

atomic retaliation, however modest?

"Some of my French friends have talked to me in this vein," Strauss replied, "but I cannot bring myself to accept their view—which implies the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance in the hour of danger—at least not yet. In my view," Strauss continued, "there is only one sure guaranty of western survival. That is the development of a really unified Atlantic Community. But that is what we Germans call 'future music.' I would like to believe it. But I must confess something: After the war—I suppose that is the typical reaction of a defeated nation—we dreamed of losing our national identity in a big evolving international community. But we found that the burden of the past cannot be shaken off so lightly. So now we see we have to move ahead millimeter by millimeter—or should I be optimistic and say step by step?"

This slightly disillusioned view of international co-operation reassures some German and foreign observers here, who fear that the lofty "Europeanism" of Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister von Brentano may be too good to last. They see West Germany with men like Strauss at the helm throttling down the rate of progress toward the international community of the future but taking care of the engines and keeping faithfully to the course laid down.

Others suspect that Strauss's talk about European integration or the Atlantic Community is merely a smoke screen veiling a shrewd and expedient nationalism. His public record up to now supplies arguments for both views.

In the end the speed and direction with which the Federal Republic and its controversial Defense Minister move will depend in good measure on the clarity, steadiness, and maturity of western policy in Europe and on the continued presence of American forces there. For men like Franz-Josef Strauss one of the essential realities in the international situation is the power of the United States. How they view the situation at a given moment may be largely determined by how they think that power is going to be used—or not used.

The Man from Arkansas Goes After Mr. Dulles

WILLIAM HARLAN HALE

ASPECTER is haunting the high-ceilinged office from which John Foster Dulles conducts the affairs of the State Department when he is in Washington. It is the knowledge that Senator Theodore Green, the mild and affable Rhode Islander who chairs the mighty Foreign Relations Committee, is close to his ninetieth birthday and that so long as a Democratic majority continues in power his inevitable successor is the Committee's next in line, J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, long Dulles's severest critic on the Hill and today his most implacable foe.

The figure on the Secretary's wall has already taken on ominous shape. Although Fulbright is still only the committee's No. 2 man, he is today the No. 1 man of a subcommittee newly appointed to investigate the recent conduct of American policy in the Middle East, with intent to sort out contradictory facts and explanations and discover why this country has met with such frustrations there.

In mid-March, while headlines were being monopolized by the search into labor racketeering, headed by Fulbright's Arkansas colleague, Senator John L. McClellan, the Fulbright group put on the stand its own first witness, C. D. Jackson, a vice-president of Time Inc. and former special assistant to President Eisenhower. Jackson had been reported as saying in a Toronto speech that our government, by canceling last July its project of financing Egypt's High Dam at Aswan, had deliberately provoked a crisis in the Middle East in order to force a showdown with the Soviets. Jackson's denial did not convince Chairman Fulbright, who inserted into the record witnesses' statements that this was indeed what Jackson had said.

The subcommittee's desire to get at the truth has been whetted by the publication of a laudatory volume on Dulles's Secretaryship by John

Robinson Beal of *Time*, in which Dulles is similarly represented as having canceled the Aswan Dam deal in order to score a "cold war" triumph over the Soviets—a statement that does not jibe with the official explanations given. "It was necessary to call Russia's hand in the game of economic competition. . . ." writes Mr. Beal, echoing the disputed Jackson statement. "Dulles' bet was based on the belief that it would expose the shallow character of Russia's foreign economic pretensions . . . He risked the prestige of the United States on those beliefs . . ." In other words, brinkmanship once again. All this gives the Fulbright group ammunition against Dulles and strengthens its chairman's determination to bring him to account.

Fulbright's Opening Shot

The Fulbright investigation stems directly from a dramatic encounter that took place in the crowded Senate Caucus Room on the morning of January 24. That forenoon, Secretary Dulles found himself sitting in the witness chair for the third day of hearings being conducted jointly by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on the President's proposed Middle East defense resolution. The Administration had confidently expected to have no trouble with the new Eisenhower Doctrine on the Hill. With Chairman Green smoothing its way with the Democrats, it was to go through as swiftly and easily as had the Formosa defense resolution of 1955, when Green's predecessor, Senator Walter F. George, had shown himself a model of bipartisanship at the helm.

Yet by this third day it had become apparent that a current of opposition was stirring and that even usually amenable Democratic Senators were restive. Chairman Richard B. Russell of the Armed Services Committee had challenged the Administration's blanket request for

Middle East funds and authority as leaving Congress "absolutely no power or no prerogatives," and he had visibly aroused Dulles by saying that the legislature was being asked to adopt a new program "pig-in-a-poke fashion."

