



The Puritan Revolt In Greece

GEORGE BAILEY

ATHENS
ANDREAS PAPANDREOU was awakened at two o'clock in the morning in his home in Psychiko when a soldier put a rifle butt through a front window, climbed in, and opened the door to admit his captain and a squad of eight men. They quickly overpowered the Papan-dreou guard, but not before Andreas had climbed onto the roof. While Andreas's wife Margaret, a native American, swooned and screamed by turns, the soldiers ransacked the house, searching for Andreas and cajoling the four children, also native Americans and still American citizens, to divulge their father's hiding place. After a fruitless half hour, the captain drew his service pistol and put it at the head of Andreas's eldest son, the fourteen-year-old George. "Deliver yourself immediately or I will shoot your son!" shouted the captain. Within two minutes Andreas stood up from his perch on the roof, his hands in the air. When he jumped to the ground from the roof his foot hit and broke the light bulb over his front terrace, causing a slight flesh wound. This was virtually the only blood that flowed during the military coup that took less than two hours to eliminate the Greek Left on the morning of April 21.

THE PUTSCHISTS rounded up over five thousand persons in three categories—suspects, potentially dan-

gerous, and known enemies—in those two hours (allowing themselves a one hundred per cent margin of error in the numerical estimate). Included were the leaders of all political parties except the Progressive Party leader, Spyros Markezines, who, with his suitcase packed and ready for prison, waited in vain and felt humiliated at his exclusion. When dawn came and the news was out and martial law declared, everyone waited for the counter-coup, for a mounting wave of mass resistance, for rioting and the storming of strong points, for the raising of barricades and a general strike. Everyone waited with a growing sense of astonishment. Nothing happened. The country was as quiet and solemn as on a high church holiday.

"There has not been a whiff of a counter-coup," said an official spokesman a full week later. The curfew from 12:30 AM to 5 AM was lifted on April 26. The same day a bare half dozen leaflets appeared in praise of democracy, but they were unsigned and unspecific. "In this situation," an American official had pronounced portentously, "a leaflet is just as explosive as a hand grenade!" If so, the leaflets were duds. It took the Greeks less than one day to get the message: on the roads into Athens on the first morning, instead of the voluble Athenian cops they found laconic soldiers with an up-country accent. "They won't argue

with you," a friend said to me. "Just one word and then they shoot you in the foot."

The extraordinary thing was the total lack of emotional reaction on the part of the public. Instead, there was a sense of sad relief—as if a battle had been lost that had long since become nonsensical. There was also an embarrassed sheepishness that Greece had taken such a turn. But there was almost universal agreement that the real turn had been taken in 1963.

The Bitter Memory

The Greek civil war from 1946 to 1949, which resulted first in British and then U.S. military and economic support under the Truman Doctrine formulated for this purpose, cost half a million Greek lives and some 100,000 abductions (many of them children) to the Communist countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Despite amnesties and some repatriations there are still an estimated ninety thousand Greek citizens living in Communist countries. The Greeks remember the Communist atrocities as worse than the Nazi terror during the occupation.

The government of Constantine Karamanlis from 1955 to 1963 was the last one to take a hard line against the Communists and long refused to amnesty any substantial number of the thousands of them imprisoned since the civil war. The issue of amnesty was used by British Communists to stir up trouble in April, 1963, during the visit of Queen Frederika to London, where she narrowly escaped being man-handled. Karamanlis then implored King Paul to cancel a planned state visit to London in July. When the King refused, Karamanlis resigned and retired to Paris.

Within a few months after that, George Papandreou was voted into power in 1964 at the head of the Union of the Center Party. He was joined by his son Andreas, an American citizen and professor of economics at the University of California who had returned to Greece in charge of a recovery mission subsidized by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. The elder Papandreou made his son, still an American citizen, the alternate Minister of Coordination. George Papandreou started

transferring key officers and rightist appointees from the Central Intelligence Service and the army high command to points as far removed as possible from the Athens area.

