

# Books

## Soviet Nations

John A. Armstrong

GREGORY GLEASON. *Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR*. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1990.

BOHDAN NAHAYLO and VICTOR SWOBODA. *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problems in the USSR*. New York, The Free Press, 1990.

NADIA DIUK and ADRIAN KARATNYCKY. *The Hidden Nations: The People Challenge the Soviet Union*. New York, William Morrow and Co., 1990.

IT WAS easy to predict that the upsurge of national expression in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during 1988–89 would stimulate publication of a variety of books. To be sure, a half-dozen first-rate treat-

*John A. Armstrong is Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of Nations Before Nationalism (1982), The Politics of Totalitarianism (1961), and several other books. The third, revised, edition of his Ukrainian Nationalism was published in 1990.*

ments of the entire range of Soviet nationality issues had become available during the past quarter-century: the symposia edited by Erich Goldhagen, *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* (1968) and by Jeremy R. Azrael, *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (1978); Robert Conquest's *Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice* (1967); Jürgen Arnold's *Nationalgebietseinheiten der Sowjetunion* (National-Territorial Units of the Soviet Union—1973); Hélène Carrère d'Encausse's *Decline of an Empire* (1979); and Rasma Karklins's *Ethnic Relations in the USSR* (1986). But the flood of information during the past three years, and the dramatic events that produced this flood, have so altered our understanding of the nationalities issue in the Soviet Union that new interpretations are in order.

The volumes under review, like their predecessors, basically afford a *synoptic* view of ethnic relations in the USSR. Although this approach, when pursued competently, can enhance comprehension of individual ethnic situations as well as of the entire Soviet predicament, readers trained as social scientists would appreciate a *synthetic* interpretation based on theory, or at least the kind of pre-theory represented by systematic typologies. At the present underdeveloped stage of so-

cial science conceptualization of ethnic interrelations, though, such synthetic interpretations are extraordinarily difficult to achieve for specialists on the Soviet Union. Consequently, up-to-date synoptic surveys are all one can reasonably expect.

The first, and perhaps best so far, of the new synoptic interpretations to reach this reviewer was *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society*, a symposium edited by Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger.<sup>1</sup> Although I deal with this volume in greater detail elsewhere,<sup>2</sup> it serves as a standard by which to judge the works under review here. Despite the large number of contributors (13), editorial oversight has achieved a considerable measure of synthetic analysis, notably in statistical presentations. Moreover, the brief volume contains seven analytic chapters which, without being fully coordinated, apply theoretical frameworks to such aspects of nationality issues as religion, economics, the role of the military, literature, and language.

On the other hand, the book's analytic approach did not leave much

<sup>1</sup>Westview, Boulder, CO, 1990.

<sup>2</sup>See *Bulletin of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research* (Rocky Hill, CT), forthcoming.

space for the treatment of specific nationalities, nor did it contain a strictly historical treatment of Soviet nationalities policy. Consequently, the three books reviewed here, although not matching the standard of analysis of the Hajda/Beissinger volume, are highly useful complements. The massive work by Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, explicitly a "history" of the nationalities problem, provides impressive chronological coverage of developments during the past two decades. Gregory Gleason's approach to federalism is also primarily historical. But unlike Nahaylo/Swoboda, it uses a systematic interpretative framework, namely, legal analysis of the federal structure. The vivid contemporary account by Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, on the other hand, will be especially valuable to the general reader.

THE work by Gleason applies a systematic interpretive framework—namely, analysis of the federal structure—to the study of the contemporary struggle for republic rights in the Soviet Union. He did not pioneer in constitutional interpretation. In addition to the notable commentaries by John N. Hazard and Julian Towster published in the 1940's,<sup>3</sup> the Arnold monograph mentioned above provided a thorough public law interpretation. However, the Gleason book brings our knowledge up to 1989. With the advantage of hindsight, he is more realistic than some earlier scholars concerning the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the federal system: "[T]hrough legerdemain and prevarication, the formal guarantees were ignored in practice or cir-

cumvented by means of artful ideological reinterpretation. In sum, the federal structures were adopted by the center to placate national sentiment, were adapted to contain it, and were designed eventually to destroy it" (p. 5). As Marxist-Leninist imperatives lose force, however, legal interpretations and legal innovations such as the new, restrictive rules on secession become salient—and Gleason's book correspondingly more useful.

