


with its intermediate ballistic missiles, but it would suffer far greater retaliation from the Russians. And even though China may be able to test its first ICBM sometime this year, in the opinion of Secretary of Defense McNamara it won't have a significant arsenal of ICBMs before the mid-1970's.

THE SOVIET PRESS carefully records each time a Chinese leader announces an imminent Soviet attack on Red China. Soviet leaders regard such declarations, along with the recent harassment of the Soviet embassy personnel in Peking, as calculated attempts to provoke the Soviet Union into an all-out war. In response, the Russians protest but do not attack, meanwhile increasing their military preparations on the tense and tumultuous China borders. Stalin's heirs learned one bitter lesson from his errors: all through the spring of 1941 he thought that it would be totally illogical of Hitler to war upon the Soviet Union while Britain had not yet been defeated; all that spring he failed to take proper military precautions. Now in 1967 it may seem preposterous to expect a military adventure from Mao, beset as he is with domestic problems and militarily weak as he is in comparison with the Russians. But to Stalin's heirs this eventuality does not seem farfetched. They are familiar with the illogic of a dictator who seeks greater troubles as an escape from his lesser ones.

Even though attacks on Russians in China stopped abruptly in mid-February (with a brief flare-up in late March), and in early April news was received of a Sino-Soviet agreement to facilitate Soviet aid to Hanoi, the danger of war continues to be intermittently stressed in both countries.

Whenever the Russians are told that they worry too much about an attack from China, they like to quote this story, familiar the world over:

A dog jumped at a passerby, barking ferociously. The man picked up a heavy stick and stood his guard. "Don't be silly," said a neighbor. "Drop that stick. Don't you know that a barking dog never bites?" "Yes," replied the man, still clutching the stick, "I know and you know, but does the dog know?"



The Intellectual Revolt In Poland

TIBOR SZAMUELY

ON JANUARY 8, Peter Raina, a young Indian leftist scholar, was expelled from Poland, where he had lived and worked for more than four years. It was a harrowing experience: Raina was held at the East German border for almost twelve hours while Polish guards methodically went through his belongings, reading every scrap of paper. Finally they let him go after confiscating a three-hundred-page manuscript of a biography of Communist Party Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka on which he had been working, with official encouragement and help, for about two years.

Raina had come to Poland full of sympathy for the Gomulka régime. He learned to love the country, its language and culture. Warsaw University gave him a doctorate. Wanting to see only the best, for a long time he resolutely dismissed all western criticisms as propaganda. He wrote letters to the foreign press attacking western correspondents for their lack of understanding of Poland and accusing them, among other things, of slandering the Ministry of Interior Affairs. Thus it came as a shock to be called an enemy of the state by that very ministry and to be ordered by it to leave the

country within forty-eight hours.

When he finally reached West Germany, Dr. Raina unburdened his disillusionment to the press, broadcast to Poland on Radio Free Europe, and made public a scathing letter he had written to the Polish Minister of Interior Affairs. His story is informative, for it sheds light on some little-known aspects of what is probably the most important process at present taking place in Poland: the new ferment among the intellectuals.

Lament for October

Since about 1960, Warsaw University, and particularly its departments of the humanities and social sciences, has become the center of disaffection spreading among the younger generation of intellectuals. In November, 1964, the security police arrested a group of the university's young lecturers and students. One of the lecturers was Karol Modzelewski, a stepson of the late Polish Communist Foreign Minister and a leader of the pro-Gomulka student movement of 1956. They were all accused of having circulated a paper criticizing the Communist system in Poland. Although soon released, five of them were expelled from the party.

Administrative sanctions, usually an effective warning, didn't work this time. Modzelewski and a friend, Jacek Kuron, composed an open letter to the party. When they distributed it in March, 1965, they were immediately rearrested. No one was surprised, for the document was a devastating indictment—couched in impeccable Marxist terms—of Poland under Gomulka: "To whom does power belong in our state?" the authors asked. "To one monopolistic party—the Polish United Workers' Party. . . . The decisions of the elite are independent, free of any control on the part of the working class and of the remaining classes and social strata."

