

The State of the Community:

Last Reprieve for Europe

DURING the last two years the peoples in the major countries of the Atlantic Community have had their say on the issues presented to them. The returns are in. Nothing more momentous has happened to the Community than this first round of democratic elections—certainly more momentous than the solemn NATO meetings to decide on the number of army divisions and the allotment of military hardware. The Community's capacity for growth is the sum total of the strength and weakness that these elections have brought forth and, for a time, stabilized. Every electoral campaign, from the one in Great Britain in October, 1951, to our own last year was fought almost entirely on domestic issues, as if the Community were the concern of the statesmen rather than of the peoples.

The only exception to this rule has been the election in Germany, a nation that does not yet belong to the Community, is still on probation, and whose democracy was considered quite frail. Yet the Germans, of all people, now have given a lesson to the democracies of the world, old and new, by proclaiming that their nation can never be secure unless it enters into broad and binding compacts with the other nations of Europe. The courage and the candor of Chancellor Adenauer in giving absolute priority to supranational rather than to nationalistic or domestic considerations throw a shocking light on the way the other leaders of the West behaved when they sought the mandate of their peoples. Adenauer's great prestige is further enhanced by the fact that he spoke the whole truth to his people—even the bitter truth about Germany's guilt for the Nazi horrors. Adenauer's presence in high international councils is likely to make the statesmen of other nations uncomfortable and inclined to seek new

justifications for the never quite allayed mistrust of Germany.

Germany's Lucky Tragedy

The alarm at Germany's new virtue can be somewhat soothed if we consider that at the present time, at least, the Germans have many practical reasons for being virtuous and for giving their overwhelming support to Adenauer—the man who considers the cause of Germany and of Europe identical. For the Germans are possessed by the urge to unite Europe, and their destiny largely depends on what their role is in what kind of United Europe. Hitler made a try at it, and the people whom that infamous demagogue had debauched into believing they were the master race found themselves tossed from the delusion of mastery into abject and total defeat. The whole of Germany would have fallen into Communist slavery had it not been for the fortunes of war which stopped Russia short of the Rhine. As to what Communist slavery means, the people of West Germany do not have to conjecture or debate: They can just look at what happens to their brothers across the street.

The fierce vitality of the Germans, more than any other factor, can contribute to galvanize the will to live of the other European peoples—or else once more, and for the last time, run amuck and destroy both Europe and Germany. At present the contrast is sharp between Germany's strength, which since the last election has become the political strength of the German government, and the tragic weakness that France and Italy revealed in their political and municipal elections. A Europe so uneven, with a German hard core and a soft underbelly in the two

Latin countries, bodes no good to Adenauer or to the most responsible European statesmen. All these men consider Europe not as an *ought* but as an *is*, which, to acquire its vital balance, urgently needs new policies and new institutions.

The unity of Europe cannot remain loose and informal as it has been for centuries. It is exposed to two major dangers: German aggressiveness and the Communist threat. Adenauer himself fears this aggressiveness and believes that a United Europe can check it. The Communist threat from within and without can be met only if Europe organizes itself into a new political entity.

The Invisible Frontier

As the recent election has proved once more, West Germany is practically immune from Communist subversion. In Germany the line of demarcation between democracy and Communism is marked in the German earth. But Italy and France are divided deep in their souls.

There is something like a division between eastern and western zones in both countries, but it is an invisible division and the two zones overlap. This is particularly serious in Italy, where, as the last election proved, one out of every three voters is a Communist or a pro-Communist. It is as if two Governments, not just two major parties, were firmly established in the country: one burdened with the daily job of administering the nation, the other a sort of standby Government entrenched in trade unions and in local administrations. Germany is getting now very close to a two-party system; Italy's two-party system, on the contrary, is entirely phony, for the so-called Communist Party is a half-underground, half-aboveground Government.

The Italian and French politicians on the democratic side are frequently inclined to forget that they represent only the "western zones" of their countries and indulge in scrambling for power as if it were possible, with the Communist blocs holding one-third or one-fourth of the seats in parliament, to have a Government and a Loyal Opposition. These politicians are exposed to rude awakenings at election time. Yet normally, just because it is so hard to see how the "eastern zones" can be liberated, democrats in both countries tend to behave as if they did not exist, as if Communism were just a party—a highly respectable party in fact, which many people from all walks of life are inclined to join or to be on friendly terms with—just in case.

