Educational development has led to the graduation of thousands of specialists every year. The 1970 statistical yearbook lists 12 kinds of specialization in

²⁹ See, for example, Republica Socialista Romania, Directia Centrala de Statistica, *Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Socialiste Romania 1970* (Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Romania 1970), Bucharest, 1970.

³⁰ Republica Socialista Romania, Directia Centrala de Statistica, *Rescensamintul Populatiei si Locuintelor din 15 Martie 1966* (Census of the Population and Residents of March 15, 1966), Vol. 1, Bucharest, 1969, especially pp. 283-370.

professional schools below the university level and 29 fields of higher education, all with substantial numbers of students enrolled and graduates.³¹

The rapid development just described was initiated and has been supervised by a highly committed party elite whose modernization goals have also included massive political indoctrination and control. The latter have been carried out primarily through the party structure itself, which today consists of approximately 65,000 primary organizations with about 2.3 million members.³² Through a complex set of overlapping memberships, the RCP exercises hegemony over the governmental structure, the main mass organizations, and the Socialist Unity Front.

The modernization process has created a far more complex society, economy, and polity than existed when the Communists attained power about a quarter of a century ago, and that growing complexity has posed new problems for the rulers of the country. By and large, the leadership has appeared to be in agreement on the general principles to be followed in approaching these problems. For example, the top RCP leadership has remained a modernizing elite with strong preferences for rapid socioeconomic modernization. Thus, there seems to have been little conflict in the upper echelons of the party about the need for accelerated industrialization, with concomitant urbanization, improved education, and (at least for the time being) relative stratification of society. Similarly, there has been broad commitment to a steady rise in the standard of living—in terms of better living conditions, higher wages, and more satisfactory social services.³³ However, to the leadership, industrialization has essentially meant continued emphasis on heavy, extractive, and machine-building industries rather than on consumer-goods industries.³⁴ According to the 1971-75 economic plan, the ratio of investments to consumption during this period will be among the highest in Europe, auguring only modest growth in per capita consumption.³⁵ Agriculture will continue to receive a relatively

small share of investments, and agricultural production is scheduled to rise only moderately in the plan period.³⁶

Ideologically and operationally, the Romanian political elite has also uniformly supported the "Soviet model" of socioeconomic modernization, which is characterized by centralization of decision-making and planning, strict party control, and limited market orientation. Whatever decentralizing measures have been introduced have been carried out under central guidance and supervision. In this connection, it is worth noting that the commitment to centralism appears to have been as strong among the professional engineers and academics in the RCP Presidium, Executive Committee, and Secretariat (e.g., Stefan Andrei, Constantin Babalau, and Gheorghe Ciora, who have engineering degrees; Ion Gheorghe Maurer [now deceased] and Emil Bodnaras, who have law degrees; Gheorghe Macovescu, who has a degree in philosophy; and Miron Constantinescu, who has a degree in economics) as it has among the *apparatchik* generalists (e.g., Nicolae Ceausescu, Petre Blajovici, Florian Danalache, Constantin Dragan, Gheorghe Pana, Gheorghe Patan, Dumitru Popescu, Virgil Trofin, and Ilie Verdet).³⁷

The predilection for firm party control has found reflection in the increasing power of the party *apparat* vis-à-vis other bureaucratic elements—exemplified by the reorganization of administrative agencies already mentioned—and in the push for the expansion of party influence in society at large. There has been elite consensus that the party's role as the leading force in society must be exercised decisively in all situations and among all societal groups and strata.

The practical manifestations of such an outlook have been strong tendencies toward the use of mass mobilization techniques in the socioeconomic, cultural, and political life of the country, with frequent campaigns to increase ideological education and awareness not only among the masses but also among leadership cadres at all levels, to complete the harvest, to reduce wastage in industry, to improve utilization of manpower and machines, to eliminate corruption, or to eradicate "old-fashioned eco-

³¹ *Anuarul Statistic* 1970, pp. 592-624.

³² This figure was given by Ceausescu in his speech to the 1972 National Conference of the RCP, *loc. cit.*

³³ This theme ran through most of the speeches at the Tenth RCP Congress in August 1969. See *Congresul al X-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman*.