The Poland which Modzelewski and Kuron described and analyzed with a wealth of statistical and other evidence is, in fact, the familiar Stalinist system—which Communist leaders and wishful thinkers in the

and Leszek Kolakowski. It was Kolakowski who occupied the center of the stage. His reputation and popularity as a champion of intellectual and political freedom—and as Poland's leading Marxist philosopher—was established in the "Polish October" of 1956. He was one who rallied the intellectuals and students behind Gomulka and the ideal of rebuilding Polish Communism on an ethical, libertarian, and humanistic foundation.

Today his fiery declarations of ten years ago may well seem naïve—not least to Kolakowski himself—but at the time they conveyed hope. In his ideological credo, published in 1957, Kolakowski argued that the true Communist's place was on the side of the oppressed and the persecuted: "No one is exempt from the moral duty to fight against a system or rule, a doctrine or social conditions which he considers to be vile and inhuman,

were introduced, party control was tightened. The restrictions brought a wave of even more vociferous indignation. Protest meetings were held, delegations dispatched, signatures collected. There were noisy scenes at the 1966 May Day demonstration.

In the meantime, ever-increasing pressure was being applied to Leszek Kolakowski. In March, 1966, he was summoned before the party Control Commission and called upon to submit a declaration retracting his views. Despite a grueling interrogation, he remained obdurate. The climax came on October 21, the tenth anniversary of the uprising that had swept Gomulka to power. A commemorative meeting was held in the history department of the university, at which Kolakowski spoke for about half an hour. His message, as reported in a Polish paper in London, was on the order



West insist was swept away in the cleansing aftermath of the 1956 Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. But it was the authors' conclusion that was intolerable to the authorities: "In view of the impossibility of overcoming the economic and social crisis within the framework of the bureaucratic system, revolution is inevitable." Modzelewski and Kuron were tried in July, 1965, behind closed doors, with the courthouse surrounded by a tense crowd of students. They were sentenced to three and a half and three years respectively.

This, however, was far from the end of the affair. Modzelewski and Kuron had been voluntarily defended in court by some of the most esteemed figures of Polish intellectual life: Antoni Slonimski, the dean of Polish writers, and Professors Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Leopold Infeld,

by resorting to the argument that he considers them historically necessary." Through the sad years of Gomulka's gradual repudiation of all that he seemed to represent in 1956, Professor Kolakowski had retreated into semi-passivity. The case of Modzelewski and Kuron forced him again to face up to the dilemma of the idealistic Communist in a repressive Communist state.

IT is at this point that young Peter Raina enters the story. Dr. Raina was a devoted admirer of Kolakowski, and he unhesitatingly joined his professor in protesting the sentences given the two teachers.

Last year, the party leadership decided to stamp out student unrest and began a series of repressive measures directed against Warsaw University; a number of students were expelled, new disciplinary rules

of an obituary of freedom in his country:

"Genuine democracy is lacking here. There is very little public choice of the leaders. Thus, the leadership, which is not really elected, becomes conceited, self-assured. There is no opposition; hence there is no confrontation between those who are in power and those who are without. . . .

"The government does not feel responsible to the nation. The system of privileges is prevalent. These privileges exist for a few outside the law. . . . Public criticism is lacking. Free assembly is nonexistent. Censorship is extremely severe. . . .

"All this has weakened society, for there is no perspective, no hope. The state, the party, the society are the victims of stagnation. There is therefore nothing to celebrate."

Speaker after speaker rose to re-

iterate the main points of this comprehensive indictment. Among them was Peter Raina. Two resolutions were moved: one demanding the introduction of freedom of speech and the abolition of censorship and political repression, the other calling for the immediate release of Modzelewski and Kuron. Although the motions were not allowed to be put to a vote, the thunderous acclaim with which they were received spoke for itself.

Unity in Protest


Next day Professor Kolakowski was summarily expelled from the party. In the following few days his assistant was also expelled, six students were suspended, and seven others were sent before the university's disciplinary commission. A systematic campaign of calumny was mounted with the object of discrediting Kolakowski, who was accused of being "a tool in the hands of the imperialists."

