

or the best of them—seem to contain an inexhaustible fund of energy. Religion was as casual and politics as muddled; revolution as threatening, Europe as unstable. But there was more virility in literature. Life was more sharply reflected in it. It was more shameless, perhaps; but at the same time it was cleaner-flavored and less hypocritical.

"Common morality differs less from time to time than we like to confess. But public attitudes differ enormously. In the eighteenth century a woman was looked upon either as a paragon of chastity—or as a woman. Either she was unapproachable, or else she was—and fashion demanded that she should be—the object of innumerable gallant attempts. Chastity was entitled to singular respect; it was considered that it could have been preserved only by a miracle of strict behavior and courageous opposition. Town and country alike were full of men who thought it binding upon them as gentlemen to attack the virtue of every attractive woman they met.

"This common attitude should be remembered in reading the endless catalogue of unwelcome overtures in Mrs. Pilkington's 'Memoirs.' At first her complaints may seem the peevish discontent of an unsuccessful adventuress, eager to whitewash herself unnecessarily. But the literature of the day can testify to her. Like all autobiographers, of course, she exaggerates: and, being very conscious of the dubiousness of her own position, she saw it all too personally. But Fielding lets the Squire send his retainers to carry off poor Fanny as a matter of course. The very blue-stockings, some time later, could never dare to converse with men *tête-à-tête*: they had to take precautions to see them in clumps, reinforcing their individual virtue by reciprocal support.

"But Mrs. Pilkington was in an even more vulnerable position. A divorced, penniless, unprotected young Irish scribbler, living alone in St. James's, was obviously the easiest of game. After all that scandal, it was the hardest thing in the world to prevent people from treating her simply as a creature. In these circumstances, one imagines, she was not wholly irreproachable. Yet, by comparison with any of her contemporaries who found themselves exposed to the same dangers, she cuts a very creditable figure indeed.

"She kept her head high, and showed a brave face to her detractors. She fought to the day of her death against all attacks on her human dignity. The pressure of Society would cheerfully have made a prostitute and plaything of her. It was the easiest way for her to go, and perhaps it would have been the most profitable and worldly-wise. She was a silly little thing to protest so much and fight so ardently to keep up appearance; but there was something heroic and indomitable in her silliness; and in a queer, outlandish fashion she preserved the honor of womanhood."

## New Psychologies for Old

UNDERSTANDING HUMAN NATURE. By

ALFRED ADLER. Translated by Walter Béran Wolfe. New York: Greenberg. 1927. \$3.50.

TOTEM AND TABOO. By SIGMUND FREUD.

Translated by A. A. Brill. New York: New Republic. 1927. \$1.

DELUSION AND DREAM. By SIGMUND FREUD.

Translated by Helen M. Downey. New York: New Republic. 1927. \$1.

Reviewed by S. D. HOUSE

Columbia University

THE Adlerian approach to the problems of disharmony and maladjustment resident in human nature constitutes a new chapter in psychology and, what is more important, a fresh beginning in education. The most interesting fact in contemporary medicine is its overwhelming importance for the new education. By the new education we are beginning to understand an acceptance of the child as possessing personality from its earliest infancy, a perception and recognition that imply the cultivation of a technique for comprehending the problems of the child's adjustment to the social and human *milieu* that surrounds it momentarily at home, in the school, in the street, in church, at play and work.

We might refer to Adler's work as educational sociology and compare him in his general social philosophy and creative attitudes toward education with John Dewey. Or, if one thinks of his enlightening contributions more medically, he might be

referred to with considerable accuracy as the pioneer in the comparatively new field of educational psychiatry (a term which I have originated to represent that fruitful inter-relation between the new medicine, psychology, and education which the mental hygiene movement in America embodies so adequately).