³⁴ Ceausescu's views on this issue have repeatedly been emphasized in speeches and meetings. See, for instance, Nicolae Ceausescu, *Romania: Achievements and Prospects*, Bucharest, Meridiane Publishing House, 1969; and Ceausescu's speech to the 1972 National Conference of the RCP, *loc. cit.*

³⁵ See, for instance, the article on the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan in *Scinteia*, Oct. 29, 1971.

³⁶ These priorities were clearly set forth in "National Conference of the Romanian Communist Party, July 19-21, 1972. Report presented by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party," Supplement to *Romania Today* (Bucharest), No. 8/213, 1972, pp. 4-10. (Hereafter cited as "July 1972 Report.")

³⁷ "The Rumanian Party Leadership," pp. 6-8.



Engineer Ioan Tudor, left, instructs students about time and motion in the mechanical engineering industry during a lecture at a Bucharest institute.

—Maria Posteinicu for Agerpress via Eastfoto.

nomic practices” among the population.³⁸ Two major campaigns are currently in progress under the slogans of “fulfillment of the five-year plan in four and a half years!” and “improved ideological training of the population.”³⁹

The pattern of such campaigns has become fairly standardized. First, the party leader voices strong opinions about a problem perceived to be in need of a rapid and thorough solution. Next comes quick and vociferous endorsement of the idea by other central leaders, followed by party meetings in regional and local RCP branches in which unanimous support for the new campaign is expressed. At times, this second step is superseded by popular meetings in which factory workers, farmhands, or the local population generally endorse Ceausescu’s ideas and express their support in lengthy telegrams. In the latter sequence, party leaders at the central, regional, and local levels meet to consider popularly voiced demands for action subsequent to the telegram campaign.⁴⁰ The third stage is the beginning of implementation. Local and regional party bodies, branches of the Socialist Unity Front and of the trade unions, or general public meetings produce resolu-

tions and suggestions concerning ways to carry out the specifics of the campaign. Individual workers and peasants are encouraged to send suggestions to the central leadership bodies for consideration. At this stage, it is also customary to call a conference of party activists and experts in the relevant fields.⁴¹ The final stage of the campaign is the implementation of specific decisions that often appear first as decrees of the RCP Central Committee and later receive the ratification of the legislative body, the Grand National Assembly. Implementation is supervised by the 65,000 local party branches and the numerous governmental structures at all levels.⁴²

The campaign approach, of course, requires a citizenry which is willing to be mobilized at any time, and a continuous socialization campaign aimed at producing such a citizenry has been an important feature of Romanian political life. Once again, the top party elite has seemed united in its dedication to undertakings of mass socialization and indoctrination—and in this regard has differed greatly from some other party elites in Eastern Europe, notably the Hungarian leadership, which has operated under Janos Kadar’s famous formula, “whosoever is not against us is with us.”⁴³ In Romania, the top party elite is still engaged in massive efforts to convert the populace to the local brand of Marxism-Leninism, not merely to achieve tolerance of the ruling oligarchy.

Political mobilization and socialization, then, have had socioeconomic as well as political overtones. Since the party has attempted to maintain strict control of the economy and the administrative apparatus, questions of economic efficiency have become political concerns. This consideration has put socioeconomic behavior and political/moral concerns into a common “socialization package,” with the following themes most frequently voiced: the need for punctuality, for the skill levels required in a modern sophisticated economy, for reliability, trustworthiness, and thrift, and for a general commitment to society and one’s fellow man; and, in negative terms, the need to eschew selfishness, greed, “bourgeois individual-

³⁸ See, for example, *Scinteia*, July 24, 1972 (campaign for innovation and economy in industry); *ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1972 (campaign for better utilization of machinery); and *ibid.*, Nov. 18 and Dec. 23, 1972 (campaign for early fulfillment of the 1971-75 plan).

³⁹ See, e.g., *ibid.*

⁴⁰ This procedure was employed at the outset of the “cultural revolution” campaign in the summer 1971 and of the campaign initiated in early 1972, for early fulfillment of the five-year plan.

