

has kept pace with nuclear and missile development elsewhere, to the point that American defense experts estimate that Japan could produce a nuclear device within two years at the maximum. A more than adequate delivery system could also be made quickly available. The modest Japanese rocket program, designed for scientific space probes and satellite orbiting, will this year have a rocket with intercontinental ballistic missile range. The Japanese Lamda series rockets, say American defense experts, are the equivalent of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and the new Muh series to be tested late this year is roughly the equivalent of the American Minuteman. The Japanese rockets have solid fuel and are believed to be far superior to anything the Chinese Communists have tested. While the Japanese guidance systems are not as sophisticated or consistently accurate as the more expensive American systems, Japanese technology is capable of refining current models within two years if funds are supplied on a crash-program basis.

ONE of Japan's outstanding military-strategy specialists, Kiichi Saeki of the Nomura Research Institute, has said: "Economically and technologically we are capable of producing nuclear weapons, but politically and psychologically Japan is not prepared for such a move." Before the psychological trauma of their defeat in the Second World War and the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is erased, a new generation will have to come of age. Japan is governed by consensus; it takes time for public opinion on any given issue to build up and prevail. Defense policy has only recently been emerging for discussion in the monthly magazines that generate the mood for the intellectuals; the nation will gradually follow.

How long Japan holds to its pledge never to build nuclear weapons depends primarily on the course of events in Red China and the outcome of the Vietnam war. The Japanese could make unexpected changes of direction, as they often have in the past. Meanwhile, they are relying on their alliance with the United States to help build a new Asian prosperity sphere.



The Palestine Refugees: Perennial Source of Trouble

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THE young man's eyes lit up when I asked directions to the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). "I can show you," he said. "I am a Palestinian myself."

Thus I soon found myself sitting across the table from the hero of all Palestinian refugees, Ahmed Shukeiri, president of the PLO. Shukeiri is a shortish, stoutish, lively man in his middle fifties who learned his perfect English at Cambridge and the American University of Beirut. Starting as a lawyer in a Palestinian town that is now part of Israel, he subsequently put his talents at the disposal of successive Arab states at the United Nations. It is to them that he owes the possession of no less than four passports. Only in 1964, however, did he really come into his own, so much so that today he is apt to speak of himself in the third person ("Ahmed Shukeiri thinks . . .," etc.) and to boast that he associates on equal terms with "Presidents and Kings."

Puppet Without Strings

Since 1964 Shukeiri has taken his place as a chief of state at meetings of the Arab League as representative of the "Palestinian Entity." After twenty years of empty talk about the liberation of Palestine, the League decided in that year to start doing something about it and

formed the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestine Liberation Army. Shukeiri, who had been asked to make the necessary preparations, was elected president of the PLO by the Palestinian refugee communities. The "Presidents and Kings" to whose level he had thus been hoisted agreed to contribute a million Egyptian pounds (\$1.35 million) a year to the PLO as well as an undisclosed sum for the Liberation Army, whose members are recruited among Palestinian refugees and total, according to Shukeiri, "some thousands."

The threat of these thousands, mostly stationed on Egyptian territory and equipped with Communist Chinese arms, does not particularly worry Israel. Some of the Arab leaders, on the contrary, are finding Shukeiri a liability—above all, King Hussein of Jordan, who helped to set up Shukeiri and now hears him using his Cairo radio to call for Hussein's assassination. The Egyptians, as I discovered in a talk with Khaled Moheddine, a leading figure in President Nasser's Arab Socialist Union, fear that Shukeiri's belligerence may become awkward if not dangerous for them, and they are at a loss on how to control him. Legally Shukeiri is autonomous, free to provoke Israel as much as he pleases. Nor can Nasser restrain him by threatening to withhold money and facilities without giving Cairo's

enemies in the Arab world a chance to denounce the United Arab Republic as lacking in zeal for the holy war for Palestine, or of being guilty of aiding Israel.

