

THE REPORTER'S NOTES

As Truman Said

When we sit here tonight, in our evening clothes, partaking of food on white tablecloths, and enjoying ourselves in other ways, bear in mind that there are men fighting and dying in an endeavor to reach that peace for which we have been striving since World War Two ceased.

Remember that these men are baring their breasts for liberty and unity in the world.

It is necessary that the people of the United States, the greatest and most powerful free nation in the world—and I say that not in a bragging way, but because it happens to be the truth—the people of the United States have assumed the responsibility which no other nation in the history of the world has assumed.

We are the leaders of the free peoples of the world. It is necessary that we display that leadership, and we must display it here at home by a unity so that those young men on the battlefields of Korea shall not die in vain, so that those young men in Korea may accomplish the purpose for which they are fighting.

It is necessary that you here at home remember that this is a world crisis, that this crisis must be met through the leadership of the United States of America, and it is up to you people here at home to see that that is accomplished.

In order to accomplish that purpose, you must quit your bickering here at home, you must quit playing petty politics, you must remember that there are certain things that have to be done here at home, if we are going to accomplish the purpose.

We are fighting for time. The young men in Korea and Japan are fighting for time—for us.

There is always an emphasis on the casualties in Korea. Of course, when there is fighting, there are casualties.

But, did it ever occur to you that if this necessity with which we are faced is not met, that the casualties in Korea will be one small drop in the bucket from one of those horrible bombs of which we talk so much.

Think—think—think what a responsibility your President faces in a situation of this kind. If you would think, and think clearly on this subject, you would get behind me and help me to win this peace.

And that is what I am asking you to do.

And that is what our armed forces are in the field to do.

It is up to you.

—Remarks at the Armed Forces Day dinner at the Statler Hotel in Washington on May 18, 1951.

That Old Hand McCloy

On May 2, the administration disclosed the details of its agreement with London and Bonn on a proposed reduction of U.S. and British troops in West Germany. The three governments also announced simultaneously that they had reached agreement on some new arrangements to ease the foreign-exchange problems of Britain and the United States, without automatically obligating the West Germans to “offset” their expenditures with the purchase of British and U.S. goods. The plan, which will now be submitted to the NATO Defense Planning Committee, envisions the redeployment to the United States on a rotating basis of thirty-five thousand troops—two brigades of infantrymen and four Air Force fighter-bomber squadrons. Since three brigades and nine squadrons will be involved in the rotation, however, all of their dependents will be returned to the United States. It is estimated that the plan would result in a saving of around \$100 million annually in foreign exchange. For their part, the British

would withdraw about 6,500 troops, which is fewer than they originally had in mind, but Bonn would lighten their financial burden with certain offset purchases. The Germans also committed themselves to the purchase of \$500 million in U.S. government securities and publicly pledged that they would not exchange any of their dollar holdings for gold in the foreseeable or unforeseeable future.

THE AGREEMENT was widely hailed in the press as a near-miracle of mutual accommodation, and John J. McCloy, the former U.S. High Commissioner for Germany who negotiated for the United States, was accordingly complimented for having somehow brought tripartite agreement out of tripartite chaos. But that was not the half of it. There were many more parties to the dispute than the Germans, the British, and the Americans, and in effect Mr. McCloy (and the White House) deserve at least as much credit for having negotiated a temporary truce among them on the question of NATO troop commitments. They are the State Department, the Secretary of Defense, the Treasury, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Democratic members of the U.S. Senate.

Roughly, the participants could be divided into those who at one time or another favored much more drastic reductions (Secretary McNamara and the Senators) and those who favored few or none. The Joint Chiefs and numerous officials at State were in the latter category. When the President designated Mr. McCloy to adjudicate their differences as well as those among the Allies, it was generally supposed that this move represented an early State Department victory over Defense, since Mr. McCloy would (and did) refuse to go along with a massive redeployment of troops.

His chore was not made any eas-

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ier by the fact that even those who took the same position often did so for varying reasons—economic, strategic, and political. The group of Democratic Senators who joined Majority Leader Mike Mansfield last year in calling for a substantial reduction of troops was itself a coalition of these different points of view. Some, such as Senator Stuart Symington (D., Missouri), were primarily disturbed by the gold drain. Others were of the view that the Soviet Union had mellowed to such a degree of benignity that NATO forces could be drastically curtailed. Among these, there were also Senators who believed that such a curtailment would set a peaceful example that the Warsaw Pact countries might follow.

THE COUNTERARGUMENTS in the Senate were summed up by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Washington), who insisted that "Any suggestion for a unilateral cut of American combat forces in Europe, with no quid pro quo from the Communist side, constitutes foolish advice to the President of the United States." He added: "Such a recommendation at this time would confirm the European skeptics in their claims of American unreliability." Senator Joseph S. Clark (D., Pennsylvania) also objected that a unilateral withdrawal passed up an opportunity for a troop-reduction agreement between East and West.

When the McCloy group entered this disorderly scene there was danger, as U.S. officials have put it, of a "stampede." In its inter-Allied and interdepartmental dealings, the mission therefore set about to achieve some agreement on the present size and strength of Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. Its review concluded that the strength and capabilities of these troops had not diminished but rather had increased. Reportedly, however, the strategic implications of this fact remained in dispute until the mission came up with the rather ingenious financial formulations that the Germans and British accepted. The financial solution is said to have had a marked effect on the military thinking of some of the participants in the discussions, who revised their opinions about necessary troop levels and tripwires

when it became clear that the cost would not be so burdensome.