⁴¹ The National Conference of the RCP, July 1972, served this kind of purpose. For a discussion, see Ceausescu’s speech to the conference in *Scinteia*, *loc. cit.*

⁴² This was the designated function of local party branches in the “cultural revolution” campaign. Ceausescu revealed later, however, that there had been problems in implementation (see *ibid.*, Nov. 21 and 22, 1972, where his speeches to the RCP Central Committee plenum were published).

⁴³ This formula was restated by Kadar at the 1971 congress of the Hungarian Workers’ Party. See *Osteuropa*, November 1971.

ism," and corruption. Furthermore, the regime has constantly promoted the image of the New Socialist Man, who not only incorporates all the positive character traits listed above but also willingly accepts the party as the supreme motive force of society with the right to mobilize individuals for socioeconomic or political action at any time.⁴⁴

Despite the apparent agreement of the top party leaders on the principles of RCP supremacy and of the need for mass mobilization and continued indoctrination efforts, there have been differences in this group concerning actual *implementation*, as well as considerable conflicts in the party just below the uppermost levels. The current reorganization of bureaucratic agencies and reshuffling of personnel have resulted in a considerable gap between Ceausescu and some of his colleagues at the top of the party. While removal of Trofin, Banc, and Dinca from central positions probably reflected personality disputes more than institutionally-based factionalism,⁴⁵ more serious splits have developed between Ceausescu and parts of the security apparatus and propaganda sections. The important personnel changes in this field clearly indicate that the General Secretary regards the implementation of the ideological campaign as faulty.⁴⁶

The most important differences at the elite level, however, have centered on the issue of the proper mix of ideological purity, party control, and economic efficiency. There has been a classical confrontation between *apparatchik* generalists concerned with continued political supremacy for the RCP, on the one hand, and economic managers, central planners, and technical personnel charged with economic output, on the other. The operational code of the RCP leadership and the posture of monolithic unity around the General Secretary preclude systematic discussion of disagreements among the members of the Presidium, Executive Committee, and Secretariat on this question; therefore, evaluations must be tentative and based on inference rather than solid evidence. Nevertheless, it appears that prior to his death in July 1974, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Premier and thus head

of the state apparatus, had been somewhat critical of the ideological campaign and the massive reorganization and rotation of cadres currently under way. He had displayed notable reticence concerning the need for increased orthodoxy in the ideological field and had repeatedly emphasized economic efficiency.⁴⁷ This approach stood in sharp contrast to the unqualified and at times anticipatory support of Ceausescu's policies voiced by most other individuals at the top level.

While disputes over economic activity and political orthodoxy have only been hinted at in the public pronouncements and actions of top leaders, there has been protracted and open debate among subordinate units of the party and state *apparats* over implementation of various programs. Specialized journals such as *Probleme Economice*, *Finante si Credit*, and *Viata Economica* have discussed economic efficiency and productivity within the context of the current ideological campaign, at times registering doubts about the propriety of increased party control.⁴⁸ The misgivings of some central planners about diminution of their role have even been recorded in the main RCP organ *Scinteia* and in the party's theoretical journal *Lupta de Clasa*.⁴⁹ Essentially, economic elite spokesmen have pleaded for autonomy "within the directives established by the party," and they have on numerous occasions voiced opposition to the economic reform instituted in 1967-68 but still only partially implemented.⁵⁰ Basically, this reform would enhance the degree of autonomy at the plant level, at the expense of central economic agencies. The occasionally esoteric debate has clearly focused on a familiar political theme: To what extent will decentralization in the economy, combined with expanded party control, seriously undermine the interests of the economic elites? This conflict-ridden issue is a source of major concern in contemporary Romania.

Values of the Masses

A fourth factor which has set the framework of political life in contemporary Romania has been the persistence of mass values inimical to the achievement of the Communist regime's broad objectives. The primary goal of the political leadership with respect to the masses of the population has lain in mobilization. In part, mobilization has been intended to serve an economic purpose: *i.e.*, to attain maximum economic output within the parameters estab-

⁴⁴ See the author's "Political Socialization in Romania," in Ivan Volgyes, Ed. *Political Socialization in Eastern Europe*, New York, Praeger, forthcoming.

