

Latin-America

CHURCH AND STATE IN MEXICO 1822-1857. By WILFRID HARDY CALLCOTT. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press. 1927. \$4.
CHILE AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. By HENRY CLAY EVANS. The same. \$2.50.

FRANCISCO DE IBARRA AND NUEVA VIZCAYA. By J. LLOYD MECHAM. The same. \$3.50.

ANTONIO DE MENDOZA, FIRST VICE-ROY OF NEW SPAIN. By ARTHUR S. AITON. The same. \$3.50.

JOSÉ ESCANDÓN AND THE FOUNDING OF NUEVO SANTANDER. By LAWRENCE F. HILL. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press. 1927. \$3.50.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN MEXICO. By HELEN PHIPPS. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Bulletin. 1927.

VICEREGAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE SPANISH AMERICAN COLONIES. By LILLIAN ESTELLE FISHER. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press. 1927. \$5.

Reviewed by HERBERT I. PRIESTLEY
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THE Duke University Press has begun the issue of a series of monographs on Spanish American history, the work of a new and young crop of writers. It is of prime significance to see that this press is willing to undertake the publication of such a series; perhaps still more significant is the now obvious fact that we have entered upon the second generation of writing on this new phase of American historiography. The Durham publishers are to be congratulated upon their decision and upon their choice of material. The recent growth in the Spanish American field is a happy widening of the egocentric enthusiasm and curiosity upon which pursuit of the social as well as other sciences rest. The day is not far off when Mr. Babbitt's progeny will have the opportunity to study a high school course in "United States History" conceived in terms of the total influences and results of the general migration of the Western Nations in the wake of Columbus.

Fifteen years ago there were but scant contributions to the history of the American areas south of the United States. There was an openly expressed belief, as late as the closing 'nineties, that nothing below the Rio Grande merited the historian's mettle, since Prescott had adequately recorded the one dramatic episode of Mexico and the great conquest of Peru. Through the researches of a group of pioneers (now getting into the lean and slippered pantaloons with no space for their encomium here) that opinion has been displaced; the last two years have seen the advent of a new and capable group which has shown by the publication of a set of doctoral dissertations that they are well grounded in the technique of research and can put their findings in readable shape.



The first of the Duke offerings is by Wilfrid H. Callcott, "Church and State in Mexico, 1822-1857;" it is a scholarly work which lays the basis for understanding the century-old religious conflict in Mexico which every now and then draws the attention of the people of the United States. The author intends to go farther into the study, for his treatment stops just when the crisis between church and state reached the acute stage; he will bring it down to the most recent developments in a second volume. Nothing of moment on the controversy has been done in English since the writing of Burke's *Life of Benito Juárez*, and the American people have known next to nothing of the story of the fight between conservatism and liberalism across the border which has gone on since the day of Mexican independence. Callcott's book is a lucid, temperate account of the problem from the liberal point of view; it takes notice of the economic and political influences, as well as the religious ones, which have affected Mexico's destiny.

The book was inspired, like what may be called its companion volume, that of Henry C. Evans, "Chile and Its Relations with the United States," by the interest in Spanish America long existent at Columbia University. Professor Evans has dwelt soberly and with restraint upon the character and the problems of our representation in the Magellanic republic. He had a wonderful opportunity, had he

been of the "intellectual" type, to rant about his country's misconception of its rôle in Pan American relations, especially where Chile has been concerned; we have not done very well by ourselves in that land, speaking historically, because we have had few commercial relations and because our representatives have often been "deserving" instead of meritorious. But Evans, as a loyal American and sober historian, leaves the reader to make his own generalizations and draw his own conclusions. Chile has often been difficult, herself a sort of aggressive Yankee type, and we have blundered along without ever getting far away from suspicion and mistrust, especially when the public mind has been stirred by incidents like those of the "Itata" and the "Baltimore."

