

of *Tygodnik Powszechny* from 40,000 to 50,000 copies have been steadfastly refused. Censorship of Catholic papers and books has remained tight. The Catholics have been discriminated against in public service and at the universities, and Catholic intellectuals have been conspicuously absent from Polish delegations at various international gatherings. In 1972, the Communists crudely meddled in the selection of the Znak parliamentary candidates, preventing Mazowiecki from continuing as a deputy. In 1973, the Catholic publishing house "Verum," directed by Micewski, was closed down.

Yet, for the time being, even if the Communists' tolerance stems solely from expediency, there is no need for apprehension about

Znak's continued existence. As long as the group enjoys the support of the Catholic Church, it is unlikely that the Communists will attempt to attack it frontally. The regime, however, is likely to persist in its tug-of-war against the Catholic intellectuals and continue efforts to restrict their activities. Under such circumstances, the Znak group might unilaterally decide against participation in the next Sejm. The Polish Catholics, of course, would prefer to avoid taking such a drastic step; instead, they continue to hope that the Communists will show some signs of readiness to enter into a true dialogue with them.

The future of Znak has important implications extending beyond the fate of Poland's Catholics. Located at the crossroads of

different political and cultural systems, at the intersection of communism and Catholicism, the group serves as a sensitive barometer by which true Communist intentions can be gauged. As such, its fortunes are relevant not only to relations between the Communist countries and the Vatican, but also to East-West relations in general. The Polish Catholics are well aware of the significance of their role. As Mazowiecki puts it,

*There can be no true opening of Christianity to the East, nor any true coexistence between communism and the Christian world, which excludes Poland; in this regard, we can either advance or hinder global solutions by confirming or disproving the prospects of coexistence. (p. 179)*

## Communism in Bulgaria

By Joseph Rothschild

NISSAN OREN: *Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power: 1934-1944*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.

NISSAN OREN: *Revolution Administered: Agrarianism and Communism in Bulgaria*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.

BOGOSLAV DOBRIN: *Bulgarian Economic Development Since World War II*. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973.

THE PUBLICATION of these three stimulating books provides a welcome incentive to speculate about

the unique as well as the universal features of Bulgarian communism—and indeed of Bulgarian political and socioeconomic development in general over the past half-century. Rather than recapitulate the contents of the three studies, the following essay will utilize them as springboards for the consideration of some interesting propositions which they either express or catalyze. Lest this treatment cause the high opinion in which the reviewer holds these books to be lost from view (though it is implicit throughout), he wishes to state it at the outset:

these are learned as well as provocative studies.

The Bulgarian experience punctures the conventional present-day academic myth that political violence and political radicalism (of both left and right varieties) are the outgrowth of socioeconomic inequality and/or ethnic tension. The society of independent Bulgaria has traditionally been highly egalitarian in terms both of property distribution and of status flexibility. It was unhampered by any historic nobility, and its easily accessible educational system was effective in facilitating occupa-

tional and hence social mobility for able and ambitious peasant children. Ethnically, too, Bulgarian society was homogeneous, with only very small and relatively assimilated minorities. (The Macedonians were a political power-group, but not an ethnic minority.) Yet the country's politics—during the interwar as well as the post-war Stalinist years—were particularly violent, and its extremist movements exceptionally strong. Frustrated nationalism, provoked by Bulgaria's failure in both world wars to achieve her revisionist ambitions in Macedonia and Thrace (against Yugoslavia and Greece), accounts for much of this domestic violence. Indeed, violence quickly became a reflexive pattern as, in turn, the large and well-organized community of Macedo-Bulgarians and then the powerful Peasantist, Anarchist, and Communist movements, as well as the military profession and its paramilitary auxiliaries, and even the royal palace, sporadically resorted to assassinations, bombings, riots, insurrections, quasi-insurrections, and executions to punish rival movements and persons suspected of laxness in the pursuit of Bulgaria's supposed true national interest.

THE PLACE OF Russia both in the strategy and in the tactics of this pursuit of the national interest and in the very perception of where that interest lies has always been a critical issue for the modern Bulgarian political elite, and it is a problem analyzed with particular perspicacity by Oren. An irredentist-revisionist state from the moment of her modern rebirth in 1878, and one whose national resources perennially fell short of her territorial ambitions, Bulgaria always seemed to require

at least one great-power champion—unless she would opt for the solution recommended by her radical Peasantist premier (1919-23), Aleksandŭr Stamboliski. That solution was to escape from the need for great-power sponsorship by organizing a credible clustering of East-Central European peasant states which would be politically autonomous vis-à-vis all the great powers and socio-ideologically immune to both Soviet Bolshevism and Western industrial capitalism.