Since the announcement of the agreement, only the Joint Chiefs have complained about it publicly. Apparently they consider that they have "lost" to McNamara, although it is equally widely believed in Washington that the McNamara view lost out to the strictures of the Joint Chiefs and to the misgivings of the State Department. Indeed, Senator Jackson, who led the opposition to the troop-cut resolution in the Senate, has announced his entire satisfaction with the result, thirty-five thousand rotating troops being nothing like what his colleagues had in mind.

Meanwhile, although the Senate resolution is still under consideration and although Senator Mansfield has described the tripartite arrangement as only an acceptable first step, few people in Washington expect that the Senate Democrats will actively revive the issue or get very far with it if they do. In the aftermath of the government's announcement, none of the interested parties in Washington seemed able to decide whether to claim a victory or to deplore a defeat. That is something of a victory for Mr. McCloy; and although the truce is only temporary, President Johnson could well have had more in mind than inter-Allied affairs when he sent Mr. McCloy a telegram of congratulation.

A Little Learning

Representative Henry S. Reuss (D., Wisconsin) has leveled some familiar charges against social scientists laboring on behalf of the government. A massive collation of criticism produced by the Congressman's subcommittee on Research and Technical Programs states that the \$380 million spent annually by the government in social research produces, in the first place, too many reports. These reports are often myopic and redundant, the subcommittee claims, as well as "trivial or irrelevant; usable but not used; valuable, but buried in scholarly journals or government filing cabinets."

This allegation is at least as old as that made against the Oxford Clerk in the *Canterbury Tales*, who kept at his bedside but seldom read

"Twenty bokes, clad in blak or reed,
Of Aristotle and his philosophye."
This behavior finds present-day fruition in a \$7,300 government grant for "Formal Models of Mass Social Processes"; \$13,600 for "Dimensionality of Nations"; \$41,300 for "Multivariate Analysis of Legislative Behavior"; and (more title for more money) \$366,300 for "A Program of Collaboration and Research Services Among Social Science Data Archives." One need not be a yahoo or an anti-intellectual Scrooge to ponder the merits of giving such large fees to vandals of the English language.

The Reuss subcommittee also found that "few Federal agencies ask social researchers to evaluate critically and candidly" and that "Federal agencies have a tendency to withhold research findings critical of present performance or policies." Worse yet, for apostles of automation, is that "the current fashion of quantitative analysis and indiscriminate accumulation of large bodies of facts, made possible by the computer, often leads away from, rather than toward, greater social understanding. Yet the Federal government encourages the first and permits the second in the name of 'science.'"

The Reuss report is indeed an eloquent denunciation of the tedium and tautology afflicting the social sciences. But the report itself, alas, is a poignant, Cassandra-like symbol of the problem. It weighs four pounds, ten ounces, and goes on for 2,303 pages. Moreover, it is only a preface, Reuss says, and simply "provides a basis for hearings by the subcommittee." The four-volume tome, although it is not clad in black or red, does assure some solace for the descendants of Chaucer's Clerk:

"Nowher so bisy a man as he ther
nas,
And yet he semed bisier than he
was."



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
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The Pitfalls of Guaranteed Income

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
THREE YEARS have elapsed since President Johnson exhorted the nation to wage a total war on poverty. Congress responded to the President's call by enacting the Economic Opportunity Act and a related series of laws, and there has been broad public support of the legislation. Nevertheless, even the most ardent advocates of this war admit that the measurable achievements have been minimal and that its future direction remains in doubt. Although the number of the poor, as counted by official government statistics, has declined during the past three years by some two million, thirty-two million remain poor. And most of the six per cent decline was the result of economic growth and a tightening labor market, a product of monetary and fiscal policies and the demands of the war in Vietnam.

Help and Humiliation

Many supporters of the war on poverty find the slow progress frustrating. However, their commitment to combat poverty persists. Since the strategy designed in 1964 has, at best, produced minimal results, it is hardly surprising that the search for new weapons which will dispatch the enemy in short order has intensified. In contrast to the anti-poverty program, which has concentrated on self-help measures aimed at rehabilitating and training the poor, the new proposals center on lifting the poor out of poverty by providing them income.

Programs to provide income aren't

new. The Social Security Act of 1935 provided for income maintenance for the aged population and temporary aid to workers forced into idleness. The coverage has since been extended to include dependent survivors of workers covered by the social insurance system and to those who become permanently disabled. Pensions are also paid to permanent-



ly disabled war veterans and to their dependents.

Most relevant for the poor are the public-assistance programs, also established under the Social Security Act. They provide financial aid to some 7.5 million persons in four categories: the aged, the permanently disabled, the blind, and families with dependent children. The annual cost of these programs has recently amounted to more than \$5 billion. Both the cost and the coverage have been expanding consistently during the past two decades, particularly for the program of Aid to

Families with Dependent Children.

The AFDC program has been under increasing attack from foes and friends alike. The major criticism is that the program tends to perpetuate poverty, providing little or no incentive to escape public assistance. In most cases, any earnings of a family are deducted from the public-assistance receipts. These deductions are tantamount to a one hundred per cent tax on income. When a mother (about ninety per cent of AFDC families are headed by females and incapacitated males) secures a job paying in excess of her assistance payment, the family is dropped from the rolls. If she loses her job, which happens frequently because of the marginal employment available to the public-assistance recipient, she may find it difficult to be reinstated on the rolls. Thus the way the system is administered discourages any incentive to gain employment and to escape poverty.

Though the Federal government contributes more than half of the total cost of the program, its administration, within broad Federal standards, is left to the states; they determine qualifications, eligibility, and the level of benefits. Many poor families cannot qualify for assistance, and those who do are subjected to continued harassment and control of their lives.

IT IS NO WONDER, then, that there has been a clamor to terminate the present harsh and humiliating public-assistance system and to sub-