

assistance more generous than that promised in the 1950 agreements. And in its own interest Moscow seems to have helped Peking much more than it had originally intended. Russian industrial plant and technical assistance have played an important part in China's recovery after fifteen years of war, although it is still an open question whether all this has compensated China for the war booty to which the Russians helped themselves in Manchuria.

The Russians would obviously like the Chinese to produce their own munitions, including heavy artillery, tanks, and planes. But Moscow must also keep an eye first of all on the requirements of its own Five-Year Plan and then on the demands of the other countries within the Soviet orbit. Russia is now avowedly in a much better position to contribute to the industrialization and armament of China than it was in 1950.

Nevertheless, the margin of re-

sources which Moscow can spare for this purpose is still narrow because of the extremely strenuous pressure of Russia's continued industrialization. Stalin is convinced that, in terms of power politics and economics, the returns on domestic investment are quicker and more cumulative than those on investment in China. He therefore favors those forms of economic assistance that are least likely to lead to the dissipation of Russian resources. The emphasis in the Russian program has been on supplying China with technical skill rather than industrial plant.

FOR ALL its indubitable realism, this policy has given rise to disappointment among Chinese Communists. They welcome the Russian technicians; they learn from them eagerly; but they would like to get more Russian machinery. The Russians have to go to considerable trouble to explain their attitude.

In justification of that attitude a

Russian correspondent in Peking quotes an ancient Chinese tale:

A saintly Chinese sage was blessed with a finger which worked miracles. By a touch of this finger he changed pieces of rock into bars of gold. From all the villages in his neighborhood the poor flocked to his cave in the mountains to ask for help. One day a man came from a very remote place. He begged for help not for himself but for his whole poverty-stricken tribe.

"But how can I help a whole tribe in a far country?" the sage asked.

"Give me your finger," the stranger replied.

The saintly man was so distressed over the poverty of the man that he readily agreed to cut off his finger. But his finger, when it was cut off, failed to change stone into gold.

The moral of the story is clear: The Sage of the Kremlin will not allow the Chinese to bite off his finger, no matter how long the Chinese wait hungrily in Moscow.

# Moscow, Prague, And Israel

FRED M. HECHINGER

THE RECENT purge of ranking Czech Communists had been in the making for so long that it seemed like the explosion of a time bomb that had been ticking for years; those who saw it being planted knew it would go off some day; when it did (about two years later than could reasonably have been expected), it still produced a shock.

What is surprising, however, is that despite all the background knowledge, despite the near certainty of what was going to happen, the press missed some of the significance of the climax. Most editorial comment dwelt on the anti-Semitic theme of the trials and pointed to the horror of it: the completion of the full circle—from Nazi occupa-

tion, with its anti-Jewish excesses, through the brief return to democracy, the Red coup in 1948, and, now, the Communist version of Heydrich's persecution of the Jews.

BUT the stress should have been laid on the coldly calculated nature of the move. The anti-Semitism of recent weeks is no different in purpose from the anti-anti-Semitism which the Soviets proclaimed so loudly in the postwar days of Poland. The protection of the Jews then, the widely advertised Soviet opposition to any sort of racial discrimination, had nothing whatsoever to do with any sense of right and wrong or any humanitarian sentimentality. It was the current neces-

sity of the party line, which at the time aimed to achieve certain objectives, among them the winning over of the non-white races. Racial equality, therefore, was the slogan-instrument. (In a similar way the Soviets have switched with ease from an opposition to all national sovereignty to the exploitation of extreme nationalism and the "right of self-determination.")

Among those who fell for the line were those few Jews who accepted the slogan, rationalized that it was therefore permissible for them to rise to power in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and drowned out the voices of their own consciences with that rationalization.

The preparations for the purge

were in the making during my last visit to Prague in late 1948. And since I also covered the last part of the Arab-Israeli war during that same year, the events of recent weeks fall easily into perspective.

