

ish Japan's military dependence on the United States, which maintains some 150 bases and other installations and about fifty thousand military personnel in Japan. Actually, the U.S. government is prodding Japan to undertake a greater share of its own defense. But Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara surprised many Japanese when he indicated that Japan had a "larger" defense role in the Far East than just the security of its own territory. Communist China, McNamara said pointedly, poses a "threat" to every nation in the Orient. *Asahi Shimbun*, the largest newspaper in Japan, retorted: "It is quite extraordinary that a U.S. leader should stress Japan's defense role as nakedly as this."

The Buildup

To attain "independence," the Self-Defense Forces are being systematically modernized and strengthened. Joint exercises are being held annually with U.S. forces. The chief objectives of these exercises are said to be (1) training in early-warning systems and interception of intruding aircraft and (2) aerial combat and the defense of bases.

Currently there are about 250,000 men in the Self-Defense Forces, plus some 22,000 in a reserve force. The navy, or Maritime Self-Defense Force, consists of approximately 480 craft with a total displacement of 135,000 tons, including seven submarines—four of them domestically built—and eight destroyers (another eight are scheduled to be constructed by the end of 1968). One of these destroyers, already on duty, is the locally built *Amatsukaze*, with Tartar surface-to-air missiles. There are 1,160 planes in Japan's "air force," about half of them jet-powered, including several squadrons of supersonic F-104 Starfighters. Moreover, there are plans to replace the F-104 with the Phantom F-4, the F-111, or the YF-12A.

The Self-Defense Forces, many of whose senior officers are veterans of the imperial armed forces, possess Hawk and Nike missiles, and additional missile battalions are projected for the "Third Defense Build-up" during the fiscal years 1967-1971; missile units and anti-submarine warfare will also be emphasized. In

addition, experiments are being carried out with Japanese-developed anti-tank missiles, torpedoes, and short-range rockets.

Evidently the old imperial military traditions and prewar military strategy were in the minds of the officers who prepared the Flying Dragon and Three Arrows studies. In fact, Yozo Kato, a former director-general of the Self-Defense Agency, admitted that segments of Three Arrows bear a resemblance to the Tojo government's "Basic Principles for the Empire's National Policies."

According to the financial daily *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, the "Basic Principles" are actually cited in Three Arrows, with the notation that "they provide good introductory remarks."

The United States, which played an important role in helping to shape the no-war constitution, keeps in close contact with Japan's still limited military effort, and is solidly behind the present accelerated build-up of the Self-Defense Forces, which were also "reborn" under U.S. tutelage.



France's Changing Policy In Africa

PHILIPPE DECRAENE

PARIS
DURING the election campaign last month, one of the most popular themes of President de Gaulle's right-wing rival, Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, was his attack on government aid to former French colonies in Black Africa. He was able to rouse the most unenthusiastic audience to cheers by contrasting

this supposed largesse with the austerity of French rural life: "Which would you rather have," he asked again and again, "a new water supply system for a French town, or one for Niamey, the capital of Niger?"

Officially, the planners of French policy in Africa have denied the existence of this sentiment—called

"Cartierisme," after Raymond Cartier, the *Paris-Match* columnist, who was one of the first to criticize France's program of assistance to Africa. Various polls conducted for the benefit of the Ministry of Co-operation have been cited as proving that the overwhelming majority of citizens support aid to the former overseas territories, and the Minister himself has often defended the program in public. Nevertheless, the government's defensive statements are definitely out of step with a new trend that has become apparent in France's policy in Africa south of the Sahara.

FRANCE is not reneging on its longstanding African responsibilities. Too many economic, political, psychological, and even sentimental reasons prevent it from officially disengaging itself from its former colonies. Moreover, France's dynamic assistance to the uncommitted nations helps it to maintain its position as one of the great powers. Government circles, however, are not wholly indifferent to the obvious inroads the "Cartierist" doctrine has made, particularly among the rural French, and they are aware that it is bound to make further headway. France has gradually reduced its aid to its former African territories every year from about \$650 million in 1963 to a proposed \$210 million in 1966. It argues that military reconversion, commitments to the European Economic Community's fund for assistance to underdeveloped nations, and the extension of French influence to new areas in Africa and elsewhere must take precedence to conform with the nation's changing worldwide political interests. Not only is the amount of aid being gradually reduced but the kind of aid is shifting from administrative and military to technical and cultural.

For many months France has been thoroughly reorganizing its armed forces. The redeployment plan of the French Military Forces Organization Overseas announced in October, 1964, by Defense Minister Pierre Messmer has already resulted in important economies. This inevitably has had repercussions in Africa, where much of the army was stationed during the colonial era. In

less than a year, France has withdrawn three-quarters of its military personnel in Africa. The number of officers, noncommissioned officers, and men of the army, air force, and navy for the whole of the former French African states and the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) was reduced from 27,800 in October, 1964, to 6,000 by last July.