It is true that for the time being Shukeiri shows more bark than bite. While he occasionally claims credit for raids against Israel, most observers agree that the few that have taken place are the work of Palestinians acting independently of the PLO, sometimes with the complicity of the militant leftist Syrian government, sometimes entirely on their own. His extravagant propaganda statements are also difficult to take seriously. For example: "We Arabs may not yet be able to take on Israel in a classical war but we can certainly destroy it in a guerrilla war; look at what the FLN achieved against the French in Algeria." As if there were any analogy, as if the people of Israel were waiting to be liberated from alien rule, or the Arab guerrillas were not certain to meet fanatical resistance from all but the 200,000 Arabs among Israel's total population of 2.5 million. Yet it is not only Shukeiri who propounds these fantasies. One can hear them proclaimed with as much conviction in Damascus, where all the talk is about the forthcoming "people's war." And even such a sober-minded realist as Sayed Nofal, the Egyptian assistant secretary of the Arab League, tried to convince me that the successes of the FLN, the Vietcong, and the EOKA in Cyprus showed what the Arabs would be able to achieve with similar methods against Israel.

ONE does not have to talk with Shukeiri very long, however, to discover that what he really has in mind is a very different strategy from that pursued by those three organizations. If he puts his hopes in guerrilla war it is not because he has any illusions about the reception his fighters can expect from the Israeli populace, but rather because he sees it as the best way to provoke Israel into waging a large-scale counterattack and thus incurring the odium of the aggressor. "We would then have the advantage," Shukeiri told me, "of being on the defensive." World opinion would do the rest.

A more sophisticated version of the provocation strategy is propounded by those who are realistic enough to realize that world opinion is not likely, as Shukeiri professes to believe, "to reduce Israel to zero" in punishment for what would hardly be unprovoked aggression. They rely on Israel to do their job for them. Their aim is to provoke Israel to attack Jordan and annex the territory on the West Bank of the Jordan River, thus acquiring more rebellious Palestinian Arabs than it can hope to hold down. It would seem at least as likely, however, that the whole enterprise would procure its initiators no greater gain than the temporary transformation of the West Bank into a battlefield and an eventual return to the status quo.

Whatever the merits of the provocation strategy, Shukeiri seems only too willing to accept its considerable



risks. He may still be unwilling to make a direct challenge to Israel, but he is certainly going all out with indirect provocation by openly working for the overthrow of King Hussein. Much to the King's chagrin, Israel treats him as a sort of protégé, and with good reason. For he has ample reason to strive for peaceful coexistence with Israel. He is bound to lose if the long-promised war to liberate Palestine ever comes. If the attempt were successful and led to the territorial restoration of the "Palestinian Entity," it would deprive him of two-thirds of his two million subjects, Palestinians all, and would reduce his kingdom to the chunk of desert east of the Jordan. If unsuccessful, the result

would be almost as bad, with Israel occupying the West Bank. His lack of enthusiasm for the "holy war" is therefore understandable, as is the support given to him by Israel, which has warned more than once that it would not stand idly by if its *ami malgré lui* were removed from the throne. This also explains Shukeiri's declaration that "Amman must be liberated before Palestine can be liberated," his decision to transform the executive committee of the PLO into a "Revolutionary Council" working underground for the overthrow of Hussein, and his virulent radio campaign calling for the King's assassination.

King in a Shadow

No one who meets King Hussein can help feeling both sympathy and respect for him. It is not only that his diminutive size must be a psychological handicap for the commander in chief of a long-limbed, proud, and martial people. His deep voice, his easy and yet dignified manner, and, above all, his calm reasonableness—so rare in this Arab world of demagogues—soon make one realize that behind the boyish exterior there is a mature man of high caliber, a descendant of the Prophet and of the family that led the Arab revolt against Turkish rule. Fate has placed him on the throne of a country whose integrity he can only hope to maintain with financial support from the West—the United States subsidizes twenty per cent of Jordan's budget. Worse still, his kingdom is subject to Israel's veto on any change in constitutional or territorial status.

Hussein has spent much of his life in the shadow of violent death. In his autobiography he relates how the assassin of his grandfather, King Abdullah, also fired at him and only failed to kill him because the bullet ricocheted off a medal on his chest. Once he discovered that his nose drops had been replaced with acid. Then there was the time when the palace cats died off, poisoned by a cook who was experimenting with them before using his skills on the King. There was the pursuit of his plane by two Syrian MIGs, and finally the bomb that killed his Prime Minister and eleven others, followed forty minutes later by an-

other explosion, presumably intended for Hussein himself.