His treatment is weaker on the implications of earlier Soviet maneuvers. For example, Gleason's account (p. 54) of the 1940 annexation of Bukovina (which the volume by Swoboda and Nahaylo correctly describes) is inaccurate. Bukovina (not "Bukhovina") was indeed incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, but never into the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Rather, parts of Bessarabia acquired at the same time from Romania were added to the small pre-1940 Moldavian ASSR, which was then (for the most part) removed from the Ukrainian SSR to become the new Moldavian SSR.

Chapters 2–8 of *Soviet Disunion* (written by Swoboda) provide a better summary of Soviet nationality policy prior to Leonid Brezhnev's rule than does Gleason. The treatment would have been improved, however, had Swoboda systematically consulted up-to-date Western monographs on nationality policies under Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev. Moreover, Swoboda's scant nine pages on the significant tsarist background to Soviet nationality policies are inferior to Roman Szporluk's excellent chapter, "The Imperial Legacy," in the Hajda/Beissinger volume.

The main thrust of *Soviet Disunion*, which emerges in the subsequent chapters written by Nahaylo, is a dense chronological account of

nationality developments after the accession of Brezhnev. In addition to Soviet sources, Nahaylo relies on the cogent, detailed analyses by Radio Liberty Research and on a wide range of other Western studies. For the years after 1986, his coverage is virtually week-by-week. To a greater degree than volumes which excel in *analysis* of the nationalities problem, *Soviet Disunion* will remain an indispensable *factual* reference book for Sovietologists for years to come.

*The Hidden Nations* will appeal to a rather different audience.<sup>4</sup> Diuk and Karatnycky, a wife-husband team whose work was sponsored by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in New York, traveled extensively in the Soviet Union during 1989–90. Fluent in Ukrainian and Russian, they encountered nationality concerns at an intimate, human level. This experience gives their book an immediacy that familiarity with up-to-date written materials alone cannot provide. By vividly presenting their observations, the two authors offer a book that may well reach a wider public than the others considered here.

Like other journalistic accounts, *The Hidden Nations* relies on anecdotes. The reader must trust the authors' assurance that these are in some sense "representative" of contemporary Soviet society. Where the authors are thoroughly familiar with the societal context, as in Ukraine, their anecdotal approach generally works well. Occasionally, they are a shade starry-eyed, as in their enthusiasm regarding the prospects (p. 98) for construction of a monument to Taras Shevchenko in Lviv; the authors are apparently

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, John N. Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government*, which has appeared in many editions; and Julian Towster, *Political Power in USSR, 1917–47*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1948.

<sup>4</sup>I read *The Hidden Nations* in page proofs. It will become available in early autumn 1990. No doubt pagination, and possibly some details, will be altered.

unaware of the fact that a monumental statue of the outstanding 19th century Ukrainian poet has graced Kharkiv at least since the 1950's.

In regions (primarily Muslim, as will be noted below) with which the authors' acquaintance is limited, shrewd personal observations tend to take second place to reliance on local oral informants. A pitfall throughout Soviet history even for Pulitzer-prize-winning journalistic accounts, until recently such oral information was distorted by official guidelines imposed on the informants. Now local informants can be drawn from broader spheres, including adamant opponents of the Marxist-Leninist regime. Most, however, find it difficult to set aside Soviet thought patterns, and still harder to overcome areas of ignorance that official disinformation has fostered. Moreover, anyone—like the present reviewer—brought up in a historic American town knows that even in an open society, numerous factors—reflexes of local pride, glib assumptions that natives naturally know better than outsiders, and a tendency to diametrically oppose interpretations previously imposed—combine to undermine the reliability of local informants about areas outside the sphere of their personal observation.

