



The Writing on the Rock

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THE ANGLO-SPANISH conference in progress here to discuss the future of the Rock of Gibraltar is more than a mere postscript to the story of a classic fortress and symbol of power. It is one of the most important diplomatic negotiations ever conducted between the two nations, being as much a discussion of their respective destinies and influence and advantages in a changing Europe as about the Rock itself. There is a real danger of a complete breakdown in Anglo-Spanish relations if these talks fail. This would have a serious impact not only upon Spain and Britain and their precarious economies but upon the rest of Europe and the western alliance as well.

Behind the whole question lies the restless, dissident mood now prevailing through most of Europe, of which President de Gaulle's defection from NATO is one manifestation. A new shape is emerging, and there is an undercurrent of excitement about it. No one knows exactly what the new shape will be, but it is becoming increasingly clear that Spain, encouraged by France, will play a stronger and more competitive role in it. Britain's future is far less assured. An acute apprehension of the changing pattern of Europe, with a sense of being caught in a chronically unequal struggle for a competitive role on the Continent, is now guiding Britain's policy and forcing it to reconsider some long-cherished concepts.

Gibraltar has assumed immediate importance for Spain for several reasons. First of all, it provides an emotive distraction from serious

domestic problems in a country now racing with considerable success to catch up with the century. Secondly, General Franco's intimations of mortality increase his desire to retrieve the Rock as a nonpartisan memorial to the nation. But more important than either of those considerations, the struggle to regain Gibraltar reflects Spain's intention to drive a hard bargain with a Europe and a western alliance that have coldly and unreservedly rejected it for the past twenty-five years but no longer can afford to do so.

Industrial expansion and the rapid rise of living standards have made Spain the Continent's most promising new export market and investment opportunity. The competition is fierce. This situation has given Spain a sudden and powerful leverage of which it has taken prompt advantage. For the first time in a very long while, Spain is acting with verve and ebullience in the mainstream of international diplomacy instead of standing by, defensively truculent.

DE GAULLE regards Spain as a strong potential ally for what he wishes to achieve in Europe and is pursuing an assiduous courtship, championing an associate membership for Spain in the Common Market despite the cool responses of Belgium, Holland, and Italy. West Germany, with its own considerable financial stake in Spain, seems to be favorable, and in some circles Spain's chances are considered equal to or even better than Britain's. Spain at least is not equivocal about its desire to be in.

When West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder recently visited Madrid, his Spanish counterpart, Fernando María Castiella, clearly indicated that Spain was no longer satisfied to be taken for granted; outstanding disputes with its European neighbors must be settled. There was no doubt about what he meant, nor about where he hoped pressure might be applied. The same line has been taken with Washington. Now that the United States has lost its French bases, it wants stronger assurance of its Spanish ones. Apparently Washington has been bluntly advised that putting the diplomatic screws on Britain about Gibraltar is the best way of getting such assurance.

Gibraltar has thus become a crucial pawn in several European power plays for reasons which no one anticipated and which have nothing whatsoever to do with its original strategic value. Militarily, the Rock is as dead as the dodo and nobody pretends otherwise. What started as an exasperating but confined squabbling point between the Continent's two principal outsiders has enlarged to something that threatens to affect the balance of the new Europe. For Britain and Spain to engage in recriminations, sanctions, and, not inconceivably, force against one another is an altogether intolerable concept. First, it would push Spain closer to France and de Gaulle's policies, and would seriously affect both Britain's and Spain's positions with the Common Market. In addition, a confrontation with Spain would be a serious financial burden for Britain, which can scarcely afford even the minimal garrison it maintains in Gibraltar at present. And Britain's commitments elsewhere, possibly including West Germany, would be affected, further weakening the West.

Both Britain and Spain have made it abundantly clear that they do not want the thing to go too far. But they stand deadlocked on honorable points of principle that would seem to make collision inevitable—Spain's that Gibraltar is Spanish territorially and historically; Britain's that the sovereignty of the twenty-five thousand native Gibraltarians is not negotiable. On these points both sides have spoken

with reason and conviction: there have even been moments when the exchange has sounded like a noble debate. But these have been rare; principle has not been raised nearly so often as jingoistic emotion.

Hostile Labourites

Animosity against Franco has remained stronger in British political circles than almost anywhere else, especially among the Labourites. Until recently, Spain could scarcely have been treated here as an equal, let alone deferred to as a nation holding some trumps, which everyone now grudgingly recognizes to be the position. Yet, by 1963, when Spain first brought up the issue of Gibraltar at the United Nations, it was already in the throes of change. Franco's succession was a serious topic in Spain as well as throughout Europe, and it was clear that Britain and Europe might be treating with a more democratic régime in Madrid at some point within the foreseeable future.