On November 15, the university organization of the Communist Party held a general meeting; it was addressed by Zenon Kliszko—the secretary of the Central Committee, the chief party theoretician, and Gomułka's second-in-command—and by Stanislaw Kociolek, first secretary of the Warsaw committee of the party. Kliszko trotted out all the clichés about the perils of revisionism; Kociolek went straight to the point: "I am against discussions, dialogues, and seminars. The unity of the party is supreme. Discipline is the cardinal principle of the life of the party." Instead of giving the expected dutiful assent, the assembled university Communists launched an attack on the party's leadership. Kliszko, driven into a corner, protested: "I didn't come to this meeting to present any explanations. I came to listen to them." Similar stormy scenes were repeated at party meetings held in other leading cultural institutions. The intelligentsia clearly was getting out of hand.

The conflict spread fast. On November 25, fifteen writers, all active members of the party and regular contributors to official periodicals, sent a letter to the Central Committee expressing their solidarity with Professor Kolakowski and demanding his reinstatement. The response of the party bureaucracy

remained doctrinaire—and ineffectual. The writers were summoned to the Central Committee, where, one by one, they refused to withdraw their protest. Six of them, including prewar Communists, driven at length into rebellion against the beliefs of a lifetime, resigned from the party. Seven others were suspended. Nor was the party leadership any more successful in its dealings with the Writers' Union as a whole. At a special meeting of the party organization of the union's Warsaw sections (numbering about a hundred members) that was convened to condemn the actions of Kolakowski and his supporters, only one speaker supported the official line.

It would be wrong to assume that all those who joined this broad front of intellectual dissent necessarily subscribe to Modzelewski's or



Kolakowski's views. The principle that unites them is opposition to the stifling system of Communist conformity, to the totalitarian controls over thought and speech and writing, to the subjugation of the intellect and the prostitution of culture. Yet, as the history of Communism—whether in Poland, the Soviet Union, or any other "socialist" state—has shown, the party cannot afford to compromise this control. The result it has achieved in Poland has been the successive alienation of the intellectual community, and with every new purge the area of revolt grows wider.

Peter Raina's letter to the Minister of Interior Affairs summed up the sense of betrayal.

"A few days ago," he wrote, "when I went to the militia headquarters in order to have my visa extended, I was greatly surprised by the decision of the militia not to extend my stay in Poland. I was aghast at the motivation of this decision, namely that I have a hostile attitude toward Poland. . . ."

"For the first time in my life I came against a case when the control of university life was exercised by secret agents of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. . . ."

"I never had any treacherous intentions towards Poland. I always defended Polish interest. I published abroad letters which criticized foreign correspondents for their lack of understanding of Poland. I endeavored within the limits of my possibilities to spread Polish culture through numerous translations of Polish literature. I feel, therefore, greatly injured by the mendacious accusations formulated against me by the Ministry of Interior Affairs. I am writing to you that thanks to the activity of agents of the Ministry of Interior Affairs at the university, everybody is governed by fear and one cannot behave normally and calmly at seminars and meetings. I am ashamed for the university and its leadership that things have come to such a pass that low and dirty methods are applied to students, methods that recall the times of fascism and its terror. Methods applied to me during the last few days at the militia headquarters (to wit, the denial of any possibility of explaining things) recall to my mind the methods of Stalinism.

". . . the events of the last days convinced me that all the ministries, the university, the whole cultural life, the political parties, the parliament, were subject to orders of the Ministry of Interior Affairs from which there was no appeal and that nobody had the courage to dare even to make a rightful protest against unjust treatment."

A fair description of a country which was only recently being advertised as a showplace of "liberal" Communism—and a melancholy epitaph to the illusions of an idealist who learned about Communism the hard way.

