

the rural population in Latin America will succeed unless something like the U.S. Agricultural Extension Service with its system of county agents is put into wide operation. This should be a prime emphasis of the Alliance for Progress; and to break down the local barriers of language and custom, it should train and utilize people from the very areas where they will be sent back to work. Beginnings have been made through the Point Four agricultural *servicios*, and the Peace Corps may make some contribution in this direction, but native trainees will have to be drawn in more extensively.

Mexico has already had some valuable experience in this respect, but in most other countries it is a neglected approach. Agricultural vocations are not popular in Latin America. The universities are crowded with students seeking degrees in law and accounting, but few enroll in schools of agronomy and veterinary medicine. Argentina, a country one-third the size of the United States, is said to have no more than a half dozen specialists who have had formal training in soil conservation work. Yet the pampas, the best cattle and grain land in South America, are increasingly infested with thistles that severely reduce the carrying capacity of the ranges, and are subject to wind erosion from the south that has appreciably lessened the yields in field crops. The personnel necessary to cope with these problems could be attracted by scholarships and the assurance of adequately rewarded careers, and the cost would not begin to compare with that of major industrial projects.

IF THE Alliance for Progress fails, it will probably not be for lack of U.S. financial or technical support. But neither the sympathetic American people nor self-respecting Latin Americans will wish the program continued indefinitely on an emergency basis. The challenge to the Alliance is to find the means to render the program effective in the lives of the common people and to develop the necessary indigenous leadership to make growth self-sustaining. This is a challenge worthy of the best efforts in all parts of the hemisphere.

AT HOME & ABROAD

After Brussels

EDMOND TAYLOR

TO EUROPEAN CRITICS of President de Gaulle's foreign policy, the case against him as the author of the present crisis in the Atlantic Alliance is less simple than it appears in Washington and London. It is not the general's ambitions or his objectives that have temporarily leagued against him a substantial part of European opinion; rather it is the methods he sometimes employs. At heart, de Gaulle is a better "European" than some of his most recent public statements might suggest, and Europe remains more Gaullist than its superficial reactions to them indicate.

"Since de Gaulle's press conference [of January 14]," notes a recent editorial in *Le Monde*, "the most contradictory charges have been tossed about and the debate has taken such an emotional turn that certain realities are being overlooked. The chief of state accomplished a *tour de force* he certainly did not have in mind by managing from one day to the next to convince everybody that it was France that was blocking Britain's entry into the Common Market—despite the fact that the British had consistently refused to budge from a position that the Six had unanimously judged unacceptable."

Much the same viewpoint is reflected by René Dabernat in *Combat*. Dabernat, who often expresses the views of Jean Monnet, concedes that at the time of de Gaulle's press conference no European expert denied the existence of a wide gap between the British terms for entering into the Common Market and the conditions for membership laid down in the Treaty of Rome. De Gaulle's treatment of this crucial problem, Dabernat writes, contained positive as well as negative elements. It is even possible, the French journalist suggests, that de Gaulle—like certain

American leaders before the Nassau meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan—was seeking to hasten the evolution of British opinion by resorting to shock tactics but that he defeated his own aim by his "heavy-handed and brutal methods."

The Choice of Nassau

Even among commentators who fail to discern any constructive intent behind de Gaulle's treatment of Britain, either in his press conference or in a series of informal semi-public talks with French parliamentarians at the Elysée, there are some who feel that de Gaulle's current Anglophobia stems from his displeasure at the results of the Nassau meeting. These men think that de Gaulle's blackballing Britain's entry into the Common Market was not inspired either by his wartime clashes with Churchill or by fear that Britain would prove a dangerous rival to France for leadership within the Market. Neither was the general's stand entirely motivated by concern lest Britain disrupt the machinery of the Common Market by acquiring the rights of a voting member before formally accepting all the economic conditions laid on the other members.

De Gaulle's real objection, the argument runs, is that he considers that Britain disqualified itself as a European power at Nassau by allowing one of the vital attributes of its national sovereignty—the British nuclear deterrent—to become dependent on the United States. "At the Bahamas," de Gaulle told a group of deputies during a presidential reception on January 24, "Britain turned over to America such poor atomic forces as it possessed. Britain could have handed them to Europe. Britain has made its choice." During the same reception de Gaulle expressed the fear that because the British had ac-

cepted the American Polaris proposal they would be likely henceforth to behave like "traveling salesmen" of the United States interest.