This move would have excited suspicion immediately had it not been for the formation—then in progress—of an army contingent for duty on Cyprus. The influx of rightist officers into Cyprus pleased General George Grivas, who is in charge of the army's Cyprus operation, but displeased Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus, who was looking to Cypriot Communists and the Soviet bloc for support. At the prompting of his son, the senior Papandreou then reversed his policy and began sending leftist officers to Cyprus—among them members of the small Aspida (Shield) organization, whose aim was the overthrow of the monarchy and the severing of Greece's military alliance with the West. This pleased Makarios but displeased Grivas, who subsequently exposed the Aspida conspiracy and implicated Andreas as its leader.

THE administrative investigation that followed Grivas's exposé implicated twenty-eight officers, including the deputy chief of intelligence and the chief of intelligence on Cyprus. The young new king, Constantine II, interceded and demanded a full-scale judicial investigation: there were far too many coups in modern Greek history to warrant complacency in such a case. Papandreou refused to mount the investigation. When the King turned directly to the Minister of Defense and the investigation proceeded, Papandreou dismissed the minister, who thereupon refused to resign without a writ of dismissal signed by the King. The King in turn refused to sign until a replacement was named. To his astonishment Papandreou named himself. The King refused to accept this, pointing out that he could not allow Papandreou to preside over an investigation of a conspiracy in which his own son was implicated. Thereupon Papandreou announced that he would resign within twenty-four hours. Fearing that Papandreou would use the twenty-four hours to dissolve Parliament and call for new elections or set an Aspida military coup in

motion, the King demanded that Papandreou resign then and there. When Papandreou refused, the King appointed a new Premier from the ranks of Papandreou's own party the same night.

George Papandreou reacted to his ouster by taking to the streets and attacking the King point-blank on the issue of monarchy versus re-



publicanism. "Who rules Greece?" he asked. "The King or the people?" In the turmoil that ensued, just enough members of Papandreou's Center Union defected to allow the conservative National Radical Union to govern in coalition with the small Progressive Party and the Center Union defectors. Both Papandreous stumped the countryside demanding new elections while the state's investigatory apparatus slowly ground toward a trial of the men accused in the Aspida affair, an important aspect of which was the fact that Andreas Papandreou could not be tried because he enjoyed immunity as a member of Parliament. After fifteen precarious months the coalition government fell in December, 1966, when the conservatives refused to support a new electoral law providing for proportional representation, a system that would have favored the smaller and splinter parties. This was an attempt by the defecting segment of Papandreou's Center Union (representing twenty per cent of the party's original strength) to constitute itself as a separate party and whittle down the parent party still further. The attempt failed because it would have diminished the conservative National Union as well.

Changing the Election Rules

Greece has no electoral system that can be called permanent. The party in power sets the electoral procedure

before each new election. If the elections had taken place with the electoral system that brought Papandreou to power, it would have meant the reconstitution of all the political parties that had been splintered.

One more caretaker government under Ioannis Paraskevopoulos was brought down on the issue of Andreas Papandreou's parliamentary immunity. In March of this year an Athenian court had found fifteen officers guilty of plotting against the state and the monarchy in the Aspida conspiracy trial. In accordance with the findings of the court, the public prosecutor prepared charges of high treason against Andreas Papandreou. The prosecutor made application to Parliament for the lifting of immunity of Andreas and another deputy. While this was being considered, George Papandreou's Center Union proposed an amendment to the election law to extend the legal immunity of members after the dissolution of Parliament. As it was, the immunity of members continued for only four weeks after dissolution. This would leave two weeks before elections during which members of Parliament were liable to arrest. The exception was that the public prosecutor would arrest Andreas Papandreou the moment his immunity expired and put him on trial before a summary court. If he was found guilty, "Handy Andy's" political career would be finished.

King Constantine then tried to arrange for the formation of a grand coalition between the National Radical Union and the Center Union to prepare the elections but was rebuffed by his long-confirmed enemy, George Papandreou. The King's subsequent appointment of Panayotis Kanellopoulos of the National Radical Union as Premier drove the two Papandreous to a new pitch of fury, the senior announcing that Constantine was no longer "King of Greece but King of the National Radical Union," and the junior advising the King publicly to choose a pleasant spot for his exile. When Kanellopoulos dissolved Parliament on April 14 and called for elections on May 28 without bothering to put the issue to vote, his action was almost universally accepted as the last storm signal. "For some

weeks," a senior American official in Athens told me in the classic language of American diplomacy, "I have had the feeling that the options open were rapidly being narrowed down."

