

ARTS & LETTERS

tainment of happiness on earth." James Schall tells us, "We are beings meant for eternal life, and this world is to end—whether consumed by some passing planetoid, some cooling sun, or by some mistake of nuclear fission, or by some act of man, perhaps even one man." John J. O'Connor provides the biblical passage: "The burden of our trial is light enough, and earns us an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison. We do not fix our gaze on what is seen but on what is unseen. What is seen is transitory; what is unseen lasts forever... when the earthly tent in which we dwell is destroyed we have a dwelling in the heavens to last forever..." (2 Cor.). Although, at times, the authors suggest that at least under certain conditions earthly existence may have some instrumental value for God's plan for man, far more vivid to them is the infinite glory available to us after the apocalypse.

Don't get me wrong. These authors are surely correct that a Christian perspective on the value of earthly existence does argue against bearing great costs for the sake of mere earthly survival. But this is because this perspective argues against bearing great costs for the sake of *any* earthly goal—even the authors' undefined goals of freedom and justice.

Where the authors are more directly mistaken is in their charge that *anyone* deviating from their premises will be committed to a policy of physical survival at any cost. The authors' problem here is their collective inability to understand any distinctions among nontheologically based ethical systems. They repeatedly, unfoundedly, and incoherently charge any humanistic ethic with necessarily being (somehow all at the same time!) materialist, hedonist, nihilist, and bare survivalist. Indeed, the authors of these central essays make no attempt at intellectually challenging their opponents. Essentially all that we get is name-calling and pronouncements of guilt by doctrinal association—the latter often based on egregious scholarship. None of the authors seems able even to state coherently the Catholic just-war theory.

Justice and War does contain two worthwhile essays, one on the assumptions of arms-control negotiations, the other on the possibility of active non-nuclear strategic defense. The former essay, by Thomas Payne, argues that arms-control negotiations are only productive when the negotiating powers already accede to one another's spheres of power and that this condition is not

currently satisfied between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The latter essay, by Angelo Codevilla, includes the book's most sensible just-war response to the arguments of the "peace bishops." In this essay, "Justice, War and Active Defense," Codevilla properly denounces all intentional attacks on centers of population and all variants of Mutual Assured Destruction that require each superpower to offer its civilians as hostages to the other. Codevilla calls for the development of an active missile or space-laser defense that will sufficiently protect our counter-attack weaponry so that no Soviet first strike will be rational. The bulk of the essay is devoted to documenting the technological feasibility of such a non-nuclear strategic defense.

Of course, anything less than a perfect system of defense per se will have to be supplemented by some counterattack capability. Otherwise an aggressor's first strike will involve no risk for the aggressor other than the expenditure of its weapons. And it is presumably Codevilla's view, in accordance with just-war theory, that the weapons by which we threaten counterattack be as precise and discriminating as possible and that they be directed only at crucial military targets. It is ironic and unfortunate that only in this anthology's most technologically oriented essay, and not at all in its moral-theological essays, does some appreciation of the force of just-war distinctions appear.

Eric Mack teaches philosophy at Tulane University and contributed a chapter on the philosophical issues concerning defense policy to the Reason Foundation book Defending a Free Society.

Moscow's Masterminds

The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union

By Edward Luttwak
New York: St. Martin's.
233 pp. \$14.95.

Reviewed by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.

Those who enjoy Edward Luttwak the charger, challenger of conventional wisdom and purveyor of unique insights into troubled areas, will be disappointed by *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union*. In this book, Luttwak appears to have deliberately set out to posi-

tion himself in the middle of the road. As he states in his preface, "It is in between these extremes (the Soviet Union as only defensive or as an expansionist military empire) that we must find the reality of the Soviet Union." And, position himself in the middle he does, although considerably more toward the former than the latter.

The book is mainly a series of elegant ramblings and interpretations of Soviet behavior, complete with a rich load of historical relevancies. In this, Luttwak is the master. Unfortunately, however, the book is supposed to be about Soviet grand strategy. And while there are many different views on what grand strategy is, Luttwak neither describes what he means by "grand strategy" or discusses it, nor does he treat the subject in any reasonable sense.

When one speaks of grand strategy, several concepts generally come to mind, concepts such as national goals or objectives, long-range plans, the role of war and military forces, diplomatic objectives, and so forth. But in *Grand Strategy*, there is no discussion of goals or war, of the Soviet concept of peace, of the politics that have governed Soviet behavior for a long time and, as they say, would continue in the event of war, or of Soviet long-range strategic plans. There is little discussion of the tools, techniques, or tactics used in support of their grand strategy or of interrelationships between strategies in various regions.

