Aburdene recommend are changes in personnel policies: "flattening" the corporate hierarchy, giving employees lots of benefits and scheduling flexibility, and generally getting more casual about relating. Dig it.

The dust jacket of *Re-inventing the Corporation* promises "a bible," a "survival guide," a "blueprint." According to the introduction, the book "tells what to *do*." But it really doesn't. The book is mostly a catalogue—pages of lists, thin anecdotes, and "models" of novel corporate policies and practices.

The method of composition is strictly cut-and-paste. The authors take almost every example from articles in newspapers such as the *Wall Street Journal* or the *Washington Post* or from business and newsweekly magazines such as *Business Week* and *U.S. News & World Report*. The apparent criterion for inclusion of any particular practice is the journalistic adage, "three items are a trend."

The fruit of this second-hand method is advice so vague as to be practically useless. Naisbitt and Aburdene tell us that many firms are doing interesting things, like letting workers set "flextime" schedules, cutting out middle managers, and offering "cafeteria benefits." But they offer no criteria for determining whether a policy would be good or bad for a particular company; nor do they say how to set up and run any particular program.

Not only is *Re-inventing the Corporation* irritatingly shallow, it is often erroneous and confused. The authors say that "following World War II, we had rising incomes and falling prices for several decades." For *several decades*? What time warp have they been stuck in? They give directly contradictory advice, praising the elimination of corporate titles and hierarchies early in the book and later praising a foundation report on education for recommending a teachers' hierarchy—complete with titles.

They say that comparable worth "sounds pretty difficult to argue against." But they treat it as just one more unquestionable, mondo-boffo "humanistic" value. Their sources of knowledge on the idea are five newspaper articles; they haven't looked into any critiques or defenses of comparable worth in more learned journals. Not understanding how wages are determined, they argue from their warm feelings.

Bad as it all is, the real agony of the book lies in having to read it just to find out how bad it really is. Because the writing itself, beyond the artless method and lack of seriousness, is execrable.

Diction is hit-or-miss: The dust jacket (which, judging by the style, must have been written by the authors) tells us that we are in a period when "divergent forces come together"; a careful writer would have noticed that "divergent forces" are, by definiton, moving apart. They say that "re-invented corporations stress inordinate regard for… employees and customers," as if *inordinate* meant "extraordinary," rather than "unreasonable," "excessive," or "harsh."

They are blind to metaphors, so they end up with garbage ("monumental thinking slump"). The book is full of redundancies ("a shared vision that all employees embraced"). They simply cannot choose prepositions or match them with the correct verbs ("inventing the corporation into a place").

Is it harsh to criticize Naisbitt and Aburdene's writing as severely as what they try to pass off as ideas? Hardly. They devote a whole chapter to education and several pages to the teaching of writing and clearly believe that they themselves are good, creative writers. Moreover, they castigate the "traditional obsession with grammar, punctuation, and other rules of the writing game," and advocate "intuitive" writing, "fun" writing. The result is *lousy* writing.

I should comment on the impression of political and economic naivete this book leaves. Certainly the authors didn't set out to show how political policies can make or break the economy, so it wouldn't be fair to criticize them for not showing how, say, eliminating the corporate income tax might do wonders for our international competitiveness.

But they don't even show any understanding of or concern about such issues. It's one thing to say that new personnel policies may increase productivity. It's another thing to proceed, as Naisbitt and Aburdene do, on the silly axiom that making work "fun" is about all that matters and that the whole fate of the economy is in the hands of executives, managers, and entrepreneurs—regardless of what the folks in the swamps of the Potomac do.

It would be great to have a work of genuine value, something that could really help vitalize a few businesses. But clearly Naisbitt and Aburdene haven't given us one. Naisbitt, this time with Patricia Aburdene, has gotten away with bad work a second time: *Re-inventing the Corporation* also made the bestseller list. This should be a warning: Are the same American business people who can be taken in—many of them twice—by this pinheaded bestseller sort of consulting *able* to revitalize our economy?

David Stewart is a free-lance writer.

From Heredity to the Collectivity

By John McCarthy

Not In Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human Nature, by R. C. Lewontin, Steven Rose, and Leon J. Kamin. New York: Pantheon Books, 322 pages, $21.45/$8.95

Scientific study of the contributions of heredity and environment to human abilities and behavior began with Francis Galton in the 1860s. He studied "hereditary genius," concluded that heredity is more important than environment, and initiated the eugenics movement to improve humanity. The eugenics movement sought, on the one hand, to encourage more children among people with good heredity and, on the other hand, to prevent reproduction of bad heredity, especially by discouraging children among the feeble-minded.