IN ITALY the Communist tide is mounting so steadily that some day in the not distant future it could rise above the fifty per cent mark. In no country so far has Communism attained power through

the ballot, but in Italy this is at least possible because the responsible Government, beset by Communist pressure and internal squabbles, has less and less chance of carrying out overdue structural reforms.

In France as in Italy, Communism assiduously cultivates all causes of popular unrest—causes which in both countries long antedate the postwar formation of strong, Moscow-controlled Communist Parties. For certainly it is not because of a Kremlin plot that far too many people are crowded into Italy and mass unemployment is so large. Neither do the Italian and French capitalists take from Moscow the line to which they zealously adhere: Keep production low and profits high, and let the Government socialize the losses of what they still call the system of free enterprise.

The Weary French

Unlike Italian Communism, French Communism seems to have lost most of its aggressiveness and zest. It does not lose ground but it does not advance much either; it seems to be possessed by a gloomy spleen which keeps it unimaginative and sulky while it goes through its daily chores of routinized subversion. It is stuck, and in this respect French Communism is truly French.

No political party or movement has proved strong enough to give France, directly or in coalition with other parties or movements, that kind of steady Government which the Germans have now confirmed in power. Each of the too-many parties checkmates the others, just as each is stymied by the conflicts of factions within its own ranks, just as all organized interests—of the workers as well as of the employers—checkmate and stymie each other. Yet, as everybody knows, the nation is rich and the people are hard workers.

There seems to be irreconcilable conflict between France's vigor and the feeble, tortured image of itself that the country produces at every election. The French have a saying for it: They call it the conflict between the *real* and the *political* country. In fact, they have a saying for everything. But this does not make them any happier or any abler to overcome the national difficulties they so sharply denounce.

We frequently complain, in our country, that the French are critical of us and not good enough friends of America; but we forget that they are bitterly critical of themselves, and that many a Frenchman is not a good friend of himself. The French are still playing at being a great power, for they know what a great power is, having been one. Some of their parties are still playing at revolution—there have been so many revolutions of all possible kinds in the French past. The last was less than ten years ago

at the time of the liberation, and it did not do much to improve the people's lot. In no European country can one see today so many lined, tired faces, with such restless, weary eyes, somewhat afraid that what allows them to see into others may also allow others to see into them.

NOTHING could shock the French more than seeing Germany turn into a paragon of democracy—a democracy that works, and is backed by full American support. For a long time, neutralism has been an extraordinarily widespread yet strangely unorganized sentiment in France as well as in many other European countries. Now, in the renewed fear of Germany, French neutralism has the chance to turn into a powerful political movement. The French would only have to follow in their country the policies advocated by the late Senator Taft for our own. They have available leaders as able and respected as Senator Taft was, men determined to put an end to France's overcommitments in international affairs, to get out of Indo-China at any price, and to concentrate the nation's energies on its tragic domestic plight.

The bitter resentment over the houses that have not been built, over the well-being which despite their hard work they have not attained, can drive the French people toward an all-out policy of France First.

Which Neutrality for Europe?

Chancellor Adenauer is now the leader of Europe and not just of West Germany. Technically he is responsible only to his German constituents. Yet he must take care also of the welfare of France and Italy, for should both countries turn neutral, then West Germany would be exposed to Russian aggression and to American overprotection. Just because United Europe is to him not just a project but a living thing, Adenauer must now exercise his statesmanship to relieve the distress of the two most vulnerable nations on the Continent.

Repeatedly during the last few months Adenauer has advanced the suggestion that the European Defense Community could well propose a nonaggression pact to Soviet Russia. Our Secretary of State did not seem particularly pleased by this suggestion and claimed not to have received the letter Adenauer wrote to inform him of his new plan. Yet there is hardly anything that may be considered anti-American or anti-Atlantic in such a plan, for the Atlantic Community itself was established to

discourage the Soviet government from embarking on military adventures.

