




An Inside Look: Watergate and the World of the CIA



“Are these men really former CIA men or are they still subject to the orders of the CIA? The CIA would like to have it one way, and then to have it overlooked the other way.”

Explosive as the Watergate revelations have been, no disclosure has been more ominous than the 1970 Domestic Intelligence Plan attributed to the pen of Tom Charles Huston. The plan, as revealed last June, provided for the use of electronic surveillance, mail coverage, undercover agents and other measures to an extent unprecedented in domestic intelligence-gathering. This program was to be directed by a committee of representatives from all of the national intelligence agencies. It goes far toward justifying the worst paranoia Americans have felt during the past quarter century over the growth of secrecy and deception in our government. Much of this anxiety relates to what might be called “the CIA Mentality,” the stealthy abuse of power and the practice of deception of the American public—all performed under the cloak of secrecy and often in the name of anticommunism and national security. In fact, what makes the Watergate

case different from other scandals is that the system and methods used, the means by which it was all planned, staffed with experts, financed clandestinely and carried out was all taken from the operating method of the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency was created, and its powers and responsibilities defined, by the National Security Act of 1947. Its character was developed over a span of 11 years by its greatest mentor and guiding spirit, Allen Welsh Dulles. The “Frankenstein” product of this implausible union of a well-intentioned law and of a scheming opportunist is the agency as we find it today.

Before 1953, when Dulles became the Director, Central Intelligence (DCI), the CIA was primarily concerned with performing its assigned task: as the central authority for all of the various intelligence organizations of the government, the CIA’s business was to collect and interpret information gathered by other intelligence units. But that all soon changed.

In 1948, President Truman established a committee to review the CIA, to make recommendations for improvement and to evaluate its past performance. The members of this committee were Allen Dulles, Mathias Correa, and William Jackson, and their report was without question the most important single document on this subject ever pub-

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by L. Fletcher Prouty

“... what really rises up over the storm clouds is the evidence that this ongoing clandestine activity had the approval at least of Nixon, Laird and Helms.”

lished in this country. In it, Dulles (the principal author) firmly proposed that the CIA must not only coordinate intelligence but that it must collect intelligence and that it must be authorized to carry out covert, clandestine operations. Needless to say, during his 11 years with the CIA, Allen Dulles saw to it that the Agency did in fact carry out these activities—federal law notwithstanding. Dulles' change of emphasis led to the overshadowing of the rest of the agency by the “dirty tricks” or “operations” division.

To understand the importance of this change, it is necessary to know a bit about the CIA's three divisions. Each has its own distinct character, interests, and powers. The whole operation—men, money, materials, aircraft, bases overseas, people and all kinds of weird and wonderful gadgetry—is supported by the Deputy Director, Support (DD/S). Without the DD/S, that most competent and experienced part of the CIA, none of the remainder could operate. Much could be written about the special expertise of the DD/S, especially in the area of money manipulation—a subject which takes on special significance in view of Watergate's “laundering” of money. This is one of those secret arts which the CIA didn't plan to reveal to anyone; but now it finds its alumni practicing the art for a variety of political purposes.

A second part of the Agency is headed by the Deputy Director, Intelligence—this is the true intelligence side of the house. The intelligence professionals are the people who do the statutory work of the Agency, who turn out its most important product—the intelligence reports. They are heeded too little by too few people. Although DD/I employees are usually perfectly open about their assignments, their work is quiet and not nearly as spectacular as that of

their covert brethren. No DD/I has ever become the DCI, and none is ever likely to. The DD/I might have risen in status and importance had James Schlesinger remained head of the agency. Now, with Schlesinger's removal to the Defense Department, we shall never know. The Directorate of Intelligence suffers from the pangs of fluctuating fortunes and of low morale. It certainly is not the glamor center of the intelligence community.

The glamor in the CIA resides with the Deputy Director, Operations (DD/O—sometimes DD/P—Deputy Director, Plans)—the dirty tricks director. The men who have held this post have been blamed for some of the CIA's most spectacular gaffes: Frank Wisner was fired for the failure of an anti-Sukarno “rising” in Indonesia in the '50s; Richard Bissell was canned for the Bay of Pigs. But three men have risen from DD/O to the Directorship of Central Intelligence—Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, and now William E. (Bill) Colby.

