

the Screen Producers' Guild, little has been done to provide a technical and creative proving ground for new talents. An industry school, perhaps in conjunction with the local universities, could help to provide future manpower.

Ancient methods of selling and releasing should be overhauled. Distribution offices of companies could be combined and thus save large sums in operational costs. The exhibitors might also add to the improvement of business by cleaning up some of their theaters, by closing decrepit ones and building new ones.


The Bewildered Giant

Louis Brandeis once said: "In the field of modern business, so rich in opportunity for the exercise of man's finest and most varied mental faculties and moral qualities, mere money-making cannot be regarded as the legitimate end—since with the conduct of business human happiness or misery is inextricably interwoven."

"Human happiness" is a standard worth raising, a goal worth achieving in any business. Most certainly it applies to the motion-picture industry, which is indeed "inextricably interwoven" with the lives of the hundreds of millions it serves.

Hollywood is laden with competent and hard-working talents. Its resources have always been greater than it has realized—which explains why, in a crisis, it has always behaved rather like a bewildered, muscle-bound giant.

If Hollywood can overcome some of the oppressive burdens left by the management of the past while retaining the features that helped to build and sustain it, the motion-picture industry's future is surely no darker than the future of that other "fabulous invalid," the New York theater.



The Powerhouse Of German Defense

EDMOND TAYLOR

THE FIRST TIME I caught sight of Franz-Josef Strauss, the German Federal Republic's energetic Defense Minister, he was standing behind a frosted-glass panel across the floor of the Bundestag from the press gallery where I was sitting. Yet I had no trouble identifying the burly silhouette. Surrounded by his colleagues in an impromptu caucus, he was acting out a kind of lively shadow play. The frosting on the glass, filtering out everything but the basic data of mass and motion, lent to Strauss's pantomime an extraordinary *élan*. From time to time his big fist came smashing down like a mace on some key argument; newcomers to the huddle were greeted with a wrestler's lunge ending in a hand-clasp of genial ferocity.

Later, when I interviewed Strauss at his office in the Defense Ministry, he seemed somewhat less volcanic, but still gave an impression of tremendous drive. This dynamism—a reflection of the energy that the visitor today feels pulsing everywhere in the Federal Republic—greatly impresses the Minister's numerous German and foreign admirers, but gives pause to his equally numerous critics and adversaries. One Opposition newspaper, the Social Democratic *Vorwärts*, recently accused him of being "power-mad." The charge, whether justified or not, is understandable. No German politician wields power with more unabashed enjoyment—or greater effectiveness. Few have pursued it with such single-minded concentration as this handsome, jovial-looking butcher's son from Munich, who at forty-one is one of the brightest rising stars of German politics, and a possible successor to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

"Why is it," asked *Vorwärts*, "that the Defense Minister rarely makes a speech without referring to 'military weight' and 'power' as instruments of German policy?" *Vor-*

wärts specifically charged that Strauss, in an off-the-cuff talk to a meeting of German officers and military journalists in Baden-Württemberg early in February, declared that the German and other western European armies would be equipped with atomic weapons, "whether the Americans liked it or not."

Why Be Apologetic?

At his first NATO meeting as West German Defense Minister in Paris last fall, where Strauss's breezy shirt-sleeve truculence earned him the nickname "the Bavarian Siegfried," he eventually made a favorable impression on his western colleagues. But initially he ruffled them with his emphatic assertions that he had no intention of providing German "foot-sloggers for the American atomic cavalry." And according to the well-informed national liberal weekly *Der Spiegel*, which, with reservations, generally approves of Strauss, at an earlier Euratom meeting in Paris he pushed over a note to Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, one of Strauss's leading rivals for the Adenauer succession, saying, "You don't always have to apologize for our being here. We were invited, after all, and they'll surely remember that."

Many of Strauss's informal political speeches have been in a similar vein. Last November during the Hungarian crisis, he caused a furor with a speech in the small Bavarian town of Hollfeld in which, according to *Der Spiegel*, he declared that in case of war the Soviet state would be wiped off the map. Later, as frequently happens, Herr Strauss said he had been misquoted.

In its issue of February 20 *Der Spiegel* editorialized unhappily on some of the implications of Strauss's dynamism: "Whereas Hungary was cut off from all help . . . the Soviet Zone of Germany borders on a state bristling with vitality in which Franz-Josef Strauss is Defense Min-

ister. . . . knowing the Germans, it must be said that this is where World War III would start."