But Dulles was taken completely by surprise when Senator Fulbright took up a manuscript and began reading from it in his measured, cultivated drawl one of the most sweeping indictments of a policy and a Cabinet official that have been heard in the Senate's precincts in our time.

While the accused sat red-faced and rigid, the heir presumptive to the Foreign Relations Committee chairmanship cited what he called the "dark and gloomy picture" of our affairs in the Middle East that Dulles himself had given at the hearings. From it he concluded that "Not since the turn of the century have our relations with the other peoples of the free world been so strained . . ." Our relations with our closest Allies in particular had suffered "a disastrous . . . collapse." He himself was not willing, he said, to vote the requested "blank check" to the Administration to "do as it pleases with our soldiers and with our money" in the Middle East, unless he had faith in those who were to exercise these powers. This faith he did not have. Before the Senate gave any vote of confidence in "the stewardship of Secretary Dulles" such as was implied in the present call for funds and authority, it should request from him a full, documented White Paper explaining how we had got ourselves into such a fix in the Middle East in the first place. Lacking this trust, Fulbright himself had no desire to make a sweeping grant to "people who have disproved their foresight, their wisdom, and their effectiveness in the field of foreign affairs."

PERSONS in Dulles's entourage later remarked that they had never seen their chief as aroused as he was on leaving the hearings that day. Not only his competence but, in effect, his good faith had been impugned. Emissaries of his, long inclined to write off Fulbright as an officious but ineffectual maverick, now began going about town with worried looks to ask possible inter-

mediaries, "What's eating Bill Fulbright, anyway? What has he really got against the boss?"

If it were just that Fulbright of Arkansas had become seized by some burning personal dislike of John Foster Dulles, the matter might be passed off as simply another unhappy collision of political personalities. Some of these in themselves, of course, have led to explosive public results—as when the late Senator Henry Cabot Lodge's violent hatred of President Woodrow Wilson drove him to destroy all chances of America's participation in the League of Nations. But there is far more to the



Senator Fulbright

Fulbright opposition today than some private vendetta of the egg-head of the Ozarks against the lofty former senior partner of Sullivan & Cromwell.

Many Senate colleagues, aware of Fulbright's background as a far-traveled Rhodes Scholar, instructor of law, and sometime university president, and put off by his pursuit of study and evident disdain for those who don't do the same, have long looked on him as possibly a good philosopher but certainly no great shakes as a politician and mobilizer. Within the precincts of their club, they have been inclined to echo the evaluation put on him by the State Department. Yet Fulbright's rising impatience with the

"Dulles stewardship" over recent months has rubbed off on many Senators usually far less critical than he, and actually is now serving as a pole to galvanize opinion and—what is more—initiate action.

The Subcommittee's Birth

Late last year, Fulbright came home from a tour of NATO capitals convinced that abroad all semblance of trust in Dulles had vanished. December was also the nadir in relations at home between the Administration and the Senate. Only broken bits of information were passing up to the Hill. Just before the year's end, details of a bold new Presidential program for the Middle East were leaked—not to Senators but to the press. Key legislators were hurriedly summoned to the White House on New Year's Day for a publicized fill-in, although no text of what was afoot was shown them until the next day. The sudden atmosphere of urgency and high pressure that had been built up affronted several Senators—and Fulbright in particular.

On the Saturday before Senate hearings began on the Doctrine, a strategy meeting of Democratic committee members was held in Fulbright's own Room 409. It was the signal of commencing opposition. Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson himself, somewhat grudgingly in favor of the Eisenhower resolution and anxious above all not to have his party appear simply as obstructionist, felt a new wind blowing.

Ultimately, the mass of Senate Democrats did go down the line Eisenhower had requested—but not until they had subjected his foreign-policy management to thirteen days of harassing hearings. Fulbright himself stayed away from the final vote—a move that prompted some to call him a quitter. Yet he had not really been routed. In the meantime his demand for a White Paper had been taken up again with Johnson's blessing by the joint Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, which on January 29 presented the Department of State with the formidable request that it "provide a chronological statement, together with classified and unclassified supporting documents, telegrams, and the like, of all the events that have

contributed significantly to the present situation in the Middle East. . . ." This call for a full accounting was voted unanimously, all the Republican members falling into line when the stipulation was added that the submitted record go back to the Truman days of 1946.