De Gaulle's remarks echo one of the essential themes of the anti-Anglo-Saxon political campaign that Gaullist agents are conducting throughout Europe—a campaign nearly as violent as the American and British campaigns against de Gaulle. Yet a number of his more moderate opponents believe that it also reflects a sincere conviction on his part. The extreme conclusions that he draws from the Nassau encounter are deplored. But the premise on which they are based—that the Nassau accords represent from the European viewpoint a highly one-sided and therefore somewhat "colonialist" arrangement—appears to be widely accepted. *Opera Mundi*, a weekly European report that has close ties with the Common Market's bureaucracy, noted that the British press played up the interview Monnet gave in Brussels criticizing de Gaulle for trying to break off the negotiations with Britain but that most of them omitted its closing paragraphs, which called for a more equal distribution of responsibility between Europe and the United States in both defense and economic programs. Monnet's real view, the newsletter argues, to this degree diverges from the Kennedy-Macmillan concept and approaches that of de Gaulle "in spirit if not in wording."

THE BRITISH themselves appear to have been embarrassed, and anti-Gaullist diplomats among the other five of the Six were irritated by the emphasis the Kennedy administration placed upon U.S. predominance in the proposed NATO nuclear pool. "There was a feeling," reported the diplomatic correspondent of the London *Sunday Times* on the eve of the critical foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels on January 28, "that it was overobvious and ill-timed to announce with such fanfare the intention to press ahead at once with the NATO multinational nuclear force and the appointment of a top American diplomat, Mr. Livingston Merchant, to supervise it. It was presumably time to emphasize General de Gaulle's isolation in the

Western Alliance, but many senior European diplomats felt it would make the French president more obdurate than ever."

One of the curious minor paradoxes of the crisis is that the French government voiced no official objections and de Gaulle himself refrained from any *sotto voce* sarcasms when Adenauer accepted in principle the multinational deterrent force projected at Nassau that earlier had inspired the general's anathema against Macmillan. But West Germany, unlike Britain, had no independent nuclear capability to give up, and therefore detracted nothing from Europe's nuclear potential by accepting integration in a multinational force dominated by an extra-European power. And de Gaulle, unlike Kennedy, did not feel strong enough, or did not feel it would be sound diplomatic technique, to antagonize the Germans by calling upon them to choose between French and American friendship—especially just before the Bundestag would be called upon to ratify the Franco-German treaty.

Europeans vs. Atlanticists

De Gaulle's aim is to contain, not to exclude, U.S. influence. As Raymond Aron and other French critics of de Gaulle's position have pointed out, the general in his press conference was careful not to slam the door on eventual co-operation between the independent French nuclear force he is building and analogous U.S. or NATO forces. In rejecting the concept of an Atlantic community, de Gaulle has never repudiated the ideal of equal partnership within an Atlantic Alliance.

De Gaulle's concept of Europe remains similar to that advocated by the United States government during part of the Truman administration and all of Eisenhower's. Particularly while John Foster Dulles still lived, it was U.S. policy to foster the growth of the "Little Europe" then favored by Monnet, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, and other European leaders—but not by de Gaulle—rather than that of the broader Atlantic community. (I can even recall participating as a consultant in the drafting of U.S. information programs intended to encourage indirectly the development of the

kind of emotional and romantic Europeanism that de Gaulle is accused of cherishing today.) But with the advent of the Kennedy administration, the "Atlanticists" appear to have got the upper hand in Washington.

"The previous administration was hostile to the British proposal for a free-trade zone in 1957 and 1958," Aron writes in *Figaro*. "The present administration adopts a different attitude. It wants to see the enlargement of the European community to include Britain to start with, then the liberalization of exchanges between the European and the American pillars of the Atlantic Alliance. This project may be the better one, but among those firmly devoted to the Atlantic Alliance there are not a few who prefer another scheme of organization."

It is since the Kennedy administration came in that de Gaulle's Europeanism has made the greatest strides toward a strictly continental union. The general's evolution has been hastened by the rebuffs of his earlier efforts to win recognition for France as a nuclear ally, by American policy on the Berlin question, by the dread of a nuclear Yalta between the United States and the Soviet Union, and no doubt by the feeling that the improving balance of power between East and West makes it relatively safe to seek to aggrandize Europe's position within the Atlantic Alliance. His triumphal visit to West Germany last September was another psychologically important factor because it seems for the first time to have given him the feel of Europe as an emotional reality. The success of the Common Market convinced him that it was an economic reality.

