

# Foreign Reports

## Generals of the New Army

"The solution in Vietnam is more bombs, more shells, more napalm . . . till the other side cracks and gives up."



Lt. General William DePuy

WHILE THE USUAL NOISES are being made about the "new" army that is to emerge as a result of the lessons learned from our "mistakes" in Vietnam, the "new" generals have a discouragingly familiar look about them. Lt. General William DePuy, the man most often mentioned as a possible successor to Westmoreland, is a case in point. A World War II troop commander, DePuy was sent to Vietnam in 1964 as a colonel to be Westmoreland's Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. From there he rose to Major General in command of the 1st Infantry Division, then returned to Washington as special assistant for counter-insurgency and special activities with the Joint Chiefs. Now he is Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army.

From the beginning, DePuy pushed for greater American participation in the ground fighting, and reportedly played a major role in Westmoreland's request for more ground troops in 1965. Apparently DePuy suffered from a common assumption, that U.S. troops could come in and clean up the Communist guerrillas in a short time, thereby actually cutting U.S. casualties over the long haul. As Westmoreland's J3 officer (operations), DePuy was the major architect for search and

destroy. DePuy badly wanted a combat command position, and in March 1966 was rewarded with command of the 1st Infantry, the Big Red One.

In the 1st Division, DePuy was known for his toughness. In one AP dispatch Peter Arnett described him as using a "mixture of ruthlessness, talent and exact leadership." DePuy insisted that his battalion commanders "perform" and, to impress this upon them, he kept a chart in the divisional tactical operations center which rated each battalion according to DePuy's favorite index—body count. During the early weeks of his command, DePuy relieved five battalion commanders for failing to get a high enough body count. Four or five other commanders were sacked for artillery errors.

DePuy was a great believer in the use and over-use of artillery and air-support, both of which, of course, were principal sources of civilian war casualties. He is quoted in a memorandum of conversation with Daniel Ellsberg in January 1967 as saying, "even against a squad of snipers I'd use an air strike. . . ." Grey Hayward, his former aide, recalls that DePuy was particularly impressed by the actual number of artillery rounds his



division shot off on a single day. A favorite goal was to expend 10,000 rounds in a 24-hour period, a quantity that was unprecedented for an American division. DePuy's approach to war was summed up in comments to Ellsberg at his headquarters in Lai Khe, "The solution in Vietnam is more bombs, more shells, more napalm . . . till the other side cracks and gives up.

"We're winning the war. We're killing VC, guerrillas, Main Forces, destroying their bases, destroying caches of food and weapons, we're getting more Chieu Hoi. If people in Washington want to win fast—if they're in a hurry, because of elections or something—they could move five more divisions over here and get the job done faster. But if they're not in such a hurry, we can do the job with what we've got. . . ." He continued, "Pacification hasn't worked anywhere. But the 1st Division is doing one thing: killing guerrillas."

Terrorism through firepower is the cornerstone of his concept. DePuy told Ellsberg, "I don't have much

faith in our brainpower, only in our firepower." In his memo, Ellsberg recounts a high U.S. official's amazement at DePuy in action, riding around in his chopper spraying clumps of trees with machinegun fire for two hours in an elusive hunt for a couple of Vietcong. All during the time, DePuy never called in ground troops, although a platoon from his own division was never more than a few hundred feet distant.

DePuy's reluctance to use ground troops against the Vietcong was hardly an outgrowth of his concern for the safety of his men. In fact, he was one of the first U.S. commanders to use his own men as bait. He did this in the Minh Thanh Road ambush—a firefight that took place about a month before Operation Attleboro in early 1966. Knowing that his Vietnamese counterparts were plagued by security leaks, DePuy let it be known that he was planning to send an engineer battalion down a road in his tactical area of operations that ran from Tay Ninh city to the Minh Thanh rubber planta-

tion. DePuy sent the 1st battalion of the 4th cavalry down the road, then positioned two artillery battallions as well as three infantry battallions in a cordon around the place where he expected an ambush. Sure enough, the Vietcong struck and were plastered by the waiting artillery and air strikes; but the unit used as bait sustained 40 percent casualties. Having gained a huge body count at Minh Thanh Road DePuy pretty much won his reputation as *the* ground commander in Vietnam.