The absence of any treatment of Soviet long-range plans, especially considering the planned nature of their government, is quite disconcerting. Luttwak fails to discuss the "Long Range Plan for the Next 10-15 Years and Beyond" as described by General Major Jan Sejna in his recent book, *We Will Bury You*. *Grand Strategy* brings to mind Richard Pipes's testimony in congressional hearings in 1980 when, in referring to the National Intelligence Estimates, he explained, "My feeling is that, apart from whatever institutional problems there may be, the fundamental problem is that the people drafting these estimates do not believe that there is such a thing as a Russian or Soviet grand strategy..." The same appears to be true of Luttwak's book.

Luttwak discusses certain regions of the world and analyzes the related Soviet strategic options. China, Europe, and the Middle East receive dominant attention. Here there are few surprises. Soviet strategy towards China is one of encirclement. Regarding Western Europe, the

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Soviet Union seeks to break the security nexus between the United States and Western Europe.

The main surprises are in what is *not* discussed. For example, Luttwak pays almost no attention to Soviet strategy towards its declared main enemy, the United States, or to Soviet strategy toward those areas of the world in which the Soviet Union greatly increased its activity in the 1960s and 1970s: Africa and Central and South America. How can this be, in a book that purports to address Soviet grand strategy?

Nor does Luttwak mention Soviet ideology, except to suggest it is no longer a critical factor, or the Soviet concept of peace or peaceful coexistence. Little reference is directed to the role of subversion, the worldwide communist movement, wars of national liberation, and the coordinated use of propaganda and intelligence (active measures). This seems to ignore an important dimension of Soviet strategy since 1917, and especially over the past three decades. The Soviet strategy of peaceful coexistence, according to Soviet sources and defectors, was given a major push by Khrushchev in 1956. It was the cornerstone of his strategy, which did not seem to change much under Brezhnev, who, according to a high-level defector, led the major activity to develop the guidelines implementing Khrushchev's strategy in the fall of 1956, extending through the spring of 1957. Other critical aspects of this strategy were the drive to achieve military superiority, beginning with nuclear weapons, and the rejuvenation of the worldwide revolutionary movement, with the Third World as the primary target. Such possibilities do not enter into Luttwak's analysis in *Grand Strategy*.


The Soviet drive for superiority is only regarded as a tactical shift, borne of necessity. As Luttwak explains, in the 1970s the Soviet Union found itself much more powerful and also distinctly poorer than its leaders could reasonably have predicted a decade earlier. "It was thus only natural that the goal of economic supremacy, which had become utterly unrealistic, should have given way to the pursuit of imperial power as the new dominant aim of Soviet national strategy." By "sheer chance" the recognition of their economic failure at the end of the 1960s happened to coincide with the beginning of the abrupt and phenomenal decline of the United States as a military power, which then acted to

cause the Soviets to accelerate further their new military push.

Though Luttwak discusses the role of the military forces, there emerge serious questions concerning the rationale behind his interpretations. For example, Soviet nuclear forces are seen in the US image, that is, as only for deterrence. For Luttwak, the principal forces (and focal point in his book) are the conventional forces. Luttwak recognizes the Soviets'

huge investment in conventional forces, but he almost ignores their investment in nuclear forces as well as the role of the nuclear forces beyond Soviet-style "deterrence" and the interaction between the nuclear forces and the "conventional" forces. While I would like to believe Luttwak's analysis is correct, it somehow seems to slight what could be an extremely important aspect of Soviet military and political strategy and to fail

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Book Hints

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Deregulation continues to attract scholarly attention. *Telecommunications in Crisis: The First Amendment, Technology, and Deregulation* (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 113 pp., \$6.00 paper), by Edwin Diamond, Norman Sandler, and Milton Mueller, provides a timely analysis of an industry recently partially deregulated. A broader variety of regulatory reform controversies are discussed in *The Political Economy of Deregulation: Interest Groups in the Regulatory Process* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 164 pp., \$15.95/\$7.95 paper), edited by Roger G. Noll and Bruce M. Owen, in which regulation is shown to be often associated with bureaucratic boondoggles. George Roche turns our attention to bureaucratic failings and the logic behind bureaucratic action in *America by the Throat* (Old Greenwich, Conn.: Devin-Adair, 182 pp., \$14.95).