This abrupt reduction was bound to disturb African heads of state. Since President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo was assassinated by mutinous native noncommissioned officers in January, 1963, several leaders of countries south of the Sahara have feared that the Togolese example might be catching. On each of the regular private visits made to Paris since then by Presidents of French-speaking African republics, President de Gaulle has been made aware of the African concern over the "military vacuum" created by the departure of French forces. De Gaulle has not changed his plans, however. He has justified his stand to his visitors from Africa on the basis that after five or more years of independence the former colonies are entering into new relationships with France and that defense is one of the essential prerogatives of independent states.

France considers that the new national armies are now strong enough to maintain or restore order whenever necessary without resorting to outside help. This was proved, government officials here say, by the way local forces put down riots in Brazzaville in February, 1964, when supporters of Abbé Fulbert Youlou, the former President of the Congo Republic, demonstrated against Alphonse Massamba-Debat's government, and in March of the same year when disturbances were fomented in Dahomey on behalf of former President Hubert Maga. Even in the case of Gabon, where in February, 1964, officers of the national army attempted a coup that was put down with the help of French troops flown from neighboring former French colonies, the speed with which President Léon Mba was reinstated proved that the French military need not be stationed in a new nation in order to be effective there. France has retained only a few footholds in sub-Saharan Africa near large airfields and seaports, to which ele-

ments of the 11th Infantry Division, with special training in foreign "brushfire" operations, can be rushed from France in emergencies. The three pivotal bases are Dakar in Senegal, Fort-Lamy in Chad, and Diégo-Suarez in Malagasy.

Still, the thoroughgoing reorganization of French military deployment in Africa has had some serious economic repercussions in several countries, notably Senegal and Dahomey. President Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal protested that the closing of French bases in the Cap-Vert Peninsula would deprive the country of several million francs in local currency. The local labor market and retail trade are suffering from the departure of the French military and their families, and the demobilization of African soldiers in the French Army has placed a burden on countries that cannot find immediate employment for them. Despite these drawbacks, Paris has insisted that the operation proceed without delay and has stressed that the new measures will mean a healthy turn to reality "because it is not good for a nation to base its economy on the presence of foreign troops on its territory."

Broader Designs

De Gaulle's difficulties with his five Common Market partners have not prevented his government from emphasizing in recent months the importance to Africa of its commitments to the European Economic Community. The heads of the French-speaking African states are constantly reminded that French producers have promised to align the prices of agricultural products and manufactured goods with those of similar products from the Benelux countries, West Germany, and Italy. This presents an awkward situation for the young African economies.

For example, Senegal's peanut exports may be jeopardized by the gradual withdrawal of the French subsidy that enabled the Senegalese to sell their peanut oil at prices above the prevailing world market quotations. Banana exporters from Cameroon and the Ivory Coast have had their share of the French market reduced to one-third of the total, the remainder being earmarked for planters from the French overseas de-

partments such as Martinique and Guadeloupe.

The most interesting aspect of the changing Gaullist policy in Africa, however, is its new global perspective. De Gaulle has been disappointed by the crumbling of the French Community—France's union with its former territories in Africa—which he established in September, 1958, with himself as President. Guinea chose independence and refused to join, and Mali, the Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta left the Community in 1960 when they became independent. Nevertheless, de Gaulle firmly believes that France still has an African mission. This is one of the reasons why the former French West African and French Equatorial African states that are still members of the Community are being given relatively greater financial aid than those of any other area, and their relationships with France are still governed by the co-operation agreements. (Algeria receives more aid than any other nation, but as a group the sub-Saharan African countries receive the largest portion of the total.)

The fact that independence has lessened the importance of the Community has been a factor in turning de Gaulle's attention to wider horizons, especially among the uncommitted nations. His trip to Latin America and a number of countries outside the traditional French sphere of influence are examples of this trend in de Gaulle's policy. Whereas in 1958 he was concerned with a purely French-speaking African confederation, he now has broader designs.

These designs include the expansion of French influence on the African continent itself. France has launched an intensive diplomatic and economic drive in Rwanda, Burundi, and a number of non-French-speaking nations. Within the past few months, ministers of Kenya, Tanzania, and Malawi have come to Paris. The visit of Tom Mboya, Kenya's Minister for Economy and Planning, and Joseph Murumbi, its Minister for Foreign Affairs, received little attention from the press, but it was indicative of French diplomacy's new orientation.

When the British East African colonies became independent, the

French government's full attention was centered on the French Community, or what remained of it. But now that some co-operation is beginning between French- and English-speaking African nations within Pan-African groups like the Organization of African Unity, France is increasing its contacts in the region.

It has taken French management, still shackled by traditional thinking, several years to discover that the English-speaking East African coun-



tries are a richer market than the whole of French-speaking West Africa. French exporters have also belatedly discovered that only Malawi and Zambia still give preferential treatment to the Commonwealth, and that French products can compete freely with the British in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.

African Explorers

Early last year, the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Michel Habib-Deloncle, headed an exploratory mission to East Africa. Almost

at the same time, Kenya and Malawi expressed a wish to co-operate with France and began by requesting assistance in the teaching of French. Since this would help bridge the gap of linguistic divisions carried over from the colonial past, it was welcomed in the Elysée. By February, French professors trained in the newest audiovisual methods were dispatched to Malawi.

