


dismaying still is the extent to which the Hoover recommendations have been repeated without avail in succeeding reports.

Much the same must be said for such major studies (many directly commissioned by the President) as the Randall Report on foreign economic policy, the Bassett Report on modernizing aviation facilities, the Kestnbaum Report on intergovernmental relations, the Cooke Report on water resources, the Sarnoff Report on manpower utilization in the armed services, the Eckstein-Fromm Report on steel pricing.

Coming to the present, how many reiterations of the Conant and more recent Hovde education reports must we absorb before reforms occur? Or of the Bane Report, the next to the latest in a series of reports on the need for more doctors, recently echoed by the Johns Hopkins Report on the same problem? Or of the nine-volume Vernon Report, detailing the already fully reported troubles plaguing the New York metropolitan area?

THE REPORTS to end all reports, however, were produced last year by *Life* magazine and a big committee called the President's Commission on National Goals. The National Goals Commission consisted of "distinguished [surely this has become a pejorative label] Americans discussing in general terms what the country's aims should be and where we should be headed in the next ten years." Significantly, President Eisenhower was reported to have had a hard time corraling the necessary distinguished Americans. They completed the job just after *Life* magazine, in conjunction with the *New York Times*, had finished issuing the last of its own eight-part series of reports on *The National Purpose*. According to William Miller of *Life*: "The year 1960 was a time when Americans stopped taking their national purpose for granted and began doing something about it. Rarely has there been such vigorous and specific discussion of a nation's course by its people and its leaders. . . . Now, at the end of this national purpose year has come official action: the report of the President's Commission. . . ." As if anything happened at all!



The Chinese Puzzle At the United Nations

GORDON BROOK-SHEPHERD


THE QUESTION of whether Communist China should be admitted to the United Nations is potentially the biggest strain on the Anglo-American alliance since Suez. And despite all tactful disclaimers, Mr. Macmillan is both willing and eager to intervene in the matter.

On February 8, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, quietly rose from his seat in the House of Lords and made his now famous declaration of British policy toward China. He began with a statement with which few Americans are likely to disagree: "One must admit that a country which has lately smothered Tibet, is infringing the frontiers of India and rejecting all attempts at conciliation and which has publicly proclaimed its belief in the necessity of war, has few of the credentials of a peace-loving nation in the United Nations." But then came this passage: "All that is true. But nevertheless

we have always felt, and we feel now, that the facts of international life require that Communist China should be seated in the United Nations." At this, their noble lordships sat up and, according to the official record, cheered.

The wires to the American embassy in Grosvenor Square began to hum and the officials there at all levels were sent to remonstrate privately with their opposite numbers at the Foreign Office. The result was a tacit agreement not to rock the western boat again, at least not unless the young captain in Washington was consulted first. But the boat had already shipped a little water as the arguments and counter-arguments of the ten-year-old China controversy swirled up and lapped around it once more.

The British case is basically that of the so-called pragmatists or realists: Mao Tse-tung's is the effective power that rules the six hundred-odd million mainland Chinese, and is likely to remain so; diplomatic recognition of this power does not imply moral approbation; recognition is in our own interests, since however strongly we disapprove of the Communists, no settlement in Asia can be reached without China. Then, after touching on the economic benefits of opening up of the Chinese



market, the argument returns to a political climax: no East-West nuclear pact will be worth the paper it is written on unless Mao's signature appears along with the others.

Can We Widen the Cracks?

A theme interwoven with these arguments is that if the West can secure a stronger diplomatic leverage on the Chinese mainland, it can then widen the cracks that are presumed to exist between Peking and Moscow. London believes that it must be clear to Khrushchev that if China enters the United Nations the Moscow-Peking ideological dispute would enter with it. This might mean that Peking would emerge openly as the leader of the Communist "radicals," with Albania and Bulgaria (and perhaps eventually even East Germany and North Vietnam) yapping behind a shrill and faithful chorus.