While in Prague, I confronted one Czech official of Jewish background with the question, after all other reasoning had failed, how he could betray his own heritage by making himself the tool of a cynical totalitarianism. He lost, for the moment, his stern and official Communist composure and, as if he were pleading for understanding, he replied with counterquestions: Did I not know what the Nazis had done? Could I not see that Russia offered the Jews the assurance that Germany would not go on a similar rampage again? He did not say it, but his voice and his eyes showed that he was looking for an excuse.

It was an excuse, it must be added, that the great majority of Jews who were left in Czechoslovakia and Poland spurned. Some of them came to me secretly, with that familiar hunted look of the inhabitants of a police state, saying that their only hope and prayer was to get out of the country.

They realized what history has shown to be an inescapable truth: that in a police state the rights of minorities are never protected, and that eventually the minorities must pay for the errors and crimes committed by the leaders of the state. This is true simply because totalitarianism cannot admit error or failure, and must therefore persecute its scapegoats at every turning point of policy or party line. If power is to remain safe in the hands of the dictators, the scapegoats must come from the minorities, since they matter least in terms of consolidated power. While minorities may often be exposed to injustices even in democracies, any hope they may have for justice and protection under totalitarian rule is a total illusion.

### The Trap

Among the major charges brought against the Prague defendants was that they had shipped arms to Israel. The most important element in that charge is that it is true. As anyone who traveled with the

Israeli armies knew then, Czech arms and munitions from the Skoda factories were second in importance only to American arms. There was, however, a difference. American arms actually were shipped secretly and by "private contributors," often under difficult circumstances. Czech arms, on the other hand, came in quite openly and with the accom-



paniment of some officially inspired propaganda in Prague.

This was not a conspiracy by Slansky and the rest. It was the policy of Prague, by command of the Kremlin. One indication of this—aside from the fact that in a police state you don't brag loudly about forbidden actions—was that the Czech shippers demanded cash payment for their arms, and they wanted payment in American dollars. Officials in Prague used to laugh about what they called "Israel's Marshall aid to Czechoslovakia." It might be added that Skoda was owned, run, and supervised by the government, and it is difficult to smuggle large quantities of arms, let alone tanks, out of a Communist-administered defense plant.

The fact that these arms were shipped, probably under orders officially signed by many of the defendants, makes the recent trials something of a novelty in the history of Communist purges. The confessions did not have to be manufactured laboriously; the evidence was officially on record.

The motive behind Moscow's and Prague's shipments of arms to Israel had, of course, nothing to do with any belief that the Jews' plea for a homeland was a just one. Soviet plans demanded control of the Middle East. British policy then was openly hostile to Israel and friendly to the Arab States. For the Russians to join Britain in support of the Arabs was out of the question, especially since the only force that seemed to count at all—Jordan's Arab Legion—was British equipped, and the British were then too far ahead in Arab favor for the Russians to attempt to catch up.

Israel, then, was the logical foothold. It was a modern industrialized and mechanized state. It opposed the British—at least militarily (and fortunately the Soviets underestimated the power of cultural and traditional ties). It had a strong left-wing party, which, the Soviets thought, might be pushed all the way to Communism.

The Russians were not the only ones to be misled by appearances. When I returned home in 1948, many Americans talked dourly of Israel as a leftist menace and spoke against the Truman-Acheson support of the new state as something counter to American interests. I remember a press report which said ominously that Israeli troops could be heard singing Communist songs in Tel Aviv night clubs. This was true; they were the songs which Communists and non-Communists had been singing together in Nazi concentration camps. These were the people who had done most of their recent singing in such camps.

### The Errors

But the Soviet line and American stereotypes both proved wrong. The Kremlin's policy, which is often made to appear infallible by the professional anti-Communists here, failed miserably, and for these reasons:

First, the often maligned Truman-Acheson policy of supporting Israel against the British-Arab combination gave Israel a workable alternative to either defeat or sell-out to Soviet military support.

