

in direct support of Vietnamese ground forces. The sensation of each new development now is truly that of being carried upwards on a rapidly moving escalator.

The message does not yet appear to have reached North Vietnam, however. As one senior U.S. official commented: "The great debate in the United States about whether we should cut and run, and the generals' three-ring political circus in Saigon, haven't helped to get the message across. Hanoi still thinks it's got it made down here." This opinion is confirmed by International Control Commission reports from Hanoi. The commission's observers have found nothing to indicate a willingness on the part of Ho Chi Minh and his followers to negotiate on terms that would require anything less than a U.S. capitulation.

### Upping the Ante

American officials advance three reasons for the bombing attacks on the North: to persuade Hanoi to stop interfering in the South; to inspire some feeling among the South Vietnamese that there is real hope of winning the war; and, though graded a long way below the other reasons, to interrupt the southward flow of men and materials.

If the impact is not ultimately to be negative, bombing above the 17th parallel, and also direct American jet support in the South, must be continuous and effective. As part of a cautious phased program designed to test world reaction rather than to hurt North Vietnam, the first attacks against Dong Hoi and Vinh Linh no doubt served their purpose: but the destruction of thirty barracks and the sprinkling of some fields with a particularly nasty anti-personnel bomb known as the Lazy Dog, which showers razor-sharp pieces of steel in its target area, were not enough to promote radical changes in Hanoi. Elsewhere, the raids provoked predictable expressions of hostility and some reassuring support, not all of it expected. But they lacked the conviction of deadly earnestness that the United States must communicate if the new exercise is not to prove a failure.

North Vietnam has reconstructed its railway lines to China, and built its steel center at Thai Nguyen and

cement mill at Haiphong, only by great economic sacrifices at a time when it has the lowest living standards in Southeast Asia. It must be made to understand that the price for continuing the war in the South will be the destruction not merely of barracks and bridges but what it has labored to achieve industrially.

In terms of the Peking-Hanoi concept of wars of national liberation and their impact on the United States, the stakes are so high that Ho Chi Minh may elect to suffer even this sort of disaster while he still has hopes of victory in South Vietnam. Those who know him best believe that he will want to avoid at all costs a situation in which Chinese Communist forces (as distinct from specialists) may come to his aid. But the doubt persists, and will continue to persist, unless and until it can also be shown that direct American air support in South Vietnam and any other measures the United States may decide on are successful. Failure will breed failure, and this is true on all the complex political, diplomatic, and military fronts that are involved in this crisis.

For this reason, the battle slowly unfolding in central Vietnam for the Qui Nhon-Pleiku road is without doubt the most important of the war. This is the proving ground for American air support of South Vietnamese forces pitted against a mobile Vietcong force that not only controls the jungle, and therefore

has the initiative, but may well also prove to be numerically superior. Early combined actions along the highway, the scene of the bloodiest Vietminh ambush of the entire Indochina war, proved highly successful, as jet fighters drove off entrenched ambush forces. A government prisoner who escaped from the Vietcong during the bombing reported that he saw a hundred dead being carted off. It would be excessively optimistic, however, to expect this sort of casualty rate to continue. Targets will be more difficult to locate as the Vietcong becomes aware of the even greater need for camouflage and concealment, and experienced air officers are reluctant to predict the outcome.

What is at stake here is not merely a highway, or the security of the Second Corps headquarters at Pleiku, or even the control of the High Plateau, damaging though its loss would be: what is of absolutely critical importance is that the Vietcong be denied the opportunity to move into the Maoist phase of mobile warfare. If by the use of American air power they can be forced back to a lower level of guerrilla activity—which, though dangerous enough, lacks the means of delivering the massive blows on which their hopes for a purely military victory depend—then Hanoi may realize the futility of continuing an interminable war in which the rewards for continued struggle are the ashes of its own destruction.

## II. French Africa

EDMOND TAYLOR

PARIS  
"MAO TSE-TUNG needs a lesson," André François-Poncet wrote in a recent article published on the front page of *Le Figaro*. "If he does not get it soon, tomorrow it will be too late to administer it to him. If we had taken action against *der Führer* when he first stepped out of line, perhaps he would not have dared go farther. Mao makes no secret of his plans. He wants to be the master of Asia and of Africa, of the yellow and of the black races. . .

Indochina is one of the obstacles in his path. If he can break it down, there will be no holding him. By blocking him, America is defending the cause of the free world, our cause, and we should give her our support."