Adenauer's proposal simply means that EDC would underwrite the principles of the Community, to which EDC will belong. This underwriting, however, would be an act of European self-government, carrying the implication that Europe has the power to decide if and whether a Soviet attack has occurred—a power which Europe undoubtedly would exercise in conjunction with the other members of the wider Community. Again, it is difficult to see how this prospect could alarm our Administration. Neither could our Administration be alarmed by another implication in Adenauer's proposal: that Europe would not lend its territory or its armed forces to unprovoked attacks against Soviet Russia. At least in our country everybody should know that nothing is more remote from the intention of our government than to provoke a war.

It must be admitted, however, that a major cause of European neutralism is exactly this fear: that some time, not perhaps deliberately but out of inexperience or thoughtlessness, our country may find itself plunged into a very large, possibly even a total, war. The chatter of our unrepresentative and irrepressible preventive warriors is heard abroad, particularly when it is re-echoed by publications which reach the millions. Adenauer's proposal would relieve the European neutralists from a fear that has no foundation in fact anyway. We can well take the chance of telling the Europeans that they can be neutral in case of an unthinkable American aggression against the Soviet Union, provided they are armed and ready to fight should Russia attack.

With his proposal of a nonaggression pact, Chancellor Adenauer has the extraordinary opportunity to merge the two main movements at present existing among European democrats: one toward continental unity, the other toward neutrality. For the European neutralists should know that if they want to save their countries from the horrors of war, they must be in a position to bargain collectively with Soviet Russia. If they try to negotiate one by one, each nation seeking its special exemption, they are lost. In Europe at present the choice is between piecemeal neutrality of each disarmed nation and collective neutrality armed to resist the only nation likely to be an aggressor—Soviet Russia.

The Russians themselves, because of their utter ignorance of our motives, are likely to swallow large chunks of their own propaganda and think that ours is a country of warmongers. A nonaggression pact with a United Europe could relieve them of their insane suspicion that we may use our European allies for aggressive purposes. It could pave the way for the reunification of Germany, for, as Aden-

auer kept saying throughout his campaign, only if Europe is united can Germany be united. A peaceful but armed United Europe can develop such contagious health that the men in the Kremlin may decide that the security of their country does not necessarily require the subjection of their troublesome satellites.

EUROPEAN self-government and a nonaggression pact with Soviet Russia would mean also that the drive toward a European army and that toward the establishment of a political Community should proceed simultaneously. In fact, it does not make much difference which of the two projects starts operating first. Russian military aggression may materialize in the near or in the distant future, but Communist control over large sections of the French and Italian populations is a thing of today. Those two hard-pressed nations can gain some relief from their crushing burdens only if the heaviest among those burdens become the concern of the European and of the Atlantic Community. The superabundant Italian manpower can never be given productive full employment by any Italian Government. Only if, according to the pattern of the Schuman Plan and beyond it, a continental market is established for industrial and agricultural products, can the productive capacity of France and Italy be fully released. In the two Latin countries politics has fallen into a disheartening rut, and the creative capacities of the two nations are in desperate need of new political and spiritual outlets. There is very little prospect that this can be achieved by any reshuffling of Cabinets.

It seems almost superfluous to add that everything which makes life worth living—in these two countries and everywhere else—forces Communism to retreat.

The Locarno Riddle

There is no denying the fact that Adenauer may sometime prove to our Administration's leader a rather uncomfortable ally—just about as uncomfortable as that other hearty septuagenarian, Sir Winston Churchill. In fact, there seems already to be a remarkable understanding between the two great old men of Europe. When, on May 11, Sir Winston, in his now-famous speech proposing negotiations with Russia, mentioned a new Locarno pact, the German government, according to newspaper reports, was rather miffed, for it could not imagine how in these days anyone could think of Germany as a potential aggressor. A few days later, Adenauer went to visit Sir Winston, who must have explained to him what he meant by that cryptic word "Locarno." On May 17, the newspapers reported that

Adenauer was quite pleased with the Locarno idea. To the two great old men, probably "Locarno" is now a symbolic name, implying greater independence toward the United States without any weakening of the Atlantic Community.