The influence of eugenics peaked in the 1920s and then fell off for several reasons. Some of its supporters built their prejudices into their ideas of what were good genes. Coercive social measures, including sterilization of the institutionalized retarded, came into public disfavor. The Nazis used eugenics as a rationalization for genocide. The left, which had initially favored eugenics in line with its rationalism, moved toward environmental theories that promised quicker results. They were also disappointed that increased equality of opportunity did not bring about complete equality of result.

Like many other issues, controversy about the heredity of behavior heated up in the 1960s. Advocates of affirmative-action measures to achieve equality of result needed the assurance that observed inequalities of accomplishment must be the result of discrimination of some kind, even when overt discrimination may have been substantially eliminated. Since the '60s, scientists

It *could* happen here, and Winslow proves it:

The Washington Post: "There are firing squads in New England meadows, and at the end of the broadcasting day the Internationale rings out over the airwaves. Hairdressers are being shipped off to labor camps, while stockbrokers and even television anchormen toil away on street-cleaning gangs . . . the White House has been renamed 'The Peoples' House.' . . . If Jeane Kirkpatrick were to write a Harlequin, this might be it."

The Washington Times: "It's sometime in the 1990s and the United States has been attacked by the Soviet Union. Medium-range ballistic missiles launched from Cuba and Nicaragua eliminate most of America's land-based missiles . . . Within hours, Soviet bloc garrison troops are landed at key points, and the Sovietization of America is under way . . . Miss Winslow has written a real spellbinder, a book with an intricate plot and clever political allusions. One of its great assets is that it avoids the jingoistic pitfalls that have conspired to wreck lesser works."

Publishers Weekly: "A high-voltage thriller . . . an immensely readable, fast-paced novel that satisfies."

PAULINE GLEN WINSLOW

I, MARTHA ADAMS

A NOVEL OF RUSSIAN CONQUEST AND ONE AMERICAN'S RESPONSE

MAY 1986 • 448 pp. • 65569-8 ★$3.95

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whose studies support the view that important components of human behavior are hereditary have been attacked—some to the extent of having their lectures disrupted.

R. C. Lewontin and Leon Kamin are two leaders of American "radical science," also called critical science, and Steven Rose is similarly active in Britain. Lewontin has a substantial scientific reputation in evolutionary genetics. The three pooled their efforts in *Not in Our Genes,* which bills itself as an answer to the "New Right ideology...with its emphasis on the priority of the individual over the collective. That priority is seen as having both a moral aspect, in which

If intelligence were like strength, we would expect that an ordinary person could learn to do physics like Einstein, only taking several times as long.

the rights of individuals have absolute priority over the rights of the collectivity—as, for example, the right to destroy forests by clear-cutting in order to maximize immediate profit—and an ontological aspect, where the collectivity is nothing more than the sum of the individuals that make it up."

The authors often bow to Marxism and refer to the bourgeois origin of various concepts. Thus, they say, "We should make it clear that we use the term ideology here and throughout this book with a precise meaning. Ideologies are the ruling ideas of a particular society at a particular time. They are ideas that express the 'naturalness' of any existing social order and help maintain it."

Full-blooded Marxism, however, associates an ideology with each "class" defined by its "relation to the means of production" and explicitly postulates a "working class ideology." There is no trace of the proletariat in this book, so we have a kind of attenuated and perhaps less virulent Marxism. Why modern Marxists ignore the "working class" is too complicated for this review. However, it seems to be mutual.

Those who hold that intelligence, criminality, and other human behavioral characteristics have important hereditary components are accused by the authors of "reductionism" and "determinism." Reductionism, they say, is the view that the properties of a complex object are the properties of its parts. Their strawman is the idea that a society is "aggressive" if the individuals that compose it are aggressive. This kind of reductionism fails if the properties of the entity depend on the interaction of its parts.

The authors fail to distinguish between a universal doctrine of reductionism, which I'll bet no one holds, and specific reductionist hypotheses. For example, we believe that the color of an object is not determined by the "colors" of its atoms but is usually determined by its surface molecules—compounds of small numbers of atoms. Its visual texture, however, is not determined by its molecules but by a larger-scale structure. Thus specific reductionist hypotheses may be true or false. When they are true, they represent important simplifications. The theory that aggressiveness of societies is simply related to the aggressiveness of its individuals cannot be confirmed or refuted solely by general considerations.

Determinism, as the authors use it, seems to require an adjective—for example, *genetic* or *environmental*—to make it definite. Then it is the hypothesis that some property of an object, such as the intelligence of a person, is entirely or mainly determined by one thing, such as heredity. Again, specific deterministic hypotheses are simple, and some of them turn out to be true.

