plied. "I'll go out there and talk with these people and tell them what we've got to offer. Then I'll come on back here and be able to tell Mr. Dulles, 'This is what you can do here', or 'This won't go over so well here.'" Richards declared he would, as far as possible, steer clear of the "basic problems" of the area such as the Suez Canal and the Arab-Israeli dispute. "If this gets mixed up with that other stuff, we'll get no place at all," he told Noyes. "We'll do what we can, but I'm afraid the basic problems of the Middle East won't be settled in my time." He said he hoped his mission could be wound up in about six months.

As he faces the Senators across the table, Secretary Dulles, who has always placed popularity with Congress high among his ambitions, must wonder at times just how well he has succeeded. George is gone and he can count very little on the new Foreign Relations Chairman, Theodore Francis Green (D., Rhode Island), spry for his eighty-nine years but slightly deaf, a stickler for trivial details, and clearly incapable of swinging much weight in either the Committee or the larger body. Next in line is Fulbright, an idealistic and dedicated man whom Dulles has notably failed to cultivate or convince. Behind him in committee seniority come Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse—probably as able and internationalist a group as can be found in the Senate. Their skepticism toward the Secretary is thinly veiled. None has displayed the slightest inclination to take up the cudgels for him.

There is little counterweight on the minority side of the committee. The two senior Republicans—well-meaning but elephantine Alexander Wiley and elderly, ineffectual Alexander Smith—can hardly be of much help. It is indicative of the desperate quest for a spokesman that Bourke Hickenlooper, remembered chiefly for his long-ago "incredible mismanagement" tiff with David Lilienthal, is being watched hopefully by State Department liaison men.

Uneasy Bipartisanship

The business of bringing Congress along on foreign policy has never been entirely without guile. Even in the heyday of the great postwar achievements, the Secretary of State was obliged to practice certain deceits upon the chieftains in Congress. Few were so obliging as the House Foreign Affairs Chairman Sol Bloom, who sent word to the State Department that he didn't care what they did so long as he was informed a half hour ahead of everybody else. Few were as candid as Chairman Richards, who always wanted some fat left in the foreign-aid bills so he could get credit for cutting it out. Most of them had their pet crotchets. Even Arthur Vandenberg, whose eminence as a policymaker grew over the years, had to be "handled" at times.

These were matters of tactics. But no one who was involved ever supposed that the Executive and Congress had entered into any sort of partnership for the conduct of foreign policy. Indeed, Vandenberg once complained, "Many people seem to think that I act as a sort of Co-Secretary of State in connection with foreign-policy decisions. This of course is totally erroneous. Indeed, it would be a physical impossibility."

The playing at partnership really amounts to the biggest deceit of all. That is why Members of Congress who are vitally concerned about the Middle East situation have been angered by the notion that they are somehow being made co-secretaries of the Eisenhower Doctrine. They are suspicious of why they have been called in. From what Mr. Dulles has told them so far, they are not sure whether the Doctrine is directed at the Middle East or at them.

$200 Million For What?

GEORGE BARNES

So far as the economic aspect of the Administration's historic gamble for the Middle East is concerned, the Secretary of State apparently means to hold his hand pretty close to the vest. Hours of questioning on Capitol Hill have failed to evoke from Mr. Dulles any real explanation of how he is going to use the $200-million-a-year fund the Administration wants from Congress.

No one who knows the desperate poverty of the region and understands the irrepressible surge of its peoples toward something better will challenge the premise that the United States must respond to their need if we hope to dissuade them from further adventures with Communism. The question to which Mr. Dulles's reticence gives rise, however, is whether the Administration's new economic program can actually produce the results we look for in the present crisis.

It may be, of course, that the Secretary of State has excellent reasons for his reluctance to expose his hand at this stage of the game. It is well known that money can work wonders in the Middle East if you are not too finicky about how you use it; and it is at least possible that Mr. Dulles does not intend to be finicky. If this is the case, his noncommittal attitude at this stage is understandable.

On the other hand, if the Administration intends to pursue a major development program in the Middle East on the crash basis suggested by the President, Mr. Dulles's reticence may derive from the plain fact that he doesn't know what the money is going to be used for. We have been trying for five and a half years to get an effective economic-development program going in the Middle East, and we haven't had much luck at it.

We Can't Get Rid of the Money

The fuzziness of the Administration's new program makes comparisons with this past effort hazardous. We do not know, for example, what countries or what kind of projects are to be included in the new program. The general impression is that it is to embrace a wide area extending from Libya to Pakistan and from Turkey to Ethiopia.

