

Where Do We Go from Here?

LESTER B. PEARSON

IT MAY BE that though we can do nothing about it now, we are in the wrong spot from which to go to the right places. Certainly we got lost somewhere along the way during the last fifty years; and the road to international peace and security which we are now following often seems to be getting rougher and the country swamper. It is not easy to see the turn that will bring us to a broad and smooth highway.

So where in the world do we go from here?

The answer is devastatingly clear in one respect at least. If we don't go forward toward genuine peace and co-operation between all peoples, forward to the solution of basic international issues which will bring about a feeling of security in the world, one of two things will happen.

¶ Nuclear war with intercontinental rocket missiles against which no present defense would save us from total destruction.

¶ Suspension between uneasy peace and global war in a state of tension and fear; with the two great agglomerations of world power, the United States and its allies, the Soviet Union and its satellites, glaring at each other with fear and hostility across a widening gulf of misunderstanding and resentment; where there will be continual conflict short of war, and occasional wars short of the big one; where peace will balance precariously on the knife-edge of terror, with the outer spaces cluttered up with satellites shot there by rockets which could as easily be used to carry nuclear warheads designed not to stay up with the stars but descend on us mortals.

One alternative is only worse than the other. Indeed, all history shows that unless we do something about it, the second will ultimately lead to the first.

Russia's man-made moons would not be circling our planet today if, earlier in this century, the Russian and then other Asian millions had not emerged into the age of power through technology. This process has hardly yet begun in some parts of Asia. In others it is far from completion. It has gone so far in the Soviet Union, however, that in facing these new, enigmatic, and monstrous forces from the East, which we do not even yet fully understand, we shall need all the courage, steadiness, and wisdom we can muster.

The Vicious Circle

Out of Lenin's inflexible will, out of the days that shook the world in 1917, there has emerged a massive



totalitarian society compounded of Communism and science; a society under iron despotic control, and dedicated to the proposition that its tenets will conquer the earth in one way or another; peacefully, if that can be done, but if not . . . Well, Russia now possesses instruments of annihilative assault through its achievements in the science of destruction, and has not hesitated to threaten their use.

Nikita Khrushchev may have been perfectly sincere when he once told me—as he has told many others—that their Soviet system is inherently superior to ours; that socialism, which he thinks the Russians have, is far superior to capitalism and free enterprise, which he thinks we have; that the triumph of their system

over ours in “competitive coexistence” is as inevitable as it can be peaceful.

One could get more comfort from this Communist belief, as a factor that makes for at least an avoidance of open war, if it were not likely that Mr. Khrushchev and other Communists are also convinced that the capitalist leaders, faced with the inevitable deterioration and collapse of their order in this competition, will, according to the laws of scientific Marxism, drag the world into war in one last desperate gamble. Believing this, and professing to find an abundance of contemporary evidence to support both our disintegration and our determination to stop it by imperialist wars and adventures, Khrushchev and his temporary colleagues who control Russia keep adding to the armed power of their state and trying to extend Communist influence. They also resist by any means required, including force, the efforts of their satellite states to extricate themselves from the thralldom of Moscow; and they carry with ever-increasing vigor the war of words into world forums such as the United Nations.

These Russian moves increase our own fears of aggression. Therefore, we search for more power to defend ourselves. It is a vicious and it could be a fatal circle, nor does it do any good, in trying to cut through it, merely to assume that all is right on our side and wrong on the other; to wrap ourselves in a cloak of impeccable rectitude and diplomatic rigidity.

In the Long Run

What do we oppose to the Russian-controlled centralized society? Too often, merely the well-born clichés of the superiority of freedom and democracy and our “way of life.” Let there be no misunderstanding.

These things are superior to anything that Soviet Communism can produce or will produce. The imposed order and the directed activity of the Russians may seem to give them at times a selective advantage over our free competitive society, but in the long run there is no salvation, no hope, in their system because it enslaves the free thought and free soul of man to the dictates of a few irresponsible despots.

