



THE REPORTER'S NOTES

Stocking the Fisheries

Distance sometimes lends journalistic enchantment. The *New York Times*, which recently devoted dozens of excited articles to the arch seventy-word Stalin-to-Zarubin-to-Reston flirtation with "peace," has, interestingly enough, devoted no space to something much more specific and closer to home—namely the new "line" of the American Communist Party. True, this was all too easy to obtain, it having been in the *Sunday Worker* for December 28, 1952, which was purchasable at quite a number of newsstands. What is true of the *Times* in this case is largely true of the American press, which generally leaves the reading of the *Daily Worker* to Senators McCarthy and McCarran and to the patient archivists of Congressional committees or of the FBI.

Admittedly the *Worker* makes tiresome reading and its style is about as sparkling and intoxicating as dishwater. But after all, we can find there, written in what is nearly English, printed in New York, N. Y., the only description of that shift of party line that has taken place in every country where there are organized comrades. And why, may we ask, should we have these nuisances—the Communist Party and the *Daily Worker*—if the press doesn't pay any attention to them, or if it notices a Communist only when he has turned professionally ex-?

Anyway, here is a summary of the *Worker's* pronouncements: The American Communist Party, first of all, did the right thing in supporting Vincent Hallinan in the 1952 election. But it had made a grievous error in supporting the Progressive

candidate Wallace in the 1948 election without first assuring itself that Wallace would have a mass following. Then, in explaining its correct Hallinan action, it listed all the grievous errors it made in supporting this same Progressive candidate Hallinan in the 1952 election.

Briefly, the American comrades have been ordered to drop the Progressive Party and to concentrate on infiltrating the Democratic Party, the key trade unions, the CIO's Political Action Committee, the AFL's Labor League for Political Education, the Liberal Party, the Americans for Democratic Action, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the like.

This is quite an order. Men like Dubinsky and Berle in the Liberal Party, like Reuther in the CIO, and the leaders of the A.D.A. have good noses for smelling out the comrades. Even the national leaders of American Communism cannot be as stupid as this program indicates. They must know that they will have a hard time infiltrating the very organizations that they have reason to hate the most. But short of active effective infiltration, the best the Communists can do to harm these organizations is to announce their intention of infiltrating them.

The fisheries are stocked for the big fishing expedition of the Congressional investigating committees and of like-minded vigilante groups. All the specific causes that these committees and these groups loathe the most are dutifully listed in the *Worker*: opposition to the McCarran Act and the Taft-Hartley Law, criticism of the G.O.P.-Southern Democratic coalition, etc. The Communists have not only restocked the fisheries, but they have provided the fishermen with new nets. From now

on, anybody belonging to the PAC, A.D.A., et al., or advocating any of the causes listed above, will be confronted with a *Worker* clipping "proving" how he is following the Communist line.

We would not say, of course, that there is actual co-operation between those who stock the fisheries and the fishermen. We have no taste for discovering "singular affinities" among those with whom we disagree. But a relationship of a sort exists—antagonistic, of course, yet obvious—a relationship like the one between the dough that gives bulk to the bread and the yeast that leavens it.

Shadow Diplomacy

Ever since 1945 it has been obvious that Soviet delegates come to an international conference not to reach an agreement but to do everything possible to prevent an agreement. It has been so at every conference and at all United Nations sessions, and it has been the same with the Communist negotiators at the Korean truce talks.

The first postwar victim of Soviet nonagreement was Secretary of State Byrnes, in his 1945 conference with Molotov in Moscow. Byrnes, a man skilled in high-level negotiations, went to the conference geared for coming to an understanding with the Soviets as soon as possible. All his experience and training had been in that direction. What he did not suspect was that Molotov and his associates had been trained in the contrary process of *not* reaching an agreement.

BYRNES has never been the same since. Later American negotiators, such as Marshall, Jessup, and Acheson, also had their fill of frustrations in dealing with the Soviets. As for American delegates to the

United Nations, they have had to put steel into their souls in order to be able to listen patiently to the long hours of propaganda invective in which the Soviet delegates always indulge. It is evident that their purpose is to waste the West's time and strength.