The authors cite many determinist and reductionist hypotheses with which they disagree. These include hereditary determination of IQ, the theory that IQ determines success in academic study, and theories of the biological determination of sex differences in human behavior. One is suspicious of the accuracy with which they cite the views of the people they attack. Perhaps many of them admit more interaction among influences than is ascribed to them.

When attacking a theory such as the one that IQ is about 80 percent hereditary, they demand very high standards of proof. For example, they find *all* the studies of separated twins to be flawed. (This is apart from the fictitious studies of Cyril Burt that Kamin played an important role in exposing.)

Yet there is one determinist hypothesis that they accept without applying strict criteria: the hypothesis that their opponents hold their views because they support a capitalist society, or the oppression of women, and so on. They offer no criteria that would have to be met in order to warrant these kinds of conclusions about why someone holds certain views. But a hypothesis about why someone holds certain views requires just as

quotable quotes

■ *It is anarchism that shows a way out from the central problem of our time, the submerging of the individual in mass industrial society and in the centralized super-State. Marxism is revolutionary about private property, but this is no longer a central issue, and it is reactionary on the State, which it glorifies so long as it is that contradiction in terms, "Workers' Socialist State." The only hope is some kind of anarchist decentralization which will break up mass society into communities small enough so that the individual can make himself felt, can express and defend* his own special interests. *The horrors of collectivization in China, which recently disturbed even Khrushchev, show what happens when the revolution goes according to Marx. Anarchism leads back to the individual and the community. It substitutes for coercion voluntary cooperation and it dares to think that people can help themselves better than Robert Moses, the U.S. Senate, and the cops can help them. This approach to politics is revolutionary, i.e., it is both impractical and necessary.*

—**Dwight MacDonald**
Commentary, 1960

precise a statement and just as convincing evidence as a biological hypothesis.

The book had considerable critical success. All 11 reviews the Stanford University librarians found for me were substantially favorable. (It helped that no less than three of the reviewers were among the 15 people whose assistance was acknowledged in the preface as participants in the "Dialectics of Biology Group" and "the Campaign against Racism, IQ, and the Class Society.") The reviewers took on the role of a cheering section, applauding blows against the enemy rather than discussing the plausibility of the positions taken. In this they were somewhat less rational than the authors.

The genetics of human behavior is a difficult scientific subject, and we laymen cannot hope to play an influential role in solving its problems. However, there are two issues that concern us and that we can influence.

First, if scientists are to serve as our representatives in discovering the truth about some important aspect of the world, then we must prevent ideologies from limiting the hypotheses they can consider. Such intimidation reached its extreme in the late '40s when Lysenko, with Stalin's help, succeeded in destroying Soviet genetics by getting his opponents fired and sending some of them to die in the Gulag.

Even the American academic campaign of intimidation that this book serves has probably succeeded in keeping many young scientists who don't want to be thought reactionary from studying certain hypotheses for fear of liberal disapproval. Thus, no one mentions the grimmest hypothesis about the cause of a decline in college entrance examination scores in recent years: maybe the eugenicists were right and the lower fertility rate of educated people for 100 years contributed to the reduction in the number of people capable of high college entrance exam scores. The point here is not that this hypothesis is correct; it may or may not be, but in the prevailing political climate no scientist even considers investigating this possibility.

The second proper concern of laymen arises when controversies among scientists impinge on public policy. Then we cannot avoid choosing among the rival proposals. However, even without detailed scientific study, we can tell when intimidation is being attempted.

As a computer scientist concerned with artificial intelligence—with making computer programs solve difficult problems—I offer one comment out of my own speciality. Computers differ only in speed and memory capacity; what one can do, another can also be programmed to do, perhaps more slowly. Human nonintellectual capacities vary by factors of two or three; one man can train to lift twice or three times the weight of another. Therefore, if intelligence were like strength, we would expect that an ordinary person could learn to do physics like Einstein or chess like Bobby Fischer, only taking several times as long for the same result. Since this obviously doesn't happen, the qualitatively superior intellectual performance of some people over others constitutes a puzzle for the future to solve. Solving it will require an open mind.

John McCarthy is a professor of computer science at Stanford University.

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What's Wrong with Quotas' Critics?

By Ken Masugi

Out of Order: Affirmative Action and the Crisis of Doctrinaire Liberalism, by Nicholas Capaldi, Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 201 pages, $17.95

In judging philosophy professor Nicholas Capaldi's polemical assault on affirmative action, it is proper, following Capaldi's subtitle, to speak of a crisis of affirmative-action criticism.