⁴⁵ The removal of Banc and Dinca was officially categorized as "rotation of cadres." See *Scinteia*, June 24, 1973.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, July 20, 1972, and Jan. 28, 1973, announced the most important personnel changes in the party and security apparatuses and in the Ministry of the Interior. Ceausescu's unhappiness with the security apparatus dates back to 1972 when he removed Patilinet as Party Secretary in charge of military and security affairs (reported in *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1972).

lished by the political elite; in part, it has been aimed at a political end: *i.e.*, to ensure party supremacy in society and to enhance party hegemony over other elites. In either case, however, the mass public has been regarded as essentially an object of manipulation and control—despite recent bows to popular participation in the political process. But certain values of the populace have acted as impediments to this kind of mobilization and caused problems for the regime in its mobilization efforts. Two types of problems loom particularly important in the present context. They are:

1. *Popular apathy.* Unfortunately, no sampling evidence can be produced to demonstrate this problem since social science research is still in its infancy in Romania and since restrictions on Western scholars in the country preclude systematic interviews at any level. The researcher must therefore depend on official sources for this purpose. Even such limited evidence, however, makes it clear that political and social mobilization is not meeting with unqualified support and enthusiasm from the population. There have been frequent complaints in the party press about apathy, corruption, retention of a “bourgeois-landowner” mentality, and the development of new forms of social parasitism among the masses of the population.⁴⁷ Indeed, Ceausescu launched his “little cultural revolution” partly in reaction to what he deemed unsatisfactory developments with regard to mass attitudes in both the political/ideological and the economic realms. For the general masses, it should be noted too, the results of the elite purges and reorganization and of the increased ideological orthodoxy at the top since 1971 have been more severe social control, expanded party activity, and more stringent attempts at political socialization at all levels and in virtually all areas of activity. The current campaign against wastage of resources and for better use of machines, manpower, and raw materials also requires tighter supervision

at the production level, with markedly less room for individual or group autonomy there.⁵²

The RCP modernizers, thus, have been undergoing an agonizing confrontation with socioeconomic reality at the mass level. Although tremendous changes have taken place in the political and socioeconomic fields in Romania during the last 25 years, the change in commonly-held values has been much less drastic. Like Communist elites elsewhere in Eastern Europe, many elites in Romania have realized that value reorientation is going to be a slow process, but Ceausescu himself has elected to struggle against this kind of resignation for fear that much of the party apparatus could become oriented to the status quo instead of sticking to value reorientation. That choice has produced his current ideological offensive, clearly a major feature of the Romanian scene today.

2. *The continued existence of ethnic particularism.* Romania is a multinational country, with substantial numbers of ethnic Hungarians and Germans (as well as other, smaller ethnic groups) living inside its state borders. The 1966 census showed the following breakdown of the population: Romanians, 16,740,310 (87.6 percent of the total); Hungarians, 1,619,592 (8.5 percent); Germans, 382,595 (2.0 percent); Gypsies, 64,197 (0.3 percent); Jews, 42,888 (0.2 percent); Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Hutans, 54,705 (0.3 percent); Russians, 39,483 (0.2 percent); Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, 44,236 (0.2 percent); Slovaks 22,221 (0.1 percent); and Tatars, 22,151 (0.1 percent), with smaller numbers of Turks, Bulgars, Czechs, Greeks, Poles, and Armenians. Of equal significance with this ethnic diversity is the fact that the two largest minorities, the Hungarians and Germans, are heavily concentrated in Transylvania and the Banat.⁵³

Communist ideology and much Western scholarly literature on political and socioeconomic development have predicted increasing assimilation of ethnic minorities into any modern political culture, and Ceausescu has made his assumptions explicit by emphasizing that modern, socialist Romania will have a culture which is neither Romanian nor minor-

⁴⁷ See the author's “Ceausescu's Little Cultural Revolution . . .,” especially p. 724.

⁴⁸ See, for instance, G. Antonescu in *Finante si Credit* (Bucharest), January 1972, and S. Ansene in *Probleme Economice* (Bucharest), January 1972.

⁴⁹ See, for example, B. Almasan in *Scinteia*, Nov. 24, 1967, and Maxim Berghianu in *Lupta de Clasa* (Bucharest), July 1971.