Since the book is a review of relations through a hundred years it is a deviation from the usual dissertation; this ought to secure for it a wider reading than otherwise. Some of the chapters might be expanded into whole theses, indeed some of them have been, by other students in the same field. Evans writes well, his authorities are well chosen, with avoidance of the flood of propaganda "literature" which has broken loose over the Tacna-Arica squabble. It is, however, somewhat of a surprise to see numerous scholarly works on this topic entirely omitted.



H. M. TOMLINSON

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The Duke University Press has also brought out J. Lloyd Macham's "Francisco de Ibarra and Nueva Vizcaya," a study of one of the great little leaders of the frontier drive which finally pushed the Spanish dominion over the great Southwestern life barrier into the present area of the United States. Nueva Vizcaya was, roughly speaking, northwestern Mexico, particularly Chihuahua. Ibarra was a youngster of thirty-six when he died of tuberculosis after having fought on the frontier a full twenty years, during which he added to the realm of New Spain about one-fourth of Mexico's modern area. Mecham puts him in his proper historical perspective without teleological implications. The young men have left out of their historical interpretation the old idea that Providence mysteriously led the wicked Spaniards on, to spy out the land and hold it for a season until the good Anglo-Saxons were ready to go up and possess it. The thesis is an intensive study, like the work of Arthur S. Aiton, author of "Antonio de Mendoza, First Viceroy of New Spain." This study brings out with wealth of detail the salient characteristics of the most distinguished of the founders of Spain in North America through a period of fifteen years' incumbency in the viceregal chair. Nobody except Washington, Lincoln, and Wilson have had bigger part in shaping the destiny of this continent; his influence still runs through the latest phases of our Mexican contacts. Aiton leaves him in his colonial setting, but his appraisal is well-balanced and readable. Now and then there is evidence that the author will need to follow Hubert Howe Bancroft a little charily as an authority.

Lawrence F. Hill in "José de Escandón and the Founding of Nuevo Santander," makes another study of the Spanish thrust northward, companion in a way to the work of Mecham; this time the advance is along the eastern coast, on the Gulf, as a fender against the aggressions of European competitors threatening the Caribbean.

It would be easy to extend this list of writings on Spanish American history by going into the contributions of students a little more seasoned than those mentioned, or going back a few more years. While there is hardly space for this, it would be in point to mention in this connection work done in the last two years by some of the women who show promise in interpreting Spanish America in terms of continental interest. Helen Phipps's "Some Aspects of the Agrarian Question in Mexico," University of Texas Bulletin No. 2515, is an informative and sound study begun at Columbia and finished at Austin. Professor Lillian E. Fisher's "Viceregal Administration in the Spanish American Colonies," is a competent survey of the greatest administrative office in the New World for three hundred years; it was done at the University of California, as was Sister Mary Austin's "The Reforms of Charles III in New Spain in the Light of the Pacte de Famille," now going to press. The latter work deals with the Franco-Spanish attempt to check England in her sweep to colonial predominance in the eighteenth century.

A New Attitude

THREE ESSAYS IN METHOD. By BERNARD BERENSON. New York: Oxford University Press. 1927. \$14 net.

Reviewed by FRANK JEWETT MATHER, JR.

IN these essays, the substance of which has already appeared in Italian magazines, Mr. Berenson defines and illustrates a new attitude. Trained in pure connoisseurship supported by the Morellian method, he now declares this approach inadequate and pleads for the old archaeological method as the reasonable one for the history of art. Now the archaeological method is merely the usual historical method applied to a special material, and it means only that no problem is to be regarded as solved until every kind of relevant evidence has been considered.

