

# Europe's Most Vital Unfinished Business

GUY MOLLET

*The treaty to establish a European Defense Community, the central objective of all American diplomacy in western Europe, was signed in May, 1952, by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. But before the treaty goes into effect, it must be ratified by the various west European parliaments. Its fate depends largely on one country—France. And in France, the parliamentary votes are so divided that ratification of the treaty depends on one bloc—the hundred French Socialist Deputies in the National Assembly. These Deputies are influenced by their party's secretary-general, Guy Mollet, more than by any other personality in their ranks. In this article, Guy Mollet has written for THE REPORTER an authoritative explanation of the reservations and conditions French Socialists place upon their support of the EDC.*

THE PROBLEM of European unification is of course linked to that of Europe's military defense; but while no one denies that the Russian threat is a major factor in the European drive toward unity, it would be a mistake to think that the obvious need for defense is the most important consideration involved. Even if there were no military threat, the nations of Europe would still have to break down the obsolete barriers between the peoples of Europe which restrict markets and make economic co-ordination impossible.

Socialists, and particularly French Socialists, were among the first to attack the problem of unification after the war, because they believe that no nation by its own resources can assure its economic balance and social progress, or guarantee its in-

dependence. A renowned Socialist, Ernest Bevin, once said that the nations of Europe must live united or perish one after the other. The danger they face is not only invasion but also economic stagnation and social chaos.

I SHALL not labor the obvious reasons why we Socialists were forced to abandon the project of unifying all the peoples of continental Europe. The adamant opposition of the Soviet Union and its satellites to all effective co-operation compelled us to give up theoretical plans for a Europe federated from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains and to substitute the concept of a

free Europe open to any nation willing to accept democracy for itself and as the law of nations.

Differences of opinion appeared at the outset among the fifteen countries which established the Council of Europe in Strasbourg last March. It was soon evident that the British, followed by the Scandinavians, were hostile to even the partial loss of sovereignty implicit in the creation of a supranational authority. Complete federation was therefore impossible unless we were willing to build a Europe without Great Britain's participation.

We Socialists were and are strongly opposed to any such plan. Were we reduced, then, to nothing



more than the traditional formula of simple co-operation among governments? Obviously such a plan could not solve Europe's difficulties. It could not integrate Germany into a European whole and thus assure German participation in the defense of Europe. For even if we French Socialists have always advocated giving our former enemy equal rights in the European Community, we cannot tolerate the granting of total autonomy to a German state with a German national army at its disposal. This, we feel, would endanger European security and world peace, and would be eminently dangerous to German democracy itself.

**O**UR PROBLEM was further complicated by the fact that some of those who were working for a united Europe were tempted, when faced with British and Scandinavian abstention, to create a federal community of only those nations that were willing to give up a certain amount of national sovereignty. This reasoning led to the project of a six-power federation—Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—a project that French Socialists can in no way endorse.

Not only would such a shrunken Europe be economically unviable; the formula would contradict the whole concept of a unified Europe. It would create between the federated and the unfederated nations a division that would bring about the worst sort of economic and political competition. Furthermore, we Socialists insist that in the Europe we are building, Great Britain must become the indispensable counterweight to Germany—particularly in military matters.

### A Third Course

The two tentative solutions to the problem—a six-power community with unlimited authority and simple co-operation between governments—must both be rejected. A majority of French Socialists have turned to a third: the “functional supranational community.” Instead of a community that would be geographically limited to a particular number of nations (six are involved at present) and which would have unlimited authority, instead of a superstate



governing a fixed and exclusive number of nations, we Socialists have accepted the principle of specialized communities. Each of these communities would handle a specific problem: coal, steel, agriculture, transport, power, defense, health, and so on.

Under this formula the number of participating states would not be limited. A nation unwilling to participate in a transportation community might nevertheless find it advantageous to belong to an agriculture community. It would thus become possible to fulfill two of our major aims, that of creating flexible institutions capable of attracting the greatest possible number of adherents and that of creating as strong a bond as possible between these various specialized communities and nonparticipating nations such as Great Britain.

It was with this purpose that we voted to ratify the Coal and Steel Community, better known as the Schuman Plan. But when it came to the European Defense Community, major difficulties arose. The Socialist Party debated the subject at length, and in May, 1952, the party's national congress adopted the following resolution:

“In the matter of the draft for the European Defense Community, whose final text is not yet known, the party will decide the question of ratification in a meeting of its national council. The latter will evaluate to what degree satisfaction has been obtained on points it considers essential for the effectiveness of the treaty, notably:

“An American guarantee against

possible breaking or violation of the treaty by a member nation.