⁵⁰ One form of such opposition was the repeated redrafting of parts of the 1967 reform package. This procedure was criticized by a high economic official, G. Gaston-Marin, in *ibid.*, January 1972.

⁵¹ See, for instance, *Scinteia*, Nov. 4, 1971, for Ceausescu's thundering remarks at the November 1971 RCP Central Committee plenum.

⁵² *Ibid.* This imperative is also clearly indicated in numerous articles by prominent party and government leaders on implementation of the 1971-75 plan. See, for example, Ilie Verdet in *Era Socialista*, No. 11, June 1973; and also *Romania Libera* (Bucharest), June 6, 1973.

⁵³ The nationality breakdown may be found in *Republica Socialista Romania, Directia Centrala de Statistica, Recensamintul Populatiei si Locuintelor din 15 Martie 1966*, Vol. 1, p. 153.



A Hungarian amateur group performs at Tirgu Mures in the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region of Romania.

—Eastfoto.

ity-based, but socialist.⁵⁴ Today, socioeconomic modernization has drastically changed the life style of virtually all citizens of Romania, whatever their ethnic background, and produced a common backdrop of urbanization, industrialization, and expanded educational opportunities for a common culture, but despite the regime's express commitment to establishing a common culture for all at a higher level, ethnic particularism has not disappeared. Rather, it appears to be on the rise, especially among Hungarians.

There are several aspects to the explanation of this phenomenon. First, much of the political and socioeconomic mobilization carried out in Romania is supervised by ethnic Romanians, a situation which smacks of "Romanianization" to the ethnic minorities. Here Ceausescu has faced an excruciating dilemma. An important reason for his popularity among the *Romanians* appears to have been the mass belief that political development does, in fact, mean assimilation to the dominant Romanian culture. Hence,

⁵⁴ Ceausescu in "July 1972 Report," pp. 36-40.

he has had to walk a tightrope. On the one hand, he has had to avoid overt attempts at Romanianization and to uphold national autonomy in fields such as folklore, literary traditions, and the use of the native language, while seeing to it that "socialist values" rule political and economic activity. On the other hand, he has had to maintain his commitment to *Romanian* nationalism, one of his regime's chief sources of legitimacy.

The consequence of this exceedingly complicated state of affairs has been vacillation in nationality policy over the years. That is, there have been alternating periods of relative ethnic autonomy and of heavy stress on assimilation. At the present time, Ceausescu is engaged in an effort to operationalize the old adage "national in form, socialist in content," by allowing some ethnic autonomy in cultural and literary fields with strict controls against political separatism. This fairly balanced approach has prevailed since 1968, when the regime's concern about possible unrest among the minorities forced it to make certain concessions to them, particularly to the Hungarians. (Throughout much of the 1960's under the regimes of both Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu, a much more assimilationist approach had been in effect.)⁵⁵

There is little evidence, however, that this flexibility in policy has brought about assimilation to a higher form of national culture among the minority masses. A major reason for such lagging assimilation may be that socioeconomic modernization does not as a matter of course lead to greater assimilation. Increased urbanization, better jobs, and higher standards of literacy in many cases bring about a mounting awareness of ethnic backgrounds, historical traditions, and cultural bases and folkways, rather than a future-oriented attachment to a theoretical, higher entity of socialist culture.⁵⁶ In Romania, this has been the case especially among ethnic groups with a long and proud historical tradition essentially alien to the Romanian experience—notably, the Hungarians and Germans, who were historically the political and socioeconomic masters of

⁵⁵ For an analysis of this development, see the author's "Ethnic Minorities in Romania Under Socialism," *East European Quarterly*, January 1974, pp. 435-58.

⁵⁶ For discussions of this phenomenon, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Nationalities," in Allen Kassof, Ed. *Prospects for Soviet Society*, New York, Praeger, 1968, pp. 143-241; and the author's "Ethnic Minorities in Socialist Romania: Assimilation or Ethnic Separatism?" a paper presented to the September 1973 meeting of the American Political Science Association in New Orleans, La.

large areas of the country. Thus, the modernization process among these groups has rendered it doubly difficult for the Romanian political elite to achieve meaningful cultural assimilation.

