



# American Foreign Policy,

FOR a country whose foreign policies are on the whole directed toward attending to its own affairs, avoiding political commitments or conflicts with other Powers, and coöperating in practical movements designed to lead to peace-promising agreements with foreign nations, it seems curious that the United States has had to submit within the last ten years to charges of constituting the chief obstacle to the world's peace. Within the last few weeks the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in his annual report, has stated:

It is a paradox, but a truth, that despite the overwhelming sentiment of the people of the United States, the Government of the United States has for some time past been a chief obstacle to every movement to make war unlikely and to advance the cause of international peace. Our public officials, and particularly our Senators, are greatly in love with formulas, declarations, and rhetorical flourishes, but when they come to close quarters with practical action, they are so concerned with exceptions, reservations, and provisos that their nominally good intentions disappear in the smoke of unreality.

The supposed basis for these charges probably lies in the refusal of the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations, in the Senate reservations to the World Court Protocol, and in the refusal up to the present to adopt the Capper Resolution, defining an aggressor nation as one that declines to submit its case to international discussion before taking armed action. The charge can hardly be based on any hesitation in calling conferences and making sacrifices for the limitation of armaments or in promoting the so-called Kellogg treaties for renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, for the reservations to those proposed treaties have come from the nations of Europe whom, less than ten years after the "Great War," it seems now customary to praise as apostles of peace.

The failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and the related treaties should hardly be deemed unwarranted action. An examination of those treaties in the light of ten years' experience has convinced many students of international affairs that they embody the germ of future war in Europe; and that the treaties were dictated, not by any broad statesmanlike purpose to build a more secure future for Europe in general, but rather by the desire to promote the immediate political and economic interests of the particular nations which drafted those pacts. In that sense they were traditional European treaties of a type well known in history. To be sure, the United States Senate in 1919 did not refuse to ratify the treaties because of their unconstructive and dangerous character, which at the time was realized by few; yet at the same time those treaties were so foreign to the interests and concerns of the United States that non-participation in them, particularly in those clauses designed to insure their perpetuity, may be regarded as a service to the United States, and in the long run possibly to Europe.

It is in fact those treaties themselves and the irredentas that they have scattered over Europe, the hostility which they have promoted among neighboring peoples, the apparently accepted opportunity to oppress reconcilable and irreconcilable minorities, and the wholesale confiscation of private property undertaken by their authority, that have made essential for Europe such an organization of conference and possible appeasement as the League of Nations—although the facts mentioned materially weaken its promise as a stabilizer of peace. Upon such an unhealthy foundation as the 1919 treaties it is difficult to build any hopeful structure of political or economic coöperation, such as is essential for the future of Europe. Yet the League of Nations, has very little, if any, power to change that foundation. This is probably the explanation of the fact that the European governments still find it so difficult to disarm, notwithstanding treaty promises, and to adopt without reservation a treaty renouncing war as an instrument of national policy.

When the European structure erected at Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly is contemplated, it ought to be apparent why many thoughtful people believe it proper for the United

States for the present not to become committed to the maintenance of those political arrangements or to tinker with the structure by formal collaboration. Emotional allegiance to supposed ideals should not disregard hard facts. It is sometimes overlooked that one of the principal considerations involved in the American Revolution was to detach the United States from that system of political alliances and of peace by the sanction of war that had dragged the Colonies, without their consent and contrary to their interests, into practically every European war of the eighteenth century. That detachment became a fundamental national policy and departures from it have perhaps confirmed its wisdom. It was not unnatural, therefore, for this traditional sentiment to reassert itself after the termination of the European conflict of 1914-18, notwithstanding public professions that a new day had arrived and that peace had now become the major preoccupation of European policy. Whether the United States will ever change its position, it is impossible to say, but such a change is not likely to occur so long as the European countries maintain the 1919 treaties as the charter of European public law and act on the inconsistent slogan of "peace within the framework of the existing treaties."