ALL four of the authors of *Soviet Disunion* and *The Hidden Nations* have Ukrainian connections, and hence provide exceptionally strong coverage for the "Second Soviet Republic."<sup>5</sup> At this moment in history, both specialists and non-specialists urgently require such knowledge. Ukrainians, nearly one-fifth of the Soviet population (and therefore

two-fifths of the non-Russians), are intrinsically more important than any likely combination of smaller Soviet nationalities. The present Ukrainian situation is so complex, not to say ambiguous, that authoritative information on it is indispensable for shaping a coherent view of the rapidly evolving Soviet situation as a whole. The coverage by Nahaylo/Swoboda and Diuk/Karatnycky is especially welcome because the Hajda/Beissinger book, although providing numerous analytic insights and very useful statistics on Ukrainian developments, is somewhat fragmented in its coverage of this vital region.<sup>6</sup>

The least satisfying treatment of Ukraine is in Gleason's book, which is weak in its discussion of specific features of earlier "federal" arrangements affecting that republic: for example, the virtually autonomous status (under Moscow) of Ukraine's "councils of the national economy" (*sovnarkhozy*) in the early 1960's and the special role of Ukrainian party provincial committees (*obkomy*) in all-Union party affairs. While correctly emphasizing "national bureaucracies" (that is, the republic apparatuses) as the principal agents in the implementation of the federal principle under Brezhnev, Gleason exaggerates the degree to which such a national bureaucracy emerged in Ukraine and a number of other republics. In fact, a deep cleavage affected the Ukrainian apparatus at least since the mid-1960's. *Apparatchiki* in Dnipropetrovsk and the Donbass, whether Russians or ethnic Ukrainians (as symbolized by V. V. Shcherbyts'kyi) developed intense identification with the central apparatus in Moscow, whereas a large official Ukrainian segment, headed by Ukrainian party First Secretary Petro Shelest until his 1972 ouster, strove to maximize Ukrainian cultural expression. Under these circum-

stances, the notion of a united "national bureaucratic" position in Ukraine comparable, say, to that in Kazakhstan, is far off the mark. Innumerable details adduced by Diuk/Karatnycky and Nahaylo/Swoboda refute Gleason's discovery of a "national climate" permeating the Ukrainian scientific community and other bureaucratic agencies.

On the other hand, Swoboda tends to exaggerate the suppression of the Ukrainian language in official use. Also, the assertion by Diuk/Karatnycky (p. 53) that all Ukrainian graduate students are required to write their Ph.D. dissertations in Russian is dubious. Conceivably this became the norm in recent years when Shcherbyts'kyi was first party secretary in Ukraine. In any case, I read—and reported in print—no fewer than five dissertations on historical subjects written in Ukrainian and accepted by Ukrainian educational institutions during the late 1940's and early 1950's.<sup>7</sup>

The negative impact of the Soviet system on the Ukrainian national spirit is vividly portrayed in the interviews conducted by Diuk and Karatnycky in Kiev and Lviv. "Among Lviv's senior citizens, one is apt to encounter sad eyes, uncertainty, and nervousness—all telltale signs that *glasnost*' has a long way to go before it removes the fears built by the experiences of decades of terror and repression" (p. 90). As late as autumn 1989, such old fears were reinforced by forcible disruption of mass protest meetings. Yet

<sup>6</sup>The excellent chapter in Hajda/Beissinger by Roman Solchanyk (an expert from Radio Liberty Research) is handicapped by his requirement to cover (in 30 pages) Belorussia and Moldavia as well as Ukraine. Bohdan Bociurkiw, another Ukrainian expert, succinctly clarifies the major topic of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in his chapter on religion, but could not, of course, treat most Ukrainian issues.

<sup>7</sup>If my 1979 oral informant was accurate, dissertations could be presented in Georgian even in the Tbilisi Higher Party School.

<sup>5</sup>This expression comes from Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War Two*, New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1964.



the young continue to protest, and (in Western Ukraine) old and young together attend Ukrainian Catholic services. In a way, the countryside is worse off, for no regime change is likely to restore its role as the reservoir of Ukrainian traditions and self-reliance, since nearly all males, especially the young, have left. " 'We've gotten used to the way things are,' says Maria a sixty-year-old retired collective farmer, 'What could I possibly do with the land on my own without the men. Things might get worse if we were left each to fend for ourselves' " (p. 82).