Despite this possibility, many British observers believe that Khrushchev would like to subject the monster that sprawls below the Soviet East to some form of persuasion and restraint. In this aim, Britain and the Soviet Union might well emerge as discreet and unofficial allies. Australia and perhaps New Zealand, however, may not go along with Britain. As one Australian ambassador remarked not long ago: "The United Nations is not a reform school. It is a community of nations that have something basic in common, however much they disagree. On this score, China is just not ready as yet to be let in."

THE ARGUMENT against admitting Communist China to the United Nations was best put by John Foster Dulles: "Internationally the Chinese Communist régime does not conform to the practices of civilized nations; does not live up to its international obligations; has not been peaceful in the past and gives no evidence of being peaceful in the future. Its foreign policies are hostile to us and our Asian allies. Under these circumstances it would be folly for us to establish relations with the Chinese Communists which would enhance their ability to hurt us and our friends."

The last part of this statement admittedly begs the question of the Sino-Soviet "rift." But the rest of it,

as British officials have discovered to their cost, still seems to reflect both the policy of Washington and the instinctive reaction of the American people.

There are signs that even President Kennedy himself has been slightly taken aback by the unabated force of domestic feeling. It is now known that early in March Secretary Rusk called in Dr. George K. C. Yeh, the Nationalist Chinese ambassador in Washington, for a somber talk on the problem. While stressing America's continued support, Rusk pointed out that the old formula of the moratorium vote might not work when the issue comes up again next September and that something different might therefore have to be worked out.

But two things seem to have happened to put all the starch back into the American stand on China. The first was the realization that public opinion was still very decidedly against Peking. This, at any rate, is what President Kennedy is thought to have told Mr. Macmillan when they talked about China at the White House in April. Speaking as a party leader as well as a head of state, the President is understood to have told his British guest that the administration had found it could not yield an inch on the China question because concessions there went against the temper of the nation and might even cost the Democrats their



political future. As the statesman responsible for mending the British Conservative Party's fortunes after the clamorous debacle of Suez, Mr. Macmillan undoubtedly understood and sympathized.

The other factor that has stiffened Washington's stand is the outlook

for the moratorium vote itself. Last year, the United States squeezed this through the Assembly with a vote of forty-two nations in favor, thirty-four against, and twenty-two abstaining. It was the narrowest majority ever, but still a tolerable one in this uncertain world. If the worst came to the worst—as it well might—could this work again?

Chiang's ambassador reportedly assured Mr. Rusk that it could. Dr. Yeh's confidence was based on the tireless lobbying and research of his colleague Dr. Tingfu Tsiang, Nationalist China's veteran delegate to the United Nations.

Research Favors Moratorium

On a recent visit to New York I called on Dr. Tsiang and he developed his argument as follows:

"Britain, of course, is a grievous loss on the main issue, as she would now have to vote for Peking's admission if it came to a straight poll. But on the moratorium as such she would surely support America again or, at the very worst, abstain. Brazil might vote this time against the moratorium, but I don't think she will pull over any other Latin-American states, except perhaps Mexico. Apart from these two countries we fear no important defections. And even if we should lose a vote or two among the new states, some others among this group who abstained last time would probably vote for the moratorium this year. I am thinking particularly of French-African states like Chad, Brazzaville Congo, and the Cameroun, which are now thoroughly perturbed by Chinese Communist penetration of Guinea and other places on their doorstep."

In view of Dr. Tsiang's remarks, it was certainly no coincidence that, as I later learned, Nationalist China (Formosa) has been sending "technical assistance teams" around these very African states, dispensing good will and offers of aid.