## *The League for Europe*

This is not to say that the League of Nations is not a useful and, for Europe, perhaps an indispensable instrumentality. Indeed, as a method of conference capable of being invoked at short notice—being in this respect but the latest development of a system running back to antiquity—it affords possibly the only hope that the continuous crises to which Europe is necessarily exposed will be settled without recourse to war, and perhaps with some degree of justice and satisfaction to the parties in interest. Only on such a basis of justice and acquiescence would a settlement, even if made, justify serious hope of prolonged peace. But that the League of Nations can only with difficulty rise above its source and is mainly a method and only secondarily a political organization must be evident. Perhaps that fact is something in its favor. Its power is extremely limited, as is apparent in the fact that the Council in June felt impelled to give up the attempted solution of so comparatively minor a problem as the Rumanian-Hungarian dispute, arising out of the expropriation by Rumania of the property of Hungarian optants. By its very nature, the League is primarily a European institution, and there is some opinion in informed circles even in Europe that the League is not strengthened by the presence of delegates from American and Asiatic states. Argentina and Brazil have indeed withdrawn. The League's administrative functions have been praiseworthy, and there is no reason why the United States should not wholeheartedly coöperate in all enterprises of the League not directly connected with the local and general political arrangements for Europe. Such coöperation is now extended, fairly regularly, and the effectiveness of the League as an administrative agency has thereby been promoted. The United States ought to take part in every conference, particularly economic conferences, designed to promote the general welfare. Isolation, if it has any meaning at all, never meant more than a purpose not to become committed to association with Europe's political groupings. The suggestion that Europe is unable to keep the peace without our aid hardly carries conviction. Unhappily, Europe's worst enemy is its history, and that the United States cannot change. Europe will probably have to find its own salvation from war.

## *What Is an Aggressor?*

The very fear that European disintegration in war is possible, now that science has given the world inventions apparently capable of exterminating life and spreading havoc on an unprecedented scale, has induced the proposal of measures designed to prevent the outbreak of war. This is no idle task, and it should be encouraged. The movement, however, is hampered by the desire to maintain the *status quo* under all circumstances, whether that be just or unjust, and to punish by joint action any nation that would upset it. The effort to find an appropriate

formula to maintain the *status quo*, by force if necessary, underlies many of the arrangements proposed within recent years in Europe, e. g., the Protocol of 1924, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Covenant itself, and now the non-aggressor treaty contemplated in the Capper Resolution.

Nations which most vigorously support treaties designed to prevent any disturbance of the *status quo* are usually those which either are the beneficiaries of an unjust or questionable distribution of territory, or are satiated, or who have no hope of growing in strength, or who believe that by their influence they will be able to act as judges of a particular issue and that therefore the decision as to who is the "aggressor" is not likely to go against them. Experience of the past gives little hope that legalistic definitions of "aggressor" have any more chance than heretofore of serving as criteria for "unjust" or "just" wars. In the light of the revelations of pre-1914 diplomacy, many of the world's most thoughtful historians, including the Englishman Gooch, have practically abandoned the view that any one nation was the "aggressor" in 1914; and it is doubtful whether more than a few nations would agree with the verdict of any central body, assuming it could reach a verdict. Who was the aggressor at Tsinan-Fu? No nation has ever found much difficulty in convincing its own people that its enemy was the moral aggressor, and that it was fighting a purely defensive war; and when this is combined with the military aphorism that the best defense is a quick offense, it will be realized how elusive in practice the identification of the "aggressor" is likely to be. The smoldering embers of a conflict are usually so long in coming to life, and the conflagration then often breaks so suddenly, that little opportunity to present a case to impartial determination is afforded.

In fact, however, even if unanimity among the judges should be obtained on that difficult issue of "aggressor" it would be no indication that the aggressor might not have justice on its side. To throw off oppression has not been deemed heretofore unworthy, but expediency has often deterred a resort to force. Unless those who consider themselves the victims of standing injustices are given some other method or forum by which to obtain a hearing and a righting of the wrong, even by the making of territorial changes, it is hard to see how major political problems can be solved merely by a judicial determination of who is the "aggressor." In fact, however, even if such treaties are signed, it will be a difficult task in most crises of any importance to secure unanimity in the decision.