Secretary Dulles had no recourse but to comply. A month and a half passed. Finally a State Department delegation headed by Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy appeared on the Hill to meet with the subgroup appointed to conduct the investigation, consisting of Senators Mansfield, Wiley, Knowland, Byrd, and Saltonstall, with Fulbright in the chair. The officials brought with them a forbidding two-foot-high sample stack of historical papers, as if to suggest the size of the task of unearthing everything back to January, 1946. Fulbright, having just heard the C. D. Jackson testimony, proposed that they speed up their work by next producing a file on the recent and explosive subject of the Aswan Dam deal.

THE ASWAN documents are due at Fulbright's subcommittee headquarters at about the time of this writing. "We're ready for anything they've got to send us," remarked one of its investigators, with a sleuth's grim air of expectation. "We've just laid in plenty of combination-lock cabinets to hold Top Secret stuff." Foreign Relations Committeeman Wayne Morse, swept up by the excitement even before the dossiers are in, has declared on the Senate floor that there was "growing evidence of gross malfeasance in office by the Secretary of State." As for Fulbright himself, who started all this, the most he will say at the moment, looking over his glasses quizzically, is that the exercise may prove "highly educational all around."

'Not to Be Quiet'

Majority Leader Johnson's concern lest the Senators of his party appear to play simply an obstructionist part in our foreign relations is echoed by Fulbright himself, an ardent internationalist who first made his mark in Washington as the author of the wartime Fulbright Resolution calling for American participation in what was to become the United Na-

tions. His proudest claim to fame is the Act under which thousands of traveling scholars have exchanged American and foreign experience under "Fulbright grants." He is not one to wish to be aligned in the public eye with such perennial nay-sayers as Senators Langer and Jenner.

Yet for all his belief in broad American commitments and alliances abroad, Fulbright holds that sweeping grants without strict accountability will not do. The blanket appeal to rally to whatever plans the Executive forms against Communism abroad would involve first of all the abdication of the Senate's duty to weigh, judge, and criticize. "Bipartisanship has become a concept like motherhood," says Fulbright. "You're supposed to be for it—no matter what!" But the true job of Congress, he declared in a speech to University of Maryland students the other day, "is not to be quiet and not rock the boat during the present Middle Eastern situation. . . . It is the role of the opposition party to oppose. And without a searching criticism of the Administration the party in power runs the danger of becoming self-righteous and lazy . . ."

" . . . And uncandid," he might have added. For it is in this ground that his harshest arraignment of the "Dulles stewardship" is rooted. Fulbright went along dutifully with bipartisanship until the Administration early in 1954 made its decision to supply arms to Pakistan at the expense of good relations with India. This he denounced on the Senate floor, stating that the Foreign Relations Committee had not been consulted on the decision and that the Administration had given no concrete reasons for it. Beginning with the first instance of our huge grant of arms to Spain, the conviction also grew in him that Dulles's foreign-aid program was far too concerned with sheer military aspects and was shortsighted and unimaginative.

A Previous Skirmish

Early in 1956, he had the first of his blistering set-tos with Dulles. Covered by batteries of reporters and TV cameras in the Senate Caucus Room, Fulbright had several questions to put to the Secretary, who sat facing him across the table. The

occasion was the foreign-policy debate aroused by the Administration's on-again, off-again hassle of shipping tanks to Saudi Arabia. "Unfortunately, they [the Soviets] seem to be making rapid progress, and especially in the Middle East, do they not?" asked Fulbright.

Squaring his jaw, Dulles answered, "I do not think so. . . . they are having to revise their whole program. . . . The fact is, they have failed, and they have got to devise new policies."

While Fulbright went on citing potential dangers to us in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world, Dulles continued in his euphoric vein: ". . . They have got to revamp their whole creed, from A to Z. . . . They are in a very bad way."

"Is the situation in the French government reassuring to you?" Fulbright pursued.

Dulles permitted himself an offhand smile. "Well, the French government is an interesting phenomenon." [Laughter]

Fulbright came away from the encounter with increased suspicion of the Administration's bland impulsiveness. A year later in the same room these responses came home to roost. Now, as Dulles himself was the first to admit, the Soviets were not only *not* retreating, but actually had been advancing all along in the Middle East. All the more reason, he insisted, for an immediate grant of funds to "hold the situation." It did not require a ripsnorting political prosecutor to confront and embarrass the frowning Dulles of 1957 with his reverse image of 1956. The slow, almost professorial tones of Fulbright were quite enough.

