


in anti-Market sentiment from 45.9 per cent to 40.1 per cent. Even the five by-elections that caused such a stir here in late November offered no conclusive proof on this point either way. The Conservatives did suffer stunning vote losses in these formerly safe constituencies. But in all five instances, the staunchly pro-Market Liberal Party's share of the poll increased by amounts ranging up to 19.3 per cent. In four of the contests Labour's vote fell with that of Tories, though not nearly so far as in 1959; and in only one did Labour score even a small gain—2.2 per cent. Of the two seats that Labour did win, only one—where a dissident anti-Market Tory candidate drained off a quarter of his own party's protest votes—was clearly carried on an anti-Europe platform. The other fell to Labour because of spreading unemployment in Glasgow. It can hardly be said, therefore, that these by-elections have demonstrated a widespread popular dislike for Macmillan's policies in Europe. They have simply proved what everyone has known for a long time: that British voters in general are getting increasingly restless after eleven years of Tory rule.

Naturally, this doesn't ease Macmillan's burden. The Common Market is still a highly controversial question here, and a prime minister whose political strength is deteriorating visibly cannot press a question of such import through Parliament without a rousing political storm. Nevertheless, Macmillan does have a Conservative majority of a hundred seats in this Parliament; he can be quite sure of a disciplined party vote on this issue, despite the rumbling from some backbenchers; and since he is not constitutionally obliged to call a national election for another two years, he is entitled—at least legally—to get a Common Market treaty ratified by this Parliament without holding an election at any time between now and October, 1964.

No one who knows Macmillan doubts that he will do this if he can. What they are beginning to wonder is whether he can survive the French-German onslaught in Brussels—and survive long enough as prime minister—to fulfill this crowning purpose of his career.



Forces That Helped De Gaulle to Victory

EDMOND TAYLOR

PARIS
GENERAL DE GAULLE'S astonishing triumph in the recent French legislative elections, ushering in a new, probably accelerated phase of the Gaullist revolution, represents a major if not yet final victory over the forces of the past. "I settled that question all by myself, just as I did the Algerian one," the general is quoted as having remarked, apropos his successful offensive to shatter the chief remaining bastions of traditional political power that the Third and Fourth Republics had bequeathed to the Fifth. "I must admit, however, that the parties made things remarkably easy for me."

Like many of the anecdotes about de Gaulle that circulate around newspaper offices and parliamentary salons in Paris, this one, printed by the right-wing Gaullist weekly *Candidate*, may be apocryphal, but it points up a significant factor underlying the series of upheavals that have transformed the French political landscape since the constitutional referendum of October 28. Throughout these fevered and at moments dramatic weeks, de Gaulle's adversaries, the leaders of what he scornfully called "the parties of yesterday," have piled blunder upon


blunder. In trying to resist the winds of political change, the chiefs of the French opposition twisted themselves into caricatures even more grotesque than those sketched for them in Gaullist campaign propaganda. The masterpiece was achieved by the former premier and Socialist leader Guy Mollet, a leading French defender of U.S. foreign policy, one of the last-minute artisans of de Gaulle's return to power in 1958, and perhaps the country's most prominent anti-Communist, whose cynical appeal for Communist support in the second round of the elections rescued the Popular Front from the junk yard of history and raised Communist strength in the National Assembly from ten to forty-one.

Mollet's maneuver saved his seat in the National Assembly after he had been defeated by the Gaullist candidate in his home town of Arras, and probably saved his job as secretary-general of the Socialist Party by converting the widespread rout of anti-Gaullist parties into a limited victory for his own group. (The Socialists increased their representation in the National Assembly from forty-three to sixty-seven seats, about forty of them won with Communist votes.)

But the blatant opportunism of

Mollet's strategy, along with some only slightly less flagrant examples in other opposition parties, disgusted many French voters, particularly on the Right, and thereby contributed in no small measure to a Gaullist electoral victory whose size surprised all the experts, including the Gaullist ones. Above all, the *fin de siècle* climate surrounding the opposition campaign, for which Mollet was chiefly responsible, was a major factor in starting the breakdown of the old-time political parties. And this is exactly what de Gaulle considers necessary as a prelude to the creation of two or three stable political formations. Already one former giant of the French political scene, the party of Independents and Peasants once headed by former Premier Antoine Pinay, has collapsed and split, with the larger fragment, the newly formed Independent Republicans led by Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, now forming part of the unprecedented Gaullist majority in the new Assembly. Other splits and realignments are likely, including perhaps the early disintegration of Mollet's new Democratic Front.