## *The Kellogg Treaties*

And now we have before the world the so-called Kellogg treaties for the "renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy," with the provision that the settlement of disputes among the signatories "shall never be sought except by pacific means." These treaties, as originally proposed by Mr. Kellogg, partly embodied the plan of Senator Borah for the so-called "outlawry of war." The particular occasion for their proposal was the suggestion, perhaps not intended to be taken so seriously, of M. Briand, that he would be prepared to enter into an engagement to renounce war as an instrument of national policy between France and the United States. It took some time for this proposal to be appreciated; but when it was, the United States suggested its application not only to France, but multilaterally among the six Great Powers. This was believed to be a guaranty against all wars of a major character. France countered with a proposed renunciation of "wars of aggression"; but this proving unacceptable, replied with reservations, excepting from the renunciation, defensive wars, obligations under the Covenant of the League, the Locarno Treaties, and her alliances with eastern European countries, strangely characterized by some as treaties of "neutrality"; and maintained that before its coming into force all the nations should become parties and that violation of its obligations by any nation should release all the signatories from their renunciation. It has seemed much more difficult to obtain an agreement not to make war than to secure an agreement to make war. The French reservations seem to take out of the proposal most of its value,



# by Edwin Borchard



for within their framework all wars that any nation desires to wage could probably be accommodated. The British reservations practically supported those of France, with the exception of any reference to military alliances, but added a new one to the effect "that there are regions of the world, the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety . . . interference in these regions cannot be suffered . . . his Majesty's Government . . . accepts the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect." These reservations or authoritative interpretations of the Treaty have been categorically accepted by Secretary Kellogg, except the added one of Great Britain, which is implicitly accepted by signature of the treaty. The interpretations are an essential and integral part of the treaty.



The question arises as to what practical effect such treaties are likely to have. It may be observed that the arbitration treaties rather promiscuously signed since 1905 and excepting from the obligation to arbitrate questions of national honor, vital interests, independence, and the interests of third states, or the new reservations excepting questions of domestic jurisdiction, interests of third parties, the Monroe Doctrine, and the obligation of League members under the Covenant, have had no appreciable effect on the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Indeed, for some disputes which were most adaptable to arbitral settlement, such as the neutrality claims of the United States against Great Britain, arbitration was refused. It is barely possible, that the new treaties may have practical value, notwithstanding the fact that the reservations are so broad as to cover almost every conceivable type of occasion for war.

The reservations disclose the fundamentals of European policy. That policy is founded upon the theory that peace is to be maintained by so-called sanctions or threats of force, by alliances, or now by multilateral League sanctions. Unless the Council is unanimous, however, authorized or privileged war even under the Covenant is still possible. The chance that Europe will be unanimous in any major crisis seems rather slim. Nevertheless, the League experiment is worth trying even though the League's mandate has not yet run against any major power. The Kellogg proposals do not make the peace they envisage depend on threats or the use of force, but constitute self-denying ordinances renouncing war. That is not the European system; hence the difficulty of reconciling conflicting points of view. The reservations, or interpretations, might be deemed to emasculate the professed effect of the treaty, so that its principal purpose would be psychological. But even that would be of value, if upon it could be built further contractions against war, possibly more fundamental in nature, namely, a deflation of those economic and political factors which invite commercial and political hostility and ultimately have led to armed conflict.

As it stands, the Treaty with its reservations or interpretations may not be a step forward. The reservations expressly recognize the legality of every war embraced within them. Few, if any, escape. The signatories, including the United States, recognize Britain's right to make war in any part of the globe in which her special interests are involved. And the United States is morally, if not legally, bound to accept the decisions and political conclusions of the League as to "aggressors," etc., without opportunity to participate in the deliberations leading to such important consequences. Possibly the Senate by appropriate reservations may be able to mitigate some of the more disadvantageous results of this latest peace proposal.

