



THE REPORTER'S NOTES

Is It Really McCarthy?

The impact of Senator Eugene J. McCarthy's candidacy may some day be measured not in its effect on the Johnson administration but in its effect on the ambitions of Robert F. Kennedy. In his first press conference as a candidate, McCarthy encouraged the notion that he might be preparing a path for the New York Senator, especially by running well in Presidential primaries. "I don't think it's a matter of stepping aside," he said of Kennedy. "It may be a little less voluntary than that."

McCarthy mentioned Kennedy several times, citing him as an authority on bombing Vietnam and volunteering the news that he and the Kennedys have "had no quarrel." "I've not been as much an opponent of the Kennedys as it has been reported . . .," he said. He also suggested that should Kennedy shove him aside after a few successful primaries, "I don't see that as a disaster . . . I would have been glad to have had him move early. If he had, then there would have been no need for me to do this. But it would certainly be in order for him and wholly proper within the rules of American politics to move in."

McCarthy's motives in spotlighting Kennedy when he could better use the political attention himself lend themselves to only two interpretations. One is that he is indeed a stalking-horse, bred by a prearrangement with Kennedy and a confirmed political and ideological accord between the two men. This theory is buttressed by an examination of McCarthy's well-earned reputation as a philosophical, lackadaisical campaigner. Metaphysics has seldom been the key to winning primary campaigns, either against an opponent busily shaking hands or against an incumbent President. If McCarthy's low-key campaign produced a substantial vote, it could also signify that it is time for Ken-

nedy to rally himself to the task for which he has been waiting. Another indication of McCarthy's deference to the Kennedys is his delicacy in regard to the Massachusetts primary. The Minnesota Senator said he would not enter the primary there until after a meeting of the Democratic State Committee. This decision makes McCarthy unique, since that committee is one of the most scorned political bodies in the country. McCarthy, of course, was deferring to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, whose embarrassment could be acute if either the President or a stand-in like Speaker John W. McCormack were McCarthy's opponent. McCarthy's deference here could also involve a deal whereby a certain number of his articulate supporters from Cambridge could be named delegates to the 1968 convention with the intent of raising a ruckus with the Platform Committee. In return, McCarthy would not stray onto a Kennedy preserve, the Massachusetts ballot. Otherwise the Massachusetts primary might be a hospitable forum for McCarthy's views, largely because of the low turnouts for the April primaries there. McCormack, running as a favorite son, needed only 28,000 votes to beat Adlai Stevenson in the 1956 primary. Since that time, two well-financed peace candidates have run for the Senate, each receiving more than 50,000 votes.

The second theory on the McCarthy-Kennedy riddle involves no entente at all, unspoken or otherwise. Instead it surmises that McCarthy is taunting Kennedy in hopes of obtaining his open support or, more likely, of giving the signal to Democratic forces whose loyalties and organizational abilities are responsive only to Kennedy's call. If McCarthy is taunting, his tactics may be effective, in light of past statements by Kennedy in praise of the President. As recently as June 3, Kennedy said that the President

"has gained a huge popularity, but he has never failed to spend it in the pursuit of his beliefs or in the interest of his country In 1964 he won the greatest popular victory in modern times, and with our help he will do so again in 1968." At a meeting of Democratic state chairmen in March, Kennedy had gone even further in praising the "strong team" of Johnson and Humphrey, saying, "I know we are all going to work for them."

The rules of American politics do not require Kennedy to reiterate these sentiments, any more than they require President Johnson to repeat his 1964 words about his new opponent: "I count it one of my more desirable pleasures to say good words—at any time—about Gene McCarthy He's the kind of man—as we say in the ranch country in Texas—who will go to the well with you. That's a homely way of saying you can count on him in dark days or bright ones."

Kennedy can follow the rulebook of American politics by proclaiming his neutrality during the primaries, just as he has done in New York party affairs and his brother Edward has done in Massachusetts primaries. The New York Senator has said that a Johnson-McCarthy confrontation "would be a healthy influence on the Democratic Party." But in the springtime, as the fever of intraparty strife rises, it might be difficult to discern any healthy influence for Democrats, except for those who remain neutral.