Consider the views of the allegedly anti-affirmative action Reagan administration, which is a house divided on this policy. Some Republicans look upon affirmative action as a means of attracting votes from women (especially), "Hispanics," and blacks. In their view, it is simply another means of making an ethnic political appeal. The Justice Department has declared its opposition to affirmative action's goals and quotas, at least as prescribed in the employment practices of federal and local governments. Yet Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese has always proclaimed himself a strong supporter of it, even insisting on active recruitment of minority job applicants.

But can quotas be resisted if all the steps preceding quotas (timetables and preferential hiring) are taken? Where is the principled distinction between these positions, or indeed between those of affirmative-action originator Richard Nixon and Rainbow Coalition founder Jesse Jackson?

Avoiding such a muddle, Capaldi places his discussion of affirmative action within its political context, the development of contemporary liberalism. *Out of Order*'s eight chapters offer a critique of the concept of affirmative action, its implementation, its practice, and its politics, with special emphasis (three

book hints *a selective mention of books received for review*

What is life in space like? We all know a little bit from exhaustive media coverage of the various space shots. Now a new book, *Pioneering Space: Living on the Next Frontier*, by James E. Oberg and Alcestis R. Oberg (New York: McGraw-Hill, 298 pp., $16.95), gives us a vivid feel for spacelife—its surprises and terrors, its pleasures and petty annoyances.

Getting back down to earth, there are several recent public-policy works of note. Readers who follow the debate over regulation of public utilities will be interested to know that economist Walter Primeaux challenges long-held assumptions in *Direct Electric Utility Competition: The Natural Monopoly Myth* (New York: Praeger, 297 pp., $36.95).

Deregulation that has already occurred is the focus of two political scientists, Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk, in *The Politics of Deregulation* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 265 pp., $28.95/$10.95). The authors show how economic good sense prevailed over the "iron triangle"—the regulated industry, its regulators, and congressional committees.

Meanwhile, the Hoover Institution has collected some of the prolific Thomas Sowell's writings in *Education: Assumptions versus History* (Stanford, Calif., 203 pp., $8.95 paper).

Turning to broader themes of political economy, Peter Rutland's *The Myth of the Plan* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 286 pp., $26.95) critically appraises the Soviet economic system and raises important issues in the debate about the proper roles of government and markets in economic activity.

Capitalism and markets are the subject of two other notable works, both collections of essays by eminent economists, philosophers, and theologians. In *Morality and the Market: Religious and Economic Perspectives*, edited by Walter Block, Geoffrey Brennan, and Kenneth Elzinga (Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute, 626 pp., $14.95 paper), a number of scholars probe the ethical dimensions of major economic and social issues. In *Is Capitalism Christian?*, edited by Frank Schaeffer (Westchester, Ill.: Crossway Books, 461 pp., $9.95 paper), eminent thinkers including Thomas Sowell, Jean-François Revel, and P. T. Bauer maintain that capitalism is more efficient, more equitable, and more conducive to the maintenance of freedom and justice than alternative socioeconomic systems.

Market systems have long been challenged on a number of ethical grounds, including claims that (1) employers discriminate against minorities and women in the absence of state intervention; (2) workers are exploited by capitalists; and (3) business leaders ignore moral principles in their pursuit of profits. The first criticism is subjected to cogent refutation in the Fraser Institute's *Focus: On Employment Equity* (Vancouver, B.C., 117 pp., $5.00 paper), by Walter Block and Michael Walker.

Employee Ownership in America: the Equity Solution, by Corey Rosen, Katherine J. Klein, and Karen M. Young (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 270 pp., $19.95), investigates the growing phenomenon of employee-owned companies and shows how employee ownership has provided a mechanism to augment workers' interests within the context of free enterprise.

And in *Beyond the Bottom Line: How Business Leaders Are Turning Principles into Profits* (New York: Facts on File, 228 pp., $16.95), Tad Tuleja challenges the view that profits and moral principle are incompatible. He describes how many prominent business leaders have assumed substantial ethical responsibilities and made hefty profits by doing so. Tuleja concludes that ethical conduct actually enhances profitability.

On another front, many have argued that individualism breeds alienation. Not so, says psychologist Alan Waterman in *The Psychology of Individualism* (New York: Praeger, 359 pp., $37.95). Waterman argues that, to the contrary, individualism brings out humans' best potentialities.

Another author, Robert Greenwood, uses fiction to explore the concepts of self-interest and rational individualism. His *Arcadia and Other Stories* (Georgetown, Calif.: Talisman Literary Research, 270 pp., $17.50/$9.95) presents a collection of short stories (two of them published in REASON in the '70s) in which individualism fares better than collectivism.

For history buffs, *Tom Paine: The Greatest Exile*, by David Powell (New York: St. Martin's Press, 303 pp., $22.50), charts the life of one of America's colorful champions of freedom and individualism.

—L. S.