The European reservations indicate how deeply the world structure is built upon force and how long is the probable road to a more rational system. Not only would it become necessary to identify a "defensive" war, but "war" itself needs definition. Were these proposed treaties really to outlaw all acts of war, such as the invasion of foreign territory without the consent of the state invaded, as is exemplified by such recent incidents as those in Russia, Egypt, China, and possibly Nicaragua, they would

revolutionize international relations and international law. It is probably not intended by the treaties to go so far, but to justify such invasion as police action to maintain the interests of the Great Powers. Moreover, so long as each nation is to determine what is defensive action and so long as no satisfactory method can be devised to make such determination, the treaties are not likely to stop beligerent action. But this much can be done; police action can be internationalized in Europe by denying a Great Power the privilege of alone determining when it will invade foreign territory without the intention of waging war in the full sense; and on this continent the United States should be willing to agree to consult the major Latin-American states before undertaking to invade the territory of any state.

Moreover, the ratification of the treaties should lead naturally to a serious movement for the limitation of armaments. If it does not, the world will have to prepare itself for the conclusion that the system of sovereign states, with independent freedom of action in the waging of war, with independent economic weapons such as tariffs and other barriers and monopolies, is probably impossible to maintain for any length of time without war. Those in responsible charge of their nation's affairs doubtless already realize that many minds throughout the world no longer accept the political and psychological paraphernalia of sovereign states as the ultimate guaranty of the security of the individual. Unless that security is in some degree moderately assured, which perhaps presupposes the establishment of methods of adjusting national resentments and disputes without the necessity for war, the system may some day be changed. War is probably the most dangerous factor in the existing international and social system; yet an insistence upon the maintenance of injustice and an incapacity to cooperate so as to redress the admitted wrongs of the disinherited, will make an effective renunciation of war practically impossible. More, then, is needed for a peaceful world than a mere renunciation of war.

## Limitation of Armaments

Some efforts have been made by the United States within the last few years to bring about a limitation of armaments. It may be that the United States has not, by virtue of its policies, the same need for armaments that some of the European powers feel. At all events, on the initiative of the United States, the first genuine effort to limit armaments on a broad scale was undertaken at the Washington conference of 1921. Those efforts do not suffer by comparison with what was accomplished or not accomplished later at Geneva, either among the European powers or among the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. The 1926 Geneva conference was also called by the United States to extend to cruisers and destroyers the battleship limitations begun at Washington. France and Italy declined to participate. It soon became apparent at Geneva that the United States and Great Britain could not agree on a common basis of discussion, Great Britain proposing in fact an increase in the total tonnage of cruisers while moving for a reduction in the size of individual units. The United States, on the other hand, proposed a reduction of the total tonnage with a maximum cruiser of 10,000 tons. Japan seemed willing to agree to the American position.

Without allocating blame for the breakdown of the conference, it seems apparent that the United States was willing to propose a smaller navy. Possibly it was inadvisable to make admirals negotiators for the reduction of navies! It is also said that the service men in the Navy resented the concessions which they claimed the United States had made in 1921 in scrapping battleships, whereas the other countries, they claimed, had merely scrapped blueprints, and in abandoning the privilege of the United States to build certain fortifications in the Pacific. At all events the atmosphere for large concessions was lacking at Geneva. The result was immediate. The Navy Department in Washington demanded a large increase in our naval equipment, reviving earlier plans. The effect of the recent Anglo-French naval "compromise," the details of which have not been published, cannot yet be estimated.

## Private Property in Wartime

Other issues, minor in appearance, but major in importance, have in recent years concerned American foreign policy. The return of the sequestered alien property held by the Alien Property Custodian, 80% in kind and 20% in bonds, constitutes a distinct American contribution to sanity and security for the future. The European Allies wrote into the treaties of 1919 a provision authorizing them to confiscate the private property invested in the allied countries by citizens or subjects of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Turkey, however, in 1923 at Lausanne, won back, through the force of arms, the private property it had surrendered at Sèvres. It is hardly possible to overemphasize the dangerous tendency of the practice of confiscating private enemy property. International law had condemned it in unequivocal terms for generations and it was regarded as obsolete as slavery.