The Last Protectionist Charge

The devaluation of the British pound has hit at a moment when organized protectionist sentiment in the United States is once again on the rampage. True, the immediate onslaught of the protectionist forces was halted by the appearance of four cabinet members before the Senate Finance Committee on Octo-

ber 18 and by the spirited counter-attack of powerful anti-protectionist industrial interests. But the opposition, within and without the government, had been caught napping; it took tricky parliamentary maneuvering to beat back the protectionists.

And that was before devaluation. It was a good bet in October that Senator Everett M. Dirksen would lead his troops back into battle on behalf of import duties in 1968. Now it must be considered a certainty. And with devaluation they will come armed with a new argument: what was previously a matter of protecting this or that industry from the consequences of low foreign wages or other alleged unfair advantages will now be a matter of protecting American industry as a whole from foreign goods artificially cheapened by devaluation.

The administration's case suffers the disadvantage that it appeals, in the last resort, to enlightened self-interest—a willingness to pay now, specifically and individually, for the sake of rewards that will come later, generally and collectively. Against the undoubted immediate gain that steel or textile manufacturers would derive from import quotas, government officials can only hold out the likelihood that foreign customers would retaliate, prices would rise, our balance-of-payments position would deteriorate, we would lose friends abroad, and in the long run the protected industries themselves would suffer from a lack of “healthy and vigorous competition”—all distant, vague, and general.

Fortunately for both the administration and the British—for whom stiffer duties would be a severe blow—a sizable segment of U.S. industry abhors trade restrictions, because they have the effect of limiting the ability of foreign countries to buy U.S. goods. In many cases, these exporters also have big investments abroad; and unless tougher obstacles to overseas dollar investment are established, this group is not likely to be greatly affected by devaluation. It could play a crucial role in the months ahead; at the very least, it could keep devaluation from becoming a powerful tool in the hands of those eager to dismantle the painfully assembled edi-

fice of freer world trade. But if the events of October are any indication, it will be an uphill struggle.

The Disheartened Volunteers

There seems to be a growing feeling these days that the spirit of volunteer public service has been carried far enough. Community Action and VISTA workers have often antagonized City Hall and tangled with local agencies on behalf of the poor, and the repercussions have reached the Capitol. And the problems of the Peace Corps have been multiplying.

For one thing, “The problem of induction notices to overseas volunteers is becoming a major concern,” Peace Corps Director Jack Hood Vaughn has said. Until a year ago, no Peace Corps volunteer had been drafted. Since then, more than sixty have had pleas for deferments rejected. The Corps now has twelve thousand volunteers overseas; 7,200 of them are male, of whom at least eighty per cent are draft-eligible. Their average age is twenty-three. It takes \$5,000 and three months to train a volunteer and get him to his post. “As more and more volunteers lose their [draft] appeals,” Vaughn said, shipment of draft-eligible volunteers overseas will have to be discontinued.

Vaughn faces other problems. Recruiting in the colleges is going badly this year. Worse, Congress is cutting back the Corps' funds; the President asked for \$124 million but the budget is now down to \$105 million. Vaughn fears that by 1969 the number of overseas volunteers will be cut back by a third to the 1963 level of under eight thousand. VISTA's modest \$31-million budget, too, is nearly certain to be shrunk to about \$25 million under the impact of the current Congressional economy drive.

The young American volunteers have shown what they can do for their country, but what is the country going to do for them?

That Old Black Magic

One of the less bloodthirsty devices used by Haitian President for Life François Duvalier to extend his ten-year dictatorship is to exploit the

Voodoo superstitions of his people. He has convinced many that dogs, cats, and even insects are his eyes and ears, making him able to eavesdrop everywhere on any seditious talk. Lately the Haitian Coalition, a New York-based group of anti-Duvalier exiles, has found its own way to undermine belief in Papa Doc's mysterious powers. Using clandestine sources on the island, the coalition in its daily short-wave broadcasts in Creole is able to give details of arrests and activities of Haitians in and out of the government that are never reported in Haiti. Now many of the people believe that the New York magic is stronger than Papa Doc's.