From all that has been said, however, it may be assumed that the main focus will be on the Arab states at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, where the greatest pressure of Communist penetration is being felt. A look at our previous efforts at economic development in these countries may serve to illustrate certain problems Mr. Dulles apparently prefers to ignore.

Between July 1, 1951, and June 30, 1956, the United States allotted a total of $136,295,000 to five Arab states—Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Of this "allotment," which means money earmarked for a particular country, $129,627,000 was "obligated," which means earmarked for specific purposes, development assistance and technical co-operation, within a particular country. But of the obligated funds, only $73,054,000 has actually been spent. In other words, over a five-year period, it has been impossible to spend forty-five per cent of the money we had planned to spend in the five Arab states.

Eliminate the technical assistance funds from the totals, and the picture is even less promising. For development projects alone—presumably the kind of aid contemplated by the Administration's new program—we obligated $84,134,000 for three Arab countries—Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt—in the five years between 1951 and 1956. Of this amount, only $36,487,000 has actually been expended, which is to say that fifty-six per cent of the money we planned to spend for economic development in Arab countries over a five-year period is still in the Treasury.

Two Arab states—Iraq and Saudi Arabia—have received no development aid at all, preferring, presumably, to rely on their own oil royalties. One Arab country has refused assistance of any kind. This is Syria, ingrown, suspicious, unstable, and now deeply penetrated by Soviet influence and heavily endowed with Soviet arms.

Parenthetically, it may be noted

that for Israel, the U.S. development aid funds obligated during the same five-year period totaled $252 million, of which $234 million, or ninety-two per cent, has actually been put to work. If the amount allocated to Israel exceeds by many times the amount allotted to individual Arab states—a fact Arab leaders are fond of pointing out—the reason may be that the Israelis have had the political stability, the will, and the skill to plan and carry out development programs as rapidly as financial assistance becomes available. Washington has long wished for similar competence and initiative on the part of Israel's neighbors.

In short, there is little or nothing in our past Middle East experience to justify the contention that the Administration can get real economic development under way in the region if Congress will only put up several hundred million dollars with no strings attached. There is even less to suggest that such an expenditure will deter Soviet penetration or win for us the abiding friendship of the Arab peoples. Certainly the $136 million of economic and technical aid we have allotted to them in the last five years has done neither.

The basic fallacy in the economic aspect of the Administration's new proposal, so far as one may judge from Mr. Dulles's generalities, is that it appears to treat only the symptoms and disregards the causes of the illness that plagues the Arab world. Despite our past experience, the Administration seems ready to go right on putting money ahead of the Arabs' fundamental needs—peace, stability and regional co-operation. It should be clear by now that just spending money won't work any miracles.

Double-Crossing Over Jordan

The Jordan Valley project is a case in point. This was a plan initiated by the United States to conserve and harness the waters of the Jordan for irrigation and power. The plan was a "natural" both from the engineering standpoint and as sound economic development, offering more than two hundred thousand people—about a fourth of the Arab refugees—a decent livelihood from irrigated agriculture in what is now an all but barren valley. But there was a joker—the project required the agreement of four Middle Eastern states, all of which had legitimate claim to a share of the river and three of which were bitterly hostile toward the fourth. The countries were Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel.

In October, 1953, President Eisenhower asked Eric Johnston to go to the Middle East as his personal ambassador to try to persuade the four Jordan Valley states to agree on the project. Johnston set out with no illusions as to the difficulty of the assignment but with a firm conviction that such a plan, if carried out, would help to resolve the urgent refugee problem, establish a pattern for intraregional development, and perhaps open the way for a general relaxation of Arab-Israel tensions.

No man ever worked harder at a job than Johnston worked at this one. On the four separate visits to the Middle East over a span of three years on which I accompanied him as an adviser, I watched him argue and cajole his way through hundreds of weary hours of the most detailed and harassing negotiations it is possible to imagine. He burned the midnight oil in every U.S. Embassy in the area preparing argumentation and counterproposals for the next meeting with one side or the other. American ambassadors winced at his tough talk to Presidents, Prime Ministers, and kings, watched him shatter all the rules of diplomatic exchange, and ended up with a considerable amount of admiration for what several of them now call the "Johnston technique."