External Influences

No analysis of factors affecting recent Romanian politics would be complete without some mention of external influences, primarily those stemming from the USSR. Much has been said about the decline of Moscow's power in Eastern Europe in the post-Stalin period, and there is relatively broad agreement that the present leadership in the Kremlin cannot determine domestic politics in the Warsaw Pact countries in detail, as was Stalin's wont. At the same time, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine have demonstrated quite clearly that Moscow still can and will set general parameters beyond which no political leadership within the Soviet sphere of influence can safely venture. These parameters have been operational with respect to Romania no less than with respect to other countries. The most important are:

1. *Continued dominance of the Communist Party and unswerving attachment to a political and socio-economic program broadly defined as "socialism."* Under this requirement, the appearance of a meaningful political alternative to the local Communist Party is precluded; furthermore, the Communist Party itself may not introduce major ideological and political deviations. Similarly, the economic organization of the state must reflect a commitment to state ownership of the means of production, only limited and controlled private agriculture, a centrally-controlled money market, and minimal individual enterprise in small industry and in services.

These requirements have constituted no particular problem for the RCP. Not only is it the only party in the country, but Ceausescu's policy has ruled out the rise of any informal political alternative. It is worth pointing out here that the recent campaigns designed to reestablish ideological orthodoxy while furthering party control must be seen in Moscow as reassuring developments. There have indeed been analysts who have hinted that the ideological cam-

paign in Romania is a local "sacrifice" to Moscow in return for continued relative autonomy in foreign policy.⁵⁷ Whether such a *quid pro quo* has actually been established cannot be determined with any certainty, but it is clear that Moscow accepts Bucharest's assurances that a Romanian Dubcek will not be allowed to appear on the domestic scene. Such assurances would tend to make Romanian foreign policy maneuvers more tolerable to the Soviet leaders.

2. *Firm commitment to the Soviet Union in foreign policy, or at least a "progressive" foreign policy which supports Moscow in general terms and is suitably "anti-imperialist" in tone.* In this realm, the Ceausescu regime is in considerable difficulty. The General Secretary has repeatedly stated that Romania wishes to have relations with *all* countries without regard to social system, although relations with other socialist countries remain a major concern.⁵⁸ Romania's "deviation" in foreign policy—manifested by the recognition of West Germany in 1967, close economic ties with many capitalist countries, recent agreements with the United States, and continued relations with Israel at a time when all other countries in Eastern Europe broke diplomatic relations with the "Zionist state"—has caused considerable strain in Moscow-Bucharest relations and



Ceausescu, left, leads a delegation of Romanian state and party officials to 1970 Warsaw Pact talks in Moscow. To right is CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, who greeted the Romanian leader at the Moscow airport.

⁵⁷ See, for instance, the Radio Free Europe Research report by Robert R. King, "A Lull in Rumania's Relations with China?," Feb. 15, 1972.

⁵⁸ E.g., "July 1972 Report," pp. 40-54.

—V. Musaeliarr for Tass via Sovfoto.

has resulted in increased Soviet pressure for more conformity.

This pressure, which grew in intensity after the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, has had two domestic effects in Romania. It has slowed the trend toward greater economic cooperation with the West. This slowdown has in turn forced domestic production to pick up the slack in terms of both investment and the availability of consumer goods and has thus brought about a somewhat harsher economic climate.⁵⁹ The pressure also probably had something to do with the inauguration of the ideological campaign described above, which has had considerable impact on economic and social life.

3. *Firm commitment by the local party leadership to the Soviet position in the Sino-Soviet dispute.* This is another troublesome area for Ceausescu, an area which has caused him repeated problems internally. The Romanian party leader has officially taken a middle position in the conflict, deploring the destructive fraternal infighting between Moscow and Peking. He has steadfastly refused to participate in conferences designed to read the Chinese out of the world Communist movement, or, when he has participated, he has acted as a conciliatory influence, emphasizing the need to keep the "camp" united in the face of continued "imperialist onslaughts."⁶⁰ The Romanian commitment to a communism with national roots and Bucharest's frequent insistence on relations among socialist states based on "noninterference in domestic affairs, equality and mutual advantage"⁶¹ have caused much consternation in the Kremlin; and in Romania this conflict has given rise to factionalism, about which relatively little is known. The purges of General Ion Serb and Party Secretary Vasile Patilinet, presumably for pro-Soviet factional activity, have constituted only the visible tip of an iceberg.⁶²