“The form and the nature of the close association to be established between the European Defense Community and Great Britain.

“Reconsideration, in a special agreement that could be brought immediately into effect, of those articles in the treaty concerning the future political structure of Europe.”

It is evident that we French Socialists support the principle of the European Defense Community. It is equally evident that the party will decide in due time—that is to say, at the last minute—whether or not the treaty furnishes the assurances and guarantees upon which the party insists.

**I**N THE FIRST PLACE we think it is necessary that the United States guarantee in some form or other what I call the *indissolubility* of the future Defense Community. Some of the EDC's sincerest supporters fear that in spite of all pledges, a member nation might find it opportune to leave the Community and reclaim its national autonomy. Although the United States government has not been very specific on this point, it would seem, according to certain official declarations, that the Eisenhower Administration shares our point of view. If the State Department would clarify its position, the risk of possible secession would be greatly diminished.

The third point of the Socialist resolution concerns the future political structure of Europe, and it comes next in the order of our present anxieties. Naturally we pay particular attention to the question of democratic control of the EDC and to the nature of its political authority. The expression “political authority” has caused regrettable confusion. For the supporters of a six-power federation have interpreted Socialist agreement on the principle of political authority as constituting agreement with their own concept of a federated superstate.

But these partisans of the “Little Europe” idea do not follow their own theories to a logical conclusion. A true federation implies a central supranational power, an authority competent in almost all fields and

controlled by a parliament directly elected by the peoples of the federated states. It implies, furthermore, the existence among all peoples integrated in the federation of a sort of federal consciousness which transcends national consciousness.

The fact is that no such federal consciousness exists at present among the peoples of the six-power federation. They are keenly aware of certain common interests but not of a total community of interest. The "Little Europe" federalists, obliged to take this fact into consideration, have tended to leave to member states all their basic powers and to delegate to the federal government only limited powers over which the member states still exercise control. And they have done this while continuing to advocate almost total powers for the federal authority.

The unavoidable result, so far as one can see it in the blueprint for a European political community drafted in March by the *ad hoc* assembly in Strasbourg, is that the real power and competence remain with the member states represented by a Council of Ministers, while the other branches of the projected European Community, with its Executive, Parliament, and Court, would have no more than nominal competence and power. The federal authority, condemned to wait until the governments concerned delegated their powers, would be reduced to a consultative organization.

### The Art of the Possible

We Socialists propose a different formula: the creation of a central authority with truly supranational powers but powers to be exercised only within precisely defined fields. For the time being, this central authority would handle defense and coal and steel, since these two communities already exist and include the same participants.

The "Little Europe" project makes co-operation between member and nonmember states increasingly difficult. Whether its authority remained vague or whether the federation became a real superstate, its relations with nonparticipating states would be equally difficult.

This is the basis for our opposition to the present project. If truly



democratic control over EDC were assured, we Socialists would find it easier to ratify. But the present clumsy insistence on a pseudo federation of six powers will only strengthen our doubts.

OUR THIRD anxiety, the weightiest of them all, is the necessity of bringing Great Britain into EDC. A great many factors make Britain's presence imperative. It is of the utmost importance that the internal balance of the Community be assured so that no one state predominates. It must not be thought that we French suffer from an inferiority complex; it is simple common sense that leads us to acknowledge that France's presence in itself is not enough to counterbalance the influence of Germany. The balance of power would be totally changed with Great Britain in the Community.

Furthermore, it is in Great Britain's interest to avoid letting the EDC be dominated by forces which would inevitably bring about a shift in alliances. It is also in Great Britain's interest to strengthen an international third force that can play a great role in safeguarding peace.

Exactly what precise form such British participation should take is not our task to define. That is a question for specialists. What matters to us, from a broad political point of view, is that the treaty should provide for British participation in the deliberations of EDC and, still more, that British troops should remain on the Continent as long as EDC remains operative.

The British are visibly reluctant to enter into any precise engagements. Rightly or wrongly, they fear that the United States, assuming that EDC and British forces are enough to defend Europe, will withdraw American troops from the Continent. The British objection is a serious one, and it is not in our power to change the facts on which it is based. But we Socialists are inclined to suggest that a solution might be found by extending the NATO agreements so that American troops will remain in Europe during the lifetime of the EDC.