A-Bombs for Europe?

More significant than any of Herr Strauss's verbal fireworks is the orientation he has given German rearmament since he took over the Defense Ministry from Theodor Blank last fall. Instead of the essentially defensive 500,000-man German Army based on universal military service that NATO plans originally called for, Strauss is giving the West an initially much smaller, highly professional striking force equipped with powerful offensive weapons, and with startling capabilities for rapid expansion.

He makes no secret of his desire to equip the German NATO divisions he is raising with the most formidable modern arms, including guided missiles and tactical atomic weapons: "I think it is indispensable that the NATO forces of the European nations, including the Federal Republic of Germany, be equipped with atomic weapons," he told me during the hour-and-a-half talk I had with him recently. "We can't go on indefinitely with two categories of NATO members: first class and tenth class."


Despite such occasional barbs, Strauss talked in a quiet, relaxed voice, in sharp contrast to his flamboyant public manner.

Though Germany is forbidden by the Paris agreements to produce atomic weapons, Strauss pointed out to me that there is no legal restriction on research into the production of such arms or even creating them on drawing boards. He also mentioned the possibility that the Federal Republic, in agreement with its partners in the six-nation Western European Union, might manufacture some of the elements of a "European" atomic bomb to be employed or issued under controls to be worked out by WEU.

I asked Strauss if there was any foundation to reports current in Paris that he had agreed with French Defense Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury—one of the Allied statesmen who are not disturbed by the Strauss dynamism—on German participation in the development of a "European" atomic weapon. Strauss

replied that he thought the reports premature, but that the question was not "excluded" from the program of Franco-German co-operation in weapons research and development he had worked out with Bourgès-Maunoury during a recent visit to the French Saharan rocket range at Colomb-Béchar.

Judging from Strauss's explanations, this agreement, unprecedented



in Franco-German relations, is both more far-reaching and more formal than published reports in either nation have so far indicated. It involves the setting up of a permanent joint weapons committee with production as well as research functions, and it has raised such basic policy issues that Strauss said he had considered it advisable to obtain Chancellor Adenauer's special approval. It is his understanding that Bourgès-Maunoury obtained similar authority from the French Cabinet. On Strauss's instructions, and to avoid any misunderstandings, General Adolf Heusinger, who had accompanied him on the visit to Colomb-Béchar, formally notified all the NATO staffs of the new Franco-German bilateral venture.

From the United States, which he expects to visit soon, Strauss indicated that he hopes to obtain dual-purpose missile rockets that can be fitted with either conventional or atomic warheads, plus instruction for his forces in the use of the atomic warheads. He assumes, however, that all the atomic explosives will remain in the custody of the special U.S. units assigned to the NATO forces in Germany.

Since then, Adenauer has alluded in a press conference to the possibility of West Germany's participating with its European partners in the production of nuclear weapons

along lines similar to those envisaged by Strauss. On March 20, during a visit to Bonn, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Lauris Norstad, revealed that he strongly supported at least part of the Strauss program, and had recommended to NATO governments that all members of the Atlantic Alliance should be provided with means for delivering atomic warheads—such as dual-purpose rockets—and trained in the use of atomic weapons, which he hinted might in case of emergency be made available to them from U.S. arsenals in Europe.

In explaining his philosophy in regard to atomic weapons, Strauss said he had to assume that they would not be outlawed in the foreseeable future and therefore felt that NATO must have them. "I don't believe that any one European nation should be authorized to produce atomic weapons on a purely national basis," he told me with great earnestness, "and neither should they be in the sole possession of any one nation. Furthermore, I want to make it clear that in my view atomic weapons are the *ultima ratio* whose use is only morally justifiable in self-defense when a nation's very existence is at stake. Even as a patriotic German I could not condone their use to achieve the reunification of Germany. I know my political adversaries have insinuated that this thought was in my mind when I raised the question of atomic armament for NATO forces, but I consider that to harbor it would be a criminal attitude."

The Territorial Shield

During my talk with him, Strauss discussed with equal frankness another controversial project the re-nascent general staff had worked up under his leadership: the Home Guard or Territorial Defense units which he is planning as a supplement to the seven—eventually twelve—mobile divisions that the Federal Republic is pledged to raise for NATO. Unlike the NATO divisions, which will be under the command of SHAPE, the proposed Territorials will be directly under the command of the Defense Ministry, and despite their unpretentious title they could eventually become a formidable

ble military force free from any NATO supervision or restraints.

