



WHO— WHAT— WHY—

WHEN this issue appears, the no man's land between the old and the new Administrations will at last have been crossed. We know already that the Eisenhower Administration has called upon the talents of big businessmen to run some of the major agencies of government. We know their names and the nature of their past experience, but we must wait before we can know how these men will develop when faced with the responsibility of power.

But the fact is that these big businessmen have been wielding not only economic but also political power for a long time. They have not simply been providing the nation with useful commodities; they have also had to impress on the people at large the usefulness of their functions and to appeal to the people as if they depended on the people's votes. This process, a political process, is called public relations.

In many of its aspects big business is a sort of private government. What are the basic things that these men who have been successfully running private governments must learn in order to run the government of the United States? For between the two the difference is not one of size alone but of quality. This is the problem we asked **A. A. Berle, Jr.** to tackle. We know of no better authority. He has been in government—Assistant Secretary of State from 1938 to 1944. As a young man he served with the American delegation at the Versailles Peace Conference. He has been a diplomat—Ambassador to Brazil. As if that were not enough, he has also been professor of corporation law at Columbia Law School since 1927, and it can be said that he has devoted a lifetime to studying our gigantic corporate structures in their relation to the country's life. His book, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, is justly considered a classic, and he is now at work on a study of the corporation and the state. He has approached the subject with an attitude devoid of partisanship which is wholly shared by *The Reporter*.

BUT what of the leader of the biggest of all businesses—the U.S. government? We have known Eisenhower the wartime general and Eisenhower the candidate. For four years we are now going to see Eisenhower the President—but we have not yet forgotten Eisenhower the candidate. What was Eisenhower like in that curious in-between period after November 4 when the Presidency was no longer a goal but a fixed and fast-approaching date? We present a candid-camera account by a man who cov-

ered Mr. Eisenhower during those days of transition. The author, **Ladislav Farago**, editorial director of the Keystone Press Agency, held an important position during the war in the Office of Naval Intelligence and wrote, with Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias, *Behind Closed Doors*.

ALTHOUGH we can only look at straws in the wind for guidance in discussing the new Administration, we have an overwhelming mass of facts by which to assess the role played by President Eisenhower's predecessor. Mr. Truman, especially at moments when he had to make the gravest decisions, has always been conscious—but not self-conscious—that history would be his final judge. **Elmer Davis** shows that history is composed of many and changing histories. His estimate of the assets and liabilities that Truman will present for the accounting of history is friendly but in no way partisan. The man from Indiana looks at the man from Missouri. In both there is a strong streak of humanity and wisdom—more articulate in Mr. Davis because he is a professional writer—and both these representative Midwesterners show how false is our habit of identifying the Midwest with isolationism. For once we need not go into a writer's background: In our opinion there is nothing quite like the position Elmer Davis has made for himself in American journalism, and we are proud to have him write for us.

IT is frequently said that ugly and dreary as the Korean War continues to be, it at least has served the purpose of testing our latest military equipment and of training our soldiers. That is the kind of cliché and half-truth that *The Reporter* likes to take apart. In "Are We Teaching More Than We Learn?" a former regular Army officer who served in China during and after the last war shows that the testing and training work both ways. It is the people who have the most to learn who benefit the most from schooling. **James Colwell** (a pseudonym) gauges the extent to which the Korean War may be helping Communist China to build a modern army.

OUR European correspondent, **Theodore H. White**, has been visiting England after a year's absence. He finds the British people exhilarated by the prospect of the Coronation and thoroughly bored with politics. Perhaps this is because they see no real change since Mr. Churchill's return to power: The fact is that all British parties,

no matter what they call themselves, are Social Democratic Parties, and that such a pattern, once set, is not easily changed.

CONTINUING our analysis of the last election through the long morning after, **Harvey Wheeler** looks at the fateful process—from a Democratic viewpoint—by which the main groups that party has relied on for support are disintegrating. In his opinion, the Democrats are in danger of facing a long, long drought, and the party will need something more than A.D.A. vitamins (Philadelphia recipe) if it is to survive. Mr. Wheeler is a professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University.