Sir Winston and Adenauer have not fallen victims—and never will—to the delusion of "equidistance," the theory still so popular with neutralists all over the world who look at the conflict between ourselves and Soviet Russia with a "plague on both your houses" attitude. But Europe and the Commonwealth can well exert within the Grand Alliance the function of a loyal, at times highly critical, Opposition. Europe and the Commonwealth can never be neutral as between Communism and democracy. But there is no reason why they should not examine very closely and untiringly the policies of the U.S. government. Of course they will never interfere with domestic American politics, but they cannot ignore the fact—no one in the world can—that the major difficulties of American diplomacy today lie in the campaign commitments our leaders made last fall.

Part, but only part, of the functions of Opposition are taken care of by the Democratic Party. But the allied nations, too, in their proper place, have their restraining role to play. They can make it clear to our government that if it wants to have solid blocs of nations on our side, it should not enter into strictly bilateral dealings with the various nations that compose them. They can stress the fact that both the Community and United Europe are real, living things, the common property of the people concerned—and not just the result of artificial insemination from America.

In fact, Europe will be united by much looser ties than those binding the states into our Union. Yet these blocs of a federal or quasi-federal nature that America is fostering cannot be cemented unless all nations concerned give up at least some fragments of national sovereignty. But our nation, which is at the very center of the major of these blocs—the Atlantic Community—does not seem inclined to set even a tiny measure of example. Just a few days ago, Senator Lyndon Johnson, Democratic leader in the upper house, came out in favor of the Bricker amendment.

UNITED EUROPE seemed a forlorn cause before the German elections. Now an un hoped-for opportunity—possibly the last—has been offered to our diplomacy and that of our allies. It all depends on whether our government is ready to deal with full-fledged partners, whether the President decides to apply his great talents for establishing unity to the Atlantic alliance rather than to the G.O.P.

The Perilous Folly Of Senator Bricker

HENRY STEELE COMMAGER

THERE IS nothing essentially new about the so-called Bricker amendment, which proposes strict limitations on the power of the President in making agreements with foreign governments. The Fathers of the Constitution knew well the dangers that threatened the rights of individuals and states from a central government with extensive powers, and they threw all necessary safeguards around those rights. They knew, too, the threat to the Union and to order from feebleness and imbecility in the conduct of foreign relations, and they took care that the Federal government should be supreme in diplomacy. They had watched the frustra-

tion of treaties by states claiming to be sovereign and the decline of the prestige and power of the Confederation in its relations with other governments, and they determined to put an end to this intolerable situation. They provided therefore that treaties should be the law of the land and should take precedence over all state laws.

But because the treaty-making power was, inevitably, supreme and extensive, the Fathers carefully safeguarded its exercise. What are the safeguards? After a treaty has been negotiated by the President, it must be ratified by two-thirds of the Senators present. As a single party rarely

commands a two-thirds majority, this means that it must have bipartisan support. It must be Constitutional, or the courts will hold it void. If it turns out to be a really dangerous treaty, Congress can impeach the President who was responsible for it. It must ordinarily be carried out through legislation, and when Congress comes to vote funds for its administration that body has another chance to pass upon its merits. If it is found to be unsatisfactory, in whole or in part, it can be modified or even repudiated by law. Such an action would constitute a grievance for the other contracting nation, but no one doubts its legality.

The Fathers, then, gave amplest authority to the President to conduct foreign relations, and to the Senate to confirm such treaties as he negotiated, and then placed careful safeguards around these powers. Has anything happened in 166 years to suggest that the Fathers went wrong on all this? Has the Constitution, otherwise the object of admiration and reverence, here proved to be a failure? Has the treaty-making power in fact been—as its critics now so vigorously assert—the Trojan horse of the Constitution? Have President and Senate forfeited American liberties, surrendered the Constitutional rights of American citizens, and invaded the proper area of state government through the abuse of the treaty power?

IN THE LAST century and a half the United States has concluded something like nine hundred treaties and perhaps twice that many executive agreements. If the treaty power is the Trojan horse that its critics now assert, certainly that fact must have become apparent during these years.