Initially Strauss envisages a modest auxiliary militia developing parallel with the growth of the NATO divisions—five of which he guarantees will be completely activated by the end of this year. By the end of 1959 or thereabouts, the Territorials on active duty would total some forty to fifty thousand. But these, Strauss emphasized, would only be peacetime cadres. A reservoir of trained reservists would rapidly build up from which, the Minister indicated, substantial forces could be quickly mobilized in an international crisis.

MEMBERS of Strauss's Territorial "shield" will serve a maximum of six months' consecutive training—less in the case of the Wehrmacht veterans who will make up the bulk of the force. Reservists will be called up for periodic short refresher courses as in the Swiss system, on which the scheme is partly based. The functions of the Territorial forces are particularly significant. According to Strauss they will be responsible in case of war for:

¶ Defense against parachute attacks, partisan groups, saboteurs, etc., throughout the territory of the Federal Republic.

¶ Protection, maintenance, and operation of basic supply and communications networks. (These duties could presumably be stretched to include serving as quartermaster and signal corps of the German Army.)

¶ Static defense of the Federal Republic's eastern frontier. According to Strauss, a portion of the Territorial forces will be specially trained to fight tanks and will be stationed in a continuous anti-tank belt along the zonal border. They will be equipped with special weapons suited to their specialized mission, "but only light stuff like bazookas and special mines and some little things we are working up with the French." (The French Army has recently developed experimentally some highly advanced anti-tank rockets and other weapons.)

"The aim," Strauss emphasized, "is to stop the Russians as far forward as possible. I think the kind of force I have in mind would give any

attacking armor plenty to think about. But it is purely defensive. It couldn't be considered a threat by anyone. And we have no intention of stationing any of these special units on the French or Swiss borders, or anywhere but in the east."

Strauss expressed the view that with his proposed militia units as backstop, the twelve mobile and atomic NATO divisions will have an extremely satisfactory ratio of combat to support personnel. This is something of an understatement. If the project is realized, the Federal Republic will have two sizable armies, one purely national, the other under NATO control. Strauss does not quite put it in those terms, but he is keenly aware of the controversial aspect of his scheme.


"There is no deception in my proposals," he said, "no shadow army or anything like that. It is all perfectly aboveboard. General Norstad, General Schuyler, and everyone at SHAPE knows about it. So do the French."

Before Strauss can put his militia project into effect he has to obtain the approval of his partners in the Western European Union. But the London Conference, which established WEU, gave it power to limit all national armed forces, including police forces of its members. Despite the revolutionary implications of

rather austere budget he has drawn up for his department. It was Strauss who stopped work—on grounds of unnecessary expense—on the grandiose new "Pentabonn," capable of housing twenty thousand Defense Ministry employees, in the Federal capital. And it was Strauss who took the decision of radically slowing up enrollment of military manpower until he could build enough barracks to house his soldiers. Such steps suggest not that Strauss is at heart an anti-militarist, but merely that he is above all a realist.

To his numerous admirers his "realism" includes several almost contradictory elements. One is implied in his repeated caustic comments on U.S. foreign policy. A favorite among Strauss's supporters is a retort which according to *Der Spiegel* he made to the State Department during a visit to Washington last year when Mr. Dulles was urging him to support the French plan for Euratom: "We Germans may have lost the war but we haven't yet lost our minds." During the same visit he is reported to have described the European Defense Community as "a device for recruiting a German suicide squad to cover the retreat of the NATO forces in the event of a Soviet attack."

Above all, there is a kind of muscular neutralism evident in a series



Strauss's project, which in the future could upset the western European balance of power in Germany's favor, he seems confident that he will obtain WEU approval within the next six months—perhaps at the meeting that will take place concurrently with the May session of the NATO Council in Bonn.

The Politics of Realism

Though Strauss is sometimes accused by his critics of being captivated by military glitter and display, there is no reflection of this in the

of recent speeches and statements by him. One particularly heretical declaration—an article under Strauss's signature in the official information bulletin of Dr. Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union—suggested the possibility of a reunited Germany neutralized on the model of Austria.