DePuy created his "club" of disciples in Vietnam, and it's interesting to see where these men have gone. General Haig, DePuy's intelligence officer, is now Henry Kissinger's military advisor. General Zais, DePuy's assistant division commander, went on to command the 101st Airborne, then the 24th Corps in the northern part of South Vietnam. Another aide, General Hollingsworth, was put in charge of Aberdeen Proving Ground, then took command of basic training at Fort Jackson.

## Pakistan

**F**EARFUL LEST CHINA'S support of West Pakistan lead to an even greater Chinese influence in that part of the Asian subcontinent, the United States has lavished the West Pakistan government with arms since the start of its war against East Pakistan (Bangla Desh). At first the State Department, protesting U.S. neutrality, said it had been informed that "no military items have been provided to the government of Pakistan or its agents since the outbreak of fighting in East Pakistan March 25, and nothing is now scheduled for such delivery." Subsequently, at least two Pakistani freighters were reported to have carried large shipments of military goods supplied by the U.S. Air Force from New York to Karachi. The military items include eight aircraft, parachutes, and hundreds of thousands of spare parts and accessories for planes and military vehicles. Denying the existence of this traffic, the director of



*General Yahya Khan*

the Office of Munitions Control recently claimed that, if there were rifles aboard, "they're sporting type . . . for use in safaris." However, the State Department later acknowledged the continued shipment of U.S. weapons to Pakistan.

Joseph Sisco, the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, is particularly concerned that the United States

maintain friendly relations with Pakistan. Though some of his assistants are reportedly distressed at his choice of strategy, Sisco largely determines U.S. policy toward that country. Before U.S. shipment of weapons to Pakistan was exposed, a State Department letter to Senator Fulbright confirmed that, "the continuing military supply program . . . has been and continues to be an important element in our overall bilateral relationship with Pakistan. All past experience suggests that the suspension of U.S. military sales will not shut off a flow of supplies from other sources. Thus, an absolute suspension regardless of developing circumstances would not significantly affect the military situation in East Pakistan and could have a strongly adverse political impact on our relations with Pakistan. . . . It would therefore appear desirable for the U.S. to be able to continue to supply limited quantities of military items to Pakistan to enable us both to maintain a constructive bilateral political dialogue and to help ensure that Pakistan is not compelled to rely on other sources of supply."

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It is likely that U.S. military assistance to the Pakistan government is far more extensive than is known since, with few exceptions, the types and amounts of military aid to Pakistan are classified. Senator Fulbright requested a full account of U.S. military involvement there from the State Department and was told "the Department is unable to accede to your request without departing from the established procedure." Although American officials in Dacca have continued to send the State Department factual information concerning the situation in East Pakistan, this material has not been made available to members of Congress.

**S**INCE 1954, THE UNITED STATES has supplied Pakistan with weaponry on a fairly massive scale. Between 1954 and 1965 military aid is estimated at \$1.5 to \$2 billion. This aid included F-104 starfighters, Patton tanks, armored personnel carriers, and automatic and recoilless infantry weapons. During Pakistan's brief border war with India in 1965, the U.S. allegedly interrupted shipment of all military goods to Pakistan, but resumed export of "nonlethal" military supplies in 1966. Since 1967, sales of nonlethal goods have been running just under \$10 million annually; 25 percent of these sales—\$2.5 million worth—have consisted of ammunition. According to the State Department, this supply of ammunition is needed "to keep previously supplied U.S. equipment operational, in the belief that to allow this equipment to become inoperative would compel Pakistan to purchase more expensive and modern replacements, possibly causing diversion of resources from economic development to defense and fueling an arms race in the subcontinent."

In 1970, the United States announced a "one-time" exception to its military supply policy and offered to sell Pakistan 300 armored personnel carriers, several F-104 jet fighters, B-57 bombers, and maritime reconnaissance aircraft; these sales are not yet complete. Except for the 1965 India-Pakistan War, the only use Pakistan has made of its imported weaponry has been against the civilian population of East Pakistan.