In the end, his persistence and persuasiveness brought the three Arab states and Israel into agreement on the economic and engineering aspects of a plan for developing the Jordan Valley for the benefit of all four states. He had accomplished the unprecedented feat of working out a project that was acceptable to both sides.

In late September, 1955, a special Committee of Arab Engineers reported to the Arab League that the Johnston plan, revised and refined through negotiation, was equitable, workable, and compatible with Arab interests. This put it squarely up to the political leaders of the Arab states—whether or not to assent to a project involving the expenditure of some $200 million in their countries over a ten-year period, the creation of a major new agricultural area, the development of power for industrial expansion, and the permanent settlement of several hundred thousand of their people on the land.

On the night of October 11, 1955, in the Cairo office of the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Johnston was handed a brief statement that had just been adopted by the Arab League. It requested "more time" to consider the "technical" details of the project. This was diplomatic double talk: rejection of the plan had nothing to do with technical matters. The League's action was motivated wholly by political considerations. It was a clear reflection of the obsessive hatred of Israel that pervades the Arab world. The effect of the League's action was to kill any immediate possibility of going ahead with a major undertaking that offered indisputable benefit to the Arab states themselves.

The negative vote that killed the project under the Arab League's unanimity rule was cast by Saïd el-Ghazzi, then Premier of Syria, who feared the possible political consequences of acceptance. Both Lebanon and Jordan, the other principal beneficiaries, were in favor of acceptance. On the following morning, an exceptionally well-informed Egyptian newspaperman told me that el-Ghazzi had acted under instructions from Nasser of Egypt, who had repeatedly assured Johnston that he would support the plan.

A Pair of Prerequisites

This case history of what happened to a sound and desperately needed large-scale Middle Eastern development project is cited to illustrate several of the realities that Mr. Dulles appears to disregard in his projections of the Administration's economic plan.

One is that economic progress in the area which is of greatest concern to us in the Middle East cannot be achieved until there is peace and a reasonable political *rapprochement* between the Arab world and Israel. Continued military tension imposes a staggering economic burden on the economy of every state in the area, diverts the energies of the people from constructive to destructive ends, strengthens the hand of Nasser and lesser Arab demagogues, and invites further Communist intrusion. So long as Arab leaders feel it necessary to pursue the politically popular line of vengeance against Israel, U.S. offers of economic aid are going to run a poor second to Soviet offers of planes and tanks.

The second reality is that the Middle East can move forward economically only as a region. Its progress depends on regional integration and co-operation between the various states that make it up.

This becomes abundantly clear from even a cursory exploration of major development possibilities.

The Jordan River project, as has been pointed out, requires assent and co-operation by four governments. Development of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley would call for agreement among Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. The Nile—in spite of Nasser's emphasis on the Aswan High Dam—can only be harnessed for maximum benefit through agreement and co-operation among Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and the territorial governments of Kenya, Tanganyika, and the Belgian Congo.

An expansion of tourist travel to the Holy Land would produce immediate new revenues for the hard-pressed states of Jordan and Israel, with ancillary benefits to their neighbors. It would, in addition, stimulate the construction of new hotel and resort facilities, new transport lines, new highways. Yet, here again, a regional approach is necessary if the traveler is to have free access to all that he wants to see.

One of the region's most urgent needs is a modern highway system linking the Mediterranean seaboard with inland cities and the Persian Gulf. One imaginative and practicable project would involve the construction of a modern toll road, with feeder highways, from Lebanese and Syrian seaport cities across the desert to Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Such a project would be feasible only as a joint undertaking.

The regional approach in the present state of Middle Eastern affairs is admittedly not an easy one. Not only are the Arabs still actively at war with Israel; tensions within the Arab world itself are acute. Nasser's ambitions to weld the Arab nations into an Egyptian-dominated federation have in fact produced precisely the opposite effect. To the south, the Sudan and Ethiopia are increasingly apprehensive of Nasser's machinations, suspicious of his intentions regarding the Nile, angry at his constant propaganda aimed at their minorities. Any constructive effort to start the region along the road to greater economic well-being must begin by dealing with these pressures and conflicts which continue to plague the Middle East.

There is not the slightest doubt that a carefully planned economic attack, carried out on a regional basis under conditions of real peace, could contribute immeasurably to the progress and emancipation of the area. But the mere expenditure of a few hundred million dollars in a crash operation designed to halt Communist penetration by paying for a project here and there won't get us anywhere at all.

If this is all Mr. Dulles has in mind, he might as well save our money.