For the British, Spain was already their chief foreign holiday playground. Each summer a million of them took twenty million pounds sterling into the country. British business was moving in massively. British exports to Spain had nearly trebled in three years and were running at more than £60 million annually.

No one who was in Madrid in October, 1964, when the matter of Gibraltar was under discussion at the U.N., doubted that the crisis could have been talked out. There is every indication that Spain initiated the matter seriously enough but saw it as a protracted business to gain essential publicity for the ultimate goal, with no real conviction of much early success. Principally, it wanted its claim on the record, especially since Britain in April that year had given the Rock a large measure of self-government—retaining control of defense and external affairs—and to Spain the idea of the colony graduating to independence was insupportable.

But Madrid also had been made unhappy by another incident that spring when the British Labour Party, then in opposition, had severely criticized the sale of naval frigates to Spain, whereupon the

Spanish government broke off talks with Britain on the \$50-million naval construction program. Labour came into power about the same time that Spain was raising the Gibraltar question at the U.N., and within a week the new government withdrew from a combined Anglo-Spanish naval exercise which the Spanish Navy had set much store by. The Spanish for their part threw down a virtually total blockade of Gibraltar, and since then Gibraltar's business, which is mainly tourism, has fallen forty per cent. The vehemence and pettiness of the blockade—refusal even for altar wine to cross for Gibraltar's cathedral, imposition of duty upon workmen's sandwiches, delays of up to



eight hours for cars wanting to cross the border—is consistent with the sort of bruised pride which the Spanish so easily and deeply suffer but more especially with the rude shock felt by someone making an urgent bid for acceptance and finding himself unceremoniously rejected.

The Spanish certainly read the naval episode as an ultimatum from the Labour Party that they should expect little comfort from Britain, and this seemed amply confirmed by the reaction in Britain to their blockade of the Rock. Not since Suez had comparable talk been heard. Counteraction was fiercely proposed from both sides in the British Parliament, with suggestions of stopping British tourists from going to Spain, imposing currency and trade restrictions, and even the use of force.

The Last Symbol

The British have felt more sentiment and affection for the Rock than almost any other remnant of empire. They have had it far longer than almost anything else—it is 262 years since Admiral Rooke claimed

it for Queen Anne during the War of the Spanish Succession—and it became the quintessential symbol of British power. To such a degree has Gibraltar's spell persisted that even in these days when Britain has withdrawn from every major possession and most of the minor ones as well, no one would have supposed that the Rock was negotiable. As Colin Legum, Commonwealth correspondent of the *London Observer*, recently remarked, for the British Left such a move would spell abdication to Franco, and for the Right "destruction of the triptych of unchanging British values incorporating the Royal Family, the Bank of England and the Rock of Gibraltar."

Ever since the Spanish blockade started, the British government has stoutly insisted that there could be no discussion with Spain under duress. As late as January 4 British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart repeated the government's position: no talk under pressure, no talk at all about the sovereignty of Gibraltar. Then on February 28, Stewart announced that unconditional talks would begin. Perhaps by coincidence, perhaps not, this followed by a few days a harsh review of Britain's overseas commitments and the announcement of cuts in the Middle East and Mediterranean forces.

American pressure for an interim settlement certainly influenced Britain's change of mind on holding talks—as did the realization that the money Britons spend in Spain as tourists is not the weapon they thought it was. (French tourists now outnumber and outspend the British five to one.) There is also the fact that the number of expatriate Britons living on the Costa del Sol alone exceeds the population of Gibraltar. What would their position be in a showdown?

More than likely it was the combined effect of these considerations and a belated awareness of Spain's mounting advantages in Europe, not to speak of the fact that Britain in the long run might lose more in any breakdown between them, that induced Whitehall to change its mind.

Before leaving Madrid for London, Señor Castiella foresaw "long and difficult" talks and added that the results would be either "lasting friendship or Spain's profound re-

sentment." The two sides should not be handicapped by "Armadas of the mind or political emotions like those of the thirties." If Britain rejected the Spanish claim to Gibraltar, the Spanish people would fight tenaciously for the "restoration of their national integrity." But at almost the same moment Michael Stewart was unequivocally assuring Sir Joshua Hassan, Gibraltar's chief minister, who had flown in for consultation before the talks, that Gibraltar's sovereignty was by no means negotiable. When Stewart and Castiella finally met on May 18 and began the talks, they were painfully aware that their contradictory principles might push them where neither wished to go.