It is still a mystery how the capitalists of England, France, and Italy could permit their political representatives to write into any public document a principle so subversive and demoralizing. Confiscation is always a two-edged sword and makes all private property insecure. It weakens decidedly the moral force of the protest against the Russian policy. But it was done, and on an unprecedented scale, and the world will have to bear the consequences. It unfortunately seems to establish the doctrine that foreign private property depends for its safety not on law, but on the preponderance of armed force. It thereby hampers materially the realization of any considerable limitation of armaments, and it has increased the feeling of insecurity in Europe, especially in the confiscating countries themselves. By refusing to follow that retrogressive precedent, the United States has furnished the world with an example of good judgment and integrity of far-reaching importance in international relations, possibly greater in its constructive effect than the signature of treaties to maintain peace by force. The minor departures by administrative officials from the principle of the integrity of foreign private property in wartime may also some day be made good by Congress.

On the whole, it is not believed that the United States in comparison with Europe is subject to criticism for any alleged disinclination to aid the cause of peace. The charges, when originating in Europe, are not perhaps entirely disinterested, for it is still frequently asserted that the insistence upon the collection of the debts due to the United States is an incipient and constant ground for unfriendliness. Possibly the debts may some day be traded for a sounder political order in Europe. But at the moment a further remission of the debts beyond that already made seems unlikely. The whole problem of international organization requires reconsideration, not merely to perfect and centralize political arrangements to maintain the *status quo*, now the major interest of many, but to examine those underlying factors which make international relations what they are, notably tariffs to monopolize the home market and handicap a favored competitor, and the political struggle to secure and control foreign raw materials and markets, the means of communication and transportation—in short, all those forms of international unfair competition which make for economic and political hostility and ultimately lead to a secondary competition in armament. When those underlying problems and factors are seriously appreciated and studied, there will arise a justifiable hope of a better order in international relations, for the deflation of the unfair competition in question will alone serve to remove much hostility and make unnecessary large military equipment as an instrument of national policy. In the solution of these problems, the United States has an unprecedented opportunity for service to humanity, worthy of twentieth century minds. Possibly with a President and Secretary of State having a broad outlook on human affairs in their international connotations, we may hopefully anticipate a gradual and perhaps permanent improvement in international relations.

(For a brief bibliography bearing upon the subject-matter of his article and a personal note upon Professor Borchard's status and career, see page 159)



## Founders of the Middle Ages

By EDWARD KENNARD RAND

Men of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries looked back to the immediately preceding centuries—especially the fourth, fifth, and sixth—as to the epoch of the Founders of their civilization. Among these Founders Professor Rand has chosen for discussion St. Ambrose, the Mystic; St. Jerome, the Humanist; Boethius, the first of the Scholastics; and St. Augustine as a precursor, in some respects, of Dante. He pays special attention to the attitude of the Church toward Pagan culture and emphasizes the value of the Roman tradition in letters and thought. \$4.00.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

2 RANDALL HALL  
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

## Book Note from Chapel Hill

Our representative on the League of Nations' list of 40 notable American books of 1927

### AMERICA

and French Culture

By HOWARD MUMFORD JONES

THE definitive book on its subject—Franco-American cultural relations from 1750 to 1848, with important interpretation of American cultural backgrounds. Besides being honored by election to the League of Nations' list, it has been given a special Canadian edition and will shortly be translated into French. Leading reviewers, headed by no less an authority than Vernon Parrington, Pulitzer prize winner of 1927, have received it with high appreciation of its importance and literary distinction.

Howard Mumford Jones is Professor of Literature in the University of North Carolina, as well as a poet, translator, and critic of reputation.

\$5.00

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS

Jesus and Mark Twain,  
God and Ben Franklin,  
Noah and Charles Darwin,  
Socrates, Teddy Roosevelt,  
Billy Sunday and other  
cheery folk move merrily  
through the pages of

## HEAVENLY DISCOURSE

by C. E. S. Wood

A delicious and stimulating book, this volume is the satiric hit of the year. Countless worthy critics praise it, and countless worthy people buy it. Get your copy today!

Sales more than 35,000!

35,000 can't be wrong!

A beautiful new edition at \$2

MACY-MASIUS: The Vanguard Press

## The Transplanting

By Marie Balaschew

Edited by Martha Genung Stearns

A CHARMING BOOK

—The London Times

SPLENDID AND INSPIRING

—N. Y. Evening World

At all bookstores - \$2.50

The Macmillan Co., New York

## Books of Special Interest

### Wasps, Ants and Men

FOIBLES OF INSECTS AND MEN. By WILLIAM MORTON WHEELER. New York: 1928. Alfred A. Knopf. \$6.

