

standing. As the book ends, she reflects on that a good land, vast land, this is. And she is warmed by the thought that "throughout the school and throughout the land all children, all men and all women, were being taught with the same faith, with variations of the same procedures. Each according to his age group. Each according to his need."

Clavell's writing in this book obviously reflects his appreciation of the effectiveness of fables and Oriental brevity—condensed thought. There are no excess words. Not one. Since children are not subtle, there is little subtlety in this fable-like story. But the impact is staggering.

The impact is staggering because, although not all of us entirely agree on what is bad and what is good, we certainly agree with the point of the book: the terrifying power of mind control and how very easy it is (especially with the young mind) when there is not enough care or time or patience to counteract it—when there is not enough cherishing of freedom to even recognize when the opposite of freedom is being taught—when there is not even enough knowledge to realize it does not take winning or losing a war to have it happen.

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The Nuts and Bolts of Socialism

The Socialist Phenomenon.

By Igor Shafarevich.

New York: Harper & Row. 1980. 319 pp. \$16.95.

Reviewed by John Hospers

Many readers of *From under the Rubble* expressed the opinion that Igor Shafarevich's essay on socialism was the best in the entire collection. Now we have a full-length volume on the history of socialistic theories, written in Moscow where the author is an internationally reputed mathematician, smuggled out of the Soviet Union, published in Russian in Paris in 1975, and finally translated into English. Included is a trenchant introduction by Solzhenitsyn, a close friend of the author and the principal inspiration for the work.

The Soviet system of state socialism is far from new. Reading this history of socialism, whose theorists were largely uninfluenced by one another, one sees with what monotonous regularity the same tenets are set forth. Whether in an-

cient China or Mesopotamia, whether among the Incas of Peru or the early Christian heretical sects, whether in the theories of Sir Thomas More or those of Deschamps, the same themes are reiterated: the regulation of all details of life by the State, the abolition of private property, the conscription of labor, the abolition of the family.

Private property makes one independent of the State and must therefore be outlawed. Family loyalties get in the way of allegiance to the State, so the family must be rigidly controlled or eliminated; in many cases (for example, Plato's *Republic*) wives and children are held in common, and education of children is always a State monopoly. When religion becomes a threat to State allegiance, it too is persecuted. The same little details keep recurring in diverse historical periods, such as the insistence that doors remain always unlocked because no one may have any secrets from anyone else. And always one's work is determined by the State, and the worker may not change jobs without permission.

The nature of a society is most clearly seen in its system of punishment. Trivial offenses are often followed by the most horrible punishments in socialist societies, since when all life is regulated by the State, any infringement of the law becomes a crime against the State. Among the Incas "there were jails in underground caves in which jaguars, bears, and venomous snakes and scorpions were kept." In ancient China there was a detailed system of punishment for such offenses as stealing a bit of corn from a state farm or whispering a secret to a neighbor: "quartering, cutting into halves, cutting to pieces, decapitation with exhibition of the head on a square, slow strangulation, burying alive, boiling in a cauldron, breaking of ribs, smashing the crown of the head." In an address to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1958, Mao Tse-Tung, reviewing the record of one of his ancient predecessors, said: "Ch'in Shih Huang buried only 460 Confucians alive, we did away with several tens of thousands of people. We acted like ten Ch'in Shih Huangs. We are better than he: he buried alive 460 people, and we, 46,000."

The suppression of intellectuals—and anyone who might have independent thoughts—is another common theme. Shang Yang (4th century B.C.) wrote that "the gifted are of no use and the ungifted can do no harm; therefore, the art of ruling well consists in the ability to remove the clever and the gifted."

The motives of socialist theorists are often held to be noble; but, says the ancient *Book of the Ruler of Shang*, "to transform his people into clay in his hands, the ruler must renounce love of man, of justice, and of people. . . . They must be ruled like a collection of criminals. In a state where the depraved are treated as if they were virtuous, sedition is inevitable; in a state where the virtuous are treated as if they were depraved, order will reign and the State will be powerful." And in modern times Marx wrote to Engels such tidbits as: "It would be good to have a bad harvest next year, and then the real fun will begin. . . . Only two or three very bad years could help. . . . Our fatherland presents an extremely pitiful sight; without being battered from the outside, nothing can be done with these dogs."

Socialism often parades under the banner of justice and the alleviation of suffering; yet, says Shafarevich, "the alleviation of suffering is set aside until the victory of the socialist ideal, and all attempts to improve life at the present time are condemned as postponing the coming victory. [It] is in no way compatible with compassion for today's victims of oppression, who will have no share in the future just society."

Socialism declares itself to be egalitarian. *Equality* ordinarily means "equality of rights and sometimes equality of opportunity. But in socialist ideology the understanding of equality is akin to that used in mathematics, i.e., identity, the abolition of differences in behavior as well as in the inner world of individuals." And this is impossible "without absolute control of an all-powerful bureaucracy which would engender an incomparably greater inequality." Dostoevski, who foresaw the future history of socialism more clearly than any other writer, described the socialist ideal as that of an ant-hill and a bee-hive, and Stalin himself called the inhabitants of the socialist state "nuts and bolts."

Socialism, says the author, has no rational arguments in its favor, and its adherents cling to it more "by instinct" than by the specious arguments they use. "Socialist conclusions are radically at odds with experience," yet socialists rise eternal throughout history.