THOUGH strictly "European" as distinguished from "Atlantic," de Gaulle's Europe is a less exclusive community than some of his Anglo-Saxon critics maintain. This was demonstrated when the general, after slamming the door to the Common Market on Britain, startled the Danish prime minister by offering to sponsor his country for membership. The offer, which was turned down, was no doubt partly inspired by considerations of political strategy, but it also reflected de Gaulle's

confidence that the community could safely absorb little agricultural and continental Denmark, whereas Britain's entry might convert it into the "diluted Europe" that he dreads above all. As indicated, however, in his press conference and more casual subsequent remarks, de Gaulle recognizes the possibility that "Europe" may eventually be strong enough to cope with Britain. One of the concrete points in dispute between de Gaulle and the traditional supporters of the European idea is the exact time needed. De Gaulle has variously placed it from four to fifty years ahead.

Even de Gaulle's disagreement with Monnet and other strong European "integrationists" seems to be abating. The general considers that national self-interest is one of the abiding political realities of our day—hardly a romantic view, by the way—but he also recognizes the inexorable emergence of broader communities. Judging both from some of his studied silences and hints, he considers the eventual emergence of a European superpower, probably including Britain in the end, as both inevitable and desirable. He would like to give history a helping push and in the process assure a position of leadership for France within the nascent community. In his more optimistic moments he may see France playing a role in respect to the developing European federation comparable to that of Prussia or Piedmont in the creation of Germany and Italy. Desire to assure French political leadership is certainly one of the motives for his opposition to the method of supranational economic integration favored by the Monnet group. Another reason probably is that both his pride and his creative bent impel him to take over anything he touches and remodel it so as to leave his imprint upon it. The day de Gaulle dreams up a Gaullist formula of integration, his conversion to the cause of a supranational European community will be total.

IT ALREADY APPEARS to many observers here that the treaty of reconciliation and co-operation between France and Germany, solemnly signed here, represents a transitional stage between the "Europe of

fatherlands" implicit in de Gaulle's earlier proposals for a European political union and a true supranational community. A lecture given in Brussels by former Premier Michel Debré in which he specifically envisaged a European parliament and a European government—though in some unspecified future—suggests a Gaullist willingness to advance even farther along the supranational road.

The real issue between de Gaulle and the not inconsiderable number of European integrationists who remain faithful to the Little Europe formula thus comes back to the methods that de Gaulle resorts to at times for achieving his goals. According to some European critics of his leadership, the gravest case against de Gaulle is that he has been guilty of intramural brinkmanship and other equally hazardous and destructive methods to achieve essentially legitimate and even constructive aims. These critics say that de Gaulle has on several recent occasions substituted political moves for persuasion in trying to win over his European or Atlantic partners. The case for the defense is that some of these partners, on both sides of the Atlantic, have been using the same methods, at times perhaps even more recklessly, against de Gaulle.

Not a Man to Be Pushed Around

While Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, in justifying his intransigent stand at Brussels, put considerable stress on Britain's refusal to meet all the technical conditions for membership laid down in the Treaty of Rome, notably those dealing with farm policy, he had no compunction in admitting that President de Gaulle's fundamental objection to the British candidacy at this time was political. "In the face of the criticisms from all sides accusing France of wanting only a Little Europe," declared Couve de Murville, "let me say that what concerns us is not whether the Europe that we are trying to create is big or small but whether it is European. I reaffirm that when Britain is able to accept all the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, nothing shall prevent her from coming into the Common Market. But the burden of proof lies on her, not on us."

There is, however, reason to believe that de Gaulle, having achieved his immediate objective of blocking British entry into the Market in the present international context, and having apparently withstood the pressure of any coalition of the other five members with Britain that would have isolated France, is now anxious to ease the tension in Franco-British relations. The reaffirmed French offer to admit Britain as an associate member of the Common Market probably reflects therefore a French intention to minimize the economic consequences of the rift in western unity opened at Brussels and to create a propitious atmosphere for Britain's eventual participation as a full member. French spokesmen predict that when the angry passions stirred up by the Brussels drama have died down, the British will realize that there is nothing humiliating in the French suggestion of associate membership and will come to see its advantages.

The over-all western crisis would not be so grave if Washington and London and their friends on the Continent had not attempted to put such heavy pressure on de Gaulle. "On the occasion of the debate opened by Great Britain's candidacy for admission to the Common Market," declares a statement by Jacques Baumel, secretary of the Gaullist Union for the New Republic, "the United States, by its insistence and by the pressures it has put on all its friends, has now made clear its determination to keep the European Community in a dependent status both as to foreign and defense policies. If certain people think that France's resolution can be shaken in this way, they are gravely mistaken."