Reviewed by BEVERLEY J. KUNKEL  
Lafayette College

THE author of this volume is professor of entomology at Harvard and possibly the most eminent authority living to-day on the ants. Although his own foible is the pursuit of ants in this and other lands, that pursuit has not been so arduous that he has not found abundant opportunity to delve into the literatures of the world of both modern and classical times. Indeed, his resources and powers of literary expression are such that no zoölogist to-day is listened to at scientific gatherings with greater delight and eagerness. His addresses are characterized not only by the richness of biological knowledge, but also by their satire and wit.

The present volume, with the exception of a single chapter, consists of essays and addresses which have already been published in the scientific journals. Three or four of the essays are of special interest to the entomologist, but their sparkle and satire will prove delectable to the general reader although addressed to groups of specialists.

Three of the essays have to do with certain habits of wasps and ants which are quite peculiar, but may not appeal especially to the non-biological reader. "The Physiognomy of Insects" is not only a thoroughly scientific discussion of the general form of the insect body, especially of the head and legs, illustrated with some forty figures of the extreme types of insect physiognomy, but also a rather whimsical comparison of the same with human types of bodily form. "The Ant Colony as an Organism" is a careful discussion of the meaning of the term organism and the necessity of regarding the colony of insects as an organism of a higher order than the individual.

"The Organization of Research" which was addressed to the zoölogical section of the American Association for the Advancement of Science is delicious in its reactionary point of view with which many biologists must be heartily in sympathy. After pointing out the futility of trying to organize investigators, Mr. Wheeler sums up the whole question as follows:

As the earth becomes more densely covered with its human populations, it becomes increasingly necessary to retain portions of it in a wild state, i. e. free from the organizing mania of man . . . Why may we not regard scientific research, artistic creation, religious contemplation, and philosophical speculation as the corresponding reservations of the mind, great world parks to which man must resort to escape from the deadening, overspecializing routine of his habits, mores, and occupations, and enjoy veritable creative holidays of the spirit? These world parks are in my opinion the best substitute we are ever likely to have for the old theological heaven.

"The Dry Rot of our Academic Biology" is not a paper on the fungus that attacks dry timber as the author tells us it was so catalogued by a college librarian, but a valuable contribution on the teaching of biology both to freshmen in college and graduate students. It is rather too bad to spoil the delightful satire of this paper by attempting to summarize it, but at the same time every teacher of biology should take the author's idea deeply to heart. This dry rot he attributes largely to a departure from the study of living creatures in their relation to their environment and a too close adherence to the study of the pickled remains of active organisms constantly doing things.

The most delightful of all the essays in this volume is the concluding one on "The Termitodoxa, or Biology and Society" addressed to the American Naturalists at their annual meeting. With charming whimsicality, it takes the form of a letter from the king of the termites to the author in which he discusses human society from the point of view of the far more ancient and smoothly running society of the white ants. Says the king in his letter, "Our ancestors did not start society because they thought they loved one another, but they loved one another because they were so sweet (referring to a skin secretion which the white ants lick with great satisfaction from each others' bodies) and society supervened as a necessary and unforeseen by-product." The founders of the termite society, he continues, realized that its success depended upon its construction on the plan of a super-organism with the same basic problems to

solve as the individual organism, namely nutrition, reproduction, and protection. This naturally involved a physiological division of labor among the individuals composing the society and the development of castes.

As might be guessed from the sub-title of the essays, the solution of modern society's problems rests with the biologists, including the psychologists and anthropologists, without whose best efforts "your theologians, philosophers, jurists, and politicians will continue to add to the existing confusion of your social organization."

### Modern Psychiatry

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MENTAL DISORDERS. By ABRAHAM MYERSON, M.D. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1927. \$1.40.

MENTAL HYGIENE. By DANIEL WOLFORD LA RUE. The same. \$2.

THE INNER WORLD OF CHILDHOOD. By FRANCES WILKES. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1927. \$3.

