

# It's More Than a Freudian Slip

BY now it has become much more than a habit or a Freudian slip: People in high places from the President down think "United States" and say "United Nations." Or vice versa. The first word, "United," seems to invite the casual use of either "States" or "Nations," and the names of the two institutions have become somewhat interchangeable, as if there were a similarity both of name and of substance between the United Nations and the United States.

For more than six months, ever since the Suez crisis started, our government has been acting as if its capacity to conduct foreign affairs had been crippled by some extreme Bricker Amendment. Whenever there is a crisis in the Middle East the President quickly tells us not to worry, for Dag Hammarskjöld is taking care of it. Only in the realm of general principles are our leaders eager to take a stand. But as far as the Middle East is concerned, and assuming the Red Army stays put so as not to set the Eisenhower Doctrine in motion, it is up to the world organization to decide the course of American diplomacy. We have come full circle: The U.N. acts for the U.S., and the U.S. is the custodian of universalism-at-large.

AS A RESULT we now have the United States exposed to a serious loss of prestige, and the United Nations to irreparable damage. The power of our country gives its leaders a large margin for error. The flying trips of John Foster Dulles can end in failure, and actually there have been so many flights and so many failures that one gets tired of keeping the score. Yet our nation is still a great nation, rightly respected and feared by Soviet Russia, and Secretary Dulles is forever ready to embark on new journeys and parleys. But there is no

such safety net beneath Dag Hammarskjöld's adventures in peace-making. He is just a brave lonely man, the nominal head of a nominal organization whose nature is at best symbolic.

Symbolic—it scarcely need be added—does not, by any stretch of the imagination, mean phony. Certainly a great deal of empty universalism and empty talk goes on at the U.N. under the sponsorship of the U.S. But what the U.N. actually symbolizes is something extraordinarily real and vital. The most deep-rooted, long-cherished hopes of men to find some measure of security and peace are compelling now as never before in history because all nations and races have become unprecedentedly close to each other and dependent on each other, while the political and technical skills, once available to the few lucky ones, have turned out to be accessible to all.

Of this reality the institution called U.N. is the symbol. To make the best use of this, as of any other symbol, we must first of all know the span and the limits of its effectiveness. This is no abstruse matter, for what is money—to all of us a sure token of reality—if not a symbol of wealth?

What threatens the United Nations now may truly be called a wanton credit inflation, largely determined by our government's policy of giving blanket underwriting to all promissory notes of the U.N. General Assembly. This is why this very serious, very real institution whose structure is still so frail, is now exposed to mortal peril.

Ever since it was founded at San Francisco, it has been known that the U.N. could not survive a war recklessly started by any major power. But until the Suez crisis it was difficult to imagine that the U.N. could be put in the greatest

jeopardy by the tendency of those who lead the most powerful democracy to use it as a shield for their indecisiveness.

IT is somewhat consoling to learn, from the two articles that follow, that there is an independent agency of the U.N.—the World Bank—that is doing good work, and bringing solid, concrete improvement in the condition of too long underprivileged peoples. Indeed, the World Bank might even help the leaders of the Arab League to do something sensible in the interest of their own nations and ultimately of the Middle Eastern region.

Probably one of the main reasons why the World Bank has done so well is its freedom from the principle of "one nation, one vote" that is bedeviling the General Assembly. Or it may just be that the internationalism of bankers, engineers, and economists has proved to be more effective than that of the politicians.

Eugene Black, who is from Wall Street and has never stopped thinking and acting like a banker, has no use for prospective creditors who are likely to remain hopelessly insolvent. As a banker to the world he wouldn't dream of submitting his credit policies to the majority opinion of predominantly bankrupt governments.

YET Mr. Dulles has fallen into the habit of doing exactly this through his reliance on the General Assembly of the U.N.—an assembly where a large number of governments represented lack either the support of popular will, or solvency, or the capacity for self-defense. In fact, several of these governments lack all three aptitudes. But our Administration has decided that at least on Middle Eastern affairs the Assembly is a co-equal branch of the U.S. government and its decisions are the law.

# A New Aid Plan For the Middle East

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**T**HE MAIN PROBLEM in the Middle East is not Israel. In the quiet of private conversation, Israel's own leaders will tell you that peace, a settlement, and Israel's very survival depend on the growth of stable and progressive leadership for the forty million Arabs among whom live fewer than two million Israelis. Long before there is peace or a settlement, there will have to be a change of mood. The more the Arab leaders concentrate on their internal problems, the less they will go on flogging the dead horse of colonialism or assuring each other of their intent to push the Israelis into the sea. This is why devices to promote economic development are a necessary part of U.S. policy. It is also why Americans should take note of a little-known idea that has recently captured the imagination of influential Arab leaders.

Their aim is to create a regional bank for economic development in the Middle East, and thus to provide the Arab world with a constructive focus for its energies. If the idea takes hold, it may also provide the State Department's new Special Ambassador, former Representative James P. Richards of South Carolina, with a way to use some part of the \$200 million of economic aid that has been voted to carry out the Eisenhower Doctrine.

## Nationalism vs. Regionalism

In no area of the "underdeveloped" world is there so strong a case for a regional approach. The crucial problem in the Middle East is how to bring enough water to parched land; and the solutions engineers prescribe generally cross several of the "national" boundaries that history has left behind. Most of the keys to

the area's economic growth are "regional," involving two or three or more of the nations crowded into Asia Minor and the northeastern corner of Africa. The isolated economic development of any of these nations is patently unsound.

Even before Mr. Dulles snuffed out the negotiations to finance Egypt's High Dam at Aswan, the whole Aswan enterprise had been stalled by the failure of the Egyptians and the Sudanese to get together on a division of the Nile's precious waters or even to consult the Ethiopians, who control the Blue Nile.

For more than three years now Eric Johnston has been commuting to the Middle East as President Eisenhower's personal representative, trying in his patient and optimistic way to get agreement on the division of the waters of the Jordan River and its tributary, the Yarmuk. At the end of 1955 he thought he had a deal; but at the last moment Syria's leaders balked.

Now Jordan is talking about diverting water for a canal running down the eastern side of the river, and the Israelis are determined to divert some of the same waters into Israel. Both nations would be better off under the Johnston Plan. A regional bank might provide the Israelis with a responsible opposite number in the negotiations so that the chances of agreement—at least in that sector—would be improved.

**T**AKING the region as a whole, there are plenty of economically feasible places for the nine hundred thousand Arab refugees now marking time around the periphery of Israel to settle. There is room in the vast reaches of northern Syria

and in dry but potentially fertile areas of Iraq. But the development of these areas, especially of those in Syria, would require capital from the outside.

The Suez Canal, a regional problem if there ever was one, will shortly need a more constructive type of development than raising the ships that the Egyptians have sunk there. One of the Six Principles adopted by the U.N. Security Council during the Suez crisis decreed that "A fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development." The word "development" presumably means the long-discussed plan to deepen and widen the channel to take ships of thirty-six-foot draft. This plan, together with a possible revival of the Aswan project and the crying need for land reform and agricultural improvement, would make a full agenda of activity for the Egyptian leaders if they elected to give such projects a higher priority than buying arms and investing in round-the-clock radio agitation throughout the Moslem world.

The Middle East abounds with other development schemes, most of them the result of painstaking research by local technicians and western advisers—all held up by lack of sufficient political cohesion to get something started.

## The Money Is There

There is, moreover, plenty of hard money in the Middle East to finance regional development. If a small fraction of the existing oil royalties were available for economic projects, there would be more than enough for an impressive effort, considering the severe limitations imposed by technical and administrative difficulties and by the need to train