

and U.S.-financed projects to build from the bottom. "Maybe Ed Lansdale will come out of Gocong Province with a new Magsaysay and everything will be all right," one American official speculated. Lansdale himself laughs off the idea as a misconception of his role as the chief adviser on pacification. Essentially this involves an extensive and largely depersonalized new approach to the villages, where the Vietcong built their own strength.

THIS is where we came in years ago: land reform, the strategic-hamlet program, and what used to be called civic action. I have been going back over my notebooks trying to measure past expectations against results as a basis for evaluating the present efforts. The exercise is not only dispiriting but also unfair. Almost everywhere the observer is able to travel in relative safety, he finds dedicated men at work on programs for the rural areas. Most of the programs lean heavily on painful past experience and are designed to avoid previous errors. This is true even in the most critical areas.

In Pleiku, the nerve center in the High Plateau, political-action teams are learning not only how to improve village welfare but also how to fight. In Danang, General Thi has his own crash program for training village cadres. Two hundred graduates are going every seven weeks into the coastal areas of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces. In the Mekong Delta, the first mobile police units have brought the Saigon administrative presence to Long An Province.

If the reported demoralization in the Vietcong ranks continues to grow, and if Washington's new and ambitious plans for social and economic reconstruction bear fruit, these methods ought to work. For the first time, it seems, the Vietcong are to be challenged in the villages by groups of their own size and with skills to match their own. One all-important link is missing—Vietnamese organization and co-ordination. For the time being, the Lansdale team and its supporting U.S. agencies have the means to provide it; but in the long haul, it will be up to the South Vietnamese government.



The Information War In Saigon

HANSON W. BALDWIN

It's a Madison Avenue war," the harried public information officer complained. "We are supposed to fight an immaculate war—never kill civilians, never be ambushed, never make mistakes. Hell! We're human; we're bound to make mistakes. We'd be a damn sight better off if we were allowed to be more frank, more honest."

His comments emphasize a major factor, largely ignored, that may ultimately determine the outcome of the war: the factor of public opinion. For the government's reputation for credibility or lack of it—its relationships with the press, the reporting of the war, and the effect of the whole upon the American public in particular and world public opinion in general—could win or lose the war, regardless of what happens in the jungle battles.

Public information officers in Vietnam sometimes compare their problems with the French experience in Algeria. There is little doubt that France had won the Algerian war in a military sense: the guerrillas were stalemated. But it lost the war at home because the French public had wearied of the fight. The influence of public opinion upon contemporary history has already been of

major importance in our Vietnamese policies. It is certain to become more important now that Hanoi has once again rejected the President's persistent peace overtures and a long war of attrition appears probable.

In every insurgency conflict, public opinion is a major and often the dominant factor in the outcome. In Vietnam, Hanoi's hopes are keyed to winning the battle of public opinion. Encouraged by the anti-war demonstrations, editorials, and columns in this country, and by de Gaulle's open criticisms and Britain's lukewarm attitude, Hanoi clearly believes that the United States will not have the fortitude or the patience to stay the course. Unfortunately—and for reasons that are in part remediable—the enemy appears to have made some gains in his efforts to capitalize upon these elements.

There are three major weaknesses in our public-relations apparatus in Washington and in Vietnam. The first and by far the most damaging is what has been described as the "credibility gap"—the lack of belief of far too many people in the government's word. The second is the failure of some of our officials in Vietnam to present their case as honestly, as rapidly, and as effectively as they might have done. The

third is the failure of some of the press, television, and other media representatives in Vietnam to provide a balanced and factual picture of the war.

THE CREDIBILITY GAP has not developed overnight, nor is it the fault of any one man or any one department of the government. The atomic age, with its emphasis on secrecy and its encouragement of evasion, has tarnished the government's reputation for truthfulness. News management and news suppression—particularly in the Pentagon under Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Arthur Sylvester—have served to increase public skepticism. Yet, to be fair to McNamara and Sylvester, they have served two Presidents of widely different personalities, each intensely sensitive about his public image.

This sensitivity has been one of the causes during the Kennedy administration, and even more during the Johnson administration, for the overcontrol of military operations by Washington. Detailed and continuous supervision of operations seven thousand miles away is at least theoretically possible, thanks to the development of high-speed communications facilities and the tightly centralized control of the Defense

tions policies in Vietnam are tightly controlled from Washington. "Rockets" about a story appearing in some newspaper, queries, and requests for clarification flow in a constant stream from the Pentagon to Saigon; a telephone call from a White House assistant to the Marine Corps Commandant's office is apt to cause an earthquake in Danang.