GLOSSARY

Stifling Airs and Clumsy Graces

IN *The King's English*, Fowler made fun of pretentious language under the chapter heading "Airs and Graces." Our airs and graces are neither airy nor graceful, however, being elephantine decorations that have been dragged in by the tail from popular works on economics, sociology, and anthropology. These are terms such as "affluent," "ethnic," and "power structure" ("crisis in the cities" bids fair to join the list), which give a sort of drizzle of knowingness to an otherwise unremarkable statement. Their distinctive feature is that they hint at much more meaning than they actually convey.

Affluent came into use as a vaguely censorious way of saying "rich" after the publication of John Kenneth Galbraith's book. It used to be the kind of word one associated with Emily Post's Mrs. Wellborn, who never was crass about things when she could be dainty. Now all that has changed. Even when a writer or speaker appears to mean nothing more complicated than "rich" in the sense of having a lot of money, often as not he will eschew the word (or "prosperous" or any other variant) for the newly portentous "affluent." It brings intimations of economic doctrine, whether or not they are relevant to the subject at hand, and it also manages to imply, without the addition of a single word or thought, that the group of persons or the community that is affluent wouldn't be nearly as affluent if it were putting its money to better use or if it had a more highly developed sense of public duty and private values.

Ethnic leads many lives, most of them regrettable. It has come into general use as a courteous way of saying "Negro" for persons who feel that "Negro" is a term of disrespect. These may be divided into two broad categories: those who are merely averting

their gaze and those who are trying to be scientific and therefore helpful. The first are mostly politicians who, in the aftermath of ruling against some civil-rights measure or other, will express their fundamental concern for the welfare of "ethnic groups," the usage having become a handy substitute for that equally pompous mouthful, "racereigioncreedornationalorigin." In its pseudo-scientific incarnation, "ethnic" appears to provide what might be called the Anthropological Out. It manages to suggest that a person's "ethnic background" is more interesting than it is reprehensible and, in any event, is certainly not his fault. Probably it is the toniest of the patronizing clichés, but when you replace it with words such as "Puerto Rican," or "Mexican" or "Negro," the effect can be surprising. The statement may take on an unexpectedly racist cast. Apparently it is easier to discuss people's characteristics as a racial or foreign-born class when you think of them as being "ethnic."

Power structure became current in the early 1960's, usually prefaced by the word "white." The concept owes much to C. Wright Mills's book *The Power Elite*, possibly even its oddly inverted syntax. Mills's idiosyncratic appraisal of how power is acquired and expended in American political life was reduced to shorthand and injected into the controversy over civil rights that began to heat up in 1963. The "white power structure" was said to be a small group of public officials, businessmen, and leading citizens who controlled the fate of everyone else who happened to live within their purview. In particular they controlled the fate of ethnic agitators, but in this respect they were by no means all bad: the "white power structure" went a certain way toward accom-

modation and improvement of the average citizen's lot—only they never went any farther than they had to. Who were they? No one ever said, and the mystery was part of their attraction. From 1963 onward, to judge from the press, "power structures" began to spring up in cities and hamlets all around the country. The most that could be said of them, from a careful reading of news accounts, was that they seemed to combine all the worst features of the Detroit Economic Club and the Elders of Zion.

IT IS POSSIBLE, however, to hazard a speculation or two about the makeup and organization of these curious aggregations. One is that they may be composed of the same officials, businessmen, and leading citizens who were known a few years ago as "white moderates," and whom everyone was calling on to get into the battle. Another is that they always seem to emerge in the news when their particular community has become the scene of uncontrollable riot and disorder—a circumstance suggesting that the "white power structure" is often deficient in both power and structure.

Be that as it may, "power structure," like "ethnic" and "affluent" as well as all their pretentious cousins, appears to have become fixed in our prose. The longer such terms are around, however, the more tenuous their connection becomes with their social-scientific ancestors. Their meaning, in other words, is subject to what is known in the aircraft industry as a "fast rate of sink." On April 30, the *Los Angeles Times* correspondent in Hong Kong explained a story this way: "The supply to the Vietcong may be at the heart of Sihanouk's difficulties, since it involves a large part of the Cambodian power structure."

—MEG GREENFIELD