Over the last 20 years, the United States has given Pakistan more than \$4.5 billion in aid. The U.S. has led an eleven-nation aid-to-Pakistan consortium with an annual gift of \$200 million, which has enabled West Pakistan to buy \$100 million worth of military equipment from other countries over recent years. Even if the U.S. suspended military support, continued economic assistance would amount to subsidization of the war against East Pakistan. Robert Dorfman, an economist at Harvard, testified before the subcommittee on Asian-Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that "to subjugate the rest of the countryside [in East Pakistan] where most of the people live . . . is more of a task than Pakistan can afford to carry out. It requires force of upwards of 50,000 troops at the end of a supply line 3000 miles long, and they are already a poor country in deep financial difficulties. In the past year, their foreign exchange reserves have been drawn down from over \$300 million to less than \$170 million. . . . Their annual foreign expenses and disruptions of warfare, is over \$500 million. . . . In fact, at the moment it appears that Pakistan is desperately seeking a moratorium on its debt installments that fall due this month. This means that if the war is to go on for more than a few months and essential imports are to be procured, outsiders are going to have to provide the resources, and the United States is the principal traditional source of external funds for Pakistan. By and large, American grants and loans have amounted to about \$250 million a year. . . . This covers about half of Pakistan's adverse balance of trade. Therefore, the continued flow of American grants and loans is the most important immediate objective in West Pakistan's strategy, more important by far than any military operation."

The State Department claims that Pakistan has received no U.S. economic loans since March 27 besides those earmarked for specific projects. This is probably false, but some factions within the government apparently do wish to cut off economic aid. Recently, the eleven-nation aid-to-Pakistan consortium agreed to post-

pone any further economic assistance after a mission from the World Bank reported that the country was a shambles. (Pakistan has been the world's second largest recipient of World Bank loans over recent years, led only by India.) The United States went along with the decision, although some U.S. officials objected strenuously; a State Department spokesman subsequently denied that any such agreement had been reached.

**W**ITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS, Congressional response to the war reflects the State Department's reluctance to let Pakistan slip away. Senators Case and Mondale have introduced a resolution calling for the suspension of U.S. military assistance until the war is over. Senators Church and Saxbe have introduced an amendment to the Foreign Assistance bill which suspends both military and economic aid to Pakistan until food and medical relief, supervised by an international agency, is instituted on a regular basis throughout East Pakistan, and the majority of Pakistani refugees are repatriated. Representative Gallagher has introduced in the House a similar amendment, which requires that no military equipment provided by the U.S. to any other country should be transferred to the government of Pakistan. (When the U.S. cut off aid during the India-Pakistan war of 1965, Iran and Afghanistan pledged their support to the Pakistan government, and Iran shipped it some spare parts.) However, several moderates in Congress argue that cutting off aid would aggravate the wretched situation of the Pakistanis; for that reason Senator Kennedy refused to sponsor the Saxbe-Church amendment. Of course, this is simply a more humanitarian way of stating the State Department's basic position, i.e., that the U.S. dare not jeopardize its position on the subcontinent by letting go of General Yahya.

Continued aid would have to be administered by the military government of West Pakistan, which has refused to permit aid distribution by foreigners. To determine how relief distribution would be managed, it is instructive to examine how such efforts were conducted last November in East



Pakistan following the cyclone. The central government never allowed the majority of funds given for cyclone relief even to reach the eastern provisional government, much less make its way to the survivors. Fifty boats supplied by the U.S. for use in relief efforts were reportedly taken over by the army and are now being used in military operations *against* East Pakistan. According to a physician who took part in the relief effort, "the cyclone provided up to \$50 million in much-needed hard currency to the military government of Pakistan. Relief monies was one of the largest earners of foreign exchange in 1970."