If regulations have increasingly shaped our lives in the past few decades, so, it is argued, have the media. Curtis D. MacDougall looks at one form of this influence in *Superstition and the Press* (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 616 pp., \$29.95/\$16.95 paper). MacDougall documents the plethora of stories about paranormal events that appear in major American newspapers and asks whether the press, in treating claims of such phenomena without questioning their validity, perpetuates ignorance and superstition. And in *Channels of Power* (New York: Basic Books, 175 pp., \$14.95), Austin Ranney focuses on television as a source of influence on political reality.

The American economy has finally begun to show signs of improvement, but are Reagan's supply-side economic policies responsible? *The Supply-Side Solution* (New York: Manhattan Institute, 289 pp., \$12.95 paper), edited by Bruce Bartlett and Timothy Roth, provides a broad-ranging anthology for the layman and professional interested in evaluating the merits of the supply-side debate. Another book, *From Basic Economics to Supply-Side Economics* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 268 pp., \$10.25 paper), by M. L. Greenhut and Charles T. Stewart, Jr., evaluates supply-side economics and Reagan-

omics in the context of general economic thought. The book is a project of the free-market Political Economy Research Institute.

Free-market advocates may be heartened to know that a number of French-language works have begun to appear in support of limited government and laissez-faire economics. One such book by Canadian economist Pierre Lemieux is particularly noteworthy, because it has been published by a major French publisher. In *Du Liberalisme à l'Anarcho-capitalisme* (From Classical Liberalism to Anarcho-capitalism), Lemieux traces the roots of anarcho-individualism and describes the political theory that weds free-market economics with a philosophy of individual rights and the limited state (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 171 pp., [available only in French], 110 FF). Two French authors, Christian Fav-elais and Jean-Yves Glain, analyze French government policies regulating publishing and bookselling. Those policies, assuming that books shouldn't be left to allegedly perverse market forces, have included stifling price-fixing laws that are criticized in *Le Prix Fixe pour le Livre* (Uniform Pricing for Books), published by the Institut Économique de Paris (160 pp., 48 FF).

Also published by the Institut Économique de Paris is a French translation of *Political Economy: Reflections for Today and Tomorrow*, by Ludwig von Mises. Entitled *Politique Économique* (111 pp., 40 FF), the translation marks the debut of a series of works designed to acquaint French readers with works of free-market scholars relatively unknown in France. Two other works published by the Institut Économique de Paris deserve mention: Frédéric Bastiat's *Propriété et Loi* (Property and Law) reintroduces a work by this once-esteemed 19th-century French thinker who is now almost completely unknown in France (48 pp., 15.80 FF). *Planification et Économie de Marche: Il n'y a pas de troisième voie* (Planning or Free Markets: There is No Middle Path), a pamphlet by Henri Lepage, argues in behalf of free markets and against any state economic intervention (22 pp., 15 FF).

—L. S.

to explain the investment in nuclear-war preparations and their clearly stated doctrine.

Perhaps to throw a few plaudits to the current administration, the United States is seen since 1980 to be on the upswing, which in turn is seen as causing great consternation in Moscow. Should this and Luttwak's assessment that the Soviets have acquired new and expanding confidence in their military leaders be true, the future may indeed be fraught with danger. As Luttwak concludes, "If in the Kremlin the fatal conjunction between regime pessimism and military confidence is indeed affected, and if at the same time it is also believed that the nations of Western Europe and Japan will simply refuse to respond seriously to anything short of a direct attack, thus undermining both the capacity and the incentive of an American response, the Soviet Union will be set on the road to war—a war neither Western nor nuclear but quite possibly catastrophic all the same."

Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., is a policy analyst at IRT Corporation in McLean, Virginia.

Banking on Free Markets

The Mystery of Banking

By Murray N. Rothbard

New York: Richardson & Snyder.

286 pp. \$19.95.

Reviewed by Joe Cobb

Murray Rothbard is one of my favorite authors. He is able to deal with some of the most complex issues in an engaging and witty style, and throughout all of his writing runs a recurring note of righteous anger at elitism, pomposity, fraud, and injustice. Although he has written on the subject many times in the past, this new book usefully restates the issues and analysis of free-market banking and monetary theory.

There is a need in this literature for books like Rothbard's *Mystery of Banking*. Some economists write narrowly about money and banking as simple guides to businessmen in one of the most heavily regulated fields of our economy, as if the existing laws and institutions were beyond criticism. Other writers, particularly Milton Friedman and Maxwell Newton, have recently published books challenging the monetary system, suggesting the Federal Reserve does more harm than good; but their point is that the central bankers should just manage things more efficiently. At the