While that "long run," however, is taking place, there are some signs that our own social and economic and political institutions will not be equal to the challenges that face them; that our clichés are too empty of content for too many.

Soviet life and Soviet policy, admittedly, are founded on power and compulsion rather than consent. But are we sure that our own social purpose, derived from the right of the individual to make his own choice, is steady, strong, constructive, and based on enduring values?

Perhaps we should worry more about that, and not just about what is going on behind or over the Iron Curtain.

The very word "freedom" has now lost some of its earlier, angry meaning of stern and sturdy resistance to pressures and persecutions, from men or from mass opinion. The current popularity of that awful expression "the organization man" and the vogue for dissecting our motivations and desires so that we may fit into a group, whether as executives of a corporation or as purchasers of soap, are depressing portents. Surely we are not going to escape total state control in order to seek security in the "big organization" type of social and economic conformity.

The Defense of Values

True and responsible freedom does mean strength. We know that. We know also that we have to pay a price for it, and we are glad to do so. But let us not by our own action or inaction make that price any higher than necessary. We know also that inevitably we tend to advertise our weaknesses and our failures. They make news on the "man bites dog" theory. But surely a sense of responsibility in this regard should be dictated by the realization that

this kind of ammunition—which we not only manufacture but fire from the biggest guns possible—is directed against ourselves by ourselves. The other side can sit back and chuckle over our success in fighting their battle.

Undoubtedly we of the West must accept some handicaps in the con-

ple knowing true men when they see them, and preferring them as leaders to rabid partisans or empty quacks."

The Threat to NATO

There is, of course, another and more conventional aspect of defense which should be mentioned. It is the strengthening of the alliance of



test with the Communist world. I have not even attempted to catalogue our strong points. Perhaps that is not a serious omission because we know them so well. In any event, it is time for soul searching, perhaps for soul shocking, rather than self-satisfaction as we face this new force of Soviet Communist imperialism armed with all the latest devices of a technology we used to think peculiarly our own, and indeed possessing some we have not yet acquired.

All this adds up to the fact that the strengthening of our institutions, the putting of first things first at home, the acceptance of the necessary individual sacrifices for a good social objective, are the first and most important objectives of defense. It is the defense of values.

This thought was once put by William James in the following words:

"The deadliest enemies of nations are not their foreign foes but those that dwell within their borders, and from these internal enemies of civilization is always in need of being saved. The nation blessed above all nations is she in whom the civic genius of the peoples does the saving day by day, by acts without external picturesqueness, by speaking, writing, voting reasonably, by smiting corruption swiftly, by good temper between parties, by the peo-

ple knowing true men when they see them, and preferring them as leaders to rabid partisans or empty quacks."

free nations, particularly in NATO; strengthening it militarily, economically, and politically. This is a problem of immediate and pressing importance, for an alliance of this kind cannot stand still. It will go forward or it will disappear. If the latter, the primary aim of Russian foreign policy will be achieved: the detachment, the splitting off, of western Europe from North America.

Believe me, there is a danger of this happening, with results that would be tragic for everyone but the Kremlin. At present, while real efforts are being made to make it otherwise, it would be idle to deny that the strongest element in the cement that holds the members of NATO together is fear. In maintaining the alliance, a shot in the arm from Moscow is more effective than all the rejuvenating tonics prescribed in reports and resolutions at council meetings. In this respect, Khrushchev, like Stalin before him, has done more for NATO than any of its own "wise men" could possibly do.

There are signs, however, that this cement of fear, in spite of current shocks, is not as strong as it once was. This is not because of any feeling that the danger of aggression has been removed, but because of a growing feeling among certain of the European members that NATO, as such, no longer provides security

against it, and also that the target of aggression is now more likely to be across the Atlantic. This questioning of the security value of NATO has been increased by the realization that the greatest, perhaps now the only, effective deterrent against all-out attack by the Soviet on western Europe is the ability and the resolve of the United States, not of NATO as such, to retaliate massively against Moscow.