The appointment of a man of Colby's background as DCI expresses the continuing power of “dirty tricks” within the CIA, and in the government as a whole. Bill Colby was the senior CIA man in South Vietnam and the leader of the vaunted pacification program, including the infamous Phoenix project. Pacification—with all its cruelties and insidiousness—had been used by the French in their actions in Indochina at least as far back as the early 1950s. Later they used it as a major plan of undercover action in Algeria. Ed Lansdale, Desmond Fitzgerald, Colby and others came across this French doctrine and took it over as a part of their own method of operation. Pacification, in this special sense, became a part of the U.S. Army Special Forces “Green Beret” training doctrine. The Phoenix Project was the assassination (to use Lyndon Johnson's term, the “Murder, Inc.”) part of pacification.

It was Bill Colby who raised pacification to its highest and most deadly levels and taught the Vietnamese to implement the Phoenix program through which they attempted to terrorize and liquidate the political apparatus believed to direct and control the Communist effort in South Vietnam. Colby sought to make the ARVN into better para-military fighters—capable of suppressing threats and then “pacifying” the country by terrorism, assassination and any other means. How and where Colby plans to apply such deadly skills as DCI remains to be seen. But unquestionably, Colby's appointment fulfills Allen Dulles's highest hopes for a dynamic “operational” CIA, reaching way beyond the mere gathering and interpretation of intelligence data.


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Watergate folklore has it that the White House “plumbers” got their name because of their assignment to stop “leaks” from government agencies to the news media. As a matter of fact, the “dirty tricks” operatives in the intelligence community have long been called by a similar name—“Acme Plumbers.” Maybe the green young men in the White House meant to use intelligence community jargon when they nicknamed their special investigations unit the “plumbers.” If so, they got it wrong, but their mistake was prophetic: just plain “plumber,” without the brand name, is CIA slang for an undercover man who botches the job.



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Cleaning up the Act: The Politics of Police Reform



The urge to reform the police in America followed directly the racial rebellions and radical insurgencies of the last decade. If form follows function in design, reform follows malfunction in politics: the impetus to redesign social institutions flows from their failure.

At the flashpoint of dysfunction—the burning of Watts, in August, 1965—the government made the first commitment of federal resources to police reform: an Office of Law Enforcement Assistance. Then came a succession of national and state programs, a Presidential Commission, foundation projects and academic studies.

All this activity was marked by the persistent belief that the police regulate the quotient of law and order in the world. The spectacle of Mayor Daley's police provoking riot in Chicago; of the Ohio National Guard blazing away at Kent State; of local police mired in corruption, indolence, and inefficiency; of the FBI barking up one wrong tree after another while Panthers, Weatherpeople, Mafiosi and draft dodgers slip away into freedom: it all suggested that the machine of social control had ceased to operate in its most crucial capacity. To be sure, the managerial response to the threat of insurrection, riot and criminality (the three are inextricably connected) was as varied as the perceptions of the managers. The only constant was the expansion of police power and the concentration on police reform, reorganization and redefinition as the principal means to put

America together again. Long after anti-poverty, welfare, educational and integrationist programs have been cut, impounded or abandoned, the police industry continues to flourish.

Administration officials of both the Johnson and Nixon eras created and fed the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) with a budget of billions and a cast of thousands. The career reformers in the criminal justice set formed the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (the Crime Commission). They studied "the problem" and then spread out to various public and private institutions formed to deal with it on the terms their study had set. One of those private institutions is the Police Foundation, a Ford Foundation spin-off with \$30 million to play with for its chartered life-span of five years.

In the ecology of law and order, federal programs and private foundations are support-systems that feed more vigorous but unrooted activities. Those were undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency, which created and expanded a Domestic Operations section; by the Treasury Department, which, under John J. Caulfield, politicized its

by Andrew Kopkind