Though original, Stamboliski's strategy proved both unrealistic and abortive as his peasantism and neutralism were repudiated by the ruling elites of the other intended member-states of his proposed agrarian bloc. In the end, he was overthrown and assassinated in his own country by an outraged Macedo-military-bourgeois coalition for allegedly betraying the national interest. His fall was also greeted initially with satisfaction by the Bulgarian Communists, who resented and feared his Peasantist movement's militant radicalism and authentic popularity coupled, in a fashion which puzzled and disoriented the Communists, with an "objectively reactionary" ideological program. Despite the Stamboliski regime's international and domestic isolation, its overthrow entailed intense violence and continued repression in Bulgaria, and the successor regime soon extended this repression to the Communists.

Stamboliski's fate categorically reemphasized Bulgaria's need for great-power patronage. Who, then, would be the patron? Britain and France were never seriously in the running. For approximately a decade, Italy—then also entangled in her own revisionist-irredentist

frictions with Yugoslavia—was the leading candidate for this role. But over the long haul Italy lacked the economic and military muscle to sustain her political ambitions in the Danubian-Balkan region; hence, from the mid-1930's, her prospects faded in the face of the competing candidacies of Germany and Russia.

Initially, Germany's manifest economic, technological, and military power and reputation gave her the advantage in this competition for the favor of Bulgaria's rulers. Nevertheless, the underground but always active Communists successfully kept alive the Soviet Russian alternative not only in the eyes of their own cadres but also in the eyes of the broader Slavophile sectors of the general population—this notwithstanding the fact that appealing to traditional historico-cultural Slavophilism and Russophilism, though a strong potential asset for the Communists, was for long deprecated within the interwar Communist Party as somehow ideologically unworthy of true Marxist-Leninists and only became really legitimate in the post-World War II era. In the meantime, Soviet Russia was portrayed during the interwar decades as a land of promise for the masses in general, but especially for Bulgarians because the Bulgarian comrades were the Bolshevik leaders' consistent favorites within the world Communist movement and because many Bulgarian Communist political exiles living in the USSR had achieved successful political and administrative careers in both the Comintern and Soviet party apparatuses. This particularly close relationship with the Kremlin for long gave the Bulgarian Communists an advantaged position vis-à-vis other

European—especially East-Central European—Communist parties.

Of course, both the bourgeois-military coalition that favored Germany as Bulgaria's prospective big-power ally and the Communists who championed the Soviet Union wished to utilize such an alliance not only to enhance Bulgaria's international position but also to provide leverage for her social and economic modernization and industrialization. Thus, both Right and Left agreed in repudiating Stamboliski's hopes of avoiding the industrial-urban system.

QUITE APART from any historical or institutional advantages the Soviet Union might be said to have enjoyed over Nazi Germany as a model for the rapid industrialization of an agrarian society, the "intellectual" aspects of the debate were rendered moot, and the political issue settled, by the outcome of World War II, which placed Bulgaria squarely in the Soviet orbit and brought the Communists to power within the country. The Communists' achievement of domestic political hegemony bore little, if any, relationship to their wartime partisan record, which had been unimpressive. In fact, Bulgaria's war effort under her previous rulers as one of Hitler's allies had been rather minimal, and the underground Communist cadres had fought and suffered little in comparison to those in many other East-Central European countries. Nonetheless, both the postwar Communist purge of the preceding political elite and the immediately subsequent purge within the Communist Party of those members suspected of insufficiently intense and blind obedience to the Soviet line and Stalin's wishes were particularly

savage. Bulgaria's somewhat mystifying tradition of seemingly gratuitous political violence was thus maintained into the initial years of the postwar era. Reciprocally, the audacious and "unrealistic" courage of the small group of anti-Communist opposition leaders—internationally abandoned and domestically isolated, and today all but forgotten—proved unique in the history of postwar East-Central European resistance to sovietization. Oren's politico-historical discussion of this episode is analytical, but his moral sympathies are manifestly engaged here.

But if the Bulgarian Communists owed their accession to power to Soviet military might rather than their own efforts (indeed, their own strength and morale were probably lower at the close of World War II than at the end of World War I), they nevertheless proceeded to consolidate their political position and to implement their (and Moscow's) economic program with characteristic Bulgarian efficiency and with thoroughness and toughness. Collectivization of agriculture was ruthlessly and successfully imposed on the countryside even though Bulgaria already had one of the most egalitarian patterns of land distribution in Europe, though there was no landed aristocracy or gentry against which peasant resentment and land-hunger could be directed, and though the old Stalinist tactic of pitting poor against middle-level and kulak peasants was consequently unfeasible. In the process, the Communist regime achieved total administrative-political control over the peasantry and hence the capacity to squeeze out of it both the surplus labor and much of the capital needed for the parallel industrialization program.