This creates a sense of the futility of local defense as at present organized, and therefore of the folly of spending great sums of money on it. This feeling could possibly be changed if European countries had their own tactical atomic weapons. Then they could themselves provide a deterrent against aggression without involving the use of bombs and missiles which would automatically convert what might be a limited war into global destruction.

As it happens, however, no continental European NATO country now has these atomic weapons under its own control or is manufacturing them. The ability of the United States to make them freely available is limited by legislation. All this is a serious weakening of the principle and practice of collective defense. Surely in an alliance of this kind, every aspect of defense must be fully collective and co-operative, whether strategic or merely tactical considerations are involved, and all weapons must be shared. The time has come when security risks—if there is much risk now in view of what the Russians know—must be subordinated to the greater risk of the alliance weakening and disappearing.

Indeed, if NATO cannot continue on the widest possible basis of pooling and partnership, it is not likely to continue at all, at least as an effective organization.

Eloquence and Co-operation

If there are dangers ahead for collective defense, the situation is even more disturbing in the field of political and economic co-operation. Here again at intervals the Russians make an aggressive move that shocks us into appeals for greater unity and closer co-operation. Then the crisis passes and too often also our noble resolve to work more closely together.

There has recently been some emphatic talk that the NATO countries should not only pool weapons but also their experience and their resources in the field of science and technology; should avoid wasteful duplication and provide for full exchange of information and know-how in this field. This admirable idea is not a new one. Indeed, a proposal to convene a conference to do something about scientific pooling was put forward to the NATO Council on December 1, 1956, in the report of the Committee of Three on nonmilitary co-operation. There is nothing to indicate that this recommendation caused very much interest at that time among the governments most concerned.

It is the same with political co-operation generally. Every NATO member, including Canada, becomes



eloquent on appropriate occasions over the virtues of the closest kind of such co-operation and consultation. But there is a steady reluctance, especially among the more powerful members, to take the necessary measures to make it effective. That would mean perhaps too much interference with the sacred cow of national sovereignty, would impose too great a limitation on the freedom of national action—and national legislatures.

We have two duties in the West: to protect our institutions within the city walls from deterioration and decay, and then to defend the walls themselves.

There is, however, a third and even more important duty: to bring about a state of affairs in the world where no one will wish to attack us at all—or we them; where even-

tually walls themselves will be as much of an anachronism as trenches, barbed wire, and forts on the U.S.-Canadian border.

Patience and Persistence


This is the supreme obligation of all men in all nations—the extension of the area of peace with law and justice and freedom. We cannot be sure, however, that all other nations will co-operate with us in that task. So we must maintain the means for our own defense while taking every possible step, and making every possible effort, to remove any doubt in others that our force, military and diplomatic, will ever be used for any aggressive and unworthy purpose.

Our insistence on the primacy of this task of making peace by international negotiation, our seizure of every political opportunity to this end, does not mean that we should or need contemplate agreements that would betray either our friends or our principles. Indeed, peace on such terms would be false and any arrangements made would be worthless.

I know that there are those who look with suspicion on every move that implies a desire or even a willingness to negotiate; who call it “appeasement”—one of those words debased by polemics—or softness toward Communism. Such critics forget that if total and unremitting hatred of Communism were the only test of loyalty to democratic ideals, Hitler would be the greatest democrat of all time.

Ignoring the voices of passionate if often sincere prejudice and unreason, we should go on seeking, patiently and persistently, a basis for negotiation and agreement with the other side. In the process we should refuse to adopt the rough, crude tactics that may be used against us, or allow our own attitudes, even more our own policies, to be determined by such tactics. This is not a sign of weakness on our part but of confidence and strength.

I QUITE realize that the easiest, and in some quarters the most popular, attitude that we could adopt in the cold war would be a relentless and immovable stand on a platform of inveterate and inflexible hostility to Soviet Russia and determined oppo-



sition to every move it makes or tries to make any place any time. The corollary to this means taking steps to counter and defeat every such move in the hope that Russia will eventually accept without conditions our terms for ending the cold war and withdraw—actually and ideologically—behind its old Czarist boundaries. I see myself no prospect of any such easing of tension, and ultimately of international peace and security, if we have our policy and diplomacy on any such basis.