Dr. Adler does not wish to be known as a psychoanalyst but as an individual psychologist. He does not sympathize with the Freudian high-power emphasis on sex as the causative factor in psychoneurotic disturbance. To him the central reality is the human personality with its omnipresent sense of inadequacy, of inferiority, that gives rise inevitably to that search for compensatory satisfaction which is abstractly known as the will-to-power. His philosophy is colored by the Nietzschean wisdom, humanized by an enormous respect for the superiority of the principle of coöperation to the reigning ethic of competition. His psychology has its affinities also with the so-called Gestalt psychology which views human reaction as essentially synthetic, organismic, configurational. Adler finds Freud in error for abstracting from the total human personality one significant segment, labeled sexuality, to which psychoanalysis devotes that excessive attention which belongs more properly to human nature in its entirety as the embodiment of ego striving restlessly in quest of dominance and superiority and the unattainable equilibrium of personal adequacy.

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In Adler's psychology the pervading emphasis is on the universal existence of the feeling of inferiority, organic or functional, real or imaginary, which drives the self-conscious and handicapped child to withdraw from the more vigorous tests of reality, of fellowship, of social communication, and to cultivate fantastic and petulant and neurotic patterns of behavior as modes of introverted escape from the burden of reality. Therapeutically, Adler therefore never stops emphasizing the need on the part of parent and teacher to stimulate in the child a sense of confidence, to evoke his coöperative dispositions, to socialize and humanize his ego. Communal fellowship, an affectionate attitude toward children, a genuinely humble comradeship with them, an appreciation of their inner life, are the impressive doctrines that constitute the Adlerian basis for understanding human nature.

It is a pleasure to find a psychologist writing so humanly and thoughtfully, avoiding the technical sterility of the academician on the one hand and the speculative luxuriance of the dogmatic psychoanalyst on the other, about problems that concern all of us so intimately. The translation of a very difficult German into an eminently readable English is the work of Dr. Walter Béran Wolfe, Adler's most important American disciple.

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Freud moves in a world of concepts and values that are sharply dissimilar to those ideas congenial to Adler. If ingenuity, sheer creative guesswork, is evidence of mental power, I doubt not that Freud is far and away the most original-minded of thinkers. Whoever will take the trouble to read carefully his brilliant studies, "Totem and Taboo" and "Delusion and Dream," will agree that the father of psychoanalysis is possessed of an intellectual agility that is positively uncanny in its more subtle ramifications and insights.

In "Totem and Taboo" Freud makes a most ingenious attempt to show that the primitive veneration of the totem animal and the awe-inspiring far-ranging taboo associated with it, culminating in the baffling phenomena of exogamy (the compulsory seeking of sex mates outside of the totem-loyal group) are ultimately traceable to psychological factors, to compulsions resident in human nature. The most ancient underlying concealed reality in human nature is the dread of incest. To account for this still obscure dread in the human breast Freud, encyclopedic and inexhaustible, ransacks the whole fascinating field of the literature of ethnology, leaning upon the illuminating researches of MacLennan, Westermarck, Lang, Spencer, Robertson Smith, and most particularly Frazer, in order to discover clues for his bold psychoanalytic speculation that the phenomena of totemism and exogamy are traceable to one psychological origin which he finally sums up in these words: "... the beginnings of religion, ethics, society, and art meet in the Oedipus complex. This is in entire accord with the findings of psychoanalysis, namely, that the nucleus of all neuroses as far as our present knowledge of them goes, is the Oedipus complex."

To be sure, this conclusion of Freud's is not to be taken as science, but as brilliant and conceivably meaningful speculation. No anthropologist will want to accept so generalized and simplified an origin for so vast a variety of psychological and cultural activities. Freud speculates upon the existence in the dim dawn of history of a primal horde over which a father ruled ruthlessly to the cruel disadvantage of his sons, all bitten by sexual jealousy and envy of that power-intoxicated ruler. The brothers banded together and slew that most unnatural father and proceeded to mate with the hitherto tabooed females of the group denied them by an omnipotent sire. As a consequence of that unseemly murder, conscience and remorse and ceremonial atonement and a traditional respect for the primal father developed. Murder and incest have troubled the minds of the race since the dawn of human life. Freud sees in that primeval crime the origin of the sense of guilt that haunts the dreams of men like an ancient doom.