The options presumably left open on April 14 were listed thus: (1) no party would obtain a majority in the elections, thus forcing a coalition of the National Radical Union and the splinter parties; (2) victory of the Center Union Party, ushering in George Papandreou as Premier but effectively under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou; (3) a military coup.

In fact, the options were already narrowed down to one: Papandreou senior had already threatened revolution and his son had called for open revolt if the King did not name another nonpolitical caretaker government to prepare for the elections; with the treason charge hanging over Andreas's head and an arrest warrant in readiness, the operative date became May 12, which marked the expiration of parliamentary immunity. The prospects were nil that Andreas Papandreou would wait that long for the privilege of trying conclusions in custody, or that the conservative elements in the army and the state would wait still longer and leave the first move to the Papandreous or risk an electoral victory by the Papandreous only to intervene thereafter. There was bound to be some sort of military or at least paramilitary move (there was widespread rumor that sixty thousand rifles had been brought in and cached in the Athens area by the leftists). The only pertinent questions were who would execute the coup and when it would take place.

The second question was answered within the week; the answer to the first question took considerably longer to emerge. Allied intelligence claims to have spotted "four or five" developments within the army pointing toward the preparation of a military take-over.

King Constantine was informed of the coup at four o'clock in the morning by a "friend" (he was unable to find either his military or his political adjutant). He had no idea who the putschists were and what faction they represented.

But his very ignorance on these points moved him to think that the coup was anti-monarchic. His first move therefore was to direct a plea to American Ambassador Phillips Talbot to call in the Sixth Fleet to save the monarchy.

The ambassador temporized; his advisers had told him they had a good idea who was behind the coup



and that they were not Communists. Besides, said Talbot, the coup was already a *fait accompli*. It had been executed brilliantly and any attempt to intervene at this point would mean a bloodbath. Also, if they should succeed in putting down the revolt in short order, might not this make matters worse, discrediting the army and playing into the hands of the Papandreous and the Left? Would it not be better to treat with the putschists, "to push, press, and prod," as one American spokesman put it, "so that as soon as possible representative government can be set up"?

The King proceeded to armed forces headquarters, called "the Pentagon" by the Greeks, and found his chiefs of staff in much the same position as he himself: they too had been presented with a *fait accompli*. While all professed unswerving loyalty to the King, they nevertheless urged him to accept the situation in order to avoid civil war in which the army would be divided against itself. There were discernible degrees of loyalty. The navy was apparently ready to follow the King unquestioningly, along with at least some units of the air force. But the army was the overwhelming power factor and the army was now entirely in the hands of the putschists.

'Who Are We?'

Toward noon of the same day martial law was declared, and the putschists delivered their first message

to the public. It was a strange message.

"People of Greece:

"We have for long witnessed a crime which had been committed against our society and nation.

"The unhesitant and shameful party dealing, the misconduct of a great part of the press, the methodical assault against all institutions, their corrosion, the debasement of Parliament, the slandering of everything, the paralyzing of the State machinery, the complete lack of understanding for the burning problems of our youth, the ill-treatment of our students, the moral decline, the confusion and the blurring, the secret and open co-operation with subversives, and, finally, the continuous incendiary slogans of unscrupulous demagogues have destroyed the peace of the country, have created a climate of anarchy and of chaos, have cultivated conditions of hatred and division and have led us to the brink of national disaster. There was no other way of salvation left than the intervention of our Army. . . .

"Who are we? We do not belong to any political party and we are prepared to favor no political camp at the expense of the other. Nor do we belong to the economic oligarchy which, similarly, we are not prepared to let cause poverty. We belong to the class of toil. And we will stand by the side of our poor Greek brothers. We are driven exclusively by patriotic motives and we aim at abolishing the rule of political corruption. At rendering public life healthy. At removing from the country's organism the decomposition by which it was endangered. At averting the division and the killing of one another to which we had been directed by bad Greeks, and at creating healthy bases for the speedy return of the country to the truly orthodox Parliamentary life. We preach brotherhood. From this moment, there are no Rightists, Centrists, Leftists. There are only Greeks who believe in Greece, in a noble, superior, and full ideal of true democracy and not of the democracy of the street, of mob rule and of anarchy. When the Greeks are united, they work wonders. Certainly, there are also a few traitors, demagogues, unscrupulous opportunists, and professional an-

archists. They have tried to divide us. And so they call us Leftists, Centrists, Center-Leftists, and Rightists."