Ever since his accession in 1953 at seventeen, Hussein has been made to feel that to the Arab nationalists he is no better than a traitor. He has also tasted the bitterness of betrayal by the men in whom he had placed his trust. No less than three successive commanders in chief of his army have had to flee the country or have been imprisoned when they were discovered to be plotting his overthrow. No doubt this experience led him to write the poignant words about his early discovery of "the frailty of political devotion."

HUSSEIN lives simply and spends most of his leisure time in a modest villa outside Amman, where he is said to keep only a couple of servants. He commands the loyalty of his troops and the Bedouin tribes. The picture of the arch-reactionary that Radio Cairo regularly paints of him is far out of line. While some of the Bedouin chiefs may own considerable tracts of largely worthless desert, a ceiling of fifty acres—half the maximum allowed in Egypt—has been put on holdings in the irrigated part of Jordan. Under his rule, the people of Jordan have enjoyed at least as much political freedom as their brethren in Iraq, Syria, or Egypt. They have had three elections since 1956, the most recent on April 15, when a sixty-member parliament backing the King was elected. Shukeiri's call for a boycott of the elections was not widely followed.

Nevertheless, a large number of Hussein's subjects are Palestinian refugees who remain disaffected and provide fertile ground for Shukeiri's Liberation Organization. Intent only on the recovery of their homeland, they see in Hussein an obstacle to the realization of their hopes, remembering that his grandfather Abdullah, then the Emir of Transjordan, profited from the Arab debacle in the war against the Israeli usurper to add the unconquered part of Palestine to his domains. And after twenty years in which the Arab leaders have vied in calling for the destruction of Israel, the Palestinians are becoming impatient for action instead of mere

words. Time has brought not resignation but exasperation, and has not stilled their longing or appeased their sense of injustice.

In recent months, moreover, something has happened to render them even more susceptible to the appeal of Hussein's enemies. When Israel selected a target in Jordan, the village of Samu, for a reprisal raid last November 13, the King's forces failed to offer the villagers adequate protection. His Palestinian subjects



on the West Bank reasoned that if the King would not or could not protect them, if they were at Israel's mercy anyhow, they had little to lose by supporting those who are prepared to overthrow him. They are readier to risk Israel's making good its threat to occupy the last remaining Arab part of their homeland.


Friends and Enemies

What can have induced Israel to make Hussein's position more difficult than it was already? Part of the answer is that Israeli public opinion demanded a show of retaliatory force and that action against Syria was considered too risky both geographically (the border is dominated by Syrian-held mountains) and politically (Damascus is very close to Moscow these days, besides having a mutual defense agreement with Cairo). According to some, this reasoning was further reinforced by the calculation that an

attack on Jordan might, paradoxically, help to strengthen rather than undermine Hussein's position by depriving his enemies of their charge that he is a friend of Israel.

It has not worked out that way. Hussein's throne today rests on a narrower base than ever, and Shukeiri's prospects have considerably improved. Although the latter denies that he really wants the conquest of power in Jordan rather than the liberation of Palestine, he already speaks of one day "marching at the head of [Palestinian] troops into Jordan and praying at the Al Aqsa Mosque in our Jerusalem to offer thanks for victory." Whether Hussein succeeds in frustrating the fulfillment of these dreams depends on his success in retaining the loyalty of the armed forces by purging them of conspirators in time, as he has so often had to do in the past. Brave and agile as always, Hussein shows no outward signs of anxiety or weariness. But that he feels dangerously friendless and isolated could be deduced from the manner in which he has again taken to harping, very unfashionably nowadays, on the danger of a Communist take-over throughout the Middle East. Such talk is doubtless intended first of all for American ears. But is it conceivable that Washington, after its experiences with shoring up tottering régimes in other parts of the world, would be prepared to send in paratroops to keep Hussein on his throne as the British did in 1958? And even if it were, could Hussein afford to enrage his many enemies inside and outside Jordan by asking the West to come to his rescue?

Strangely enough, Hussein's best hope for the survival of his country may well lie in Cairo. However exaggerated Shukeiri's claims may be, Nasser and his Arab mentors are uneasily aware that they may not be able to prevent his very real provocations from leading them into a war they are ill prepared to face. Twenty years of promises and threats, twenty years of competitive shouting to Palestinian refugees "You shall return" and "Israel shall be destroyed," have built up a formidable head of steam that already threatens to get out of control.



By Fernando Krahn