Those who love psychoanalytic jargon and Freudian technique will be delighted with "Delusion and Dream." All the famous concepts are illustrated in this study, such as repression, displacement, the unconscious, rationalization, flight from reality, the dream as wish fulfillment, the erotic *motif* in reverie, the psychoneurotic purposes served by delusion, the mechanism of projection, psychoanalytic cure.

This psychoanalysis is built upon a charming and fantastic narrative by Jensen called *Gratidia*. The story concerns the delusional ideas of a young archaeologist whose infatuation with the replica of a bas-relief of a sprightly young female (whose manner of poisoning her foot somehow fascinates him) stirs a restlessness that impels him to travel to Rome and Pompeii in the fond hope of rediscovering the original. His dreams and experiences and delusions are exquisitely related by the author and as acutely accounted for by Freud who patiently takes up thread by thread of the entire narrative to convince the reader of the unconscious repressed sexual motivation of the dreams and the delusions of our young scholar who had fled from love into science as an elaborate defense against being human, tasting passion. Freud assures us that "every psychoanalytic treatment is an attempt to free repressed love, which has formed a miserable compromise-outlet in a symptom. . . . The disturbance disappears then by being traced back to its origin; analysis brings cure at the same time." Let us hope so.

## On High Executioners

(Continued from page 713)

certain amount of this is enlivening in its way—not too much. It is exhibitionism rather than criticism.

In closing, there have always been, and will always be, certain rare, major, critical writers whose range and scholarship and powerful individuality are exhibited in "slashing" reviews. But the majority of critics should beware how they try to bend the bow of Odysseus. Their shafts are very likely to recoil upon them. Courage and honesty, it should go without saying, are necessities in all critical work. But a mere lust for battle, and for laying about one, qualify the possessor not for this but for some other, alien arena.

Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., in coöperation with *The Christian Herald*, announce a prize of \$2,500 to be awarded to the contestant submitting the best religious novel before October 1, 1928. The contest is open to every writer, professional and amateur, in the United States and Canada. The prize novel will be serialized in *The Christian Herald* and will be published in book form by Doubleday, Doran & Company.

## The Saturday Review of Literature

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## Equalitarian Doctrine

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF EQUALITY. By T. V. SMITH. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1927. \$3.

Reviewed by RALPH BARTON PERRY

Harvard University

THIS is a useful book, attractive in its physical appearance, well written, and calculated to stimulate the American reader to thought about the premises of his democratic faith. It gives evidence of the author's wide reading in social and political philosophy, as well as of his open-mindedness, candor, and moral buoyancy. The earlier chapters trace the ideas of "natural" equality which underlay the Declaration of Independence, the slavery struggle, and the movement for women's rights. Then after examining and rejecting the philosophical justifications of the equalitarian ideal derived from Christian theology, Kant, and Utilitarianism, the author expounds and applies the gospel according to the school of Dewey.

As is usual in discussions of this subject, too much attention is devoted to disproving the historical truth of the equalitarian doctrine. That is not, and never was, the fundamental question at issue. When philosophers said that men were "naturally" equal, their principal concern was to prove that it was good that men should be equal, or that all men by virtue of their common humanity possessed just claims which were morally prior to the privilege and authority conferred by organized society. They meant, in short, that equality was a standard by which the existing state of society might be judged, and if needs be, reformed. They identified this moral order with nature, because they believed that nature was the manifestation of a benevolent God; and they thought of this idealized "state of nature" as lying in the past because they were accustomed to a literal, historical view of creation. Nature as coming next after God, was conceived as more divine, that is, as more good and more just, than the later and man-made systems of organized society.

The conception of "nature" being thoroughly impregnated from ancient times with a moral significance, it is misleading to say, as does our author, that "since the Civil War," natural equality being "confessedly refuted," the doctrine has changed "from the assertion of equality as a past or present fact to the declaration of it as a worthy ideal."