The commotion caused in the Federal capital by this bombshell—roughly equivalent to the tremors that would rock Washington if Secretary of State Dulles wrote a signed article for the New York *Herald*

Tribune recommending the recognition of Communist China—led Strauss to report that he had once more been misquoted, and the tendency in western diplomatic circles in Bonn was to write the whole thing off as a somewhat regrettable but not



especially significant incident of the forthcoming German electoral campaign.

MORE AND MORE, however, Strauss's tough-minded realism is being recognized in Germany as a valuable asset.

"Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss is increasingly showing the qualities of a statesman," declared the conservative *Die Welt* of Hamburg in an editorial last February. "He wants to make the Federal Republic a participant in international politics and not an object of barter."

Today Strauss says he supports the common market as a sound example of European co-operation, and somewhat less wholeheartedly accepts the current watered-down version of Euratom. He has no desire to produce German guns exceeding 40 mm.—possibly because he feels that rockets will soon replace conventional artillery. He declared to me emphatically: "Armaments autarchy for Germany would be nonsense politically, economically, and militarily."

In a February speech in Hamburg, delivered hard on the heels of the explosion over his so-called "neutralist" article, the Defense Minister defended NATO, denounced the Socialist Party, and insisted that it would be "irresponsible to scrap our weapons and alliances without being firmly convinced that Soviet policy had changed."

"Strauss is not a man who thinks in terms of rigid political systems," one western diplomat explained to me. "I wouldn't go so far as to call him an opportunist—but he's

very quick to seize an opportunity."

My own conviction after hearing Strauss elaborate on the burning issue of reunification in our talk is that there is something deeper than politics beneath his attitude. He made it clear that he saw no immediate chance of fruitful negotiations with the Soviets for reunification. He appeared to take it for granted that Germany's cultural and economic ties with the West would remain intact even after unification, and that only Germany's military status "might be the subject of an international conference."

What impressed me most was his emphasis on the legalistic platitude, conceded by everyone, that after unification Germany will have the right to choose neutrality if that seems the soundest national policy. He declined to suggest the kind of basic change in Soviet policy that would make German neutrality a safe course. It is "impossible," he said, to say how Germany would decide on the issue of neutrality vs. NATO when the time for a decision came. Such a decision "could only be taken on the basis of sober political and military deliberations in the light of the situation then existing."

Myth and Metamorphosis

Strauss's flexible realism has undoubtedly been largely shaped by the mental outlook of the generation to which he belongs—an outlook strangely compounded of conformism and of a certain cynical integrity, the result of exposure to the seamy side of political myths from that of the Master Race to that of democratization by military government. In many respects Strauss is a representative member of this younger generation.

As a boy in Munich, Strauss attracted the attention of his teachers by quickness of mind and a phenomenal memory. With the encouragement of his parish priest—he comes from a devout Catholic family—he obtained a series of scholarships that took him through high school and university, where he received an intensive training in Greek, Latin, and ancient history. By German standards of the day he was the perfect pupil—conscientious and incurious. He graduated with high marks from a Bavarian teachers'

college, intending to become a high-school teacher himself, but military duty prevented him from completing his doctoral dissertation. He does not, however, discourage people from addressing him as Herr Doktor, and likes to be described as a historian.

As a student in the Nazi era, Strauss conformed politically as well as scholastically. Membership in the National Socialist students' organization was inescapable if you wanted to get a diploma, and he did. Membership in the Motor Section of the students' Storm Trooper (SA) unit was necessary if you wanted to be able to ride a motorcycle without owning one, and young Strauss loved the throbbing power and speed of motorcycles, as he loves rockets today. (He was also a champion bicycle racer.)

Strauss always kept aloof from Nazi politics as such. When he went into the army in 1939 he continued to keep out of politics but took



his military duties very seriously. After service on the Western Front he was commissioned a second lieutenant in February, 1942, and was assigned to a front-line flak unit on the Eastern Front—a hazardous duty requiring courage and good nerves. A little less than a year later the fighting was ended for him when both his feet froze. Upon recovery he was assigned as instructor in a training unit near his home. He is remembered by men who served under him as a conscientious officer but a tough disciplinarian.

AFTER the debacle of Germany, Strauss landed a job as interpreter to a U.S. Civil Government regional officer—he speaks fluent English—and then with the support of the Occupation authorities was named to the local administration, whence he soon graduated to the permanent civil service. He became increasingly active in Bavarian poli-

tics and rapidly made himself a power in the Christian Socialist Union through the classic method of hitching onto the coattails of established politicians and then switching to more influential ones as opportunity permitted.