The method in which Mr. Berenson was bred and which has sufficed to make him our foremost critic of Italian painting admitted only two kinds of evidence—that of connoisseurship and that of minute morphology (Morellianism). But this offered only one kind of evidence that was objective and available for purposes of demonstration. Connoisseurship, as Mr. Berenson well defines it in the present volume, is merely "that sense of being in the presence of a given artistic personality which comes from a long acquaintance." It is a mystical experience from the critic's subconsciousness. Its validity can only be affirmed. It cannot be demonstrated or even discussed. For this reason, seeking an honest method of demonstration, nearly fifty years ago, Giovanni Morelli invented the morphological method which bears his name. This meant only that all artists have tricks or mannerisms which betray their hand and mind. So far as it went, the method was excellent, but it also had many shortcomings and dangers. It worked best with third rate artists. The great artists were either relatively free from mannerisms or their mannerisms were bewilderingly changeable. The method, for example, utterly broke down on so cardinal a problem as the borderline between Giorgione, Sebastiano del Piombo, and Titian. Moreover, the method begged too many previous questions. It assumed that the critic knew the problematical picture was an original rather than a copy or a forgery, that he knew its date and place and school. Now neither the intuitions of connoisseurship nor the earmarks of Morellianism give us sure evidence on such essential preliminaries.

So connoisseurship, already charged with the intuitive recognition of artistic personality, was tacitly burdened also with the responsibility for authenticity, time, and place; and its shoulders were often not broad enough for the load. Connoisseurship not infrequently flouted time and place, and Morellianism was impotent to call connoisseurship to order. Mr. Berenson's contention is that these errors are inexcusable, for within the medieval and renaissance periods the time and place of any work of art of consequence can be fixed within a quarter century and often within a decade. He then proceeds to illustrate the method

in the case of a group of anonymous or misattributed narrative panels which he ascribes to Domenico Morone of Verona, about 1490; in the case of a Botticelli which had wrongly been excluded from the canon because of revamping some twenty years after its painting; and in the case of two pictures ascribed to Antonello da Messina, one of which he asserts is impossible as an Antonello since on archaeological grounds it can be proved to have been painted at least fifteen years after that artist's death. In these demonstrations architecture, furniture, landscape, hairdressing, costume, iconography, composition serve as evidence of time and place. We have so many exhaustive and practical exercises, and they should be valuable to students of all ages.

Mr. Berenson's profession of archaeology—which, by the way has always been the standard academic method in America—is timely, for the aberrations of connoisseurship were rapidly bringing the history of art into discredit. Let us admit that the mystical act of recognition, when the critic is experienced and conscientious, has sufficient authority. However, the most experienced critic may lack the scholar's conscience. In his attributions no mystical act may really be involved. They may rest on an irresponsible *libido adscribendi* prompted at best by personal vanity, at worst by dealers' bribes. And the possibility of self-deception is such that no critic should fail to check what seem to himself subjective certitudes by every available objective test, so that his verdict shall rest not solely on authority but at least in part upon such evidence as may be understood and must be accepted by an attentive and intelligent reader.

Such a conception of the function of attribution would be not only a much needed protection to student, dealer, and collector, but also to the critic himself.

For example, had the eminent Swedish critic who ascribed one of Mr. Berenson's nine Morones to the Florentine, Baldovinetti, passingly consulted the architecture and costume, he would have known that he had to do with a Venetic work of about 1490. More important yet, he would have perceived that he himself had been guessing irresponsibly, and this perception might and presumably would have deterred him from a whole series of guesses equally irresponsible which have brought confusion into the history of Italian painting. So much for the evils resulting from ignoring archaeological evidence. And we had actually reached a stage where such evidence was shamelessly flouted. A Ferrarese Chronicler wrote about 1306 that Giotto had painted at Assisi. The writer was familiar with Paduan matters while Giotto was painting in that city, and may easily have known Giotto personally. In short, from the historian's point of view the testimony is the very best. Any student of Giotto who respected historical evidence would simply scan the frescoes at Assisi until he found something that could be by Giotto before he painted in Padua, 1303-1305. As it happens, the choice would be really simple. Nothing would meet the conditions except a certain number of the stories of St. Francis in the Upper Church. Everything else would be too early, too late, or too different in style. If now the Stories of St. Francis seemed difficult to reconcile with the rest of Giotto's work, no historically minded student would dream of rejecting them because of the apparent discrepancy; he would rather seek the reasons for it. But the late Professor Rintelen, being subjectively convinced that the stylistic gap was unbridgable, not only ignored the documentary evidence, but with no reason at all hinted at interpolation and the like. And he built up an active school of young Giottoists to promulgate his error, and he received countenance from people who should have known better. In view of such arrogance of pure connoisseurship and perversion of scholarly method Mr. Berenson's appeal to archaeology was emphatically needed.