A Flexible Policy

Such a policy is one of simple “unconditional surrender.” It means limiting our diplomacy and foreign policy to that requirement. It means also, of course, remaining armed to the teeth, at a time when it is equally useful to be armed to the brain.

I know quite well that whatever we do we have to be well armed for defense in all its aspects. I am not suggesting that we throw away any elements of our military strength except some antediluvian ideas. I accept the fact that no matter how enlightened and flexible our policy, we cannot safely allow it to result in a weakening of what the military call our defense posture. If, however, we allow an exaggerated and provocative posture to result from, or be encouraged by, a rigid “unconditional surrender” type of diplomacy, we make the establishment of peace through tolerable arrangements even more difficult than it already is.

What I am suggesting is that, without weakening our necessary defenses, we refuse to allow our policy to be dictated solely by military considerations or frozen by fears based on those considerations.

I am not naïve enough to think that as a result, satisfactory solutions

will then be found for all the international problems that divide and bedevil the world. Certainly my own experience makes me more than skeptical about finding in the present political climate any such solutions based on friendship, or understanding, or mutual trust between Communists and non-Communists. My hopes are no higher than that accommodations may be brought about step by step on a basis of mutual tolerance and self-interest, and certainly without betrayal of any principle on our side.

It may be that we cannot even achieve this. That does not mean, however, that we should not try, and make sure that if failure comes it will be through no fault of ours. As the Bible says, “. . . it must



needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh!”

The Way Forward

In following the course I have outlined, we can take hope from the knowledge that no society, certainly no Russian Communist society, remains static. There is a ferment of freedom ever at work, even in Russia; for freedom, as the epic of Hungary has shown, cannot be rooted out of the human mind by force or by fraud. Signs of this evolution which is taking place in Russia have been noticeable in the last few years. This gives us reason to hope that one day in a new Russia settlements can be made which will have stronger foundations than any that are possible now.

There is also in Russia a continual and implacable struggle for power going on within the Kremlin walls. This struggle often reflects itself in the violence of a position that may be taken and expressed by Russia on some international issue at the United Nations or elsewhere. There-

fore, what may often seem to be an indication of brute strength and confidence may conceal weakness and division in the Kremlin. In this kind of discord, any forces of reason that exist among the Russian people may become stronger.

Such an evolution, however, will be held back, perhaps indefinitely, if we now take fixed and final positions in opposition to every Russian move. As I see it, if and when Russia has a legitimate interest in some area or some development, we would be foolish to act as if that interest can either be ignored or attacked. Such an attitude, of course, plays right into the hands of the worst elements inside the Kremlin. It also weakens our position in those nations who have no love for Communism but refuse, for reasons that seem perfectly good to them, to take sides in the cold war. There are situations in the world today which do not admit of any permanent solution which will bring about stability without Russian participation in, or at least acceptance of, that solution. We might as well admit that hard fact.

IN SHORT, I think that if we wish to go forward from where we now are to something better, we must not only keep our domestic institutions strong, free and healthy; our defensive coalition firm in its collective will and power but we should take full advantage of every opportunity to negotiate; indeed create opportunities to negotiate differences with those whom we have had and still have good reason to fear.

In that course, followed steadily and not by spasms, with positive actions rather than panic reactions; based on a strength which is more than military, lies our best hope for a peace with law and order; a peace that will be endurable and perhaps, therefore, enduring.



The Continentals

Stand Firm

EDMOND TAYLOR

PARIS
SHORTLY after the French delegation to the recent NATO Parliamentarians' Conference here had walked out in protest against the Anglo-American arms shipments to Tunisia, I met one of the more reflective French delegates taking a farewell stroll around the crowded lobby of the Palais de Chaillot. "I don't feel the crisis in the western alliance is insoluble," he said in answer to one of my questions. "I am only afraid that instead of trying to solve it you will give us a big smile and then think everything has been fixed up."