School for Censors

Because press and public have become aware of a tendency to give the best version of the conflict, because of past evasions, distortions, or half-truths in Washington, and particularly because of vivid memories of government public relations in Saigon under Diem and General Paul D. Harkins, a considerable credibility gap remains. A number of important and able correspondents who were bruised by official antagonism and denunciation during the stormy period leading to Diem's overthrow are still reporting the war in Saigon. They have a built-in skepticism and mistrust of government announcements and government figures that date back to the days when Secretary McNamara was claiming that we were winning the war at the same time the correspondents were reporting—with far greater accuracy—that we were in deep trouble.



Department that has been one of McNamara's principal "achievements." In the Vietnam war and in the Dominican intervention—as in the Cuban missile crisis—Washington instructed military commanders in detail not only what to do but how to do it. In effect, even tactical command has at times been transferred to Washington.

Like everything else, public-rela-

Much of the skepticism of these reporters today focuses on the Army. "The Army just hasn't established its credibility," one correspondent told me, "or at least not to the same extent that Barry Zorthian [Minister Counselor for Information of the U.S. embassy in Saigon] and the political-civilian side of the embassy country team have done. We believe that Zorthian is trying to tell us the

truth; we are not so sure about the Army."

There is reason for this doubt. Too many of the current generation of military Pios—especially those trained in the last decade—no longer believe that they serve two masters, the Executive branch of the government (in the form of their own superiors) and the public. This change in attitude and concept is epitomized by the current teachings of the Defense Information School, which in its new Indianapolis home trains the services' public information personnel.

The concepts of the school were well expressed by two of its current lecturers. Captain Gary Werner of the Army (as quoted in the *New York Times*) said: "Our task is to prepare the students for their primary obligation, which will be to the people they work for, the Executive branch. The public's right to know is not the controlling factor as far as the individual information officer is concerned."

Martin F. Nolan, who worked for the *Boston Globe* before he taught at the school as a draftee (and has since rejoined the newspaper) commented: "The course's main aim is to further goals of the brass and not the public's right to know. The spirit of public relations prevails while democratic ideals get lip service."

The Army's Pios are dealing with more security information than the civilians are and they can't be as free as the civilian Pios. But I am convinced, along with many other correspondents, that the Army is now making an honest attempt to depict the war accurately—particularly as judged by the controversial "body count" yardstick.

The Vietnam war is the only war in which body count has become a major yardstick of victory or defeat. It should never have assumed such significance. Body count became important for two reasons—first, because it was emphasized by the frequently apocryphal Vietnamese accounts of "victories" in the Diem days; second, because McNamara's computer-minded assistants seized upon these statistics as one of the important measurements of success.

But in a guerrilla war, the seizure

of the enemy's ammunition and rice supplies is perhaps more important than the number of guerrillas killed. Second, body count, especially in the jungles against an enemy who carries away his dead, can never be completely accurate. And third, if measured against our own casualties, which are given not in numbers but in terms of "light," "moderate," or "heavy," with their widely different interpretations, body count carries no comparable significance. All things considered, it would be much better if Vietcong casualties were described as our own are.

The Briefing Gap

The second factor that has hampered the transmission of the fullest and frankest possible picture of the war is in considerable measure the fault of the Army and its public-relations apparatus in Saigon. There, each afternoon, in a briefing for correspondents, the Army attempts to round up and present a balanced picture of the operations of the preceding twenty-four hours. This attempt is complicated and sometimes compromised by the fact that the South Vietnamese government now provides its own separate briefing, which is handicapped by language difficulties, a mental gulf, and inadequate or distorted information.

Until recently the U.S. briefings also left much to be desired. Information was inadequate, late, or inaccurate. Correspondents who had returned from a battle area found they often knew more about what was actually happening than the briefing officer. He, in turn, was often miscast for his role—undoubtedly an excellent combat officer, but unable to reply effectively to some of the loaded questions of the press. Without meaning to, he could give the impression of withholding information. Last summer and fall the situation between the press and the Saigon pros was often near the boiling point. Correspondents complained that some of the pros were misleading, inefficient, and even dishonest; the pros complained that some of the journalists were arrogant, untrustworthy, and sensational.

Fortunately, the Army, with the help of Barry Zorthian and other embassy officials, has attempted to remedy some of its own shortcomings.

Public-relations communications systems from Saigon to the various combat units and corps areas are being improved and gradually the briefing information will be more up to date, although the gap between the front lines and headquarters can never be completely closed. A new briefing officer with more of the extrovert qualities the job demands is now on the stage in



the little press auditorium. This month or next, Rodger R. Bankson, an Army colonel who has been one of Sylvester's assistants, will become the military pro in Saigon. The job will be elevated to one-star rank to symbolize its importance and to give Bankson more prestige and power.

THE PRESS, too, appears to be cleaning house in Saigon. In the opinion of both the Army and many of the more mature correspondents in Saigon, it is high time. For there is no doubt that the third problem that has handicapped the presentation of an honest and comprehensive picture of the war is the fault of the media themselves.