Above all, the language was strange. It was the stylistic equivalent of the upcountry accent—old-fashioned, severe, almost quaint. In the government's policy program which followed on the same day (an odd mixture of army order and social tract), this was even more apparent:

"The mission of the government is:

"To apply the law. . . .

"To create the proper conditions for a return of the country to parliamentarianism on a healthy base, and to cleanse the state machinery."

Throughout, words like "cleansing" and "purification" kept recurring. There was heavy emphasis on "social justice": "This means a just distribution of the national income among all social classes." The aim was to create conditions in the villages "which would reverse the current of the movement of the population from the villages to cities," to put an end to the stripping of rural areas and the "hydrocephalism" of big cities (more than a quarter of the Greek population lives in the Athens area). There was emphasis on religion: "Assistance to the clergy so that it may respond to its heavy task under present circumstances," followed by "the cleansing, supplementation, and extension of social welfare and public utilities." But "the number one target of the government," reserved for special emphasis because of its "supreme importance," was the education of Greek youth, "devoted to national ideals as the golden hope of our nation."

All political parties were more or less equally guilty for Greece's plight, while the outsiders, the farm boys in uniform, burned with resentment.

"According to the intention of its protagonists," ran an editorial that appeared in the controlled press on Orthodox Easter, "the intervention of the army equates with a revolution. . . . The army has undertaken a surgical intervention on the body politic and the cut will be deep. . . . During the night of April 21 the old political parties were buried."

An indication of what the surgery was intended to remove was pro-

vided at the same time by the announcement that the United Democratic Left (EDA), a front party for Greek Communists, had been banned. For the rest, the transformation of Greek life was apparently to be brought about by re-emphasizing the Greekness of the Greeks, by purifying the ideal (this included a ban on miniskirts and Beatle haircuts: "See to it that young people are properly groomed and attend church regularly"), by imposing and enforcing the old saw that "youth and clean living will win out every time." But nobody was laughing.

The Corps Group

The "protagonists" of the Greek 21st of April emerged as a triumvirate of one brigadier general and two colonels, plus a council of nine. Patriots, puritans, and political naïfs, they are members of an organization known as IDEA—the Greeks have a penchant for initials that make words—which stands for the Sacred League of Greek Officers. It was founded in 1943 by General Zervas, the head of the right-wing



anti-fascist underground, in response to the Communist-engineered mutinies in the Greek Army and Navy. The IDEA organization is cenobitic, formed and informed with the unbroken Byzantine monastic community tradition. The cenobites are a religious order based on absolute obedience to the abbot of each cenobitic house who is responsible for the temporal as well as the spiritual well-being of the rural (usually mountain) community and whose special concern is the care and medical treatment of the poor. In fact, the cenobitic tradition is the earliest organized form of

Christian socialism. IDEA is Christian socialism militant with a strong bucolic infusion: the farm boys in uniform are having their day.

In the military government Constantine Kollias, a Supreme Court prosecutor, was conscripted to serve as Premier; the first among equals of the triumvirate, Brigadier General Stylianos Patakos, became Minister of the Interior in the best coup tradition, while the reputed brains of the trio and probably the brains of the coup, Colonel George Papadopoulos, became Minister to the Premier's Office. The third leader, Artillery Colonel Nikolas Makarezos, took over the key Ministry of Coordination (created in 1950 on the recommendation of American authorities in the interest of a more efficient distribution of U.S. aid).

These officers and their followers are referred to by their allied colleagues as "the Corps Group" because their rank and maneuvering placed them at the corps command level, and in one case at least one echelon above. The Greek armed forces' command structure is peculiar in that it has an echelon of executive officers (one for each branch of service) between the chiefs of staff and the next lower echelon. The executive officer in charge of the army was thus in a position to coordinate the commands of the three corps areas without the knowledge of the chiefs of staff. At least two years ago the general staff had drawn up a plan for an army takeover in an emergency precipitated by Communists. It was carefully supplemented and extended by the Corps Group in preparation for their coup. In effect, the group used its position of maximum leverage in the army command structure to work a kind of judo trick and throw the entire organization into the line of its purpose. The coup of April 21 was a concatenation of successive *faits accomplis*, first within the army, then within the armed forces, and then within the entire apparatus of the state. When it became clear that the putschists had succeeded in bringing in not only the senior military officers but also the Bank of Greece, it was conceded that the first stage of the coup (control of the physical and the fiscal security) had been successfully completed.