As a campaigner he was a huge success from the first. He has a simple, black-and-white style of presenting his arguments—even *Der Spiegel* accuses him of a tendency to “think in slogans”—a stentorian voice, a large repertory of earthy jokes, and a wonderful, rough way with hecklers. As a Bundestag Deputy—he eventually became chairman of its Military Affairs Committee—Strauss, according to *Der Spiegel* and other reliable German sources, became one of the leading spokesmen of a group in the government coalition that favored German rearmament but resisted leaving responsibility for it to the pre-First World War generation on the ground that it would be too responsive to foreign influence.

In particular, Strauss repeatedly stressed the advisability of enhancing Germany's bargaining power by making the Allies take the initiative in promoting German rearmament. As early as 1947 he had apparently foreseen that the cold war would eventually oblige the West to recruit West Germany as an ally. At times he also advised going slow to avoid alarming Germany's future allies. In 1952, when there was some sentiment in the Bundestag for trying to muscle into NATO despite French opposition, Strauss said in a parliamentary debate: “I don't think we should really put our cards on



the table right away; that would be a sure way to lose the game.”

In the 1955 elections the personal political machine that Strauss, a Minister without Portfolio since 1953, had been building up in Bavaria made a brilliant showing, and

he became the unchallenged boss of the Christian Socialist Union, the C.D.U.'s Bavarian arm. On the strength of this he renewed his demands for a defense post in the new Adenauer Cabinet. The Chancellor temporarily appeased him with a vague promise for the future. (Later he served briefly as the Cabinet Minister responsible for questions of atomic energy.)

ALMOST immediately Strauss started undermining the position of the man whose job he coveted, Defense Minister Theodor Blank. Strauss's unquestionably sincere dislike of the European army project, which he feared would tie West Germany's hands in the military field and tend to rule out possibilities of diplomatic maneuver over reunification, furnished him some of his most effective ammunition in his war of attrition against Blank. In public he usually damned EDC with faint praise. When his party's support of of EDC came under attack from the Opposition, he was even capable of defending the proposed treaty with considerable vigor, as he did in a major speech before the Bundestag in December, 1952. But behind committee doors, in off-the-record talks with the press, and in political dinners, he was more outspoken. Blank, he frequently charged, was just a recruiting agent for a new kind of foreign legion.

As Strauss's impatience to get his hands on the huge concentration of power represented by the Defense Ministry grew, he is said to have threatened Adenauer that if he was not given the post he would pull the C.S.U. out of the government coalition and form a new government in alliance with the Social Democrats and the Free Democratic Party. Oddly enough, it was Admiral Radford who unwittingly put Strauss across the goal line. After the publication last summer of the so-called Radford Plan envisaging massive withdrawal of U.S. forces overseas, Strauss exploited Adenauer's fury at Washington's failure to give him advance information about the plan and convinced the Chancellor that with Strauss as Defense Minister the perfidious Yankees would meet their match, if not their master.

Since Strauss took over the Minis-

try, however, U.S. officials who have to deal with him say he has been highly co-operative and practices a straightforward frankness that convinces even the most suspicious among them that he has nothing up his sleeve.

Contrapuntal 'Future Music'

In his public speeches, and even more in informal party caucuses or off-the-record press conferences, Strauss has repeatedly stressed several closely related schemes.

One of these themes—the most discreetly developed one—is that the



growing isolationism of the United States may one day lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces, and the necessity for Germany to take the vacant American place in Europe as the senior member of the western coalition. There appeared to be a reflection of this preoccupation in the complacency with which Strauss remarked to me: “In a strong, unified Europe, the physical presence of the United States troops might no longer be necessary.”

Other themes are the need to defend German soil as far east as possible, and to obtain a decisive German voice in defense planning: “We shall and must prevent the formulation of any defense plans for Europe to which we do not agree,” Strauss declared in a Bundestag speech in July, 1952.

In the course of my talk with him I remembered the interview he had recently granted *Der Spiegel* in which he specifically envisaged the possibility of limited war breaking out in Europe without the United States taking action unless it was directly attacked. Did he, I asked him, subscribe to the view that under contemporary conditions no nation can ever count fully on its allies to risk thermonuclear attack by coming to its aid unless they are directly attacked themselves, and that therefore no nation can be considered effectively independent unless it has independent means of

atomic retaliation, however modest?