The issue of uneven development of national consciousness in different regions of Ukraine—which is larger than France—persists. Perhaps because of his narrow focus on overtly national concerns, Nahaylo ignores the crucial issue of the 1989 coal-miner strikes in the Donbass, which recurred in 1990. Diuk and Karatnycky repeatedly but confusedly note the events: on p. 17, militant strike committees are set up in Ukraine and in Kazakhstan (a minor strike locale); on p. 45, the July 1989 strikes in the principal centers, the Kuznets Basin and Vorkuta, are mentioned without reference to the Donbass strikes that quickly followed. On p. 87, the authors imply, on the contrary, that the discontents of the Donbass miners "spilled over" from the concerns of other Ukrainians, whereas abundant evidence indicates that the entire coal-miner movement, starting in Russian Siberia (Kuzbass), was an extraordinarily unified labor protest, determined (as the authors admit) to exclude "politicians," including those from the Popular Movement for Restructuring in Ukraine (*Rukh*).

Quite possibly Diuk and Karatnycky are correct in remarking (p. 95) that "Now more and more miners from the Donbass, Ukrainians and Russians alike, are warming to

the idea of an economically sovereign Ukraine." The startling July 16, 1990, action of the new Ukrainian parliament in adopting, almost unanimously, a sweeping declaration of sovereignty, may reflect such support. It is also possible, however, that the parliament's principal motivation was Boris Yel'tsin's dynamic appeals, as president of the Russian republic, for broader powers for all constituent republics of the USSR. And, it is worth noting that the Kiev parliament did stop short of calling for secession from the Union.

Ultimately, both *Soviet Disunion* and *The Hidden Nations* reach remarkably similar conclusions about the strength of the Ukrainian national movement. On p. 331, Nahaylo writes that "*Rukh's* mission was complicated, though, by the fact that Ukrainian feeling remained very strong in Western Ukraine and much weaker in the more Russified southern and eastern parts of the republic." Diuk and Karatnycky more precisely refer to the "bed-rock" strength of the national movement among Eastern Rite Catholics in Western Ukraine and argue that the movement is gaining strength among the Orthodox Ukrainians of central Ukraine, including Kiev. However, "in the regions farther to the east, support for outright Ukrainian independence is still weak. Many Russians live there and most Ukrainians are Russian speakers who have lost their links to their Ukrainian roots" (p. 96). Hence, *Rukh* recognizes that demands for self-determination must be incorporated into a framework that "makes economic sense for Russified Ukrainian miners and steel-workers, whose main concerns are their paycheck, the availability of consumer goods, and food" (p. 97).

IN contrast to some earlier works that assumed Russian nationalism

had been replaced by Marxism-Leninism or Soviet patriotism, all three books (as well as the Hajda/Beis-singer volume) examine Russian nationalism in depth. The authors draw on recent monographic literature on Russian movements, notably the books by John Dunlop.<sup>8</sup> Nahaylo/Swoboda provide a brief but trenchant passage (pp. 171–72) on the emergence of extreme Russian nationalism during the early Brezhnev period. In *The Hidden Nations*, discussion of *Pamyat'* (The Memory Society) and its staunch critic, the Ukrainian writer and editor of *Ogonek* Vitaliy Korotich, is especially penetrating. An excellent analysis of the style and substance of *Pamyat'* spokesmen, especially their bitter anti-Semitism, is presented. Apart from the Russian liberal opponents of *Pamyat'*, there are other brands of Russian and Pan-Slavic nationalism, such as the "union of eastern Slavs," that endorse more positive aims (although these aims are also objectionable to many). But one is compelled to agree with Nahaylo's conclusion that, on the whole, irrational thinking is more marked among Russian political actors than among most other national spokesmen, notably *Rukh* leaders.