Currently, with East Pakistan close to famine, army control over relief food supplies will convert them into further measures of coercion. Only areas over which the army has full control will receive food. Oxfam, the British relief agency, says "It is manifest that the army will have to use hunger as a deliberate weapon against the bulk of the people of East Pakistan. Any aid, therefore, which enters that country under the terms of the army government will be used to support that policy in East Pakistan or will be used, as much of the aid already given to East and West Pakistan already has been used, to support the

army operations in East Pakistan." The U.S. has given \$17.5 million in relief funds for East Pakistani refugees in India. This amount will help care for the refugees in that country for three days at most.

China has openly supported the West Pakistan government. It pledged Pakistan \$200 million credit last Fall and recently promised to give a \$70 million loan against that amount. China's position may simply reflect traditional Chinese antipathy toward India, which has expressed support of East Pakistan; it might also involve a subtle attempt to aggravate the tense situation existing between India and Pakistan. With over six million refugees in India, the danger of war between the two countries is acute. But China has other reasons for interest in the West Pakistan government—it recently completed a road through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean.

Despite the tentative decision to cut some of its economic assistance to West Pakistan, and its expressions of concern for the East Pakistani refugees in India, the U.S. continues to support Yahya Kahn, thus propping up a military dictatorship which is vainly striving to contain a movement of national liberation.

—FRANCES LANG

## Detroit's Asia Strategy

**T**HE THREE MAJOR U.S. auto-makers are in a feverish race to get a grip on the Japanese auto industry and capture control of the mass markets in Asia. Generally they pursue a common strategy which runs as follows: Manufacturing operations are based in South Africa and Australia, two white-controlled old bastions of the British Empire which now act as springboards for the jump into Asia. These base plants are supplemented by parts-and-assembly operations in other Asian countries where wages are particularly low. Recently U.S. companies bought into Japanese auto-makers with an eye to capturing part of the Japanese luxury car market and cashing in on Japanese car export sales, most of

them in the U.S. At a later date these investments may piggy-back Detroit into China. Finally, the plan is for the big three auto-makers to begin mass production of inexpensive automobiles and trucks in the poor countries of Asia in order to develop and capture this market of over one billion people.

If successful, the overall result of the strategy will be to forestall independent auto development in Asia, meet the Japanese on equal footing, and keep control of the world auto industry in Detroit.

So far the U.S. companies are meeting with considerable success. Ford's subsidiary, Ford Asia Pacific & South Africa, with headquarters at Melbourne, is in charge of coordinating

activities of the basic Ford plants in Australia and South Africa with assembly operations in the Philippines, Singapore, New Zealand and Thailand. Ford is negotiating to purchase a 20 percent initial interest in Toyo Kogyo Company, the Japanese auto-maker which sells Mazda cars and trucks. In resisting this investment, the company president warned that holdings of more than 25 percent "would be tantamount to being taken over by the U.S. company." But Henry Ford insists he doesn't want to take over Toyo. In March when he was in Japan, he declared, "We would have representation on the board of directors and initially one or two residents in Hiroshima. We would expect to participate in major operating and policy decisions, but we would not have any positive authority—that would continue to reside with Mr. Matsuda and the Japanese management." The deal eventually may bring Ford together with Toyota, Japan's leading auto manufacturer because, in an effort to stave off a Ford takeover, Japanese interests (including the Toyota group) are considering a major capital investment in Toyo.

Ford also wants to build cars on its own for the Asian mass markets. Henry Ford said recently, "In South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia we see promising markets and an attractive supply of cheap labor." Tentative plans call for developing a car which could be sold for as little as \$800, built from local materials by Asian workers. Eventually such a vehicle could be assembled in such places as Cambodia, Laos or Papua-New Guinea. One idea is to make a plywood body with a rugged frame and a two-cylinder engine.

G.M. operations, also based in Melbourne under General Motors Holden's Pty. Ltd., is in charge of activities throughout the Asia, Pacific and South African theaters. G.M. maintains assembly plants in Malaysia, the Philippines and New Zealand. New assembly plants are scheduled for opening in Indonesia and Taiwan. G.M. was prepared to settle for a 20 percent investment in a Japanese auto-maker, but the Sato government, apparently fearful of offending the company, announced G.M. was expected to demand a 35 percent investment in Isuzu Motors Ltd., a big truck-maker. On

learning this G.M. immediately pressed for and apparently will receive a 35 percent interest.