Israel and the Refugees Of the Gaza Strip

FRANK GERVASI

GENEVA

THE PROBLEM of the Arab refugees from Israel now encamped in the Gaza Strip and in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria militates against peace in the Middle East, and thereby threatens the peace and stability of the whole world.

Given the hitherto inflexible positions assumed by Israel and its Arab neighbors on the question, is a solution possible? I have put the question to more than a score of experts—Jewish, Moslem, and Christian—in Israel, the Gaza Strip, and here, and I have received surprisingly optimistic replies. First, however, let us examine the "solutions" proposed by the Arabs and Jews so far.

One hundred per cent repatriation, as insisted upon by Nasser and his predecessors, is patently impossible. To begin with, if it was an injustice to uproot hundreds of thousands of Arabs in the creation of a Jewish state, it would be no less an injustice to impose on 1,800,000 inhabitants of Israel a Moslem multitude schooled in hate and revenge. Israel already has nearly 200,000 Arabs—the 150,000 who never left the country in 1947 and the 40,000 to 50,000 since repatriated to reunited families broken up by the war. Since 1948, moreover, Israel has taken in approximately 400,000 Oriental Jews from Africa and Asia, where Jews who had lived for generations as full-fledged citizens of their respective communities suddenly became anathema.

ISRAEL has just about as many Arabs as its hard-pressed economy, still heavily dependent on foreign assistance and investment, can accommodate.

Furthermore, the country must be prepared to make room for "unexpected guests." European Jews filter in from Iron Curtain countries at the rate of about a thousand a month. Thousands more will be coming this year from Egypt. All arrive penniless, no matter how well off they might have been where they came from.

The Mathematics of Misery

Admittedly, the Arab population of the refugee camps is not as big as Nasser's press agents would have one believe: Their figure is a nice, round 1,100,000. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which feeds and cares for them, counted them at 922,279 as of the end of last June. However, the refugees have been known to hide their dead to hang onto old ration cards and have been known to pass newborn babies around from family to family to acquire new ones. The total may well be closer to official Israeli estimates ranging from 600,000 to 650,000.

This much is certain: There were



1,100,000 Arabs in British-mandated Palestine as of November, 1947, when the United Nations partitioned the area. Of these, 150,000, according to verifiable Israeli records, remained in the country when the others left. The evidence is overwhelming that the 1947 exodus was instigated by outside leaders who promised the Palestinian Arabs a triumphant return and much loot with the annihilation of the Jews. Anyhow, that would leave 950,000 potential refugees. Of those, 450,000 remained in the Arab part of Palestine annexed by Jordan at the time of the 1948 armistice. They are on their own land, in their own homes, no worse and no better off than they were before. Under no circumstances should they be counted as refugees although they are so considered and as such live on the U.N. dole.

Subtracting the Jordanian "refugees" from the 950,000, one arrives at a figure of 500,000. Allowing for natural increment of births over deaths, the present "real" total can hardly be much more than 600,000. Of these, 217,000 are in the Gaza Strip, which was occupied by the Egyptians at armistice time.

Even 600,000 would be far more Arabs than Israel could possibly absorb, assuming that it would wish or could be persuaded to do so given its limited economic and territorial resources and, most particularly, the poisoned state of the refugees' minds. Unless their guardian, the United Nations, is prepared to reverse its 1947 decision creating a Jewish state, the refugees' only hope of a useful and productive future would seem to lie in resettlement in the Arab countries.

EVERYONE who has had anything to do with the problem, except Nasser, of course, admits that relocation of the Palestinians in other Arab countries is the only practicable solution of their admittedly wretched plight. Half a dozen bold, imaginative projects to that end have gathered dust in official files despite the approval by the U.N. General Assembly in 1952 of a $200-million relief budget, separate from the annual $30-million bill for the refugees' upkeep.

In most respects, the task involved does not seem as onerous as skeptics have pictured it. To begin with, resettling an Arab from a mud-walled hovel in Rafa to a farm in Syria is not nearly as difficult as taking a Jewish tailor from Berlin and turning him into a tractor driver on a kibbutz. There are few linguistic, social, or climatic complications.

Nor is space a problem. There is room for the Palestine Arabs in the underpopulated but as yet underdeveloped areas of the Middle East. Not in Egypt, which is unable to feed its present population, or in tiny Lebanon, which is already overcrowded and in any event must, for political reasons almost identical to Israel's, try to preserve a balance between Moslem and non-Moslem inhabitants. Roughly half of Lebanon's