AN ESPECIALLY paradoxical feature of the anti-Gaullist debacle is that many opposition leaders have long been as conscious of the need for a complete regrouping of French political forces as de Gaulle himself, and that their attempt to bring it about was probably the chief cause of their disaster at the polls. This seems to have been particularly true of the Independents. "Our electoral alliances defeated us," Bertrand Motte, the former parliamentary leader of the Independents and one of the moving spirits behind the Democratic Front of Independents, Socialists, Radicals, and the Catholic MRP, confessed to a French reporter after he had been outdistanced by an unimpressive Gaullist candidate in the first round at Lille. "What a mistake we made! The voters would not go along with us because they didn't understand and weren't interested. All they could make out was that we seemed to be systematically opposed to de Gaulle. Yet in my mind the Democratic Front was a constructive attempt to lay the foundations for a new majority. The leaders could agree to




work together but the masses could not possibly follow. A convinced Socialist in the north cannot conceive of himself voting for a Motte who in his mind belongs to the 'Two Hundred Families.' Pinay could urge Guy Mollet's election, but his followers couldn't bring themselves to vote for a Socialist."

The Socialist leadership encountered the same difficulty in trying to convince left-wing voters that a liberal-minded conservative like Motte—and in some cases a plain reactionary or an OAS sympathizer—was less of a threat to the Republic than a Gaullist.

In the Name of Europe

The major bond that united the anti-Gaullist leaders and led them to form the Democratic Front was their attachment to the Atlantic Alliance and to the cause of European unity. To men like Motte, the fact that a candidate was a firm "Atlanticist" and a staunch "European" seemed more important than whether he favored free enterprise or a planned economy, provided he avoided ex-



tremes in either direction. Some non-doctrinaire Socialists like Mollet discovered that they had much the same outlook. Thus the Democratic Front was in certain respects an embryonic merger of the traditional Center-Right and Center-Left political formations into a new French political party that was neither Left nor Right but European and Atlantic.

The Front was born last January at the so-called "*déjeuner de l'Alma*," an intimate political luncheon party bringing together the right and left wings of the anti-Gaullist opposition, and organized by Pierre Uri, a well-known international banker and former associate of Jean Monnet. Since its participants were greatly concerned with the problem of de Gaulle's succession at a time when the president was locked in what seemed to many an uncertain struggle with the OAS, the discussions inevitably were surrounded with an aura of intrigue that the Gaullists were able to exploit. The concept of European unity favored by the leaders of the Democratic Front was Jean Monnet's doctrine of a tightly integrated, supranational Europe in partnership with the United States. With some qualifications, this concept also happens to be that of the State Department. A close-knit ideological sect and the organized interests of a powerful international lobby were backing it. But the Front's electoral propaganda failed to convince the average French voter that this concept of Europe was preferable to the Gaullist dream of a Europe based on Franco-German partnership, with France as the senior partner. And after de Gaulle's visit to West Germany last September had dramatized his role as the champion of Franco-German reconciliation, it was virtually impossible for the Front's campaign orators to put across the image of de Gaulle as a saboteur of European unity.

The Democratic Front propaganda attacking de Gaulle for what Guy Mollet in a speech last summer termed his "Americanophobia" backfired in much the same way. Several of the Front's leaders had ended by convincing themselves that de Gaulle's policies, particularly his insistence on developing a French nuclear deterrent, were about to wreck the Atlantic Alliance and pro-


duce an isolationist revulsion in America. In opposing these policies they viewed themselves as crusaders in a cause so holy that its defenders would enjoy a sort of blanket absolution for any lapses from normal democratic standards of responsible leadership that they might commit in the heat of battle.