'We Are British'

Britain's dilemma is bizarre, for it is dealing with a colony that has become sullenly restive, with even an overt murmur of violence in the air, because it doesn't wish to be decolonized. "British we are, British we stay," the Gibraltarians write all over their town's walls. Their emotions are such that they staged a minor riot last year when the British naval commander on the Rock went across to Spain one Sunday to play polo.

When the British seized the Rock in 1704, the original Spanish inhabitants abandoned the fortress for San Roque, a nearby town, where their title deeds and family documents still are filed. Spain still maintains that the descendants of these people are the rightful inhabitants of the Rock. The Treaty of Utrecht specified that no Jews or Moors were to be given residence on the Rock (Chief Minister Sir Joshua Hassan is Jewish, a fact that has not escaped the notice of the Spanish press, which sometimes has revealed a nasty tone of anti-Semitism moving below the surface of its comments on Gibraltar), but the British gradually brought in Genoese, Portuguese, Spaniards, and eventually Jews and Moors and Hindus, to serve as merchants, craftsmen, and fishermen. These in turn received a strong infusion of British garrison blood over the years. They have grown into the present community of twenty-five thousand that now regards the Rock as home. Overwhelmingly Catholic, they are mainly Spanish in appear-

ance and character, and are largely Spanish-speaking, though the rich and the professional classes affect to be as British as possible.

While the Spanish influence upon their outlook and temperament seems to be complete, they nonetheless possess a distinct identity of their own. This is understandable since they have privileges—a free judiciary, free speech, free trade unions, and democratic politics—that are not to be found in Iberia. They have also long been accustomed to a prosperity that is only just beginning to be sensed in the adjoining Andalusian *campo*.

The Spanish used the anti-colonial movement at the U.N. to raise the issue of Gibraltar, pleading its anachronism as the last colony left in Europe. In the tradition now established at the U.N., decolonization supposes the realization of the wishes



of the majority of the natives. Yet Gibraltarians don't wish to be Spanish or to lose their present autonomy with its distinctively British and democratic characteristics. Can they be handed over against their will, as a sort of ritual sacrifice to the well-being of the two major powers involved? And if they were, would Spain really want this dissident community added to its other domestic problems?

ACTUALLY, Spaniards manifest a profound distaste for the Gibraltarians and regard them as the descendants of camp followers of the British. A remarkable feature of the Gibraltar campaign in the Spanish press has been the relative absence of any anti-British tone: the abuse has all been directed at the Gibraltarians. Foreign Minister Castiella has offered the Gibraltarians retention of British nationality, security in their jobs, and freedom of religion, but no guarantees of the community's ultimate future.

Perhaps none is envisaged, the hope being some form of mass emigration to Britain or resettlement elsewhere.

Spain's obvious indifference to the fate of the Gibraltarians has weakened its case. It has concentrated on long legal arguments about British infringements of the Treaty of Utrecht and how these have nullified British title to the Rock. But this, the British contend, is irrelevant, the only relevant matter really being the sovereignty of the Gibraltarians. And on this Britain is adamant: the question is not open for discussion. So where do they go from there?

Not to the United Nations, if either of them can help it. Britain already feels it went too far in asking for United Nations authority on its oil blockade of Rhodesia, and Spain has even more interesting reasons.

Spain's resort to the U.N. to internationalize the Gibraltar issue already shows a danger of back-firing, mainly because of the most curious omission in this whole affair—one which, though not bearing immediately on the issue, may well do so in the future. This is Spain's determined retention of two enclaves on Morocco's Mediterranean coast, the ancient cities of Ceuta and Melilla. It was from the Melilla barracks that Franco launched the military uprising that precipitated the civil war in 1936. On the day the present Anglo-Spanish talks opened in London, the Moroccan newspaper *Al Alam* compared Britain's readiness to negotiate over Gibraltar with Spain's refusal to negotiate over Ceuta and Melilla. Morocco had the same problem with Spain that Spain had with Britain; by agreeing to talk, Britain was adapting itself to the spirit of the century, the paper said.

Spain's real concern at the United Nations, however, is that attention will focus beyond Ceuta and Melilla on its almost-forgotten colony to the south of Morocco, Spanish Sahara and Ifni, where a major search for oil is under way and where American capital is to exploit a huge phosphates discovery. Spain recently announced "self-government" for the territory, but little is known about what this means or to whom it has been granted.