Ceausescu has long maintained cordial relations with the Chinese, and there are indications that he greatly admires some of the policies of the CCP. The advent of the "little cultural revolution," hard upon the heels of Ceausescu's visit to China in 1971,

⁵⁹ The 1974-75 plan, approved by the RCP Executive Committee on June 13, 1973, provided for more reliance on domestic production of certain goods. See *Scinteia*, June 14, 1973.

⁶⁰ E.g., *Congresul al X-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman*, pp. 74-89.

⁶¹ A favorite concept which Ceausescu has repeatedly stressed, e.g., in "Report" pp. 40-57.

⁶² The recent changes in the RCP Secretariat may indeed be a continuation of the 1972 purge.

brought forth much speculation in the West concerning the General Secretary's preference for Maoist approaches.⁶³ A cause-effect relationship is hard to establish in any analysis of personal motivations, and some of the early speculation on this point has died down. Ceausescu's official position is that he is a Romanian Communist and as such is devoted to a Romanian road within the general parameters of Marxism-Leninism. This position presumably leaves open the option of borrowing from both the Soviet and Chinese experiences. The immediate domestic effect of Ceausescu's ideological commitments, of course, has been the campaign for orthodoxy, which has met with some approval in both Moscow and Peking.

The Future

Having examined the factors that have determined the character of political life in Romania during recent years, let us now turn to a brief assessment of those which are likely to be critical in this regard in the future. Obviously, foreign influences will probably loom large, for the Soviet parameters will doubtless remain operative. Ceausescu will thus have to maneuver between domestic factions and the shadows of the Brezhnev Doctrine. To date, his ideological orthodoxy, the current campaign for increased party power in society, and the strategic isolation of Romania in a geographical sense have persuaded Moscow to tolerate his independent stance in foreign policy. But should Ceausescu be confronted with a serious rebellion among his own bureaucratic elites or adopt domestic policies which appear to Moscow to constitute major deviations from orthodoxy, he could find himself confronted with Soviet interference of one sort or another.

As for internal factors, these seem to be the most important:

1. *Ceausescu's personal power and his style of decision-making.* As described above, the personal power of Ceausescu has lately been enhanced by administrative reorganizations and the removal of important individuals from their major power bases. The General Secretary has increasingly dominated both the party and the state administration, and his personal involvement in the newly-established joint

⁶³ See, for example, King, "A Lull in Rumania's Relations with China?," especially pp. 6-8.

party-state bodies such as the Supreme Council on Socioeconomic Development has further strengthened his control over the course of events. Moreover, Romania's successes in foreign policy during the last decade have by and large stemmed from his highly personal approach to foreign affairs. As long as the country registers reasonable economic progress and retains its relative autonomy in foreign policy, the General Secretary would appear to be rather firmly in the saddle—at least for the next four or five years.

2. *Increasing socioeconomic diversification and its implications for political life.* As the modernization process continues, Romania will inevitably experience more social diversification and stratification. Functional specialization will grow, and the service sector of the economy will become more important. At some stage of this development, a centralized party attuned to the idea of strict control of all aspects of socioeconomic and political life may encounter thorny difficulties in exercising its customary supervision of society. In short, the Romanian Communist Party will be caught in a major dilemma. On the one hand, it will have to press forward with its drive for modernization since much of its legitimacy rests on the idea of steady progress and development; on the other hand, the very process of modernization will tend to make political control harder. Present-day approaches such as ideological campaigns, personalized power politics, and frequent administrative reorganizations will probably not solve the escalating problems of control during the coming decade. One possible solution might be the gradual withdrawal of the party from direct day-to-day involvement in economic affairs, as has been the case in Hungary; another could be for the Romanian political leadership to attempt to coopt more economic specialists into the RCP for better control in this field. Such innovations, however, would clash with the current trend toward ever-increasing personal power for Nicolae Ceausescu.