The current rapprochement between the East African English-speaking countries and France is motivated mainly by political considerations. In Kenya, for instance, where Joseph Murumbi has become the most outspoken advocate of this line, France's policy of absolute noninterference in the quarrels of the former Belgian Congo has won it wide approval. Kenyan political leaders particularly appreciate it, since the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of African Unity had entrusted them with the impossible task of mediating between a Congolese rebellion divided against itself and the government in Léopoldville.

A further innovation has been the sending of an impressive French economic mission to Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi. It was set up by the National Center for Foreign Trade and the French National Management Center, two bodies representative of French business circles; the current trip is designed to find outlets for French industry, some sectors of which are showing signs of stress.

The French economic mission's reports will provide the basis for a decision on whether de Gaulle's political policy of building French prestige in the whole continent should now be accompanied by an economic drive to win new markets for France. In any event it appears that the trip will prove that the East African countries are no longer a private preserve of British industry to the extent that the French-speaking African countries—from Nouakchott in Mauritania all the way down to Brazzaville in the former French Congo—still are for French exporters. By the mere fact that it is dealing with formerly British-dominated countries, France has loosened further the ties it once had with its own former territories.



The Road to Santiago

FREDERIC V. GRUNFELD

FOR CENTURIES there were miracles and apparitions to be seen at every turn of the pilgrim's road to Santiago in northwestern Spain: one could meet angels, beggars, kings, and status seekers—the Plantagenet Edward I on horseback, St. Francis of Assisi walking barefoot, and a certain Flemish wayfarer who is said to have carried a mermaid with him in a tub. In 1965 the ancient road was refurbished for modern pilgrims, and the miracle is that so little has changed since the Middle Ages, that this is still one of the most beautiful journeys in all Christendom.

The so-called Camino de Santiago enters Spain in the high Pyrenees, at that watershed of history called Roncesvalles, where I stood on Charlemagne's battlefield and watched the clouds come rolling in below my feet, blotting out the last echoes of Roland's horn as well as the forest of telephone poles that have replaced the lances of the lost rear guard (it was neither the first nor the last rear guard to discover that its function was to be wiped out). From the high point the road winds across nearly five hundred miles of unforgettable Spanish countryside to the city of Santiago de Compostela (the "well-composed") close to the western edge of the continent.

According to the old chronicles, this was where the bones of St. James were discovered early in the ninth century by a local bishop who saw light coming from the ground and a star pointing to the spot where the apostle lay buried. It is said, too, that his body had made the long journey from Palestine through the straits of the Mediterranean and up the Portuguese coast in a mysterious stone vessel that came to rest on the Galician shore and was drawn inland by the draft oxen of a pagan queen. Having found a resting place at Compostela, St. James appeared to King Ramiro I of León on the eve of a great battle with the Moors, saying: "Know ye that Jesus Christ gave to all the apostles, my brethren, all the other provinces of this earth, but to me alone he gave Spain, to guard and protect it from the enemies of the Faith, and so that ye will not doubt my words, ye will see me lead the battle on a white horse, with a white banner, and in my hand a shining great sword. . . ." He was as good as his word, and the Christian army promptly conquered the Moors to the battle cry of *¡Dios Ayuda et Sant Yague!* just as the saint had directed.

When news of his whereabouts reached the rest of Europe, thou-

sands of foreign pilgrims began converging on the cathedral that was built over his tomb, after Rome the holiest place in Europe. It was a spot so sacred that it was "honored by miracles never ceasing, and with a plenty of candles from Heaven that burn day and night, and godly Angels who serve without end." At the beginning of the eleventh century a progressive-minded King of Navarre built a new road from the French border—Roncesvalles to Pamploña, Logroño, Burgos, León, and points west. Several competing monastic orders, notably the Benedictines of Cluny, established hospices and priories along this "French Road." Some of their more elaborate establishments had facilities for a thousand guests, and traffic along the camino must have reached formidable proportions during the height of the pilgrim season. They came, led by their dukes and bishops, from France, England, and Germany; from Italy, the Lowlands, and the Balkans. Inevitably there were a certain number of camp followers "having neither office nor profession," and these were accused of bringing the pox to Santiago. But despite the many hazards it was considered *de rigueur* to make the journey. As Dante says in *La Vita Nuova*, "He is no pilgrim who does not make his way to the tomb of St. James and return therefrom."

THE CAMINO is like a heartline traced across the palm of Spain. It traverses the austere northern regions rarely visited by tourists, where winters are harsh and the cities are still stamped with the siege mentality of the Middle Ages. People along the way were not always as hospitable to strangers as I found them to be. The twelfth-century monk Aymeric Picaud, who wrote the first guidebook to the Jacobean Way—and whose impressions, in a modern edition, I enjoyed comparing with my own—warns his readers against a dozen kinds of evil that can befall the unwary pilgrim on the long journey from France. Insects are annoying, highwaymen will murder anyone for a sou, river waters turn out to be unfit to drink, and one must be on the lookout for crooked toll collectors and treacherous ferrymen. "Often the boatmen load so many,