On the other hand, the authors of *The Hidden Nations*, in an unfortunate historical excursus (p. 183), exaggerate the peculiarities in the earlier development of Russian nationalism. To be sure, Russian tradition does not include a strong democratic orientation—but this is true of many nations in East-Central Europe and the present USSR. Indeed, East-Central Europeans trans-

<sup>8</sup>See, e.g., John B. Dunlop's *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1983; *The New Russian Nationalism*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 1985; as well as his periodic articles in *Radio Liberty Report on the USSR* (Munich).

mitted to Russia a gentry's contempt for urban minorities and bourgeois pursuits that continues to brake economic development to this day. Nor is the determined drive for "ingathering" other Slavs and Orthodox Christians altogether peculiar to the Russians. At some stage of their histories, all major nations, most notably Poles, Castilians, English, and northern French, legitimized comparable expansion by appeals to divine missions. But the existence of such historical analogies in no way justifies Russian chauvinistic behavior today.

There are some indications, such as protests by Russians against calling up reservists to suppress the 1989 ethnic strife in Azerbaijan—which, curiously, none of our authors mentions—that Russians are beginning to perceive as excessive the costs of imperial domination. With all due reservations, it appears reasonable to hope that the Russian nation may become a thoroughly acceptable partner in European confederal relations.

Each of these books provides excellent discussions of the Baltic nations, whose initiatives during the past three years have done so much to force the Soviet regime to face up to the problem of real equality among nations. One result of these overt actions is that information has become highly accessible. Nahaylo's week-to-week coverage of this material is just what is needed to provide a sense of the evolution of the Baltic peoples' position, including evidence of overwhelming solidarity among members of each Baltic nation. Romuald Misiunas succinctly analyzes this evidence in his chapter in the Hajda/Beissinger book. Generally, treatment of anti-Semitism and other problems confronting Soviet Jews is adequate, and Tatars are covered fairly well. In all four books, though, lesser Soviet nationalities

are barely mentioned, and even Moldavians and Belorussians receive abbreviated attention.

COVERAGE of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia in these books is most problematic. For the Transcaucasus, Ronald Suny's expert discussion in the Hajda/Beissinger volume stands out. However, his treatment is too brief to examine fully the tangled background of this area, which includes intricate Muslim-Christian and intra-Christian relations. Unfortunately, neither *The Hidden Nations* nor *Soviet Disunion* appears to have drawn on Suny's book-length treatments, except for that on Georgia.<sup>9</sup> Neither do they cite very recent publications by other Western experts on the Transcaucasus: Audrey Altstadt, Tamara Dragadze, and Tadeusz Swietochowski.

Diuk and Karatnycky falter less by omission than by imprudent acceptance of local Transcaucasian interpretations. In accepting the position that mass demonstrations on the border of the Nakichevan ASSR (part of the Azerbaijan SSR) with Iran expressed a wish for reunion with fellow Azeris in northeastern Iran, the authors ignore the interpretations by some specialists that the real pressure was to claim the fertile land withdrawn from cultivation by the authorities to constitute the very deep Soviet border zone. Either or both interpretations may be valid—but it is incumbent on observers to seek out the range of plausible explanations.

More generally, the authors are prone to accept self-serving statements, like the local argument that

provocation by KGB or other regime supporters instigated the bloody strife between Azerbaijanis and Armenians. Some members of the elite of both nations no doubt foresaw the danger of giving Moscow a pretext for armed intervention. But the record hardly sustains the notion of high-level Azerbaijani-Armenian harmony; statements by Geydar Aliyev, not long ago the leading party figure in Azerbaijan, condemned Soviet intervention but demonstrated little concern for the fate of the large Armenian minority.<sup>10</sup>

Over-reliance on local sources is still more serious for Central Asia, second only to Russia and Ukraine in significance for the Soviet Union's future.<sup>11</sup> Relative to the Baltic and even the Transcaucasus region, information on Central Asia is hard to obtain. Diuk and Karatnycky barely mention Kirgizia and Turkmenistan, which they apparently did not visit. However, familiarity with Western sources would have gone a long way to clear up historical misconceptions clouding their interpretation. The discussion of the "process of Uzbek nation-building" (pp. 156–64) tends toward preconceived Soviet or Western conceptualizations instead of placing the subject in the framework of Central Asian history. The authors recognized a life-style cleavage between Uzbeks and Tajiks, but their implication that the separation ran along urban-rural lines is far from precise. Until the 13th century, Tajiks (Persian speakers) constituted the basic *sedentary* population (peasant as well as city-dweller) of the oases. Later, most Tajiks in what is now contemporary Uzbekistan (in con-

<sup>9</sup>For example, Ronald G. Suny, *Armenia in the Twentieth Century*, Chico, CA, Scholars Press, 1983, and *The Baku Commune 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1972. For Georgia, see Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation*, Bloomington IN, Indiana University Press, 1988.