At first a steady stream of more or less inspired American press comment and of more or less calculated leaks by Kennedy administration officials in Washington encouraged the anti-Gaullist French politicians in their self-imposed roles as paladins of Atlantic unity. "In addition to the justified fears of the old parties that they were being pushed into oblivion," remarked Jacques Gagliardi, a left-wing neo-nationalist writing in *Le Monde*, "shouldn't one include among the reasons for their mutiny certain discreet suggestions from London, from Washington, perhaps even from Brussels? Since the debacle of the 'Atlanticists' this question is being asked here and there." Gradually, however, the increasing flexibility and realism of the administration's European policy, especially after Presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy's European swing in October, made the Democratic Front leaders look rather foolish. On the eve of the referendum one of the more highly placed leaders of the Front complained at an informal lunch with a group of American correspondents that the Kennedy administration was letting down its French friends by allowing stories to leak into the press that we might agree to sell de Gaulle an atomic submarine. The Cuban crisis, which saw the alleged wrecker of the Alliance line up instantly and publicly behind his American ally, was a new and far graver blow to the anti-Gaullist crusade.

IT WAS Mollet himself, of course, who delivered the coup de grâce to the "Atlanticist" crusade—and to the Democratic Front itself—by declaring in a radio debate a few days before the first round of the elections that in any contest where a Communist and a Gaullist led the balloting he would recommend voting for the Communist in the runoff. The most gullible or fanatical French voter could not be expected to believe that

electing a Communist parliament instead of a Gaullist one would somehow strengthen Atlantic solidarity.

The irony, not to say grotesqueness, of the Socialist predicament was neatly pointed up by the electoral situation in Moulins, a city on the upper Loire, where Robert Marjolin, vice-president of the European Economic Community's executive commission in Brussels, was running as a Socialist candidate against a Gaullist, a locally prominent Independent, and a Communist. As a newcomer to politics, a nondoctrinaire



Socialist, and in a sense the representative of Europe's future, the youthful-looking, dynamic Marjolin appealed to many citizens of the town who do not normally vote Socialist. The combination of local tradition and of the nation-wide Gaullist groundswell was too much for him, however; he polled 5,292 votes in the first round, coming in fourth, while the Communist led his UNR opponent by less than a thousand votes. If Marjolin, in line with the anti-Communist discipline of former years, had urged his supporters to switch to the Gaullist candidate in the runoff, the latter would almost certainly have won. Instead,

on orders from the Socialist Party machine, he withdrew with a vaguely worded statement that led his followers to split three ways. As a result the Communist predictably won in the second round by a margin of some eighteen hundred votes.

Mollet continued to seek Communist support even while declaring in an interview given the *New York Times* that despite appearances "... there is no alliance between Socialists and Communists in France ... We are not neutralists." French Socialists, Mollet declared in various other statements, were as vigilant as ever in regard to the Communist menace, but they were accustomed to drawing up in their minds clear cut "hierarchies of peril," and the Communists for the time being stood low on the list while the threat of "personal power" topped it.

While the Cuban crisis had favored de Gaulle in the October referendum, the subsequent euphoric international climate undoubtedly made it easier for the Socialist bosses to put across the argument that there was no longer any danger in a little innocent fraternizing with the Communists. Moreover, the contrast between Washington's earlier interventions on the French domestic political scene, which fostered opposition to de Gaulle's foreign and defense policies, and the aloof correctness of the administration's attitude toward the new Popular Front shaping up in France may have encouraged some Socialist leaders in the comfortable view that their electoral escapade was regarded on the other side of the Atlantic as a peccadillo rather than as a real betrayal.

The Socialist Strategy

Mollet's dialectical gyrations would have attracted less attention if he had not so largely built up his political career for the last fifteen years as an implacable anti-Communist. He is the author of the famous slogan that "the French Communists are not Left but simply East." Despite all the verbal precautions and qualifications with which Mollet hedged his appeal for an electoral Popular Front, the Communists and their allies were quick to realize its sensational implications coming from such a quarter. "Even if the anti-Communism which for the last

fifteen years has been the cornerstone of Guy Mollet's policies remains intact," observed the fellow-traveling Paris daily *Libération*, "to hear the secretary-general of the French Socialist Party admit that in certain circumstances it is the duty of the whole Left, without any exceptions, to defend the cause of democracy is an event whose importance should not be underestimated."