"Some of my French friends have talked to me in this vein," Strauss replied, "but I cannot bring myself to accept their view—which implies the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance in the hour of danger—at least not yet. In my view," Strauss continued, "there is only one sure guaranty of western survival. That is the development of a really unified Atlantic Community. But that is what we Germans call 'future music.' I would like to believe it. But I must confess something: After the war—I suppose that is the typical reaction of a defeated nation—we dreamed of losing our national identity in a big evolving international community. But we found that the burden of the past cannot be shaken off so lightly. So now we see we have to move ahead millimeter by millimeter—or should I be optimistic and say step by step?"

THIS slightly disillusioned view of international co-operation reassures some German and foreign observers here, who fear that the lofty "Europeanism" of Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister von Brentano may be too good to last. They see West Germany with men like Strauss at the helm throttling down the rate of progress toward the international community of the future but taking care of the engines and keeping faithfully to the course laid down.

Others suspect that Strauss's talk about European integration or the Atlantic Community is merely a smoke screen veiling a shrewd and expedient nationalism. His public record up to now supplies arguments for both views.

In the end the speed and direction with which the Federal Republic and its controversial Defense Minister move will depend in good measure on the clarity, steadiness, and maturity of western policy in Europe and on the continued presence of American forces there. For men like Franz-Josef Strauss one of the essential realities in the international situation is the power of the United States. How they view the situation at a given moment may be largely determined by how they think that power is going to be used—or not used.

The Man from Arkansas Goes After Mr. Dulles

WILLIAM HARLAN HALE

ASPECTER is haunting the high-ceilinged office from which John Foster Dulles conducts the affairs of the State Department when he is in Washington. It is the knowledge that Senator Theodore Green, the mild and affable Rhode Islander who chairs the mighty Foreign Relations Committee, is close to his ninetieth birthday and that so long as a Democratic majority continues in power his inevitable successor is the Committee's next in line, J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, long Dulles's severest critic on the Hill and today his most implacable foe.

The figure on the Secretary's wall has already taken on ominous shape. Although Fulbright is still only the committee's No. 2 man, he is today the No. 1 man of a subcommittee newly appointed to investigate the recent conduct of American policy in the Middle East, with intent to sort out contradictory facts and explanations and discover why this country has met with such frustrations there.

In mid-March, while headlines were being monopolized by the search into labor racketeering, headed by Fulbright's Arkansas colleague, Senator John L. McClellan, the Fulbright group put on the stand its own first witness, C. D. Jackson, a vice-president of Time Inc. and former special assistant to President Eisenhower. Jackson had been reported as saying in a Toronto speech that our government, by canceling last July its project of financing Egypt's High Dam at Aswan, had deliberately provoked a crisis in the Middle East in order to force a showdown with the Soviets. Jackson's denial did not convince Chairman Fulbright, who inserted into the record witnesses' statements that this was indeed what Jackson had said.

The subcommittee's desire to get at the truth has been whetted by the publication of a laudatory volume on Dulles's Secretaryship by John

Robinson Beal of *Time*, in which Dulles is similarly represented as having canceled the Aswan Dam deal in order to score a "cold war" triumph over the Soviets—a statement that does not jibe with the official explanations given. "It was necessary to call Russia's hand in the game of economic competition. . . ." writes Mr. Beal, echoing the disputed Jackson statement. "Dulles' bet was based on the belief that it would expose the shallow character of Russia's foreign economic pretensions . . . He risked the prestige of the United States on those beliefs . . ." In other words, brinkmanship once again. All this gives the Fulbright group ammunition against Dulles and strengthens its chairman's determination to bring him to account.

Fulbright's Opening Shot

The Fulbright investigation stems directly from a dramatic encounter that took place in the crowded Senate Caucus Room on the morning of January 24. That forenoon, Secretary Dulles found himself sitting in the witness chair for the third day of hearings being conducted jointly by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on the President's proposed Middle East defense resolution. The Administration had confidently expected to have no trouble with the new Eisenhower Doctrine on the Hill. With Chairman Green smoothing its way with the Democrats, it was to go through as swiftly and easily as had the Formosa defense resolution of 1955, when Green's predecessor, Senator Walter F. George, had shown himself a model of bipartisanship at the helm.

Yet by this third day it had become apparent that a current of opposition was stirring and that even usually amenable Democratic Senators were restive. Chairman Richard B. Russell of the Armed Services Committee had challenged the Administration's blanket request for