Second, the stream of refugees, who soon were to make up the majority

of the population, had escaped from Nazi terror and from Soviet police states. I accompanied one shipload of fifteen hundred of these people on an unseaworthy little river steamer from Marseilles to Haifa, and I knew then that it made little sense for anyone to undergo the hardship of that trek and what had come before it if he had any notion of trading one dictatorship for another.

Third, every thinking person in Israel knew that the new state could hope to escape economic collapse in its first phase of development only if U.S. benefactors could tide it over.

WHEN it became clear that Israel would have no truck with Moscow, the Kremlin had to revise its entire timetable. The British had meanwhile been losing a considerable part of their influence and many of their friends in the Arab nations. It was time for a change of Soviet policy. It is even reasonable to believe that this is part of a major, not simply a local Middle Eastern, switch; since Russia's hostile attitude toward India's recent Korean-truce proposal would indicate that Red China and the Arab states are now the major eastern objects of Communist affection.

Obviously neither Prague nor the Kremlin could admit collapse of a major Soviet foreign-policy plank. The men in the Kremlin had protected themselves by keeping Prague alone in the aid-to-Israel limelight. But Prague could only explain failure by turning once-official policy retroactively into treason.

The second major issue of the purge trials also was written on the walls of Prague in legible handwriting as early as the fall of 1948: Czechoslovakia's economy and foreign trade.

A Czech official, a member of the planning Cabinet in charge of the Five-Year Plan, told me at a moment of exceptional and startling honesty that the only way to save the Czech economy from collapse was to aim at trade with the West—and to send a minimum of thirty-five per cent of Czechoslovakia's exports westward by 1950.

This was no secret in Czech government circles. In fact, officials talked freely of the need for con-



tinued and greater East-West trade. Such talk would not have been so free if it had not been endorsed by the Kremlin. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the officials concerned with Czech economic policy, although they were loyal Communists, entered into trade negotiations with the West. (It ought to be remembered that even last year the Soviets invited western businessmen to a Moscow Trade Conference.) It was therefore easy to provide the evidence and to document the "confessions" of this so-called conspiracy.

### The About-Face

Finally, and perhaps most important in estimating Soviet intentions, the purge trials are directly linked with the Soviets' policy toward Germany. All the defendants are members of that "old guard" which rode to power (or rationalized its ride to power) with the former Soviet slogan of holding Germany down, of stopping any further German aggression and, in the case of the Jews, of preventing the recurrence of German anti-Semitic terror.

But even in 1948 that "policy" had begun to shift. Many Czechs, some of them non-Communists and others disillusioned Communists, whispered to me of their fear that the Russian high command might sell out Czechoslovakia (and incidentally Poland) in favor of a Sovietized East Germany. While Dr. Benes was being given a state funeral by the Communist Government in Prague, newspapers in the Soviet Zone of Ger-

many were referring to him as a "murderer of innocent Sudeten Germans." Apparently the Soviet authorities did not object to those German sentiments. (Incidentally, this correspondent pointed to these ominous changes in Soviet policy in *The Reporter's* January 31, 1950, issue, and warned of the coming of the Czech purges in press reports from Prague in the fall of 1948.)

Slowly East Germany, with its more strategic position, was to become the No. 1 satellite. Czechoslovakia was to assume a subordinate position. There were sporadic strikes and even outbursts of minor violence in 1948 when Czech railroad workers were outraged to find large food shipments going from a hungry Czechoslovakia to East Germany. Everything pointed to the fact that Soviet policy would be guided entirely by military and power-political considerations, not by ideology.

THIS left the old guard in a precarious position. Everything they had stood for—if some of them had stood for anything more than personal opportunism—had evaporated. Those who had been honestly worried about the revival of German aggressive power had become outdated by a new turn in the Kremlin's party line. Now they were being steamrollered by the reversed Soviet policy. If, in the course of it all, they could also serve as scapegoats who could be blamed for people's going hungry; if, at the same time, the still entrenched despots could make use of the latent Czech anti-Semitism—so much the better.