What is important in his book is its illustration of sound archaeological method. In this reviewer's opinion attributions will still mainly be made through connoisseurship in the first instance, archeology serving as check and for demonstration. It is unlikely that Mr. Berenson first located his "Nine Panels in Search of an Attribution" in time and place and then discovered they were by Morone. It is more probable that as a connoisseur he made the attribution and then as an archeologist assured himself that it was reasonable as to time and place. For an experienced critic, indeed, the order of approach seems immaterial. For a young student, to whom prema-

ture adventures in connoisseurship should be strictly forbidden, Mr. Berenson suggests many lines of delightful and most useful investigation, for the archaeology of the Middle Ages and Renaissance is only in its infancy, and even a beginner may hope to make valuable contributions by simply collecting and classifying the data.

Such is the larger meaning of this charming and enlightening book. Admirable illustrations permit one to follow every turn of the argument, and a careful reading should be an equivalent for many a graduate course. The results of these three essays in method are avowedly less important than the method itself. On the other hand, a reader is entitled to know a reviewer's opinion on the results. On the group of Morone's and the revamped Botticelli Mr. Berenson reaches his Q. E. D. triumphantly. On the "impossible" Antonello recently acquired by the Metropolitan Museum, the reviewer feels that Mr. Berenson has only put the upholders of the attribution on the defensive. His handling of the evidence in this case shows the extreme delicacy of such problems. Because Antonello worked in Northern Italy he is treated as a North Italian painter. He was, in fact, a highly eclectic itinerant and outside of any Italian evolutionary line. One might expect anomalies in the little of his work that has survived. Moreover the iconographical criteria that are used to date the picture a full decade after Antonello's death though doubtless based on a full, do not rest on a completed survey. And, working from a photograph, Mr. Berenson could not know that the enigmatic Madonna originally had a small dishlike halo of gold, an archaeological fact which would seem to date the picture well within Antonello's lifetime despite the apparently contradictory evidence of composition and iconography. In short, the attribution seems rather highly contestible than on archaeological grounds impossible.

However that be, the goings on of the school of pure connoisseurship had plainly become entirely impossible, and for revealing the abuse and suggesting a remedy in the tested methods of archaeology Mr. Berenson deserves the hearty gratitude of all serious students of the history of art.

Germans and Turks

FIVE YEARS IN TURKEY. By GENERAL LIMAN VON SANDERS. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute. 1927.

Reviewed by SHERMAN MILES, Major, U. S. A.

WHETHER the key to Allied victory in the World War lay in the West or in the East may never be determined. The strategists argued it hotly, and still do. It is now immaterial. But it is becoming more and more apparent that there was a glamour about the eastern theaters of war, whatever may have been their strategical value, which was sadly lacking in the trenches of France or the mud of Flanders. The Homeric failure at Gallipoli, Maude's conquest and death at Bagdad, Lawrence's brilliant guerrilla raids, and Allenby's Last Crusade are epics of adventure far more stirring than the scientifically machined slaughter in the West.

In General Liman von Sanders's book, lately translated and published by the Naval Institute, we get the first authentic account of the war in the East from the Germano-Turkish side. Selected by the Kaiser to head the German military commission sent out to reform the Turkish Army, General von Sanders served almost continuously in Turkey from December, 1913, to January, 1919. Of all Europeans he had the best opportunity to observe the inner workings of the enemy's war machine in the East. And in a frank but unbiased narrative he draws a good picture of it all—the stoical courage of the Turkish soldier which earned him victory at Gallipoli; the constant difficulties in the way of Germano-Turkish cooperation, or even understanding; the final exhaustion and collapse of the Turkish power.