Like the chiefs of staff and the King, the governor of the Bank of Greece, Professor Xenophon Zolotas, really had no choice but to co-operate with the putschists. The Greek economy, particularly the country's financial situation, is so precarious that the quickest possible return to a more or less normal situation allowing a resumption of the all-important tourist trade was imperative. Four years of political turmoil have all but ruined the structure of the Greek economy. For the last year and a half, imports have been running close to four times the volume of exports. Last year, for the first time in Greek history, foreign short-term credits exceeded the country's official foreign-currency reserve. The budget for fiscal 1966 was presented to Parliament at the beginning of November, two months before the expiration of the fiscal period for which it was intended. "This lengthy delay," runs a U.S. State Department report, "was due to the delicate political situation and the resultant partial paralysis of the government's administrative machinery."

The Greek government last year had outstanding foreign obligations of over one billion dollars. A large part of this results from long-term loans which are now coming due. Projections for the economy for the next five years are particularly dismal. By the end of 1972, Greece's balance-of-payments deficit of over \$260 million is expected to nearly double. The putschists' description of the economy as chaotic is hardly an exaggeration. New government investment during 1966 amounted to \$240 million, or \$17 million more than officially forecast last November. According to the same report, the bulk of this overdraft was made in December by the former Minister of Coordination "with the aim of ensuring the continuation and implementation of new projects approved during the second half of 1966." (It had been anticipated that the government might fall.) This "peculiar development" aggravated the already weak structure of the public investment budget, which will require at least \$1.167 billion beginning this year and extending over the next several years. There is no prospect whatever of obtaining

the necessary financing. As a result, a major revision of approved projects must be made if any new ones "of primary importance" are to be undertaken. The upshot is that the Greek government must set about recasting the country's entire economic structure beginning at the base.

King and Country

The IDEA coup was the reverse of the Aspida conspiracy. With no organized forces of their own to call on, not even united and disciplined trade unions, the Papandreuos sought to get hold of the established order and turn it against itself. In a sense they succeeded. Their challenge provoked the Corps Group to mount a coup that swept everything away—with the all-important exception of the King. After physical-security measures had been taken on the first day, Colonel Papandopoulos met the King in "the Pentagon." "Your Majesty," he said, "my father served your father loyally; I acknowledge the same fealty and pledge the same loyalty to you." The repeated "admissions" by the Corps Group that it acted without the knowledge of the King are well taken: the sparing of the King and his continued presence, uncompromised by complicity in the coup even as a willing accessory after the fact, were essential to its immediate success and the long-term success of the operation as a whole. The integrity of the King made acceptance of the putsch by the Allies a foregone conclusion. The contingency plan that was adopted and adapted by the putschists to their own purpose had been part of NATO staff planning from the early days of the anti-Communist military alliance.

The allowance for the separate but complementary role of the King predetermined the nature of the coup, as well as the announcement in the policy program published on the day of the coup that the new government would undertake "to create the proper conditions for a return of the country to parliamentarianism." The same consideration will inevitably affect its future course. Through the King the Allies, particularly the United States, have already exerted considerable influence on the junta, being given

repeated assurances that political prisoners would not be maltreated.

At 2:45 AM on April 27, the U.S. ambassador was visited by the Yugoslav and Italian ambassadors—the former representing the Soviet-bloc countries—with a request that he stay the hand of the junta from executing Manolis Glezos, a prominent Communist, who was rumored to have been condemned to death. The next day the junta presented Glezos to the press unharmed and uncondemned. Simultaneously the two Papandreuos were separately presented to the press to demonstrate their fair treatment. On the same day it was announced that Andreas Papandreu had been summoned in preparation for his trial on charges of high treason. Ironically, friends of Andreas called on the ambassador the day of the putsch demanding that the Sixth Fleet be called in to put down the revolt. The ambassador was also visited by the parents of Andreas's American wife.