As for the western world, it ought to ponder well this further object lesson in the cold fact that the Soviet planners are not concerned with ideologies except as far as they serve power-political design. Fortunately, as the real background of these purges indicates, these planners and their plans are far from infallible. As for the condemned men—it is unlikely that any of them really tried to serve the West during their tenure in office. But if the West will take the trouble to heed what their fall from power really means, then their final fate will have been to serve the West, against their will, in their last hour.

# *The Long Morning After—I:*

## Which Road for the Democrats?

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.

*For years to come, the life of peoples at home and abroad will register the impact of the decision the American electorate made on November 4, 1952. This is why, not to harp on old dissensions but to see as clearly as we can into the future, an effort must be made to evaluate the nature and the causes of the election returns. Such an undertaking can be greatly helped when men who, during the campaign, held different views apply themselves to the common task of appraising its results. The following article is the first in such a series.*

**R**ARELY has any American politician made so profound an impression on so many people in so short a time as Adlai Stevenson. Never in American history has any Presidential candidate succeeded so remarkably in losing the election and winning the electorate. Only two men have polled more votes in the nation's history: Franklin Roosevelt in 1936 and Dwight Eisenhower in 1952. The almost one hundred thousand letters which poured into Springfield after the election—many of them from Republicans with a bad conscience—make clear the extent to which even those who voted against Stevenson want to look to him for national leadership in the years to come. His campaign achieved everything except victory.

The purpose of a Presidential campaign is to display the character of the candidate. No one can act a role through all the agony and fatigue of a campaign, all the grueling months of impossible hours, incessant speeches, and implacable public appearances. The true lineaments are bound to slip through, no matter how skilled the advance men, how resourceful the public-relations specialists, how ingenious the ghost writers. You cannot superimpose a

synthetic new style on an old personality; the attempt to do this, one sensed, caused the bad moments in the Eisenhower campaign. The General was only saved by the fact that nothing he did in three months of campaigning quite succeeded in defacing the image cherished for so many years by the American people.

**G**OVERNOR STEVENSON'S campaign was as much his own as any Presidential campaign can ever be in this age of mass production, mass consumption, and mass communication. He made the basic decisions, chose the key people, and personally established the tone and pitch. He could have done no other without constraining or distorting his personality—and this, he believed, would be the surest road to defeat. It was



typical of Stevenson that he had intended from the start, if elected, to visit Korea and the Far East. It took no ghost writer to give him the idea. But he would not have dreamed of publicizing the trip as providing

hope for a solution. He would not cash in on people's anxieties. His Calvinistic attitude toward the lures and wiles of politics often perplexed and exasperated his staff, but in the end they came to feel that the integrity of his personality was his most powerful weapon.

Stevenson knew what he was like and recoiled from giving the public any false impressions. He had a profound and eloquent vision of the possibilities of American life and the American character. He spoke the vision across the land—and would not stain it with sophistry or demagoguery. He refused to make promises when he did not really believe there was a good chance to deliver. He hated to cater to special groups by taking the required position on the issues that were dear to them. He flinched from the clichés of liberal oratory. He refused, above all, to excite false hopes about easy solutions—whether the hopes of businessmen seeking vast tax reductions, of Negroes seeking equal rights, or of the American people seeking a quick end to the tragic war in Korea. He did all this with a wit and a capacity for hard, clean political infighting which rescued it from any hint of sanctimony and priggishness. And the image of the man came through. No candidate for a long time has evoked such passion or commitment from his followers—or such respect from his opponents.

### Victims of Success

And yet he lost. In the first stunned moments after the election, many people agreed with Elmer Davis's gloomy remark that it might be many years before another man would run for President on a platform of talking sense. Cynical parodies of famous phrases from the acceptance address were to be heard among Stevenson's