The Vietnamese war is probably the most complex and difficult war to interpret and present that the American press has ever covered. Yet there are very few editors who are willing or able to allocate the space or the time required for real in-depth reporting. Too often the day-by-day reporting is brief, episodic, and partial. For this, the editors and publishers and television producers, not the correspondents in Saigon, deserve the blame.

But the Army pros and many of the correspondents themselves have rightly complained of distorted, biased, and sensational reporting by a few of the younger members of the press and TV corps based in Vietnam. The Army and some corre-

spondents in Saigon say that the press associations and some of the broadcasting companies have been the worst offenders; the same competition for "exclusives" and "beats" and for headlines that marred some of the Associated Press and United Press coverage during the Second World War has been a factor in Vietnam. Moreover, some of the correspondents in Saigon simply are not

capable of adequately reporting military operations. And some of the TV reporters have delivered generalized editorial judgments that they have neither the competence nor the knowledge to sustain.

During the Ia Drang Valley and Chuprong Mountain fighting of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) last fall, some of the accounts that appeared in the American press were greatly distorted. Indeed, General Westmoreland felt called upon to deny headlines or accounts that implied that the 1st Cavalry had been defeated or had been forced to abandon the battlefield. Squad and platoon actions, he asserted, had been taken out of the context of the entire battle.

Fortunately for the reputation of the press and the good of the country, the quality of reporting in Vietnam has improved. Mature and responsible correspondents head all the major bureaus of press associations, broadcasting companies, and major newspapers, and the worst offenders have departed.

A good thing, too, for the Vietnamese war is at a crisis, and what we do, how we do it, and how we report the situation will color the history of all our tomorrows. For unless the American public feels the war is worth winning and must be won, we face ultimate defeat no matter how many military victories we win.

Keeping Alive in Space: A report from General Dynamics


QUESTION: An astronaut in space needs 11 pounds of water and two pounds of oxygen a day to live. If you seal him into a spaceship, how long could just 11 pounds of water and two pounds of oxygen last him?

ANSWER: Forever, if necessary.

The reason, of course, is that air and water can be regenerated indefinitely, providing that a total man-machine system is properly organized.

Such a system is the heart of an experimental life-support facility which General Dynamics has recently built for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It is designed to take care of the basic physiological requirements of four men in a zero-gravity environment for a full year, with minimal resupply once every three months.

Regeneration is a basic fact of nature—nothing is ever really lost. The job is done by the total biosphere of the earth, its billions of cubic miles of atmosphere, its millions of miles of earth and sea, its



This sealable structure contains the prototype of a life-support system which includes facilities to maintain four men in space for a year.

thousands of species of animals, plants, insects and bacteria.

Compressing even part of that system to meet the requirements of men in space is a capability that has developed only recently.

The problem—weight:

General Dynamics has been involved in the requirements of space travel for almost a generation through its development of the Atlas and Centaur space

vehicles. We've been working even longer with the problem of sealed environments in the submarines we've been building since 1900.

But the submarine problem is somewhat different. Drinking water and oxygen can be produced directly from the surrounding water—which, because of its buoyancy, also makes weight a relatively minor problem.

In space, weight, including supplies, comes at an incredibly high premium.

Thirteen pounds of water and oxygen per man per day for four men for 365 days adds up to almost ten tons of water and oxygen.

One manned space platform now in development will weigh approximately 25,000 pounds. Without regeneration another 20,000 pounds of just water and air would be needed.

New water from old:

To avoid carrying such excess weight, the system General Dynamics put together for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ties water, air and waste removal requirements into one integrated system.

Exhaled carbon dioxide, humidity, air contaminants, used washing water and urine are filtered, absorbed, heated, cooled, catalyzed and electrolyzed in a constantly operating process to create pure water and pure oxygen for reuse.

For water recovery in our system, we chose an evaporative method as the most efficient.

Excess vapor from the cabin air, used wash water and urine are collected in holding tanks and are drawn into wicks by capillary action. At the other end of the wick, water is evaporated into a stream of warmed air. The contaminants are left behind in the replaceable wicks. Condensed vapor moves through a series of filters finally to return to a central reservoir as pure water.

Regenerating air:

Air regeneration presents a more complicated problem.

Normal air is a mixture of oxygen, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, water vapor, trace gases and contaminants. Exhaled air contains less oxygen and is enriched with carbon dioxide. On earth the constant interchange between animals, atmosphere and plants consumes the carbon dioxide and the contaminants and supplies fresh oxygen.

In a sealed ship the oxygen would be


rapidly used up and the carbon dioxide built to a poisonous concentration.

Moreover, new contaminants are constantly being formed. At the end of some Project Mercury flights, the cabin air filter contained dozens of contaminants not present at takeoff. Some, such as ammonia, can come from ordinary chemical reactions to an astronaut's own perspiration.