WHILE the interaction between the putschists, the King, and the Allies will probably moderate the severity of the puritan revolt, there can be no question that the early morning of April 21 signaled the definitive removal of the Papandreuos from the Greek political scene. George Papandreu is a shocked and broken old man of seventy-nine (at the end of the month he was being given oxygen in his hospital prison). Andreas Papandreu will almost certainly be convicted as charged: the régime claims to have secured seventy truckloads of documents in its ransacking of Communist headquarters that are said to constitute incontrovertible evidence of an imminent Communist coup. If Andreas is very lucky, he may get away with deportation. From his self-imposed exile in Paris, former Premier Constantine Karamanlis, now the only Greek politician who commands respect, made a plea for leniency that seems addressed to the single-minded men who hold power. "Everything that has happened in Greece for the last three years," he said, "is so absurd that one can assume a state of mental derangement on the part of all concerned."



First Steps Toward An Asian Common Market

DENIS WARNER

WARS, revolutions, and other traumatic events do leave their mark on the calendar; but their clarity is sometimes illusory, distorting the timing of the more profound changes they reflect," Special Assistant to the President Walt W. Rostow said at the University of Leeds on February 23. In the case of the Vietnam war, however, it is not so much the timing as the thinking that has become distorted. For Western Europeans preoccupied with Common Market affluences and aspirations, and even among many Americans bewildered by moral doubts and political obfuscation, distance has lent disenchantment to the entire Vietnam view. Yet, while it is still too early to assume, as Rostow does, that the struggle in Vietnam may be the last great confrontation of the postwar era, the war, or, more correctly, the denial of Communist goals by American power, has set in motion regional processes which, if a good deal less profound than an end to aggression for all time, are still both interesting and potentially significant.

Out of its own hard experience, Southeast Asia has always been more conscious than the rest of the world

of the realities of the Vietnam war. "There is a widely held misconception about the nature and appeals of Communism in backward countries," wrote Dr. Goh Keng Swee, Singapore's Defense Minister, in a recent review of Communist methods and goals in Southeast Asia. "Communist appeal and Communist strength are sometimes believed to be the result of poverty, oppressive domestic government, or frustrated nationalism. This pays the Communist movement an undeserved compliment. . . . The Communist Party in any country has only one purpose—the revolutionary seizure of state power."

That, as Southeast Asia sees it, is the essence of the Vietnam war. And to people who for the past twenty years have fought against repeated Communist insurrections, that is an adequate reason why the U.S. stand should be supported and not deplored. Along with this appreciation of the facts of survival, there is also an awareness that the external props and stays on which Southeast Asia has so far relied to deter Communist expansion, including the American presence in Vietnam and the British presence east of Suez, are finite. If things were still going

wrong in Vietnam, this could not be other than a cause for dismay among people who have hitherto been glad to leave to westerners such notions as Asian solutions for Asian problems. But this is not the impression at all.

The Rewards of Hanging Together

"Are you people really serious in Vietnam?" Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's acerbic and sometimes seemingly anti-American Prime Minister, asked a senior Washington official. "If you are, we are with you." The conviction now that the United States is serious—and this persists despite the sound and fury of the far-off debate—has helped to stimulate an interest in regional self-help and co-operation that even the most optimistic observer could scarcely have hoped for when the Communist capture of state power in Vietnam and Indonesia seemed imminent and Communism the wave of the future throughout the area.

Just as the fall of the "impregnable bastion" of Singapore in 1942 sparked the area's nationalist revolt against colonialism, a revolt that persisted and grew in intensity with the removal of Japanese influence from the scene, the U.S. stand in Vietnam has both stimulated interest in and opened up the prospect of much closer relationships between the free Asian states. Despite Lee Kuan Yew's phraseology, this does not involve being "with" the United States. The U.S. role is widely—and wisely—regarded as primarily catalytic. Instead of fretting about how to live with Communism, the Southeast Asians have now become concerned about finding a way to live with each other, conscious as never before that by hanging together they will avoid the danger of being hanged separately.

As Rostow remarked in his Leeds address, Asia generally offers a less promising initial base for regional co-operation than most other parts of the world. Southeast Asia's kaleidoscopic diversity is an anthropological treasure house and a statesman's nightmare. Even moving from village to village, not to mention from country to country, the differences in cultural and racial backgrounds are everywhere apparent.

As early as the fourth century, the