WHAT does Peking want? Assessments on this point have always been divided. On the one hand, it is argued that Communist China craves all the recognition due to it as a great power and full scope for extending its diplomatic and ideological influence. On the other hand, there is the long and almost unre-

lieved record of Chinese intransigence in all dealings with the outside world and particularly on the Formosa issue. Peking's public standpoint has always been that it could never consider membership in the United Nations unless the United States withdrew all its forces from "China's territory of Taiwan [Formosa] and the Taiwan Strait area." This demand, repeated as recently as March 7 at the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, is, of course, quite incompatible both with America's pledges and its strategic thinking. However, on April 6, the official Chinese news agency suddenly revived and gave deliberate publicity to a statement made by Foreign Minister Chen Yi in Indonesia a few days before. The statement was couched as a question. "Would our American friends give cool-headed consideration to this: while Taiwan is being occupied and the Chiang Kai-shek rebel clique there is being supported by the powerful Seventh Fleet . . . how can the present deadlock between China and the United States be broken? We would like to ask our American friends to reflect deeply on this. Will the U.S. make some contribution to this? We persist in this stand: withdraw the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait. This ought not to be a difficult thing for the United States to do."

These words revived speculation as to whether, for all its propaganda bluster, Communist China might not be prepared for a deal on Formosa and thus clear the way for its own entry into the United Nations. From the American point of view, obviously the one essential feature of any such understanding would be a guarantee that Peking would respect the island's independence.

BYOND THAT, of course, lies the problem of how two Chinas could be accommodated in the United Nations, especially on the Security Council, where for fourteen years the Nationalists have occupied one of the five permanent seats which convey the right of veto. As one western diplomat said to me not long ago with a weary sigh: "There is a limit to what mere words can do. And at the end of it all there's the chance that Mao will refuse to sit down on the chair we offer him."

Strangers in Africa

RUSSELL WARREN HOWE

A YOUNG MAN I shall call Robert Jones was an agricultural adviser to one of the African governments, and he had been given the task of raising living standards in one of the most benighted areas of the country. He and his wife and children made their base in a village where there was no entertainment, no electricity, and very few fellow men from the western world. They had nothing but the job, the heat, the flies, and the moral satisfaction.

The satisfaction was considerable: Jones had raised crop cultivation and stockbreeding standards in the first six months, and he had high hopes of what would be achieved before his eighteen-month mission was over. The U.S. embassy, which had brought him out, regarded him as one of its most suc-



cessful experts (as advisers in Africa are called). I found that everything I had been told about his work was true, and that the children of the area would, thanks to him, grow up a lot healthier than their fathers.

I also found that he and his wife were the butts of the local gentry. The local African administrator practically snorted when I mentioned his name. The old chief, who had accepted the expert's farming methods only because the government said he should, shook his head and spat. The old farmers sitting with the chief grimaced, and the young men laughed (there are twelve different African laughs, and one is the laugh of disapproval). Nobody approved of him, though they grudgingly recognized his talents.

Why? Because he had installed an electric generator and air conditioning in his administrative bungalow; he had brought up frozen food

from the capital and stored it in his freezer; he was touchy about what he—and especially about what his wife and children—ate. In other words, he had tried to make life as comfortable and healthy as the situation permitted in this land of amoebic dysentery. All these things would have been forgiven if he had been English or French—or white American. But Robert Jones and his wife were Negro.

THIS IS TYPICAL of the ambiguous situation that faces the U.S. Negro in Africa. The State Department, 's university, or his company thinks that because he is "Afro-American" he will be more acceptable to African people. In some cases, of course, Negroes are eager to go to Africa out of curiosity and sympathy. And there are cases in which American Negroes have done remarkable jobs with unqualified success, and have almost welcomed the psychological difficulties as an added challenge. But on the whole, the policy of using a large number of American Negroes in African jobs is dangerous for all concerned—the employer, the usually discontented or disenchanted Negro, the natives, and the United States. The U.S. Protestant missions, who live with "their" tribes and know them better than British or French colonial administrators, have never encouraged Negro missionaries.

European in Disguise

What does an "ordinary" African see when an American "black like us" arrives? Broadly speaking, he sees a stranger from a different tribe whose ancestry, whether by chance of war or by tradition, must have been slave. He sees that most suspicious of persons—a black man who does not speak the local tribal language and whose language he, the African, probably does not speak, or speaks only imperfectly. Moreover, he sees a European (Americans, in the African context, are European) in disguise. What could be more suspect? This strange and dubious