Following the lead of Professor Dewey, Mr. Smith feels that the influence of Darwin has radically altered the foundations of equalitarian ethics. Whereas man was once thought of in metaphysical terms, as having a rational soul which entitles him to a peculiar dignity in the moral world, we now know him to be an animal, highly modifiable and variable, and essentially social. But looking closer we find that, despite a change of their labels and a better understanding of their meaning, the attributes of man remain very much what they were before. The variability and modifiability of the individual lie within fixed limits. Indeed, to conceive man as "an active physical organism in a physical environment" would seem to prescribe these limits rather more sharply than to conceive him as an autonomous reason or will. Man still retains his generic human nature. He is not invariably rational, but is "an animal, who on occasion becomes ideational." He possesses "a mechanism for self-stimulation." He is a "self-directing organism" and a "dynamic centre of activity." We are told that "most of human activity is at times teleological,"—that "men work and fight and live for something." This might even satisfy Kant, and in any case it in no wise weakens the Kantian contention that men must be regarded as ends and not as means in the moral realm. Nor does the new view deprive man of his capacity to be happy and to suffer, so that the utilitarian formula is precisely as apt as it was before.

When Professor Smith turns to his own justification of equality he does the best he can under the serious handicap of his instrumentalist theory. Since equality is not supported by "observed facts" (whatever that can possibly mean in instrumental terms) he suggests that we test the idea of equality as a moral slogan. It is a pity, he says, not to try the experiment of going in for equality. But doubts arise. Social experiments are not to be lightly undertaken. We can scarcely be expected to pay the cost and run the risks from a mere adventurous willingness to "try anything once." We would like to

know whether it is an auspicious experiment, looking in the right direction. Furthermore, before we launch upon the experiment we should like to know who is to compose the jury, and by what evidence they are to pronounce the judgment of success or failure. Now in his somewhat ambiguous answers to these questions Professor Smith seems to say that the jury is going to include everybody, and that the experiment is to be pronounced a success if it enables mankind at large, through coöperation, to share in common ends. This, at least, is the impression which the reader gathers from such criteria of success as the author suggests. A moral concept is, according to Dewey, to be considered justified if it is "an adequate representative of the modern spirit." The claim that individuals are equal is true if it "promotes the major good of the situation that motivates the claim," if it serves as an "adequate stimulus to needed action," or "produces consequences of maximum desirability." Equality is proved by its conducing to "true coöperation" and "happy contentment,"—by its enabling men through coöperation "to live and then to live well." This "desirable" end, which is to serve as the standard by which equality is judged, is the "democratic" standard, which means "the sharing by all men up to the level of their ability of the ends for which they must work and fight," it must satisfy the "fundamental prerequisite of justice," and provide a "happy and efficient social order." But all of these ends and standards are equalitarian in principle. Therefore it seems to come to this,—that equality is to be tested pragmatically, and that the test is to be whether or not it results in equality. Equality is good if and because it results in equality.

The fact is that Professor Smith is a convinced adherent of the gospel of equalitarian democracy,—of the faith which rejoices that "the common laborer" should enjoy a "margin of leisure," of the creed which means that every man should have his chance, and that society should be if possible a partnership of persons who respect one another and themselves. These principles cannot be proved by their moral results, because they *define* the kind of moral result that is assumed as a criterion. In short, this book illustrates the fundamental paradox of a practical philosophy which has no philosophy of practise, or of an instrumental philosophy which provides no proof of the end by which the instrument is to be justified.

## The Eighteenth Amendment

THE A-B-C OF PROHIBITION. By FABIAN FRANKLIN. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1927. \$1.

Reviewed by HAROLD S. DAVIS

THE Psalmist, it may be presumed, was not thinking of prohibition when he wrote: "The zeal of thine house hath eaten me up." His remark, nevertheless, applies to much of the current debate upon that subject and to "The A-B-C of Prohibition" in particular. If Mr. Franklin's book savors largely of campaign invective, rather than skilful advocacy, this is partly because he has attempted the impossible in trying to compress into 150 small pages a comprehensive presentation of a subject which bristles with legal, political, and economic problems; the inevitable result is that his presentation consists largely of dogmatic generalizations, with little calculated to convince those not convinced already. The fundamental difficulty is, however, that he is so carried away by his belief that prohibition in any form is a burning iniquity that he often permits himself, as it were, to get in his own light and falls into an intemperance of thought and expression which tends to alienate rather than to persuade.

