

are relieved of the abstractions that so bedevil their colleagues.

Because the House Appropriations subcommittees always operate *in camera*, one gets only inklings of the seigniorship that makes men like Otto E. Passman and John J. Rooney and George Mahon, comparatively unknown elsewhere, awesome figures in Washington. They guard their domains jealously, to the point of excluding from the subcommittee sessions other members from the full committee. They work harder and longer hours than anyone else in Congress and get little public attention for it. They must work at great speed to make decisions of staggering importance, and without sufficient information. What standards of accountancy, for example, can be employed when the Appropriations subcommittee on Defense passes on the billion dollars already spent on a nuclear plane with no prototype yet in sight? And yet, before so great a task, they exert their power to the hilt. This session, the two Defense subcommittees went to work with zest rewriting the nation's military strategies, cutting a billion dollars from parts of the Defense Department's budget and adding nearly a billion to other parts. (The total approved by Congress, oddly, came to within \$20 million of the \$39.2 billion requested.) The subcommittees disputed with each other as well as with the Pentagon, the House subcommittee chopping funds for the Bomarc missile while the Senate subcommittee knocked out the Nike-Hercules money. (A compromise finally reduced funds for both types.) The House subcommittee cut out the Navy's request for an additional aircraft carrier; the Senate subcommittee added funds for a nuclear one.

Some have attempted to curb the arrogant tendencies of the Appropriations Committees. This year, Foreign Relations Chairman J. William Fulbright (D., Arkansas) raised one point of order after another against legislative riders affecting foreign policy tucked away in appropriation bills. At the same time, in sponsoring a measure for Treasury financing of the Development Loan Fund, he also tried and failed to remove from the hazards of the Appropriations Committees a program that

must be long-term and orderly if it is to succeed. More and more, particularly in the foreign-policy field, there is a realization that it may hurt more than it helps to pull up programs by the roots to give them the annual appropriation treatment.

EARLY LAST SESSION Senator Albert Gore (D., Tennessee) inaugurated a series of evening meetings to which he invited his Democratic colleagues. They met in the Old Supreme Court Chamber in the Capitol, dined, and joined in round-table discussion with invited guests. The Gore gatherings proved tremendously popular and there were even complaints from Republican senators at being excluded. Attempting to explain their attraction, the junior senator from Tennessee remarked thoughtfully, "Nowadays, we don't ever seem to have a chance to get together and talk things over."

It was a strange admission of loneliness from a member of an institution supposedly dedicated to the principle of getting together and

talking things over. It hints at the frustration felt by many over the way Congress has failed to come to grips with its business; over the way it subleets its powers and has to devise hasty strategies to get around self-imposed roadblocks. These lonely men sense at times that too much of their business is being farmed out—to the experts, who bring it back more complicated than ever, and to the committee barons, who have both the power and an itch to make it felt.

For some, particularly in the Senate, there is always a form of escape on the floor. So they go and speak. Yet the listener in Congress cannot help but be struck by how little, despite the flow of oratory, they really "talk things over." There is no shortage of monologists. Bold ideas, plans, programs are daily set forth with great eloquence; launched, for the most part, into the thin air of a nearly deserted hall. Perhaps a first long step in getting anyone to listen to Congress is for Congress to figure out better ways of listening to itself.



De Gaulle Breaks the Ice

EDMOND TAYLOR

THE VERY BOLDNESS of President de Gaulle's radio-television message to the nation on September 16, with its dramatic offer of self-determination for Algeria, threw his domestic adversaries off balance and paralyzed their reflexes during a brief but decisive period. Before unveiling his plan the president had discussed its essential features with a number of army officers in Al-

geria and a few key Gaullist leaders in Paris; nobody seemed shocked. Yet as de Gaulle finally delivered the message, subtly underscoring some of its most provocative passages with his rumbling, uneven voice and using the allusive magic of his style to build up an integrated program that sounded far more revolutionary than the sum of all its parts, it shocked a number of his listeners, including, perhaps, several

members of the Debré government. "Nobody could have done more," Georges Izard, a left-wing former critic of de Gaulle's Algerian policies, wrote in *Le Monde* a few days after the speech, "and anyone else who had done as much would have heard two-thirds of the National Assembly clamoring for his indictment before the High Court."