Many western observers who have followed the unexpectedly frank discussions of the parliamentarians in the flaking, fading edifice across the Seine from the Eiffel Tower share the French delegate's conviction that the forthcoming meeting of the North Atlantic Council can render the grave ills of the alliance incurable if its prescription is nothing more than diplomatic tranquilizers.

The Channel Gets Wider

In the context of the informal October debates among the delegates from the legislatures of the NATO nations, the sudden squall that blew up out of Africa was much more than a passing perturbation affecting only the relations among Paris, London, and Washington. It was the latest evidence of a generalized revolt of NATO's Continental members against Anglo-Saxon leadership in the organization. Though the Continentals were far from united on all issues, their feelings about Anglo-Saxon stewardship were revealed unmistakably in the acid tone of some public exchanges and in more candid private conversations in the lobby. Their mood was also apparent in a series of emotional huddles and impromptu press conferences after the French walkout, when the Continental delegates crowded around the

French delegation expressing sympathy and off-the-record support for the French position.

"The Anglo-American decision on Tunisia is absurd," declared Admiral J. Toumpas of Greece, whose government habitually supports the Afro-Asian position against French policy in North Africa.

"We don't always agree with you about Algeria," a Dutch delegate told a group of French delegates and journalists, "but after what the British and Americans have just done, we think you are fully justified in walking out of the conference."

The Germans were particularly outspoken—at least in the corridors. "If this is the way people are going to act," declared the chief German delegate, Richard Jaeger, referring to the Anglo-American action in overruling French objections to their Tunisian policy, "there's nothing to prevent the Americans from deciding unilaterally to pull their troops out of Europe, leaving everyone to go it alone."

The Continental powers apparently fear that the United States and Britain are engaged in setting up an Anglo-Saxon directorate. This suspicion, which has increased markedly since the Eisenhower-Macmillan talks, arouses strong resentments in all the Common Market nations of western Europe, but it is naturally most violent in France. The joint Anglo-American action in Tunisia has provoked the most violent flare-up of French Anglophobia since the war.

Oddly enough, the sentiment against the United States, the senior partner in the supposed Anglo-Saxon condominium, is much less extreme, though several French commentators felt that the implementation of the Anglo-American decision bore the unmistakable imprint of Mr. Dulles's "brutal diplomacy."

"The basic error of American NATO policy is the failure to recog-

nize that there is an internal balance of power within the alliance that must be preserved," a senior European diplomat specializing in NATO affairs explained to me recently. "If British and American power are too closely and exclusively associated, the alliance becomes top-heavy and a kind of Third Force isolationism develops on the Continent in self-defense. When you encourage European integration, as you have been doing, without at the same time encouraging closer ties between Britain and the Continent, you merely speed up this process and deepen the split in NATO. To avoid the danger, you should simultaneously put pressure on the Continental powers to save a place at their council tables for Britain and on Britain to occupy it. Your foreign policy as conceived by Dulles fails to do either. Day by day the Channel is getting wider instead of narrower."

MORE THAN anything else, it is the possible use of nuclear weapons that converts the question of NATO's internal balance of power from a mere diplomatic abstraction into a problem upon whose solution may depend the survival of the alliance itself.

"France cannot tolerate on its soil the weapons of mass destruction that expose it to enemy reprisals without having a voice in the decision as to their eventual use," *Le Monde* warned recently. "It is to be hoped that all the fine words about Atlantic interdependence won't boil down in the end to transferring the responsibility at present entrusted to the United States alone to an Anglo-American directorate. However isolated M. Pineau may be in regard to North African questions, on this issue he can, if he wishes, speak with the voice of all Europe."

Who is to pull the trigger on such strategic NATO weapons as intermediate-range missiles with nuclear warheads? This will be the supreme issue of the forthcoming Council session. Unless the Continental powers are made to feel that they have an equal voice with their Anglo-Saxon allies in this crucial decision, they will not be much impressed by any Anglo-American plans for stockpiling missiles on the Continent, for pooling scientific resources, or even