Though both François-Poncet and *Le Figaro* often criticize Gaullist foreign policy from the Atlanticist point of view, the veteran French diplomat wrote this time with exceptional effectiveness. As French ambassador in Berlin during most of the 1930's,

François-Poncet again and again warned his government in the same prophetic vein of Hitler's long-range ambitions. His discreet recall of these warnings—and of what happened when they were disregarded—touches a sore spot with old-time French nationalists, including the Gaullists. His provocative article in *Le Figaro* was cast in the form of a dialogue between two unnamed speakers, one of whom unmistakably reflects François-Poncet's own opinions, while the other voices the currently fashionable Gaullist irritation over President Johnson's Vietnam policy and approximates the statements of a high-level French government spokesman in briefing the domestic press. (François-Poncet includes as part of the dialogue that spokesman's warnings that if Mr. Johnson's "escalation" leads to war with the Communist powers, France will not be on our side as it was during the Cuban crisis.) While it would be wishful thinking to suggest that François-Poncet's sharp-edged, if oblique, attack on current French policy voices a majority attitude even in the anti-Gaullist ranks, the tone and content of his article do indicate a growing concern here both with Chinese expansionism and with President de Gaulle's strangely apathetic reaction to it. This attitude, even some Gaullists now admit privately, seems to be endangering French interests in several parts of the world, not to mention those of the general alliance on which the security of France still largely depends.

### Warnings from Africa

The most striking evidence of Chinese interference with French national interests, and of apparent governmental failure to defend these interests, comes from former French colonial territories in black Africa. With the exception of Guinea and Mali—where Chinese influence is strong and enthusiasm over de Gaulle's China policy is said to be great—most of the new African states that came into being when de Gaulle decolonized France's African empire are still loyal partners of France. Several, notably Ivory Coast and Senegal, have small but highly educated elites that make them bastions of western civilization—and of

French culture in particular—in the Dark Continent.

In recent months, the leaders of these relatively enlightened and pro-French African republics have repeatedly warned the French government that the Chinese Communist threat to their own countries was not merely economic and political but also military. President de Gaulle's policy of friendship with Peking, the Africans complained, was making it more difficult for them to meet the threat. The recently inaugurated Gaullist policy of progressively withdrawing the remaining French military forces from African soil, even when the government of a particular African state



welcomed their continued presence, was further encouraging the enemy, they said.

When nothing came of their confidential warnings or appeals, the French-speaking African leaders resorted to publicity. Last January Presidents Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, Maurice Yaméogo of Upper Volta, Diori Hamani of Niger, and Philibert Tsiranana of Malagasy, discreetly supported by President Léopold Senghor of Senegal, gave a concerted series of speeches and press conferences on the peril of Chinese subversion. Most of the speakers stressed the example of Niger, where an abortive *coup d'état* last year led, according to Niger officials, to the discovery that Peking had been arming and training the opposition Sawaba Party, which had launched the coup. Captured documents and the interrogation of prisoners proved, it was said,

that a number of the rebel cadres had been trained at a terrorist school in Nanking. Others had been trained at a similar school operated by the Algerian Army, with Chinese technical assistance, at Marnia in Algeria, or at a subversive base in Ghana maintained by the African Affairs Center, a co-ordinating committee for Pan-African revolutionaries. The rebels, said President Diori Hamani, had purchased their arms with funds deposited for them by Chinese agents in Brussels, Geneva, and Accra banks.

### Murdering the Moderates

Commenting on the Niger coup, President Yaméogo of Upper Volta declared that it revealed a Chinese plan to "lay siege to all Africa." He was backed up by Houphouët-Boigny, hitherto one of the most "Gaullist" of African leaders. Houphouët-Boigny declared that documents taken from the Niger rebels indicated a systematic Chinese policy of training terrorists "to assassinate those who are aware of the Chinese peril and replacing them with servile leaders who would open the gates of Africa to the Chinese. Those who are pushing the Chinese toward Africa," he continued, "are pursuing a most unwise policy, for with the aid of our resources the Chinese will one day sweep away Europe like a mere straw."

The tendency of French officials in speaking to newspapermen has been to minimize, if not to wish away altogether, reports of Chinese subversion in West Africa. At the conference of African leaders held last month in Nouakchott, Mauretania, French influence behind the scenes, according to some French correspondents on the spot, blocked inclusion in the final communiqué of the strong paragraph on Chinese subversion originally drafted by Houphouët-Boigny and Tsiranana.

In the past few weeks, however, Gaullist complacency toward the Chinese threat to French interests in Africa and elsewhere has been given fresh shocks.