Fulbright has already shown his mettle in the role of investigator, as when back in 1951 he ruthlessly exposed the financial favoritism exercised by certain Administration intimates of mink-coat fame, in the course of his probe into the late Reconstruction Finance Corporation. At the Foreign Relations hearings in January, Fulbright again applied rugged cross-examination techniques when Henry A. Byroade, our Ambassador to Egypt during Nasser's international rise, took the stand—and Mr. Byroade's performance is one into which the Fulbright group wants to look further.

FULBRIGHT: "What do you think is the urgency [of the Middle East aid resolution]? Why do you feel qualified on advising the committee on how fast or how slow it should move?"

BYROADE: "Purely from a foreign-affairs point of view I think a protracted debate . . . shows a question of doubt. . . . I know how suspicious these people are . . . the quicker we can tell them, talk to them, the better."

FULBRIGHT: "How do you think this doubt about our policy arose? Why did the Middle East get into such doubt . . . ?"

BYROADE: "I don't think they had doubt about our policy prior to the creation of Israel and prior to the colonial problems which have arisen . . ."

FULBRIGHT: "Why is there such a doubt now? Why did you not straighten them out on our policy while you were there?"

The end of it was that Ambassador Byroade kept emphasizing, "You are getting out of my field, Senator."

Encouraging the Students

Whether or not Fulbright can follow through at this prosecuting pace and keep a mixed group of Senators with him remains to be seen. A striking fact about this man of many quirks and even more ideas is that many of his ideas have a way of taking hold.

One side effect of his performance during the past months—a surprisingly effective political operation by a man previously thought to be chiefly a specialist in analysis and reflection—is that it has encouraged some of his political colleagues to engage in comparable intellectual exercise in the hope that this may help them in dealing with the complex world issues of our time, and particularly with Secretary Dulles. Thus Majority Leader Johnson himself, not by background a student of foreign affairs, has lately been busily boning up and consulting regularly with both ex-Secretary Dean Acheson and even the incumbent himself. And Dulles in turn has been placed on notice that all his advocate's skills may now be needed in self-defense if he is to sustain the onslaught of the Arkansan who looks as if he had every intention of unseating him.

VIEWS & REVIEWS

Interim

A short story set in the future

PATRICIA ALVIS KOSOBUD

IN THE AFTERNOONS I take the children to play in the city's one remaining strip of park, which lies between the Memorial Cannon and the district anti-missile base. What a marvelous history lesson it provides for them—the quaint old First World War weapon and the latest in intricate design for defense. We've made tremendous progress in the fifty short years that lie between them. Of course, the children prefer the old cannon, on which they climb or play at old-fashioned war games, to the new one, which is fenced off from them and well guarded.

I always make it a point to leave by 4:30, no matter how the children



protest, because John has to go to Civil Defense at seven o'clock so he only sees them for two hours each day. On the street we walk along, many of the shops have been converted for family living. The plate-glass windows have either been replaced with boards or draped and painted in gay colors. The food and supply outlets are in some of the larger stores, and we pick up our Freedom Ration on the way home.

WE LIVE in the old Kominski School building. They were going to tear it down when the board of education was dissolved, but our local citizens' committee protested and was able to salvage it. We were awfully pleased when we were ac-

cepted as tenants. We have a whole classroom just for the five of us, and since it had been condemned we don't have to pay any rent, just taxes and what we have to spend for upkeep.

At first everybody chipped in and bought coal for the furnace, but when it broke down two years ago the tenants' committee voted not to fix it. Coal rationing was about to start and we felt that the ration wouldn't be adequate for the furnace anyway. John has rigged up an ingenious fireplace for us. He got some bricks from an apartment house that collapsed not far away and bought some old stovepipe to make an outlet in the window. It hardly smokes at all, and the coal ration is enough for at least a little fire on the coldest winter days. We wear coats all winter in the house and the children have had very few colds. All in all, our arrangement is much better than the one small room in an old apartment where we used to live.

The children think it's very funny when we tell them that one family used to take a whole apartment. When I stop to think, it *is* strange. When John and I were first married ten years ago, we had a three-room place and we talked of needing more space when we had children. Of course, no one could then have foreseen how successful our industrial leaders would be at bringing people from unproductive farms and small towns into the big cities where they are needed.

When they did begin coming, in droves, just at the time C.D. ordered the curtailment of all nondefense building, everybody thought it wouldn't work, but then the zoning laws were relaxed. People quickly