Despite the exploitation and suffering that this policy entailed, the peasantry did thereby obtain the opportunity to leave the land for industrial-urban employment. Indeed, the shift of labor out of agriculture in postwar Bulgaria appears to be of a magnitude hitherto unprecedented in European economic history: between 1948 and 1968, every second Bulgarian peasant changed his occupational sector as the proportion of the total labor force employed in agriculture plunged from 82 to 39 percent. This massive transfer was anything but smooth. Many were driven off the land by near-starvation conditions, and as Bulgarian industry was not able to absorb them all in spite of its rapid expansion, tens of thousands were involuntarily sent to work abroad, in Czechoslovakia and the USSR.

Still, Bulgaria's agricultural sector has received more technological assistance than any other in East-Central Europe, and today it ranks third in the area in level of mechanization and consumption of chemical fertilizer (on an index relative to acreage). As for the industrial sector, postwar Bulgaria has overtaken Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia in the proportion of the total labor force engaged in industry, and during the 1960's the country's rate of growth in industrial output was the highest in East-Central Europe and the second highest in the world (after Japan). All in all, Bulgaria today can boast a higher level of output per unit of capital than any other country in East-Central Europe and one of the area's best overall growth rates—an average annual increase in GNP of six percent. In analyzing the comparative statistics which demonstrate these trends, Dobrin is manifestly impressed by, and

understandably proud of, the Bulgarian performance.

No wonder, then, that the Soviet leadership has concentrated more resources and attention on Bulgaria's economic development than on the development of any other East-Central European country. Contrary to the conventional assumption, this decision is not predicated exclusively on Bulgaria's strategic and political importance and her zinc and lead reserves, but also on the fact that

her educated and energetic population makes her the Soviet ally where capital investment yields the highest return.

Often dubbed "the Prussians of the Balkans," the Bulgarians have long been regarded by outsiders, as well as by themselves, as the most diligent, frugal, sober, orderly, systematic, practical, and alert people of the Balkan region. They have prided themselves on sustaining a *robota* (work) culture, in contradistinction to the

Serbs' *haiduk* (heroic) culture or the Romanians' and Greeks' alleged mercantile-ingenuity culture. Conversely, their very stoicism has supposedly also rendered them indifferent to coercion inflicted on them, or by themselves on others. While such generalizations about national character are risky, the Bulgarians are, on balance, impressively utilitarian and hard-headed, with little of the romanticism or mysticism of other Slav peoples.

# Public Opinion in Eastern Europe

By Peter Grothe

JAROSLAW PIEKALKIEWICZ:

*Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, 1968-69—*

*Results and Analysis of Surveys Conducted During the Dubcek Era.* New York, Praeger 1972.

ALLEN BARTON, BOGDAN DENITCH, CHARLES KADUSHIN, Eds.: *Opinion-Making Elites in Yugoslavia.* New York, Praeger, 1973.

MOST STANDARD American textbooks on public opinion define it as a group or complex of beliefs expressed by a significant number of people on an important issue. This definition is adequate for the Western democracies, but it is not adequate for the so-called "closed societies." The word at issue here is "expressed." In the West, public opinion is expressed through the media, public forums, etc., but in Communist countries

these outlets are controlled by the party. Nevertheless, any serious student of Communist affairs who has spent a reasonable amount of time in the Soviet Union and the bloc countries is aware that there *is* public opinion, even if it is not expressed publicly. It *is* expressed privately—to family members, trusted friends, and occasional itinerant Westerners. Therefore, while "unexpressed public opinion" may appear a contradiction in terms by traditional standards, there is clearly a need to broaden the traditional definition to include the "unexpressed public opinion" of closed societies.

At the same time, students of public opinion in the Communist countries can only look with envy on their colleagues who specialize in American public opinion, for while Americans are probably the most surveyed, "questionnaired,"

monitored, charted, and graphed people since Macchiavelli first introduced the concept of public opinion in its modern sense in his *Discourses*, quite the opposite holds true of the peoples of the Communist states. There is, alas, in Moscow no counterpart of the Michigan Survey Research Center. While Moscow *does* have an Institute of Sociological Research in the USSR Academy of Sciences, the discipline of sociology in the Soviet Union, which was coming out of its embryonic stages in the mid-1960's, has retrogressed since the late 1960's. Anyone who doubts the constraints on Soviet sociologists need only refer to a 1971 article by M. N. Rutkevich, Director of the Institute of Sociological Research. He stated:

*Sociology is a party science. The Marxist sociologist, be he scien-*