A Chrysler subsidiary in Australia coordinates activities in Asia, but is under control of Chrysler International in Geneva. Chrysler assembles cars and trucks in the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. Chrysler bought an initial 15 percent interest in Mitsubishi Motors. The amount is less than the G.M. and Ford investments, but that may reflect Chrysler's own sliding fortunes in the U.S. At any rate, the investment is scheduled to increase to 35 percent by 1973. Under the terms of the deal, Chrysler is marketing Mitsubishi's small passenger car, the Dodge Colt, in the U.S. It is also making Mitsubishi autos in South Africa and Australian plants, and Mitsubishi hopes Chrysler will make available facilities in France and Britain also. Next Fall, Mitsubishi will begin importing Valiants into Japan from Chrysler plants in Australia.

These take-over maneuverings are long-term arrangements. For the time being Japanese auto-makers are in a bad slump. Overcapacity is such that the Japanese industry could produce at least one million more vehicles than it now does with existing plants. Domestic markets are thoroughly saturated and likely to stay that way. The solution is foreign expansion: in 1967, 12 percent of production was exported; last year nearly one quarter of all autos produced were exported, most to the U.S.

**T**HE JAPANESE ARE ANXIOUS to sell more vehicles to China, which last year announced its intention to purchase "several tens of thousands" of trucks and buses from Japan. This wouldn't amount to much when set against the 400,000 units exported each year to the U.S. However, the China market is likely to increase, and it is one way out of the Japanese auto glut. To do business with China, the Japanese firms must adhere to the Four Principles laid down by Chou En-lai last spring during Sino-Japanese trade talks. China will not do business with any Japanese firms that (1) played even a small role in assisting the aggressive regimes on Taiwan and in South Korea; (2) made capital invest-

ments in either Taiwan or South Korea; (3) supplied munitions to the U.S. for use in its Indochina war; or (4) had joint business ventures with U.S. firms. In addition there was the general principle that "politics and economics are inseparable."


Toyota, the number-one Japanese auto-maker, wants to do business in China. To meet the terms of the Four Principles, the company renounced plans for an engine plant in South Korea, but said it would continue to trade with both South Korea and Taiwan. At the same time, Toyota announced plans to assemble autos in Taiwan under a license arrangement with Lio-Ho Automobile Industrial Corporation, but claimed that the arrangement did not violate the Four Principles because it was not a capital investment. (The autos are assembled in the northern part of Taiwan where wages are considered low even for Taiwan. Average wage for a worker is \$28.30 a month.) Two weeks after the arrangements with Lio-Ho Automobile were confirmed, the Chinese table tennis team visited Toyota's Japanese plant, and placed a

sample order for a truck, a bus and a passenger car. Toyota's group already has benefitted from trade with China through associated companies, Hino Motors and Suzuki Motor Company.

Nissan Motor Company, the number-two Japanese auto-maker, sold 400 trucks to China. Nissan hopes for more business from China now that Isuzu Motors is barred from China trade because of its pending tie-up with G.M. As in the case of Toyota, Nissan Motors also has a tie-up with a company on Taiwan which assembles about 10,000 passenger cars a year. Nissan claims that this is a technical aid agreement which does not violate the Four Principles.

Meanwhile, the U.S. auto-makers are anxious to get into China. The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, created by the former head of G.M., took the lead in financing activities of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, the leading China trade lobby in the U.S. The Ford Foundation is also a large financial supporter of the committee as is the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

—JAMES RIDGEWAY





# Latin America: The Left on the Move

**I**N OCTOBER 1967, WASHINGTON counter-insurgency experts were understandably jubilant. With the death of Che Guevara and the failure of the Bolivian revolutionary *foco*, they thought serious left-wing agitation in Latin America would end—at least for the foreseeable future. In fact it did the very opposite. In Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Peru, while Che's death did indeed lead to the abandonment of his continental theory of revolution, it also stimulated new revolutionary thought and groups, and brought the struggle in less than four years to dramatic and unexpected results. In all five of these countries today, the left is either on the road to power or in the process of consolidating actual victories. It is no longer trying self-consciously to mimic the Cuban experience, no longer courageously (but inopportunistically) launching rural guerrilla adventures, no longer volunteristically declaiming that the objective conditions for revolution need only the development of subjective leadership. Rather the left is now soundly grounding its strategy and tactics in local reality; and that reality, although it varies in all five countries, seems to exclude precisely the Che (Regis Debray) model of guerrilla *foco*.