Duvalier's imminent downfall has been predicted so often that one begins to discount tales of worsening conditions and to believe that maybe the dictator does lead a charmed life. Nevertheless, his situation is becoming ever more precarious. One trouble is money. Papa Doc needs millions to maintain his army and the notorious Tonton Macoutes, the sport-shirted, pistol-packing bully boys who terrorize the populace and shield their master in his white-painted palace. For lack of funds—the coffee crop has been poor, almost no foreign aid or tourist receipts come in, and the International Monetary Fund recently declined to renew standby credits—Papa Doc has had to let many of his gunmen go. The shield is getting thinner. A few weeks ago, men armed with machine guns held up a branch of the Bank of Canada in Port-au-Prince and made off with \$70,000. Since no one in Haiti has machine guns except the Duvalier forces, Haitians assumed that the job was pulled by someone powerful who was desperate for cash. In another move last month, the régime reportedly levied a special tax of \$400,000 on the Haitian-American Sugar Company, one of the few solvent operations on the island.

These indications, together with the paranoid suspicions in the Presidential Palace—from which an unceasing flow of arrest and execution orders has been directed even toward the dictator's closest collaborators and family—suggest that if Duvalier does wield black magic, he had better use it now.

We and They: II

THE MEANING of Trotsky's phrase "No war—no peace" when he refused to sign the Brest Litovsk Treaty was fully grasped by Lenin, after another Bolshevik dignitary did what Trotsky could not bring himself to do. Lenin thought that it had to be ratified, yet it had to be violated. "I don't mean to read it," Lenin said, "and I don't mean to fulfill it." The same spirit guided Stalin in guaranteeing nonintervention in the domestic affairs of countries that recognized the Soviet Union, including the United States in 1933. His successors furthered the Trotsky principle with a luxuriant wealth of different and seemingly incompatible meanings. "No war—no peace" has come to mean coexistence in the language of Soviet diplomats, particularly when they have to deal with countries not yet marked for intense penetration. But in the areas where tension is mounting, the Soviet leaders have become practitioners of brinkmanship. John Foster Dulles coined the word, and the men who he never forgot were our enemies made of it an art, by skillfully playing on the fears of their opponents with obscure threats and mystifying decoys.

The burden of balancing the Soviet Union's might and the possession by both sides of the ultimate means of warfare fell on this country—the most unsuited to the game of power politics, the most isolated because of its very vastness. Perhaps the main cause that makes it extremely hard for us to grasp the inner structure and dynamism of the Soviet Union is the fact that we never had a Communist Party worth any political consideration. Maybe this condition of things has been somewhat altered by the late Senator McCarthy; yet it is not conceivable that the riotous upsurge against the Vietnamese War and our institutions of government are maneuvered by Communist cadres. The comrades in the Soviet Union and everywhere in the world do what they can to help, but at the root of it all there is childish innocence—a childishness that knows no limits of age. The illiteracy of the literate is well known. There is also, and largely represented in our midst at this time, the dumbness of the clever.

At present, the balance of terror is unbalanced and we are on the losing side. Such changes occur constantly, determined mostly by trends inside the two major powers, and also in the peripheral ones, whose influence is not negligible. To redress an imbalance of this nature is a matter for statesmen much more than for generals. The fundamental trouble does not come from Communist aggressiveness or Communist wiles but from the complacency of so many Americans and so many allies. Such a complacency, sometimes mixed with muddleheadedness or with fear, can make a powerful country into a docile satellite.

SOVIET DIPLOMACY or Soviet propaganda, which is about the same, has succeeded in distorting ideals and institutions which the pursuit of freedom had engendered. So, for instance, voting rights for all citizens—which Communism allows only when there is no choice to make—has been advocated for the unification of the two Vietnams on the assumption that the bloc vote of the North and of the Vietcong would be enough to take over the whole country. And some Americans have said: Why not? The Communists have made the "wars of liberation," everywhere except within the Soviet empire, a preserve of their own. Many Americans were sympathetic, for, it was said, this country too had been a colony. For a time, one of the American ideals was to make the world safe for diversity, which came to be considered as an evidence of worthiness. The Communists were quick in pointing out that being diverse from us and, they say, among themselves, they too could qualify.

Diversity and newly gained national freedom, no matter how acquired, turn out to be meaningless when disassociated from the nexus of varying factors that make them livable and enduring; yet respect for its territorial integrity has come to be considered the natural endowment of anything called a sovereign state. To this notion our diplomacy is particularly dedicated. There is a strange division of labor between our country and the Communist ones: the Communists strive with