The reaction of shock, incredulity, and indignation was naturally strongest among normally right-wing voters. At first Pinay, Motte, and other conservative leaders tried to minimize the gravity of their Socialist allies' flirtation with the Communists by suggesting that Mollet had not really meant what he said. But day after day the implications of his words became clearer. When the first-round count showed Mollet trailing behind the obscure Gaullist candidate in his northern stronghold of Arras, the Communist withdrew and called on his supporters to vote for the Socialist candidate. Just before the end of the campaign Etienne Fajon, a leading member of the Communist Party politburo in France, journeyed to Arras to address a mass meeting urging all good Communists to come to the aid of "Comrade Guy Mollet." The same evening in Paris, Mollet on a radio program with other political leaders tried to justify his policy by declaring that the election of thirty or forty Communists to the National Assembly would not be serious, while electing that many additional Gaullists might prove "fatal to the representative system in France."

Formal contracts for mutual support were signed between the Socialist and Communist departmental federations in several key areas, and there were massive Communist withdrawals of candidates all over the country in favor of Socialist, Radical, and in a few cases even Catholic or Independent candidates. (One of the latter, finally elected with Communist help, was the venerable right-wing mayor of Dijon, Canon Félix Kir, a noted Catholic prelate.) Worst of all, at several places in the south, joint Communist-Socialist electoral rallies were addressed by prominent members of both parties.

All this was finally too much for

the conservative leaders of the Democratic Front. Pinay and Motte issued statements flatly opposed to the Socialist strategy, calling on their followers to vote for any national candidate, including Gaullists, rather than let a Communist get in. In many districts the Independent candidates were withdrawn to leave the Gaullists a clear field against their Popular Front adversaries. Motte himself set the example by withdrawing in Lille, where he was running behind the Gaullist, instead of staying in the race like Mollet and accepting Communist support. Even some Socialists found Mollet's electoral demagoguery too strong for their stomachs. Gaston Defferre, mayor and Socialist boss of Marseilles, publicly spurned a local pact offered by



the Communists. The gesture did not keep the Communists from helping to vote in Defferre over his Gaullist opponent, but to punish him they let his faithful lieutenant Francis Leenhardt, the Socialist floor leader in the last National Assembly, go down to defeat in another Marseilles precinct. (Three Socialists, three Communists, and a Gaullist were finally elected in Marseilles.)

THE GAULLIST victory in the final round of the elections was from some viewpoints less impressive—and less healthy—than it had seemed in the first round. The relatively high Communist vote—about 3.2 million in the first round and close to four million in the second—seems a disturbing anomaly in a nation as prosperous as France. The rise in the percentage of Gaullist votes between the two rounds from 31.9 per cent to the record-breaking figure of 40.5 per cent seems to have been achieved mainly at the expense of the Right and Center-Right groups. The injection of the

Popular Front issue into the campaign not only polarized electoral sentiment but also tended to polarize it as between Right and Left rather than as between Gaullist and non-Gaullist. Right-wing voters, whether pro-Gaullist or not, responded with unusual discipline to injunctions from their leaders to stop the Communists at any cost. On the Left, as *Le Monde* remarked, "understandings of the Popular Front type operated to the fullest extent" among Communist, Socialist, and to some extent Radical voters. (The continued high level of abstentions, nearly twenty-eight per cent on the second round, doubtless reflected some disaffection on the part of left-wing as well as right-wing voters, however.) In many districts the final vote was extremely close, reflecting, according to *Le Monde*, a division of French opinion into two big and nearly equal blocs. Analysis of last-round results shows about 7.5 million voting Left while the combined vote of the Gaullists and the anti-Gaullist Right was about nine million.

The final result, in terms of Assembly seats gained and lost, was thus somewhat misleading. Owing to their tactical errors both the Independents and the Catholic MRP suffered crushing defeats. (One of the costliest errors of the Right was its occasional flirtations with the *Algérie Française* extreme Right, which was annihilated as a political force.) The Independents dropped from 103 in the National Assembly to fifty, of whom thirty-three have joined the new Independent Republican group that ran in the elections with the endorsement of André Malraux' Association for the Fifth Republic. The MRP—which at one time seemed next to the UNR the most modern and dynamic party in France—also fared badly, dropping from fifty-seven to thirty-eight seats, of which seven are held by pro-Gaullists. Both groups are hopelessly overshadowed by the UNR (the left-wing Gaullists, of whom about twenty were elected, do not sit in the Assembly as a separate group), with its unheard-of total of 234 seats, only eight short of an absolute majority.

On the other hand, thanks to the efficiency of the Popular Front electoral machinery, not only Socialists

and Communists but Radicals—who in a dignified way played both sides of the street—and various splinter movements of the Center-Left emerged from the ordeal with slight increases in their parliamentary representation that give an exaggerated idea of the public favor they continue to enjoy.