Reviewed by JOHN E. LIND  
St. Elizabeth Hospital

RECENTLY there appeared in a magazine admittedly for the intelligentsia an article on psychiatry of which the thesis was that that science had advanced practically not at all in a thousand years. Different names were given, the author said in fluent journalese, to mental diseases and symptoms, but Hippocrates and Galen knew as much about the cause and treatment of insanity as Kraepelin and White.

Whatever may be the foundation of truth for that writer's gaudy dialectic, psychiatry is at least making an honest effort to do three things: to find out why mental disease occurs, to find out how to prevent it, and to enlighten the public on mental problems. In short, far from posing in sacerdotal garments and uttering—for a consideration—mystic and profound phrases, the psychiatrists are bustling about telling parents how to train children in healthy mental habits, they are conducting clinics in mental hygiene, and they are writing books like the above.

Dr. Myerson's book is an effort at orienting the intelligent layman in the field of psychiatry. Myerson is a competent psychiatrist, thoroughly versed in his subject, and writing well. He has attempted, however, in a very small book, to discuss psychology, normal and abnormal, neuroses, the minor and major psychoses, Freud, Adler, and Jung, mental hygiene and a few other kindred subjects. It is to be doubted that his book will be a real help to the social worker, the educator, and others who, lacking a medical education, wish to become acquainted with the premises of psychopathology. The author has, in fact, attempted too much in too little space.

Doctor La Rue's book, on the other hand, contains the whole subject of mental hygiene neatly abstracted, condensed, annotated, discussed, outlined, and prepared for classroom exercise. At the end of each chapter are such academic calisthenics as "Class Exercises," "For Further Study," and "Topics for Special Investigation and Report." Under these headings all the material in the chapter is analyzed, paraphrased, dissected, and reconstructed, and various more or less appropriate mental acrobatics are suggested for the aspiring ephebos. A few questions may be quoted: "How can one know when he has found the right love mate?" "Try to make clear what is meant by 'unconscious radiations of personality.'" "When I control myself, which part of the brain acts as 'I' and which as 'myself?'"

Mrs. Wilkes's book is one of the documents gradually accumulating in refutation of such articles as the one mentioned above. If the causes of mental disorders are ever to be discovered, and anything done to prevent their occurrence, it will be through such studies as these. Leaving aside the little explored field of heredity and not accepting the behaviorists *in toto*, we still have the vast field of child hygiene for a psychiatric laboratory. The irritable, suspicious child of to-day is the paranoiac of to-morrow; the reserved, diffident child, improperly handled, becomes a precox, and the whining, nervous child a neurotic.

With such children as these, Mrs. Wilkes is working. A thousand more such workers to-day, and twenty years hence there would be no congestion of the insane asylums.




## Elsie Singmaster

has told the story of three lovely ladies who loved one man, in a novel that the *Hartford Courant* calls, "An invigorating mental tonic . . . A really first-rate piece of work."

\$2.00. Houghton Mifflin Co.

Ask for  
**What Everybody Wanted**

## Thousands of New Words



are included in the Merriam WEBSTER, such as aerograph, picture bride, swank, zoom, etc. New names and places are listed, such as Hoover, Arlen, Sandburg, Latvia, etc.

Constantly improved and kept up to date.

## WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

The "Supreme Authority"

in courts, colleges, schools, and among government officials both Federal and State. 452,000 entries including 408,000 vocabulary terms, 32,000 geographical subjects, 12,000 biographical entries. Over 6,000 illustrations and 100 valuable tables.

Get The Best

[Send for new richly illustrated pamphlet containing sample pages of the New International—FREE if you mention Saturday Review.]

G & C. Merriam Company, Springfield, Mass.



'Tis better to have loved and lost—  
Did pretty Noel Sothern find it so?

"A cleverly drawn character study of a girl who belongs to the modern multitude of 'unanchored youth.'"—London Tatler.

## By DORIS LESLIE FOOLS IN MORTAR

At All Bookstores.

\$2.00

Published by THE CENTURY CO.

## EAT, DRINK & BE HEALTHY

The book that tells you how. Dietetics debunked!

By CLARENCE W. LIEB, M. D.

John Day

\$1.50