<sup>10</sup>*The New York Times*, Jan. 26, 1990.

<sup>11</sup>Unfortunately, Martha Brill Olcott's very brief chapter on the region in Hajda-Beissinger, though expert on the Kazakhs, does not provide a complete overview comparable to Suny's on the Transcaucasus.

trast to the Tajiks in Tajikistan itself), assimilated to the Uzbeks linguistically but not in life-style. Until the 1920's, within a common Sunni Muslim framework there was no clear concept of national distinction. At that point, the Bolshevik regime set up separate republics delineated by minor linguistic distinctions to fragment a heightening Islamic Turkestan identity.

Similarly, the assumption in *The Hidden Nations* about an "atomized peasantry of Uzbeks and Kazakhs" (p. 32), as contrasted to more cohesive Slavic peasantries, is dubious. Such major authorities as Alexandre Benningson and Hélène Carrère d'Encausse have suggested that Sufi networks in Central Asia have paralleled the admittedly strong "murid" underground in the North Caucasus. If this is true, Central Asian peasants—persistently dominant demographically—and surviving nomads may be more firmly structured than European contingents of the declining Soviet peasantry. Additional evidence points to Central Asian peasants' maintenance of a coherent, relatively uniform life-style derived from Islamic customs.

A third explanatory problem is related directly to very recent disorders in Central Asia. One line of interpretation considers the major cause to be "social immiseration" (to use the term adopted by Diuk and Karatnycky on p. 216), which produces resentment by local groups against the perceived advantages enjoyed by minorities. Thus Uzbek assaults on Turkic Meskhetians are explained as resentment against these newcomers' advantages in obtaining scarce housing. Soviet publications, however, present a different picture: on the whole, they treat the outburst as the result of prolonged incitation and plotting, and even claim that the assaults followed an explicit refusal by

Meskhetians to join a pan-Islamic front to "get rid of the Russians."<sup>12</sup> Neither *The Hidden Nations* nor *Soviet Disunion* mentions this striking assertion, nor do the two books suggest a somewhat parallel interpretation for the riots in the new town of Novyy Uzen' at about the same time. There Soviet dispatches did emphasize preferential economic treatment of outsiders, but also noted that violence escalated between native Kazakhs and the large "Caucasian" minority, numbering 20,000 out of 56,000 inhabitants.<sup>13</sup> Inasmuch as the 1970 census (the latest available detailed information) indicated that the large Gur'yev province, in which Novyy Uzen' is located, had only 6,000 Caucasian inhabitants altogether, it is evident that a sudden "invasion" by ethnic aliens was a major factor in those riots. It is possible that the non-Muslim Armenian contingent, of indeterminate size, was the main target of Muslim resentment. Without additional quantitative data, it is impossible to choose between the two explanations. Again, though, a presentation of alternative interpretations would be very valuable, for the true extent of Muslim-Turkic solidarity against non-Muslims is a fundamental consideration for all projections about the future of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.

TAKEN together, the three books reviewed plus the Hajda/Beissinger volume provide abundant material for an observer seeking to draw tentative conclusions about the direction of national interaction in the USSR. Except for some portions of the Hajda/Beissinger book, though, the reader must make a consider-

able effort to assimilate and assess masses of data not fully analyzed. Considering that all four books endeavor to cover a very complicated on-going process, their accomplishment is laudable. Precisely because national evolution is still in midstream, however, it is necessary to stress gaps and weaknesses, so that these books may become starting points for more definitive assessments when—regardless of the outcome of the national upsurge—a period of relative stabilization occurs.