A Free Hand for Progress

Already the leftist coalition that emerged from the ballot boxes is feeling the tug of contradictory tendencies. The Communists make no secret of their determination to encourage the development of a permanent Popular Front bloc in the Assembly and throughout the nation. A certain number of left-wing Socialists, especially those recently elected with Communist help, appear ready to go along with them. But other Socialists and many Radicals dream instead of launching a new Center-Left mass party comparable to the British Labour Party. Mollet himself, now that he no longer needs Communist votes, seems to favor this formula, to judge from a recent interview given to *Figaro* by one of his party lieutenants, Georges Brutelle. "The maneuver of our voters was purely tactical," Brutelle explained, referring to the recent alliance with the Communists at the polls. "They remain ready in case of need to block any attempt at setting up a People's Republic."

While de Gaulle is naturally pleased to see the new Assembly so firmly controlled by the UNR and its allies that he can count on a free hand from it for the rest of his term in office, he is reported to be disturbed at the prospect that events will confirm the Gaullists' unwished-for role as spearhead of the French Right while cementing the Popular Front trend. To avert this danger, Premier Georges Pompidou's revamped cabinet and the main Gaullist leaders in the Assembly are putting a great deal of stress on their party's progressive social aims. Plans are being worked out both for stepping up France's already fabulous economic expansion and for distributing its benefits more evenly. Various early Gaullist schemes, some of them quite radical in nature, for promoting labor-management co-op-

eration are likely to be brought forward again in the near future. There is talk of stretching the paid vacations now obligatory for French workers—three weeks in most cases—to a full month.

In the hope of splitting off the pro-European Socialists and Radicals from their Communist allies, de Gaulle is reported to be planning some new diplomatic moves, more flexible in form and more tactful in style than some of his earlier ones, for relaunching his project for a European political union. Discreet feelers are being put out by the Gaullists to some of the opposition leaders suggesting that they forget the past and accept official jobs or assignments of various kinds so as to help in the exciting task of founding a united Europe. And now that the OAS has been smashed, at least as a political threat, de Gaulle has started to bind up the wounds left from the Algerian war by commuting the death sentences passed on one of his would-be assassins, André Canal, and on a luckless military

rebel, ex-General Edmond Jouhaud.

All this is highly encouraging for the future, but it does not mean as yet that de Gaulle has solved all of his or France's problems. He has yet to transform the UNR into a solid political organization with a coherent ideology or long-range program. The electoral defeat of former Premier Michel Debré at the hands of the Democratic Front in his district seriously complicates the question of finding an eventual successor for de Gaulle at the Elysée, and if his office became vacant tomorrow the country might easily relapse into near-chaos. Above all, as pessimistic students of his régime like *Le Monde's* publisher, Hubert Beuve-Méry, point out, no amount of economic expansion or of social wellarism will suffice to head off a Popular Front—at least in the next elections—if the general, "abandoning himself to his demons," exploits his victory to accentuate the tendency toward one-man rule which served as pretext for the French Socialists' betrayal of the democratic cause.

The Government Of the City of Government

LAURENCE STERN

WHEN Representative James C. Davis, an archsegregationist from Stone Mountain, Georgia, was defeated in the state's first direct primary in September, the rejoicing was nowhere so intense as 543 airline miles northeast of Atlanta, in the nation's capital.

The reason is that Davis wielded far more power over the citizens of non-self-governing Washington than he could ever muster in his home district. This influence stemmed from Davis's membership on the House Committee for the District of Columbia.

Among the many curious and obscure power structures on Capitol Hill, the District Committee is probably the coziest. It is also the most unreconstructed pocket of Dixiecrat influence in Congress. For the Southerners who dominate it, the commit-

tee seems to be a legislative junta to rule a conquered but still hostile population—most of the 750,000 citizens of Washington. It also serves its members as a forum for making points in the segregationist press back home.

Although Davis and his fiery diatribes against integration in the nation's capital are gone, the city is still a long way from liberation. Washington is the only major city in the United States with a Negro majority, now estimated at fifty-seven per cent. Its political leadership in both parties is liberal and concerned about civil rights. But the District's representation in the House is determined by voters in Alabama, the Carolinas, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.

In the Senate, the District Committee has passed out of Southern