In recording his impressions, General von Sanders evidently labored under some disadvantages. The book is documented to a certain extent, and well illustrated with maps, but the author evidently worked without many of his records when he prepared his notes in Malta, while a prisoner of war, and later when he finished his book in Germany.

Another disadvantage under which he wrote arose through his absence from any active front during the long period between the Gallipoli campaign of

1915 and the final collapse in Palestine and Syria in 1918. It is a striking commentary on the innate jealousy and distrust of the Turks towards the Germans that the victor of Gallipoli should have been left practically unemployed in the interior of Turkey throughout the years 1916-17. His descriptions of the petty raids on the Anatolian coast with which he perforce concerned himself during that period are almost pathetic in the light of what was going on elsewhere. Townsend marched to the gates of Bagdad and was himself captured at Kut-el-Amara, Mesopotamia was lost to Turkey and Persia invaded, Turkish troops fought in Rumania and Macedonia, Lawrence taught the Arabs cohesion and victory, and Allenby took Jerusalem before the Turkish authorities were again willing to give an active command to that capable German general who had defended Constantinople at the Dardanelles. Von Sanders does not directly comment on this, but time and again his book recounts his official quarrels with Enver Pasha, dictator of Turkey. And, with a certain restraint but nevertheless quite forcibly, he brings out the great inherent difficulties which beset the methodical German when he dealt with the vague Turk. The language question alone was full of pitfalls. Von Sanders remarks that seldom were two German translations of a written Turkish order of the same import. And in temperament and method, of course, the two races differed fundamentally.

The German officers assumed that here, as in Germany, all orders issued would be carried out. This erroneous belief was bound to produce every kind of delay. In Turkey one can make the most beautiful plans and prepare the execution by drawings and perfect orders, and something entirely different will be done, or perhaps nothing at all.

The most interesting part of the book deals with the Gallipoli campaign. It was the outstanding Turkish success of the war, and the only example of a great overseas expedition attempting a landing on hostile shores. Von Sanders's account of it does not criticize the Allies for making the attempt, and only indirectly does he criticize their conduct of operations. He confirms the general impression when he says: "There can be no doubt that in view of the great British superiority success would have been possible." He describes three crises in the August attack (one of which is very doubtful, according to British accounts) in which the British missed success by only a small margin. He is equally frank in recording his own mistakes and the valor of his enemies.

If Homer had described the Gallipoli campaign—the last Trojan War—he would not have failed to have grasped a situation of keen human tension, a conflict of duties and desires in the mind of a leader. Once it had become apparent that the Allied army on the Gallipoli Peninsula no longer seriously threatened Constantinople (and that moment must have arrived in late August, 1915), the natural human desires of General von Sanders and of his army must have differed widely. He was a highly trained Prussian officer who must have realized that so long as the Allies remained on the Peninsula a great Anglo-French force was being contained and sapped by the use of Turkish troops alone: and that once the Allies had left the Peninsula it was improbable that any great numbers of western troops could be engaged and held in check by Germany's Asiatic ally. He must have seen, accordingly, that it was altogether to Germany's interest that the Allies remain and continue to suffer at the hands of the Turks on the bleak shores of the Dardanelles. On the other hand, it was most distinctly to the advantage of the Turks that the Allies leave or be driven off Gallipoli as soon as possible. The Turkish losses there were very heavy, exceeding even those of the Allies, and their defense of the Caucasus, Arabia, and Mesopotamia was greatly hampered.

It seems a pity that von Sanders's book gives no hint of the dramatic conflict of interests which must have torn him during the later part of that campaign. Prussian General von Sanders must have had some strange things to say to Turkish Marshal von Sanders during the fall and early winter of '15.

In his epilogue this much harassed man, seeing both sides of the case, sums up his criticism of the Germano-Turkish effort in the war in these two sentences:—"Turkey and her leaders must be held to account for not making their aims conform to the available means. Germany is to be blamed for the lack of calm and clear judgment of what was within the power of Turkey."