It is not enough to say that all these people merely want to manage other people's lives, though most of them do have this messianic delusion. Shafarevich concludes that on a deeply unconscious level the ultimate aim of socialism is death, the death of the human race: the recurrent attraction of this perennially fascinating

but indefensible doctrine is the same as the attraction of death, to people with a deep hatred for themselves and the world. Psychologically, says the author in a conclusion that may have less provable basis than anything in the 300 preceding pages of historical research, what animates socialism is the hatred and fear of life and the readiness to impose suffering and death not only upon oneself but upon the entire human race.

Whatever may be said of this conclusion, the theory and practice of socialism through the ages has been admirably set forth in this volume. Each chapter in the history resounds like a loud gong that keeps sounding endlessly, with only minor variations, blasting us so loudly with its reiteration that it finally communicates to us a visceral fright, even while it lays before us a fatal panorama of ideas with which we desperately need to be acquainted in order to deal with them.

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Missing Liberty

Counting Our Blessings.

*By Daniel Patrick Moynihan.
Boston: Little, Brown. 1980.
348 pp. \$12.95.*

Reviewed by Tibor R. Machan

In the author's words, this book of essays, collected from various magazines and journals and published during the 1970s, concerns, first of all, "American values in foreign affairs"; then "issues in social science that touch upon questions of law and government" (Moynihan's original expertise); next, "political issues of the present"; and finally, "arms control." They are not the usual academic discussions, however, nor mere polemical outpourings, but a mixture of analysis and rhetoric in the classical tradition.

These are pieces that aim to persuade or at least to reinforce support for certain ideas and policies by those who like to think that they are high-minded people. They may well be—but then they deserve a book of greater moral substance.

A general problem with Moynihan and his neoconservative friends and associates is that they have defended America eloquently, but their conception of what is essential about America does not square with the facts. *Counting Our Blessings* illustrates the point well.

Early, on page 4, Moynihan refers to the work of the late Prof. Martin Diamond, who argued against the revolutionary nature of the American political tradition and claimed that the Declaration of Independence offers no political advice. Daniel Patrick Moynihan is, not surprisingly, pleased with Diamond's message. Throughout his book he stresses many more conservative themes than anyone who understands the truly

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revolutionary nature of the American political tradition could.

The concept of liberty, though important enough in Moynihan's view, just does not figure as a central feature of "Reflections on the Future of America," the subtitle of his book. National defense; wise management of the ship of state; the significance of religion for maintaining public morality and decency; the enormous, even all-encompassing, threat of the Soviet Union, not just to the United States, but the Western world—these are themes Moynihan reiterates throughout. But, like other neoconservatives—most of whom really do not entertain much hope of a world in which individuals can freely embark upon their own projects, leaving to the State but some minimal functions spelled out in the Declaration of Independence—Moynihan loses sight of the point of defending America, namely, that it respects individual liberty.

Pres. Woodrow Wilson plays an all-important role in Moynihan's early chapters, and not surprisingly. Wilson's conception of America has much in common with that entertained by Moynihan and neoconservatives, albeit seriously modified to fit a less-ambitious and self-confident period of American consciousness. It is true that Wilson saw America's role as that of upholding the ideal of liberty for all human beings. As Moynihan quotes Wilson following the latter's visit to France, where he saw French women tending American graves: "France was free and the world was free because Americans had come." But the freedom at issue is not very clearly spelled out, especially by Moynihan. Throughout this work one gets the impression that national independence and power are more important than the indi-

vidual liberty in behalf of which that independence and power had been originally established and thought justifiable.

Franksly, Moynihan comes off in this work as little more than a Harvard-educated and well-read Hubert Humphrey. He has heart; but unlike Humphrey, he also thinks that heart must be given some prudent direction by social science, by political IQ. As to what ideals our society should support, beyond national independence and power, it is difficult to ascertain. Nationalism is not by itself a good thing, as the history of Europe, for example, amply demonstrates. Nationalism is justified only when the nation at issue stands for values that are justifiable apart from the fact that they are *our* values.

My liking for this book is greater than I have given evidence of in these observations. Indeed, there is much that one can learn from Moynihan's often careful scrutiny of major events on the fronts of America's recent judicial, legislative, and diplomatic histories. But much of that intelligence lacks purpose when one realizes that the ultimate substance of which America is composed—its absolutely unique concern with individual liberty—is lost in Moynihan's penetrating discussion of often important but never decisive details.

Let me conclude by suggesting that Senator Moynihan and those who share his views address the following questions:

- Should the national defense of America ever permit the sacrifice of the ideals of individual rights and the free society?
- Can the vitality of the American economy be recovered—via, for example, a freer market economy—while maintaining the kind of security state Senator Moynihan seems to endorse?
- Is the American citizen responsible to live his life so as to provide for the defense of the rights of all human beings, even those whose rights are threatened thousands of miles away? Does an affirmative answer not imply that every free human being is the slave of an unfree one?
- Does not the conception of the United States of America along Wilsonian lines constitute a serious insult to the people of other regions of the world? Do these people depend so much on Americans? Is it not enough that America teach the rest of the world, by example, what liberty can accomplish? With these and similar issues squarely confronted, the eloquence and passion