AS OUR readers know, the "Views and Reviews" section of this magazine is the place where contributors express their more personal views. We are happy to give **Bill Mauldin** the same freedom to comment on things as he sees them that he enjoyed during the war in his cartoons for *Stars & Stripes*. He rose to fame as the spokesman for the G.I. to the civilian world; in a "Dear Joe" series of letters starting in this issue, he will now interpret a thoroughly bewildering civilian world to an old G.I. pal in Korea. Mauldin remains very much of an unconstructed G.I. himself, with all the G.I.'s gripes and, visibly enough, his strong prejudice against the brass. The section also contains our usual TV coverage, which, because it deals also with G.I.s, may get **Marya Mannes** into an argument with Bill Mauldin; **Hillel Bernstein**, author of *L'Affaire Jones*, reviews the history of reform in the United States.

WE ARE NOT in the crystal-ball business, but in our next issue we shall look at the possibility of what used to be frankly called a depression—a word now superstitiously replaced by such euphemisms as "recession" or "disinflation."

What are the various ways which the Republican Administration will take to avoid a danger that is real no matter what it is called? There will be a picture of the key men responsible for economic matters in the new Administration. This time the spokesman in the "Long Morning After" series will be a Republican Congressman, **Hugh Scott**, a former chairman of the Republican National Committee. We shall also look at the Congressional committees. What are they supposed to do? In practice, what is their actual accomplishment? Why is it that even the best among them can so easily go astray?

The State of the Larger Union

Soon the people of Great Britain will be cheering their Queen as she proceeds through the streets of London to her Coronation, just as the American people have cheered their President at his inauguration in Washington. The British ceremony is a celebration of historical continuity; ours, this time, marks a break with twenty years of the New Deal and the Fair Deal; the British parade the solemn ritual of their past; our drum majorettes herald a new set of leaders who promise a radical housecleaning in the immediate future.

For all our brashness there is a stirring quality about our pageantry. Yet it is difficult to avoid a curious feeling of unreality. Because, overshadowing all the celebration, there is a dreadful continuity weighing upon the new men and the nation. It is a continuity not foreseen by the Constitution and for which there are no precedents in previous changes in the party in power; it comes from the fact that our nation is engaged in a life-and-death conflict with a merciless enemy. No change in Administration can change that fact. All the measures anticipated by the new men, such as reductions in public expenditures, taxes, etc., are likely to prove no more than pious intentions because of the grip this enemy has on us.

This does not mean that the grip cannot be shaken; indeed it must be, but this requires a thorough stocktaking of our policies, foreign and domestic, if we are to make a fresh start.

In no field is the nation more indebted to Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman than in their conduct of foreign affairs. Franklin Roosevelt saved our country during the war. The Truman Administration built the system of alliances that has allowed the nation to face a new enemy and to counteract his aggression. Yet it is exactly our foreign policy that now must be the object of a thorough stocktaking. Adlai Stevenson would have had to tackle this job if he had won.

WE ARE NOW, and we have been for some years, in an emergency of unlimited duration. No four-year Marshall Plan or Point Four program can set

the world straight once and for all. Even the Atlantic alliance, far from freeing us from the need of constant interventions in the internal affairs of the allied countries, has made such interventions, so to speak, institutional. Single measures, such as assistance to Greece and Turkey, or, in the old days, Lend-Lease, frequently brilliant, always daring, have become too perilous, if for no other reason than that the peril is recurrent and always comes from the same source.

There is much to be learned from the way foreign affairs were conducted, first against Nazism, then against Communism—things that we must do again and better, and things that we must never repeat. About our wartime alliance with Russia, for instance: We must learn to distinguish between allied nations with which we are united in common principles and lasting goals, and co-belligerents, whose alignment on our side has been decided by the enemy rather than ourselves. The lesson that Stalin has taught us must not be lost now that we are dealing with Tito and Franco and Chiang Kai-shek.

The last war taught us another bitter lesson: We cannot assume the Godlike function of deciding that a country is not only a power but indeed a Great Power, and indeed one of the five Great Powers entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations. In fact, China became a Great Power—under Mao—not because of any unity its people freely gained, but because they were made into a nation by the most ruthless of war lords.

In the same way it is supremely unwise—even if it is fashionable in United Nations circles—to endorse and take to our bosom any of the new nationalist movements in colonial or semi-independent countries without first considering what the so-called nations are likely to do with their independence. Our representatives in the United Nations and throughout the world must maintain a respectful but never mushy attitude—kind and tough—toward the nationalisms of all countries big or small.

We must be unblushing and unself-conscious in recognizing the fact that we interfere in the internal political and economic life of foreign countries. Our