Our British friends occasionally show their irritation at our continued insistence that they commit themselves formally to defending Europe. Asking them to do that, they say, reveals a lack of confidence. That is not the case at all. We do not doubt that Great Britain is sincerely determined to take an effective part in the defense of the Continent. But we French are forced to enter into specific treaty obligations, and we feel, therefore, that our allies should do so too. Sometimes circumstances make necessary exact commitments of intentions, even when no one doubts them. The British intend to participate in Europe's defense; that intention must be spelled out in the treaty.

### The Loyal Opposition

Here I should like to call the attention of American readers to the peculiar character of the problems with which the ratification of the EDC treaty confronts the French Socialist Party.

The position of our Socialist Party is known abroad only through incomplete and, only too often, slanted press accounts. And of course it is easy enough to misrepresent our position on the basis of some speech made by one or another of our party members. We Socialists are democrats; only those decisions made after free debate in the official meetings of the Socialist Party express our stand.

Everyone knows that a certain number of French Socialists are, on principle and for fairly obvious reasons, extremely hostile to any German participation in the European army. These Socialists are a minority

within the party. Another minority would be willing to ratify the treaty even if, when the time came to vote, no satisfactory answer had been made to the reservations and demands made officially by the Socialist Party. This second minority, more afraid of Russia than of Germany, has been won over to the idea of European federation, even if it is limited to six nations. I must insist that it is not these minorities that will decide. It is the majority of the Socialists who will decide, but not until they know whether or not satisfactory answers have been given on the points outlined here.

**T**HE FRENCH political situation is characterized by the fact that all recent Cabinets have derived their powers from the Center and the Right, and their financial, economic, and social policies, in our opinion as Socialists, have been catastrophically opposed to the interests of the working classes. We Socialists therefore remain in absolute opposition to any and all French Governments dependent on this kind of majority.

The time will come when we must vote for or against the treaty. If we decide to vote for ratification, that will quite probably mean supporting a Government we oppose. Since the Government will surely lose some of its usual support, it may mean, also, that our votes will be responsible for keeping that Government in power. We want so strongly to organize a peaceful Europe that, if need be, we shall subordinate legitimate internal politics to that end.

I am proud to say this. But I would like to make clear the dilemma in which we are placed. In voting to ratify the EDC treaty, we would save a Government we would like to see fall. It is easy to predict what our adversaries, particularly the Communists, would say in that event. With their usual bad faith they would accuse us of being the accomplices of reaction.

That is why the French Socialist Party, no matter how anxious it is to help organize collective security and Europe's defense, cannot vote for ratification unless its demands for the treaty's revision are taken into consideration. These demands we consider legitimate.

## VIEWS & REVIEWS

# A Woman Looks At Men's Magazines

NAOMI BARKO

**F**OR those uneasy critics of popular publishing who, as the comic books flourished like weeds and the near-pornography overwhelmed the newsstands, flung their hands to the midtown skyscrapers and moaned "What next?," there is now an answer—the men's magazines.

When the latest census of newsstands was taken, there were twenty-two men's magazines. Circulation managers, who speak of them with something akin to awe, hesitate to go on record with an over-all sales figure, but when one is mentioned it is well over ten million. Ten million copies is almost the combined weekly circulation of *Life*, *Newsweek*, and the *Saturday Evening Post*. While most other magazines since the war have had a slow, respectable sales increase of less than fifteen per cent, the men's field has gained sixty-two per cent.

The material of this publishing bonanza is not easy to define. Coming under the heading of men's magazines are both the blueblooded

*Gentry* and the unsubtle *Sir!* The editors of the sophisticated *Esquire* and the prosperous *Argosy* do not even recognize their poor relations who have never made their way out of pulp paper. But if a curve of sales averages were drawn, the typical men's magazine could be described as the slick grandchild of the pulps, the tabloid newspapers, and the less bitchy women's magazines. From one it has taken the characteristic of escape reading, from another the technique of sensational journalism, and from the third the spurious authenticity of the "true fact."

### War, Women, and Wrongdoing

The best seller of all the men's magazines is a slick, competently written Fawcett publication called *True*. It is significant that only eight years ago *True* was a detective pulp. Its circulation began to climb to its present 1,750,000 only when its publishers discovered the paradoxical base formula for men's magazines: Fact can be better escape than fiction.

True to its name, *True* publishes only articles. The blight of plain fact is removed from them by a style bordering on that of the short story. There is usually action and it is usually presented through a protagonist. But what really makes *True* escape reading is that the facts presented hardly ever touch the lives of its readers. The table of contents of a recent issue listed, among others, "Escape or Die" (an escape from a Japanese prison camp), "The