3. *Probable long-term expansion of the power of the "technocrats."* The increasing sophistication of the economy and the stratification of Romanian society will likely result in more influence for the managerial and technical experts who have been emerging in large numbers from the universities and research institutions of the country. At the moment, the party *apparatus* is still primarily in the hands of professional *political* cadres whose education is rudimentary or limited to short courses at party institutes. These two groups now coexist in a reasonably peaceful manner. The experts need political support in order to advance their careers, and the political cadres need the technocrats to improve social and economic conditions and to propel Romania forward to the overriding goal of "modernity." During the next decade or so, however, the services of the technical and managerial experts will become even more crucial, and it seems improbable that they will perform these services without demanding greater *political* power. The party could meet this challenge by coopting some of them, by training its own people as specialists, or by intensifying ideological campaigns and social control (the device currently in use). In the long run, the most likely scenario appears to be one that will involve recognition by the party of the need for concessions to the societal elites it has helped create. At that time, of course, the personal authority of the party leader would have to be curtailed, and such a curtailment would certainly not sit well with the present General Secretary.

The broad prospects in Romania, then, are for continued emphasis on rapid socioeconomic modernization, with continued impressive achievements. At the same time, political problems will probably become increasingly severe because of the complexity of the issues facing the Romanian political leadership, and how the leadership will respond to the challenge is bound to be a subject of ongoing interest to the rest of the world.

The Albanian Cultural Revolution

By Nicholas C. Pano

November 1974 will mark both the 30th anniversary of Albania's liberation from Axis occupation and the Communist seizure of power. Although it is the smallest and least developed of the East European party states, the People's Republic of Albania (PRA) has, since the end of World War II, enjoyed a prominence far out of proportion to its size and power. To a considerable degree, Albania's notoriety stemmed originally from the role the country played in the events that led to the Soviet-Yugoslav break in 1948 and the Sino-Soviet rift in the early 1960's. Since the mid-1960's, however, it has been the Albanian Ideological and Cultural Revolution that has most attracted the interest of foreign observers.

Viewed in the context of Albania's postwar history, the Albanian Ideological and Cultural Revolution does not appear to be either "a great aberration" or a mere carbon copy of the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It represents, rather, a distinct stage of what Albanian Communist theoreticians have termed their nation's "uninterrupted revolution," which began during the wartime "struggle for national liberation" and is intended to continue until Albania has successfully completed its construction of socialism and made the transition to communism.¹ Albania's present rulers hold that the Ideological and Cultural Revolution constitutes the most recent and decisive phase of their campaign to build socialism in accordance with the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. Concerning this point, Enver Hoxha, First Secretary

of the ruling *Partia e Punës së Shqipërisë* (Albanian Party of Labor—henceforth referred to as APL), declared in November 1966:

*So long as the complete victory of the revolution in the realms of ideology and culture has not been ensured, the victories of the socialist revolution in the economic and political fields can neither be secured nor guaranteed.*²

The roots of Albania's Ideological and Cultural Revolution are to be found in the history of the PRA, and especially in the experiences of the republic's formative years. That history may be divided into two periods. During the first period (1944-60), the Communist seized power, consolidated their hold on the country, inaugurated their program of socialization, and strove to preserve Albania's independence and territorial integrity. This was an era of strife within the ranks of the ruling party and of conflicts between the PRA on the one hand and Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the major Western powers on the other. It was above all the period during which Enver Hoxha firmly established himself as the leading personality in the Albanian ruling elite. By the end of the period, the now tightly-knit Albanian leadership had established the institutional bases of socialism, provoked the diplomatic and ideological break with the USSR, and cemented the ideological and economic alliance with China. The second period began in 1961 and extends to the present day. It is this period which has witnessed the emergence and

Mr. Pano is Assistant Professor of History at Western Illinois University (Macomb). He is the author of The People's Republic of Albania, 1968, and a contributor to The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe, edited by Peter Toma, 1970.

¹ See Ndreçi Plasari, "Some Features of the Revolution in Albania," in *Konferenca Kombëtare e Studimeve Shoqërore* (National Conference on Social Studies), Vol. II, Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1970, pp. 3-30.

² *Zëri i Popullit* (Tirana), Nov. 2, 1966.