**B**ECAUSE OF THE TUPAMAROS' spectacular exploits, it is Uruguay which has received most publicity. Indeed the *Tupas* have repeatedly robbed supposedly impregnable banks and gambling casinos, assaulted police headquarters, kidnapped high government officials, captured official radio stations long enough to broadcast 12-minute manifestoes, and, in general, convinced the country's 2.9 million people that they are invincible—despite massive US counter-insurgency aid to the government. But most importantly, the *Tupas* have helped radicalize that population, so much so that today all liberal and left-wing forces are united in one formidable front and that has been *Tupamaros'* strategy from the beginning.

Organized by socialist party cadremen as early as 1961, the *Tupamaros*, which are armed forces of the clandestine Movement of National Liberation (MLN), never intended to seize power simply through violence. Their goal was, and is, to help build a mass political consciousness. Until 1963 their activity was limited to helping the non-unionized and exploited sugar workers of interior Uruguay to win bread-and-butter demands. Only when the government veered sharply to the right, broke relations with Cuba, installed press censorship and launched widespread repression did the *Tupas* begin their "retaliation." Although some of the money they stole went to help finance their own activities, much was distributed to the needy.

By making public the official documents they seized in banks or ministries, the *Tupas* exposed government corruption and showed up the collusion existing between the rich, the USAID programs, and the elected officials. In exchange for the release of kidnapped officials, the *Tupas* forced the government to distribute food to the needy and, in one dramatic case, to build a free workers clinic, winning the population's admiration and a great deal of co-operation as well.

"From 1967 on," one *Tupa* told me in Montevideo last June, "we were strong enough to seize power. But what good would that have done? The gorillas [right-wing generals] in Argentina and Brazil would have descended on tiny Uruguay and crushed us. Besides, the people might have cheered us, but would not have fought for us. Our people have to learn that it is for themselves that they are fighting. They have to *want* power. That takes years of politicization. We have to wait." Waiting, of course, has been costly not only to the government but to the *Tupas* themselves. The police also are learning from the struggle, and, as it has been intensified, the *Tupas* have begun to suffer serious losses. Scores have been killed, and there are currently over 100 in jail, including Raúl Sendic, once a socialist party official and one of the original leaders of the MLN. Also, as US counter-insurgency experts have taken over command of the hunt, torture has become a standard part of the government's retaliation. That was why the *Tupas* executed Dan Mitrione, the CIA's super-sleuth, whose office was in Montevideo's police headquarters.

With general elections scheduled for this November, it is campaign time in Uruguay now. In the past, only two parties have jockeyed for power: the *Blancos* (Whites), by and large representing the landed population and the *Colorados* (Reds), strong especially in Montevideo, where half of Uruguay's people live. But now a third party will be on the ballot, a united front which is so vast that it has official support from Moscow to Rome, joining together under a single banner the Communist and Christian Democratic parties, as well as Trotskyists, anarchists, pro-*Tupamaro* militants, left liberals and dissidents from the two major parties. The *Frente Amplio* offers none of the usual "advantages" (pork barrel posts, concessions, contracts, etc.) in exchange for votes; presidential candidate, General Liber Seregni, who once ruled Montevideo's army but resigned when ordered to use his troops for repression, promises only hard times ahead. Yet in a few short months, and starting from scratch with neither the press nor the airwaves in its favor, the *Frente* has become the front-runner, so much so that there is a great deal of talk that Pacheco will cancel the election. "That is why we will not

by John Gerassi