Both sides are anxious to avoid a disastrous breach in Anglo-Spanish relations and are hoping for some escape from deadlock. There have been suggestions of a condominium with Spain, or of a principality guaranteed by Britain and Spain. The example of Andorra on the Franco-Spanish frontier is frequently cited. Its laws would be its own, with Britain and Spain participating in its economic, military, and cultural side. Another proposal, lobbied by powerful joint British-Spanish financial interests, is for a free port under a joint administration. Franco himself has suggested that Britain should cede the Rock and then lease it back from Spain.

Britain could not maintain a

siege indefinitely, and Gibraltar for its part could not live tolerably under a permanent blockade from its neighbor; some association with Spain is essential to its development and progress. So compromise seems inevitable, if only to buy time for tempers to cool; some arrangement whereby the Gibraltarians retain their autonomy while accepting some form of Spanish "presence" would seem the only sensible course. As one source here put it: "Emotion is never long-sighted, and whatever emerges in the distant future may be quite different to what anyone imagines now or would dare to, so all we can do at the moment is keep talking." Or, as someone else bitterly remarked in Gibraltar, "The writing is on the Rock."

sometimes called Vice-President for Research and Advanced Studies, Vice-President for Educational Development, or Vice-President for Research Administration, is the campus co-ordinator of Federal funds. Research proposals and grant applications filter through the academic and administrative hierarchies to his office. There the routine paper work is handled. Rarely is the university lobbyist involved directly in processing those papers.

Instead the lobbyist's function on the campus is to inform the researchers and administrators about the latest Federal programs and regulations. "My job is largely one of keeping tabs on the Federal scene and making sure my people at the university know what is going on," one university agent said. But because some fifty agencies and major administrative subdivisions dispense funds for education and research, knowing what is going on is a full-time job. Often the university agent seeks friendships and informal working relations with the men who administer the funds.

One lobbyist tells how a friendship with a high civil servant led to a rich contract. "I knew that he was drawing up guidelines for the proposals, and I also knew that his agency was in a hurry to get the project under way. The guy and I had worked together before. I was able to discuss the guidelines with him before they were published, and because we were first with the proposal, we got the contract."

But for the most part, the university lobbyists are reluctant to discuss such intimate techniques of their trade. Few will disclose the exact amounts that their efforts yield in Federal dollars for their universities. Even California's Ferber, representative of an institution that receives more than \$300 million annually in Federal funds, tries to play down his role as a money broker. "I don't think any one man can take complete credit for any single grant," he said. But when pressed to reveal his accomplishments for California, Ferber conceded that a recent grant of \$6.9 million for a building program for California's eight undergraduate schools was the result of his "understanding the way

The University Lobbyists

MARK LEVY

IN THE past three years a new kind of lobbyist has appeared in Washington—the agent of a college or university. About a dozen such university lobbyists are working in the capital now, representing institutions as diverse as the vast University of California and tiny Elmira College in upstate New York. They all seek Federal money for education and research, a prize that is expected to total about \$5 billion by next year.

Until recently the universities relied on a combination of institutional prestige, informal contacts, and administrators' shuttle flights to Washington to get Federal funds. The attitude of the big universities was best expressed by a spokesman for Harvard who said that it "does not have a full-time representative in Washington for grant procurement and Federal liaison work, nor have we ever considered nor are we considering a Washington office for such work."

Even now, of the top ten institutions receiving grants, only the University of California has a full-time man in Washington. But as the number and complexity of Federal programs has increased, so has the number of university lobbyists.

Some universities have found that a Washington lawyer alumnus can supply the required services. For example, Douglas Whitlock, a partner in Whitlock, Markey & Tait, whose clients include Firestone Tire & Rubber and the Automatic Canteen Company of America, acts as a representative of his alma mater, Indiana, in Washington. Sometimes faculty members studying the national government or "interning" with public officials develop useful knowledge and contacts. Others come to this new profession with a variety of backgrounds. James C. Messersmith, who represents the College Center of the Finger Lakes of New York (an association of six small colleges in upstate New York), once worked for the Office of Education. Mark Ferber of the University of California holds a Ph.D. in political science and was a professor at Rutgers. Rowan A. Wakefield of the State University of New York served in State Department and ran education programs. Most have spent time on the campus as faculty members or as administrators.

The university lobbyist reports on his Washington activities to a university bureaucrat. That official,