Some have come from China itself. There, President de Gaulle's efforts to establish a favored position for the French diplomatic mission in Peking are generally agreed to have fallen flat. And French intellectuals

returning from recent semi-official visits have reported their consternation and alarm at an arrogant racism among Chinese artists and writers, reminiscent of that of the most fanatical Japanese army officers in the 1930's.

Further shocks for French Gaullists have come recently from Southeast Asia, where, among other signs of increasing Chinese aggressiveness, subversive infiltration in northeast Thailand, preparatory to the establishment of guerrilla bases there, has been noted in the French press. Even Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, the chief hope of French official neutralism, has disappointingly aligned himself with Peking's position that American troops must be withdrawn from Vietnam before de Gaulle's proposed international conference can be called. "One must ask oneself," glumly admits the Gaullist *La Nation*, "whether the possibilities for negotiations are not blocked for a long time to come due to the hardening of the position of both sides." (In *La Nation's* editorial, Sihanouk's intransigent statement was balanced against the news of United States Marine reinforcements arriving in South Vietnam as evidence of editorial symmetry.)

Nearer to home, opposition editorialists have noted with indignation, and Gaullist ones with ill-concealed dismay, there are signs of increasing Chinese and African revolutionary influence in Algeria. An Afro-Asian economic seminar held at the end of February in Algiers as a kind of rehearsal for the main Afro-Asian Conference scheduled for June adopted a series of exceptionally violent resolutions, mainly sponsored by the Chinese delegates or their allies, calling for intensified military and other support to "national liberation forces" throughout the African continent.

The worst news, though, continues to flow in from the former French colonies in black Africa, where France still has vast political and economic interests at stake. Early this month, *Le Monde's* correspondent in Dakar reported an attempt to install a Communist *maquis* in eastern Senegal that had recently been discovered and liquidated by the Senegalese Army. Some of the guerrillas captured or killed in the clean-

up are said to have been trained in Cuba, which now appears to be participating actively along with Algeria and Ghana in the Chinese offensive against western positions in West and Central Africa. (Che Guevara participated as an "observer" in the Algiers seminar and gave several violent speeches and press conferences.)



Above all, there was the murder in Brazzaville last month of three moderate and pro-French officials—the president of the supreme court, the attorney general, and the director of information—by terrorists belonging to the youth organization of the National Revolutionary Movement, the Republic of the Congo's only political party. According to

earlier reports in the French press, the youth groups of the movement, and for that matter both the party itself and the government, had been infiltrated by Chinese agents. The murders were an alarming revelation of the stranglehold that the Chinese appear to have acquired on the political life of the country, confirming Houphouët-Boigny's thesis that the liquidation of pro-western leadership throughout black Africa is one of the priority aims of Chinese subversion.

President Diori Hamani of Niger drove the point home in a heart-to-heart talk with de Gaulle during a recent visit to Paris. "You in France only have to deal with very polite diplomats," the African leader told French newsmen as he left the Elysée. "It's the tough revolutionaries who get sent to us in Africa. The Brazzaville murders prove that we have not been successful in curbing their activity. Obviously, a drive is under way to eliminate everything French or in any way linked to France in Africa."

### III. Tibet

GEORGE PATTERSON

IN A PERIOD that has been called "the decade of the guerrilla," Red China, the master of this kind of warfare, has been suffering losses in an inadequately reported guerrilla campaign at the hands of poorly armed, illiterate tribesmen who have probably never even heard of Mao Tse-tung's primer *On Guerrilla Warfare*. The Khambas of mountainous eastern Tibet have been fighting since 1952. In the revolt of 1956-1959, they seriously embarrassed a 300,000-man Chinese army of occupation until they ran out of ammunition, and they are still a force to be reckoned with.

Guerrilla strategy, Mao wrote in the 1930's, must be based primarily on "alertness, mobility, and attack," and "must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather, and the situation of the people."

Out of their own tradition of feuding and tribal warring and their practical experience as natural mountain fighters, the Khambas have arrived independently at many of Mao's conclusions. And what is more important, China, the occupying "colonial" power in Tibet, has been unable to cope successfully with the Khamba threat. To find out the facts about the Khamba resistance, I recently made a three-month journey to Nepal and Tibet to meet some of these guerrillas, investigate their potential, and go with them, if possible, on a raid against the Chinese Communist occupation forces in Tibet.

What is not fully appreciated in the West or even in India is that China actually fears for its position in Tibet—a fact that should not be overlooked in any consideration of aggressive Chinese actions along the Sino-Indian border. It is particu-