Until recently de Gaulle's primary strategy in dealing with the domestic repercussions of the Algerian question had been to isolate and neutralize the right-wing "ultras" in Algeria and metropolitan France. Now he is attempting a more radical feat of political surgery. By admitting in his radio talk the possibility, however theoretical and remote, of an independent Moslem Algeria, and by invoking, however vaguely, the specter of partition, he implicitly repudiated the *mystique* of a French Algeria that inspired the May 13 coup last year. By indicating his personal preference for a federated Algerian state enjoying a large measure of home rule in the framework of the French Community, he defied the shibboleth of "integration" that has been the main ideological bond among the different elements of his own governmental majority. This naturally infuriated the ultras, but it likewise dismayed many moderate French nationalists and even a number of conservative Gaullists who up to now have been at least lip-service integrationists. In taking the stand he did, de Gaulle drove a wedge into his own political majority that has opened deep fissures in many French parties, especially the conservative Independents and his own U.N.R. (Even the Royalists have split: the day the official Pretender, the Comte de Paris, approved de Gaulle's program, the Algerian Royalist Union thunderously denounced it as compromising his North African heritage.)

Rift and R.A.F.

There is no doubt that de Gaulle knew full well what he was doing. Instead of sugar-coating the pill, he deliberately made it more bitter. Before the speech he ostentatiously refused to receive a delegation of deputies from Algeria representing the "integrationist" lobby in the Na-

tional Assembly; even the members of the government—with the exception of Premier Debré—were not allowed to see the final text of his talk on the afternoon of September 16, though it had already been put on tape for TV release that night. Clearly de Gaulle intended to provoke a showdown that would force his secret adversaries into the open.



For a few days the integrationists thought they had figured out a counterstrategy that would allow them to continue poisoning the political atmosphere in France as they have done for the last eighteen months, by professing loyalty to de Gaulle while effectively sabotaging his Algerian policy. They proposed to launch without delay a campaign to mobilize public opinion in Algeria and metropolitan France behind "Francisation"—the slightly contemptuous substitute for "integration" which de Gaulle had said would be one of three choices in the eventual Algerian referendum.

Overnight a new but familiar-sounding political committee sprang up to put across "Francisation." It called itself *Rassemblement pour l'Algérie Française*, or R.A.F.—translated by the integrationist clandestine propaganda machine in Algeria as *Rien à faire, mon Général* (nothing doing, general). Its founders announced—prematurely, as events turned out—that they were going to use the offices of the long quiescent U.S.R.A.F., the committee headed by Jacques Soustelle, former Premier Georges Bidault, former Defense Minister André Morice, and Senator Roger Duchet, boss of the Independents, which had provided

cover and psychological support for the organizers of the 1958 conspiracies. By an interesting coincidence, Senator Duchet turned up again as one of the moving spirits of R.A.F.; so did MM. Bidault and Morice. (Soustelle was out of reach on an official trip to the South Pacific.) A number of U.N.R. deputies joined immediately, among them several

participants in the May 13 coup. Léon Delbecque, who played a major role in swinging the insurrectionary movement behind de Gaulle and is now an important U.N.R. leader in his own right, denied press reports that he had formally joined the R.A.F. but made it clear that he approved of its objectives and was co-operating with its leaders.

THEN DE GAULLE struck back, fast and hard. Nothing in the constitutions either of the Fifth Republic or of the U.N.R. (to which he does not belong) gives him any authority to interfere in the internal affairs of political parties. But nothing forbids him from talking with anyone he likes, and he used this license to summon Albin Chalandon, the U.N.R. party secretary—who happens to be unpopular with the Soustelle-Delbecque faction—and Louis Terrenoire, the U.N.R. whip in the National Assembly, over to the Elysée for a little talk. These two then organized a series of party caucuses or committee meetings which after prolonged and heated debate produced an unprecedentedly Draconian ruling, seemingly backed by nearly two-thirds of the U.N.R. membership and all the top leaders except Soustelle and Delbecque: no

member of the U.N.R. would be allowed to join or remain in the R.A.F. Deputies resigning from the party to join the R.A.F. would be expected to resign their parliamentary seats as well.