The same point was made by the non-Gaullist Catholic and strongly pro-Atlantic Paris daily *La Croix*, with particular reference to Livingston Merchant's ill-timed visit. "Everyone knows," *La Croix* commented, "that General de Gaulle is not a man whose hand can be forced, and one cannot help being astonished by the brutal method which the President of the United States has employed."


Resentment of American arm-twisting methods is said to be almost as sharp in West Germany, though

it has been largely muffled in the West German press and parliament. The dramatic last-minute letter from Secretary of State Rusk to German Foreign Minister Schröder at Brussels urging that the negotiations be kept going had exactly the opposite effect to that intended, according to press observers in Brussels.

Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, who, in defiance of the Rome Treaty, publicly urged that the continental five continue negotiations with Britain without France, was the most violent of the anti-Gaullist crusaders. There are rumors that he was working in close touch throughout with the British delegation, with international labor leaders, and with a posse of vigilantes from the New Frontier. The temper and strategy of these anti-Gaullists were indicated by an article of Nora Beloff in the London *Observer* on the eve of the dramatic session in Brussels. Assuming that the French would refuse London's terms for continuation of the talks, the British, wrote Miss Beloff, wanted "the conference wound up at once—with a clarion call to France's five partners and Britain, declaring to the world that Britain's entry is desirable and that negotiations should be resumed as soon as circumstances permit. In this way France would be isolated and the way open for diplomatic and psychological war, backed by commercial and political reprisals—which have, in fact, already started."

Fortunately, no organized anti-French bloc was set up to take sanctions against de Gaulle or to exert concerted new pressures upon him. For this the French largely credit the Bonn government's diplomacy, which though outwardly schizophrenic has been both more subtle and more constructive than generally realized. There is also said to have been a strong reaction inside the Belgian government against Spaak's attitude and a noticeable cooling off of the anti-Gaullist crusading spirit that Italian Premier Amintore Fanfani evidenced to President Kennedy in Washington.

Perhaps, after all, Europe is busy working out its future and strengthening a unity that is already an accomplished fact; it can scarcely afford to indulge in fits of resentment.



The Ivy-League Integrationists

R. W. APPLE, Jr.

JUST DOWN the street from the most aristocratic of Yale's secret societies, Skull and Bones, are the headquarters of another and very different college organization. This is the Northern Student Movement, a loose federation of college civil-rights groups formed only a year and a half ago, which now has about twelve hundred members on sixty-five Eastern campuses. Most of its members are white, like the colleges they come from, but its leadership is more equally biracial.

A number of Northern college students have taken part in Freedom Rides, sit-ins, and voter-registration drives in the South, but the members of the NSM have decided to do something about the barriers to racial equality closer to home. Accordingly, the organization has taken as its primary task the development of leadership and self-esteem in the Negro ghettos of the North.

Because students' chief assets are time and education, the NSM is putting most of its effort into tutoring Negro children in Harlem and North Philadelphia. But in addition to this, it has raised more than ten thousand dollars to help finance the Southern Negro voting drive run by the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), participated in sit-ins and similar projects along the Eastern Shore of Maryland, picketed a segregated apartment building in Rye, New York, collected ten thousand books for Miles College in Birmingham, and operated an educational and recrea-

tional program for 150 of the fourteen hundred schoolless Negro children in Prince Edward County, Virginia.

Many of its partisans speak of the Movement—and it is always a movement, never an organization—with such fervor that they sometimes sound rather civil-righteous. ("If you sit down to have dinner with Mary," a Sarah Lawrence girl says of an NSM friend, "you have to talk civil rights. She never talks about anything else.") For some, the NSM takes the place of a fraternity or sorority; for others, perhaps, it is a cult.

To a considerable degree, the NSM is cast in the image of Peter Countryman, its executive director. An intense, slight young white man of twenty, the type sometimes described on campuses as a "cause chaser," Countryman has been in on the NSM from the beginning. "I'm not a utopian," he told me a few weeks ago. "I'm in this simply because I have certain ideals."

Under ordinary circumstances, Countryman would have been a senior at Yale this year, studying philosophy and living in Berkeley College. But an experience during his sophomore year, in the spring of 1961, changed all that. From time to time he had been helping youth workers with Negro boys in the Dixwell area of New Haven, and one night he went to hear three Virginia girls describe their part in a sit-in. "I was very impressed with their honesty and integrity and sac-