So it's a problem of what to do in any matter involving the Soviets or their satellites. Impatient people have suggested that the only good method is to refuse to have any dealings with them. "Expel them from the United Nations," they say. Such treatment would, of course, afford the Communists a propaganda field day in those areas of the world where they are still not known for exactly what they are. It would be represented as the suppression of free speech not to allow the Soviets a forum where they would be free to abuse and malign everyone as they will.

THERE IS another method of dealing with them. That is the shadow method.

In the earlier days of autocratic east European régimes (as if there weren't any now in eastern Europe) there was a celebrated journalistic institution known far and wide as the "shadow board of editors." Papers which were combating a régime were always in a position where the régime's secret police might descend upon them, close the plant, and arrest the editors and contributors. To

forestall such a disaster, these rebel papers usually maintained a shadow staff of editors.

Actually these shadow editors were merely dummies who had volunteered, for the sake of the common cause, to let themselves be arrested as the editorial culprits—and to serve time in prison too. Meanwhile, the real editors were always at liberty to continue their work.

IN THE same way, but inverting the order, the United States could set up a staff of shadow negotiators and debaters, and send them to all United Nations meetings and to all international conferences to which the Soviets send delegates on the pretext of wanting to conclude an agreement. In this case, obviously, it would be the shadow men who would be sent in against the Soviet delegates. These should be men without nerves, never in a hurry, conditioned by training or habit never to agree on anything.

Some might complain, of course, that the United States was descending to the same level as the Soviets, but it could be thoroughly explained to the critics by our own information services that we were simply wearing down the Soviet bores, and that this was necessary policy, not an indication of our character.

AFTER ALL, men like Vishinsky and Gromyko, whatever their official titles, are shadows too. They are not

really Foreign Ministers, diplomats, makers of foreign policy, conclusers of treaties. They have no such powers. Actually they are simply Soviet dummies, authorized only to block, disagree, object, and fulminate at international meetings and conferences. They should be recognized and regarded as such, and should not be honored with the time and thought of our Secretaries of State, our United Nations delegates, our negotiators. Whenever these men appear, let us throw in our shadow delegates to cope with them, and let us save our statesmen for times and occasions when there is really some chance of agreeing on something.

FOR our purpose, some old time-honored Southern filibusterers would do very well as shadow delegates. And, since the Eisenhower Administration is devoted to the principle of teamwork, it might borrow its strategy from the football tactics of the late Knute Rockne of Notre Dame and of his eminent successor Frank Leahy. Rockne, you may remember, always maintained three equally powerful teams on his Notre Dame squad. Often he would throw in a man for just one play, and in that play the man gave his all. When the opposition was sufficiently softened, so that a real play for a touchdown could be made, he would unleash either Secretary of State Harry Stuhldreher or Secretary of State Don Miller, and send him streaking down the field to conclude negotiations for an eighty-yard touchdown. Coach Eisenhower could do this against the Soviet team.

Come to think of it, we don't need to go to the filibustering South for a chief shadow delegate. How about Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R., Wisconsin)? It is hard to believe that since the man exists, no useful function can be found for him in the universal order of things. Here is perhaps the role for which he was born.

When the Soviet team, including Coach Stalin, is all worn out by McCarthy, we can send John Foster Dulles for a long run around the Iron Curtain. But we certainly shall object to seeing Dulles ground down in the all too familiar Soviet scrimmage and party-line play.

INAUGURATION

Two men, two men in an open car,
The one who lost, the one who won,
The one beginning, the other done,
Two men in an open car.

Two men, two men who smile and wave,
The one in peace, the other in pride,
The two with humbleness inside,
Two men who smile and wave.

God bless the old, God save the new,
The one who lays his burden down,
The one who wears the heavy crown,
God bless and save the new.

—SEC