Deficiencies are more notable in treatments of Central Asia than of more accessible European regions, which are also more familiar to Western observers. Many criteria for further investigation apply, however, to both Europe and Asia. More extensive resort to analytic concepts, even if a holistic theory of national interaction continues to elude social scientists, should provide initial hypotheses to help researchers consider all relevant interpretations and avoid missing crucial bits of evidence. A thorough utilization of existing monographic literature, even if it relates to chronologically remote periods, would also deepen awareness of potentially crucial factors.

Neither of these indirect approaches is, of course, a substitute for directly confronting the mass of new information, including that provided by increasingly available on-the-spot informants. Still, immersion in theoretical and background studies should refine appraisals of such local information. In addition, observers of the Soviet nationalities scene should constantly keep in mind that erosion of the "monolithic" Soviet ideology has not eliminated all sources of bias, most notably those resulting from the subconscious effects of ingrained Soviet thought patterns and from newly awakened national self-assertion.

<sup>12</sup>Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), June 21, 1989, abstracted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), July 19, 1989, pp. 22–23.

<sup>13</sup>Compare *Soviet Disunion*, p. 324, and *Izvestiya* (Moscow), June 20, 1989.



# Poland: Phase Two and Beyond

Christine M. Sadowski

PAUL G. LEWIS. *Political Authority and Party Secretaries in Poland, 1975–1986*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.

WERNER G. HAHN. *Democracy in a Communist Party: Poland's Experience Since 1980*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1987.

ANDRZEJ SWIDLICKI. *Political Trials in Poland, 1981–1986*. London, Croom Helm, 1988.

SHORTLY after the declaration of martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981, Lech Wałęsa said that the suppression of his union was only "phase two" of Solidarity's existence (phase one comprising the period from its emergence in Au-

*Christine M. Sadowski is currently Contract Chair of the Intensive Seminars on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the School of Area Studies at the US Department of State's Foreign Service Institute (Rosslyn, VA). She also works as a private consultant to agencies of the US Government on processes of democratization in developing countries.*

JANE CAVE, Ed. *On Trial in Gdansk: A Transcript of the Proceedings Against Adam Michnik, Bogdan Lis, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk*. Washington, DC, The Poland Watch Center, 1986.

J. L. BLACK and J. W. STRONG, Eds. *Sisyphus and Poland: Reflections on Martial Law*. Winnipeg, Canada, Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1986.

gust 1980 until the suspension of its activities in December 1981). Implicit in Wałęsa's statement was the vision that Solidarity would again emerge sometime in the future as a significant, viable, and legitimate political actor in Poland. Wałęsa himself did not pretend to know how or when this phase three would come about or what it would look like when it arrived. Nevertheless, his comment was prophetic, and Poland has, in fact, entered phase three.

The books under review focus largely on phase two,<sup>1</sup> and they show that in many respects this phase was unique to Poland. It was a period during which established political and military actors and entrenched members of the security apparatus, using old methods, attempted to reassert their control and reverse the massive process of

change that had taken hold of an entire nation. But unlike in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and thereafter, this reassertion of control took place without the direct intervention of Soviet or other Warsaw Pact troops. The process in Poland began under the watchful eye of Leonid Brezhnev and continued through the short and never fully established tenures of Yuriy Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, yielding eventually to phase three under Mikhail Gorbachev.

In Poland, this period was one of heightened conflict that, to be sure, was never fully resolved. In light of the tumultuous and very sudden changes that swept Eastern Europe in late 1989, a number of conflicts in Poland in the 1980's seem to have been played out in slow motion: the internal struggles within a party grasping for opportunities to reestablish its control and baffled by its disgraced public image; the standoff between the communist party and society; and the polarization between the security apparatus and those individuals and groups in society (who in fact constituted a substantial share of the population)

<sup>1</sup>Paul Lewis's *Political Authority and Party Secretaries in Poland*, however, begins in 1975 and ends in 1986. Werner Hahn's *Democracy in a Communist Party* begins in phase one and ends in 1986, midway through phase two.