Machinery now has to do the job otherwise done by nature.

How it works:

In our "spaceship," cabin air—the original mixture, plus exhaled breath, excess moisture from cooling systems and new contaminants—is continually circulated through a bank of equipment. A *dehumidifier* removes excess moisture. A



**HOW WATER AND AIR CAN
BE REGENERATED IN SPACE**

charcoal filter holds back some contaminants. A catalytic burner converts others. And a separator screens out the carbon dioxide. But the removal isn't final.

The water wrung out by the dehumidifier, for instance, is added to the central tanks for reuse. The carbon dioxide is moved to another chamber where it is mixed with hydrogen at a high temperature in the presence of a catalyst. That reaction creates water and pure carbon.

Techniques have not yet been developed to use the carbon, so it is simply blown into a storage area. But the water, collected through a porous plate, is transferred to an electrolytic cell where an electric current breaks it into hydrogen and oxygen.

The hydrogen is pumped back to fuel the previous reaction in which the water was formed. The oxygen returns to the cabin air to be breathed again.

A separate problem is presented by solid wastes. In a biological food sys-

tem utilizing algae or bacteria, these wastes might fuel the growth process, but now there is no use for them. International agreements forbid the contamination of space, so they cannot be jettisoned.

Solid wastes, therefore, are dehydrated into a powdery dry residue and stored. In operating spaceships, this may serve as additional shielding against radiation or meteorites.

The work ahead:

The entire life-support system is the most advanced yet developed and does include, of course, much more than the air and water regeneration loop.

Other facets are an electricity-generating system, mechanisms to circulate gases and liquids, monitoring and control instrumentation, food preparation, storage and other facilities.


Efficient regeneration of food is not yet feasible. So dehydrated food will be

carried by the spaceship and resupplied.

All in all, we think the prototype is close to what will be needed in space. But as experimental equipment it's still somewhat heavy—over two tons altogether. We expect the long period of ground testing to be conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to provide further guidelines for the design of much more compact and lighter equipment.

General Dynamics is a company of scientists, engineers and skilled workers whose interests cover every major field of technology, and who produce for defense and industry: aircraft; marine, space and missile systems; tactical support equipment; nuclear, electronic, and communication systems; and machinery, minerals and gases.

GENERAL DYNAMICS





The Trial of Two Soviet Writers

A Special Report on the Failure of a Dogma

GEORGE BAILEY

THE ARREST last September of the Soviet writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuri Daniel (on the subsequent revelatory charges that they were engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda under the pseudonyms Abram Tertz and Nikolai Arzhak) has brought the dilemma of Soviet literature to a head. The announcement of the arrests came shortly before the award of the Nobel Prize to Mikhail Sholokhov, the first "Soviet writer" to receive the award, and there followed a small storm of protest from western writers who turned both to Sholokhov himself and to the Soviet Writers' Union with telegraphed appeals on behalf of Sinyavsky and Daniel. The immediate answer to the appeals has been in the form of a furious article in the January 12 issue of *Izvestia*, accusing Sinyavsky and Daniel of treason and railing against leniency in dealing with them. The charge of treason seems to establish a link between Sinyavsky and Daniel and the late Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy: the colonel

is said to have been engaged in espionage; the writings of the dissident authors have been described by Soviet authorities as "ideological espionage."

There is logic in the use of this term—Soviet logic. In the Soviet Union's totally ideological society, the writer is a key figure, the "engineer of the human soul" as Stalin called him, the exemplary disciple of *partiinost* or "party spirit," which is the demiurge that creates or abolishes facts, that confers existence and significance on men or events or else annuls them; for the writer is the interpreter of history in the making or remaking—past, present, and future.

To bind the writer to the party cause, the theory of Socialist realism was propounded at the first congress of the Soviet Writers' Union in 1934 and included in its statutes: "Socialist realism, which constitutes the basic method of Soviet artistic literature and literary criticism, demands from the artist a truthful,

historico-concrete representation of reality in its revolutionary development." Karl Radek, in his rejection of the realism practiced by James Joyce in *Ulysses* (Joyce was too impartial: "We should select . . . all phenomena which show how the system of capitalism is being smashed, how socialism is growing . . ."), made it clear at the congress that Socialist realism was the groundwork for a dogma that would reduce the function of literature to the illustration and eulogy of party decisions.

To secure the primacy of "party spirit" in Soviet letters, a permanent ideological emergency was proclaimed in the mid-twenties and has been periodically reproclaimed since then. A state of acute revolutionary urgency was simulated and made the statutory foundation of Soviet society. For this reason, any information reflecting Soviet policy or from which Soviet policy is even vaguely deducible became and remains the object of obsessive secrecy. This applies above all to statistics