Opposition to Senator Duchet's frenzied "Francisation" has also developed inside his own Independent Party, though he still seems to command a majority there. Both the U.N.R. and the Independents are threatened with eventual splits, though the final showdown may be delayed for months. When they do occur, Premier Debré, who has been faithful to President de Gaulle in his fashion but not too happy about it all, might find that to survive in the face of the emergent right-wing opposition bloc he would need the support of the Socialists, the Catholic M.R.P., and other despised leftovers from the Fourth Republic.

Principles and Politics

This prospect—implying a cabinet reshuffle, or more likely an eventual dissolution of the Assembly and new elections—has already had a tonic effect on the parties of the Center and Left. Former Premier Pierre Mendès-France, who practically dropped out of public life after his electoral defeat last year, is attempting a comeback under a curious new banner: despite his past criticisms of doctrinaire Marxism, he has joined—together with most of his remaining followers—the Autonomous Socialist Party, a high-minded splinter group that loyal Mendésists hope will now begin to manifest some dynamism. (The party is critical of de Gaulle's Algerian program and calls for peace negotiations with the Moslem rebels.) More to the Center, Félix Gaillard, the youthful president of the Radical Socialist Party and the premier whose government fell during the 1958 crisis, has called on French democrats to forget trivial ideological differences and join in a sort of center-left cartel, pledged, among other things, to support de Gaulle's program for a liberal settlement in Algeria. Gaillard has had some encouragement from former Premier René Pleven, from the M.R.P., and particularly from the boss of the regular Socialists, former Premier Guy Mollet, on whom de Gaulle lavished unusual

public attention during a recent presidential visit to the north.

What finally emerges from the current political fermentation is likely to have an important influence both on the destinies of the Fifth Republic and on the chances for early peace in Algeria. Public opinion, long dormant here, has again become significant. For the time being it is more solidly than ever behind de Gaulle and his Algerian policy, but the disturbing new rise in prices, especially of food, could change the picture. (Pierre Poujade, the tax collector's scourge who helped sabotage the Fourth Republic with his demagoguery, is also trying a comeback this fall.) The army, of course, is still a formidable factor. Reports that it was united behind de Gaulle's Algerian program and that all links between it and the Algerian ultras had been severed appear to have been over-optimistic, but there are no present grounds for fearing that it would countenance a new May 13 in Algeria.

IN THE FINAL analysis the decisive factor is President de Gaulle. Since September 16 his intentions have seemed clear. Only a handful of fanatics on the Right and utopians on the Left imagine that his

aim is to negotiate a French military withdrawal from Algeria rather than to win a political victory for France there. As his radio talk last month demonstrated, de Gaulle realizes that political victory in Algeria is not possible without running political risks both there and at home.

"It is necessary to be noble," remarks the venerable Catholic novelist François Mauriac, chiding his colleagues on the Mendésist *L'Express* over their cool reception of de Gaulle's Algerian program; "but it is also necessary to have some guile."

The FLN reply to de Gaulle's offer has probably postponed a showdown between the integrationists and the anti-integrationist forces in France while making it even more likely to take place. By demanding *de facto* recognition as a precondition to cease-fire talks, the FLN has seemingly spiked any possibility of negotiation in the immediate future, thereby eliminating the Right's greatest worry. But the relatively mild tone of the FLN communiqué has encouraged both the Communist and the non-Communist Left—the former to step up its agitation for peace at any price, the latter to support de Gaulle in any new attempt to break the Algerian deadlock and if necessary to prod him a little.

Wanted: A European Deterrent

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THE RELATIONSHIPS within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are becoming more paradoxical every day. The smaller European countries, after complaining for years about the dominance of U. S. leadership, have recently been making it clear that they have no intention of accepting the leadership of either Britain or France in its stead. And after the idea of a denuclearized zone in Europe has been argued back and forth for several years, it has become an accomplished fact—not, however, in Germany but in France—with the removal of the American fighter-bombers to Germany and Britain.

As one whose job it now is to

travel the length and breadth of the alliance, I find everywhere the same sense that NATO is quietly decaying. There are no dramatics, for there is no single point of dissolution to act as a final challenge. Rather there is a steady discounting among the member governments of the number and importance of the decisions on which they feel it necessary to carry their allies with them. The Eisenhower-Macmillan communiqué from Washington two years ago said: "The arrangements which the nations of the free world have made for collective defense and mutual help are based on the recognition that the concept of national self-sufficiency is out of date. The countries of the free world