This comes out in the assumption which he constantly makes that the question has only one possible side and that those who differ from him must be moved by sheer perversity. It is probably the same want of calm thought that explains the failure to touch upon two of the strongest points urged by the supporters of prohibition, i. e., the increased danger to the public which, through the introduction of the automobile, now inheres in the use of liquor and the impossibility of making prohibition effective in States which wish to adopt it so long as the liquor traffic is countenanced by States adjacent.

It is, however, in his handling of the legal problems which enter so largely into any discussion of prohibition that Mr. Franklin's lack of poise most

affects his arguments. The error which he makes here is akin to that so often made by the friends of prohibition, i. e., conceiving of the controversy as involving issues which go to the root of our theories of government, rather than as presenting what are, after all, mere questions of expediency. One illustration of this is found in his handling of the subject of "personal liberty:" his contention appears to be that a prohibition law differs from all other so-called "police regulations,"—barring, perhaps, the laws against narcotic drugs, which he regards as belonging in a class by themselves,—in that these laws, apart from those aimed at liquor, represent the practically unanimous sentiment of the community and only forbid things which no well-disposed citizens would want to do anyway. This suggestion must seem strange to the landowner who finds the value of his property largely destroyed by a zoning regulation or to the manufacturer who sees his business ruined by competition which he is unable to meet because of restrictive labor legislation.

Again, it is hard to follow Mr. Franklin's argument that the regulation of the liquor traffic by the United States, rather than by the States, is inconsistent with fundamental principles. The precise point at which the line may best be drawn between state and federal jurisdiction depends upon considerations of mere convenience and necessarily shifts from time to time. It is surely no more revolutionary to place the regulation of the liquor traffic in the hands of the national government than to override the settled policy of the States in the matter of voting qualifications.

Finally, Mr. Franklin's reasoning is based in large part on the idea that, however, it might be if the Eighteenth Amendment had merely given Congress authority to enact liquor laws, the insertion in the federal Constitution of a specific prohibition against the manufacture and sale of liquor is an unspeakable anomaly and, as it were, taints the entire instrument. The difficulty with this contention is that it disregards the whole trend of our constitutional development. The early constitutions of the several States were short and were largely confined to provisions as to the frame of government. The federal constitution was naturally shaped along similar lines. In the subsequent years, however, the successive state constitutions have tended steadily to increase in length and to embody provisions which operate as direct restraints upon individual conduct and have nothing to do with the governmental machinery. To cite only a few illustrations selected at random, Ohio in 1851 forbade by a constitutional provision the sale of lottery tickets, Mississippi in 1868 declared that "no person's life shall be perilled by the practice of duelling," Pennsylvania in 1873 provided that no foreign corporation should do business in the State without having an authorized agent upon whom process might be served, Arkansas in 1874 declared void all contracts calling for a greater rate of interest than ten per cent., and Delaware in 1897 forbade the issue of corporate stock except for value received, while Oklahoma in 1907 prohibited the employment of children in hazardous industries. The restraints upon the manufacture and sale of liquor which were inserted in the constitutions of many states after Kansas set the example in 1880 were in line with this tendency.

The inclusion of such police regulations in a constitution may be unwise in many instances, but it violates no basic principle for the simple reason that, in the last analysis, a constitution and an ordinary statute alike express the will of the same sovereign power, the difference being merely in the manner of establishment and repeal. A constitution is, in fact, nothing but a collection of laws which are regarded as so essential to the well-being of the community that they are enacted in a peculiarly solemn manner and are protected against alteration at the whim of a momentary majority. Just what laws are so important that they ought to be thus hedged about is always debatable. It is safe to say that many of the recent state constitutions are overloaded with relatively unimportant matter. The point is, however, that here, just as in the apportioning of federal and state jurisdiction, the drawing of the line between constitution and statute is nothing but a question of expediency. It is true that the federal constitution has been comparatively immune from the insertion of matter not having to do with the frame of government, but this is only because the difficulty of amendment has caused it to respond more slowly